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1.

SUMMARY:

The INS appeals CA9's holding that the one-

------

''

house legislative veto provisi0n of the Immigration and
:

---...

..._

Nationality Act of .·1952 (hereafter INA) is unconstitutional.
Curve-lined with this case are 'Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, in which
the

------u.s. House of RepresentativP.s

and the U.S. Senate seek cert.
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merits is entangled with noteworthy issues of jurisdiction and
justiciability.
2.

FACTS:

In 1966, resp Chadha, a Kenyan of East Indian

descent with a British passport, entered the U.S. on a student
visa, which later expired after he finished his bachelor's and
master's degrees in 1972.

In 1973, the INS issued an order to

show cause why he should not be

~eported.

At the resulting deportation hearing in early 1974, Chadha

---

conceded his deportable status, but requested that his
~-------~ -·
deportation be suspended under§ 244(a) (1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §
1254 (a) (1)

(1976).

-

That section permits, at the discretion of

the Attorney General (who has dele9ated his authority to the INS
hea~ers),

a deportable alien of good moral character who

has been continuously in the U.S. for the last seven years ._____
to
remain, provided his deportation would be an "extreme hardship,"
------.>

and neither house ·of· Congress objects, 8
(1976).

§ 1254 (c) (2)

Chadha's request was granted by the hearing officer, who

found "it would be

~

u.s.c.

extreme~y

difficult, if not impossible, for

[Chadha] to return to Kenya or go to Great Britain by reason of
~

'

his [East Indian] racial derivation--."
'

In 1975, however, the House of Representatives adopted a
resolution vetoing the suspension of Chadha's deportation.
Thereupon the INS reopened his deportation proceedings, and in
August 1976 an immigration judge entered a final order directing
that Chadha be deported to the United Kingdom.

The Board of

Immigration Appeal's affirmed.
In March 1977 Chadha sought review of his deportation order
in CA9 under § 106 (a) of the Act, 8

u.s.c.

§ 1105a(a) (1976),

which grants the Courts of Appeal jurisdiction to review such

~~

-

orders.

3 -

Chadha's sole assert ion was that the one-house {

legislative veto is unconstitutional.
In response, the INS told the CA9 that it would enforce its
deportation order unless reversed by the court, but that it
agreed with Chadha that the one-house legislative veto is
unconstitutional. The CA9 therefore sought the participation of
the House of Representatives and the Senate as amici curiae to
argue for the constitutionality of the veto.
In December 1980, two-and-one-half years after oral

-

-

argument, the CA9 found for Chadha on the merits. After first
addressing threshold jurisdictional and justiciability questions,
CA9 held that the one-house veto violates both the procedural
requirements for the exercise of legislative power in Article I
of the Constitution and the constitutional principle of
separation of powers.
In February 1981, pursuant to enabling resolutions in each
house, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate
successfully moved to intervene in CA9 in order to file petitions

-----.-

.............

for rehearing and suggestions for a rehearing en bane.

After

these were denied, the House and Senate filed their present
pet it ions for cert iorar'i, and the INS brought this direct appeal.
The House · and the Senate then moved to dismiss the INS appeal.
In August 1980, Chadha married an American citizen.
3.

HOLDINGS BELOW, CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION:

underl~ing
.....___....
'

issues in these
._........,_

cases~hether

I

Because the

the constitutionality

of the legislative veto is a nonjusticiable political question

cP

-

-----

-

and, if not, whether the legislative veto is constitutional-plainly present substantial federal questions, this memo focuses
solely on threshold questions of jurisdiction, standing and

- 4 -

-.

mootness.

In view of the number of such issues presented by

these cases, the contentions of the parties and the corresponding
holdings of the CA9 will be presented and discussed in turn.
It should be noted that the INS is represented by the SG
(whose jurisdictional statement concentrates principally on the
ultimate merits, touching on threshold questions only briefly in
a couple of footnotes).
usually be abbreviated

Also, "the House and Senate" will
"H&S"~

in what follows arguments advanced

only by the House or only by the Senate are sometimes attributed
collectively to the "H&S."
A.

Did CA9 have jurisdiction?

The H&S contend that the CA9 lacked jurisdiction under §
106 (a) of the INA, 8

u.s.c. § 1105a(a) (1976), which directs that

a petition for review in the Court of! Appeals "shall be the sole
and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final
orders of deportation •
{ I

made against aliens within the United
'l

States pursuant to administrative proceedings under section
242 (b) of this Act."

The H&S argue that because Chadha conceded

he was deportable, he did not challenge before the

C~9

a final

order pursuant to a determination of an "administrative
proceedin[g] under section 242(b) ,"but rather an action of the
House of Representatives not falling within the ambit of

§

106 (a).
The CA9, on the other hand, concluded that the phrase "final
orders • • • made • • • pursuant to administrative proceedings
under section 242 (b)" encompasses review not only of
determinations actually made in a§ ?42(b) hearing, but also of
any matter on which the validity of a final order emerging from
such a hearing depends.

..
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CA9 based its holding on Congress' explicit intent in

..

enacting§ 106(a) "to expedite the deportation of undesirable
aliens by preventing successive dilatory appeals to various
federal courts."

Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 226

(1963).

If

jurisdiction to hear all challenges to the INA does not exist
under § 106 (a), a litigant wishing to contest both an
administrative determination and the constitutionality of the INA
would be forced to bring his administrative claims to the court
of appeals, but his constitutional claims to the district court
in a habeas corpus petition, directly contrary to Congress'
intent to have one "single, separate, statutory form of judicial
review."

H. Rep. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).

Discussion.

In support of its position, the CA9 cites Ninth

and Tenth Circuit cases, see Rubio de cachu v. INS, 568 F.2d 625,
627

(CA9 1977):

denied, 400

Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6, 9 (CA10), cert.

u.s. 908 (1970), as well as decisions by various

lower courts, see cases cited in App. to Juris. Statement at lOalla, finding jurisdiction under § 106 to adjudicate the
constitutionality of the INA.
The authority in the

Court~

of Appeal does not all point in
\

one direction, however.

In particular, the CA6 decision in

Andres v. INS, 460 F:2d 287 (CA6 1972), appears to run contrary
to the CA9's reasoning. ' In Andres, the Secretary of Labor had

.

upgraded the minimum professional qualifications required of an
alien seeking

preferred

'

imm~gration

status as a teacher: under

(

the new standards Andres no longer qualified so that when her
visa expired she

w~s

ordered deported.

Andres went to the CA6

for review of the Secretary's . actions under the Due Process
Clause and < the Administrative Procedure Act.

CA6, however, held
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that it did not have jurisdiction under § 106 to review such
matters, suggesting instead that the proper forum to hear Andres'
claims was the district court in a habeas action.
CA6 based its decision on this Court's opinion in Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968), which is pivotal to the CA9's
decision in the present case as well.

In Cheng Fan Kwok, after a

§ 242(b) hearing ordering him deported, the alien requested a
stay from a district director of immigration, who denied the
request.

The alien then sought review of the denial in CA3,

which found that it lacked jurisdiction under§ 106(a) to hear
the case.

This Court affirmed, holding that§ 106(a) grants

jurisdiction solely to review "orders entered during proceedings
conducted under§ 242(b}, or directly challenging deportation
orders themselves,"

id., at 215, and "embrace[s] only those

determinations made during a proceeding conducted under§ 242(b},
including those determinations made incident to a motion to
reopen such proceedings," id., at 216.
The Cheng Fan Kwok Court considered its result "entirely
consistent" with Foti v. INS, 375

u.s. 217 (1963}, in which the

Court had found jurisdiction under§ 106(a} to extend to review
of a hearing officer's denial, during a§ 242(b} hearing, of a
request for a suspension of deportation under § 244 (a} (5}.
result in Foti was not inconsistent, the Court decided,

The

because

the exercise of administrative discretion to grant a suspension
of deportation had "historically been consistently exercised as
an integral part of the proceedings which have led to the
issuance of a final deportation order."
Foti v. INS, supra, at 223}.

Id., at 216 (quoting

- 7 It should also be noted that the Cheng Fan Kwok Court
expressly stated that its result would "doubtless mean that, on
occasion, the review of denials of discretionary relief will be
conducted separately from the review of an order of deportation
involving the same alien.

11

Id. at 217.

In the present case, CA9 reasoned that it had jurisdiction
under § 106 (a) because after the House vetoed the suspension of
Chadha's deportation, his § 242(b) hearing was reconvened and the
final order he challenges emerged from that hearing.

See App. to

Juris. Statement 7a-8a.
CA9's reasoning is open to attack, however, on the basis
~-----~----------------that here, unlike in Foti, the exercise of discretion to suspend

-

deportation, involving as it does the participation of Congress,

-

is not "exercised as an integral part of the proceedings which
have led to the issuance of a final deportation order."
supra, at 216.

Cheng,

The situation here is thus akin to that

underlying the CAlO's decision in Andres, in which the Court,
purporting

to

follow Cheng Fan Kwok, found it had no§ 106(a)

jurisdiction to hear challenges to actions of the Secretary of
Labor which were independent of and prior to the§ 242(b) hearing
in question, even though the Secretary's actions were logically
prerequisite to the outcome of the § 242(b) hearing.
In sum, with the Courts of Appeal in apparent conflict and
the impact of prior decisions of this Court on the question ciJLJ
ambiguous, CA9 may have erred in finding it had§ 106(a)

~

______ ________...J
jurisdiction
to hear Chadha's case.

The practical result of the choice of the CA9 rather

~.

t~~

habeas court as the forum for review is that the administrative
record before the Court of Appeals is solely concerned with

- 8 -

questions regarding deportability; the record does not contain-as perhaps it might in a habeas case-- constitutional fact
evidence concerning the application of the legislative review
technique to Chadha's case, material on which the ultimate
resolution of these cases conceivably could turn.
B.

Does

Chad~

Certainly deportation is an
support standing.

have standing?
11

injury in fact

11

suff ic ien t to

But, in these cases, there is more.
----:>>

The H&S argue that the one-house legislative veto provision
in

§

244 (c) (2) is inseparable from

§

244 (a), which provides the

authority for the INS to use its discretion to grant a suspension
of deportation.

On this theory, if Chadha gets the courts to

invalidate the one-house legislative veto, t't}e section which

1

allows him to remain in the country will also be simultaneously
)

invalidated, leaving him no better off than before.

He thus has

no standing, because whether or not he wins or loses his case, he
gets deported.
CA9 rejected this argument, finding the one-house veto
provision severable from the rest of the Act.
First, the CA9 noted that
11

§

406 of the Act provides that

[i]f any particular provision of this Act, or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the
remainder of the Act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

11

This provision distinguishes the present case from McCorkle v.
United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (CA4 1977), which held that the onehouse veto provision of the Federal Salary Act of 1967 was
inseparable from the rest of the Act, because that Act did not
have a severability clause.

..

·.

-

9 -

CA9 concluded that this provision ' "reverses the usual
presumption of inseverability, [and] establish[es] the opposite
presumption of
303

u.s.

divisibility."

419, 434 (1938).

Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC,

The Court then found this burden

unmet. See App. to Juris. Statement 14a-17a.

The Court stated

that Congress' purpose in enacting the section was to alleviate
the onerous burden of dealing with large numbers of private bills
by authorizing the INS to handle hardship cases on its own.
Striking the one-house veto provision, noted the Court, would not
affect Congress' private bill docket.

The Court further argued

that an examination of the wording and organization of the Act
shows that the legislative veto provision is lumped together with
a number of other provisions which also limit the exercise of
discretion in the granting of deportation suspensions.

The fact

that these other provisions are plainly nonessential suggests the
legislative veto provision is also.
The H&S argue from the legislative history (summarized in
Pet. for Cert. of
passed

§

u.s.

Senate 6-12) that Congress would not have

244 without providing for congressional review. Their

~~----'-----

argument is based on the fact that in three successive Congresses
in the late 1930's proposals to grant discretion to the Executive
Branch without congressional review were defeated, and that the
predecessor of the present

§

244 passed in 1940 only because it

contained a procedure for congressional review.

Moreover, since

then Congress has amended the provision for the suspension of
deportation orders three times, always retaining some form of
congressional review.
The H&S also challenge standing on the ground that Chadha's
threatened injury, his deportation, is not fairly traceable to

- 10 the operation of the one-house veto statute,for the same reason
that a prisoner's obligation to serve a prison sentence is not
fairly traceable to the operation of a pardon statute, under
which a pardon has been refused.

Pet. for Cert. of U.S. House of

Representatives 22.
Discussion.

The severability question is a close call.

---

On

the one hand is the statutes's severability clause, on the other,
nearly forty years during which Congress has insisted on
retaining some form of review in its own hands.

The CA9's

determination that the one-house veto provision is separable,
then, is not beyond question.
Even if the one-house veto provision is inseparable,
however, Chadha should have standing to contest its
constitutionality, lest it be insulated forever from judicial
review.

Presumably, Congress cannot shield from judicial review

an arguably unconstitutional provision depriving individuals of
some statutory benefit by simply embedding the questionable
section inseparably within the provision creating the benefit, so
that no aggrieved person has standing to contest its
con~t

itu t ionali ty •. .
C.

Is the case TOC>ot?

The H&S contend Chadha's

~r~~~e

to an American citizen

late in 1980 moots these cases, because Chadha could now become a
permanent resident alien should his wife file an "immediate
---------~-------

relative petition" under 8
gran ted by the INS.

u.s.c.

§§

1151, 1154 (1976), and it be

The H&S also con tend that the passage of the

Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.

96-212, 94 Stat. 102, moots

these cases because it no longer can be said Chadha will be
deported should his challenge fail.

- 11 CA9 rejected the argument that Chadha's marriage moots these
cases, see App. to Juris. Statement 17a-18a n.6, because marriage
alone confers "neither permanent resident status nor a guarantee
thereof."

Id. Moreover, even under the assumption the INS would

grant Chadha's wife's petition should she file one, Chadha would
still retain a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation,
because under that circumstance the date of Chadha's eligibility
for citizenship would run from whenever he became a permanent
resident in this manner, rather than from the day in 1974 when
the immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation, as under
the CA9' s dec is ion.
Similarly, the SG argues, see Memorandum for the Federal
Respondent 2-3 n.l, that the operation of the Refugee Act also
would not permit Chadha to acquire present eligibility for
citizenship, as would the decision of the court below.
The H&S respond that CA9 was required to rewrite the INA to
achieve these results.

According to§ 244(d) of the INA, the

date of admission to permanent resident status is the date of
cancellation of deportation, which, as the INA is written, does
not occur upon the suspension of the order of deportation, but
instead after the Congress has acquiesced by failing to exercise
a one-house veto.

The H&S for this reason characterize the

relief granted by the CA9--dating Chadha's permanent residence
back to the suspension of deportation--as "judicial invention."
Pet. for Cert. of

u.s.

Senate 15 n.lO.

The H&S thus urge that

under the INA as written by Congress--before CA9 got a hold of
it--the case is moot.
Discussion.

wa-

' h t.
CA9 is probably r1g

~·~ ~ ~
.an
.
Unt1l
1mme d'1ate~/

relative petition is filed, Chadha remains subject to a final
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order of deportation.

True enough, his wife has failed to file

such a petition, and one may question whether the reason is
simply that, having invested this much in the case, Chadha
prefers to litigate it rather than moot it out.

Nonetheless, it

is a nonparty, Chadha's wife--not Chadha himself--who must file
the petition, and she may have her own reasons for keeping Chadha
on the hook.
D.

Was the requisite adverseness lacking?

Before the CA9, Chadha and the INS were in agreement that
the one-house veto is unconstitutional and so argued.

The H&S

argue that this agreement between the parties to the case robbed
the case of the adverseness requisite to a case or controversy
under Article III of the Constitution.
CA9 had little trouble finding the existence of a concrete
controversy, concluding that:

"if we rule for Chadha, he will

not be deported; if we uphold section 244 (c) (2}, the INS will
execute its order and deport him."

App. to Juris. Statement 23a.

The CA9 also suggested that a contrary finding would provide a
way for an agency to insulate unconstitutional orders from
appellate review simply by conceding the unconstitutionality in
court.

Finally, CA9 pointed to cases in which courts have

proceeded to adjudicate disputes in which dispositive legal
issues have been conceded.

CA9 emphasized, for example, that in

Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, the INS agreed with the alien's
interpretation of the dispositive issue in the case.
Nonetheless, this Court proceeded by appointing an amicus to
argue for the contrary position.
The H&S respond by quoting from the two paragraph opinion in
Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402

u.s.

47,

- 13 47-48 (1971) (per curiam), in which the 'appellants sought review
of a decision finding a portion of an anti-busing statute
unconstitutional:

"We are thus confronted with the anomaly that

both litigants desire precisely the same result, namely a holding
that the anti-busing statute is constitutional.

There is,

therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III
of the Constitution."
Discussion.

CA9's reliance on Cheng Fan Kwok is misplaced.

The dispositive issue there was jurisdictional, with the parties
agreed there was jurisdiction under

§

106(a) of the INA, but with

first the CA3 and then this Court concluding to the contrary.
The critical point is that questions going to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court cannot be waived by the parties, and
the court is free to consider them on its own.

Cheng Fan Kwok

thus has little to do with the question whether a case or
controversy exists when both parties are in agreement on a
dispositive issue not going to the jurisdiction of the court.
The other cases cited by the CA9 are cases in which the
government has conceded a dispositive issue on appeal.
v. United States, 315

In Young

u.s. 257 (1942), for example, the

Government confessed error in this Court on an appeal from a
ruling in its favor below.

Nonetheless, this Court decided the

case, writing that "our judicial obligations compel us to examine
independently the errors confessed • • • . Furthermore, our
judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the
criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of
parties." Id., at 258-59.

Similarly, in Sibron v. New York, 392

u.s. 40 (1968), the District Attorney for Kings County, New York,
confessed error on appeal from a ruling in his favor by the Court

- 14 of Appeals of New York.

Citing Young, this Court noted that the

judgment of New York's highest court was "deserving of respectful
treatment," id., at 58, and that to accept the view of the D.A.
"blindly" would be a "disservice to the State of New York," id.,
59.
These cases are thus distinguishable from the present case
in that in each there was an adversary presentation of the issues
involved in the trial and intermediate appellate courts; the
confessions of error involved occurred only in the court of last
resort, over contrary judgments by the courts below.

In the

present case, on the other hand, the lack of adverseness was
present from the outset.
Nonetheless, there is precedent for the CA9's treatment of
this case.

In United States v. Lovett, 382

u.s.

303 (1946),

federal employees brought suit in the Court of Claims to secure
compensation denied them by an act of Congress, which they
contended was unconstitutional.
the employees.

An AAG

The Executive Branch supported

appeared for the Government in defense,

but agreed with the plaintiffs. To assure representation of its
position, Congress, by a joint resolution, authorized for special
counsel to appear on its behalf to defend the constitutionality
of the statute.
amici curiae.
Cl. 1945).

The special counsel appeared in the cases as
Lovett v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 142, 143 (Ct.

A majority of the Court of Claims declared the

statute unconstitutional.

Id.

Even though the Department of Justice agreed with the result
reached in the Court of Claims, because it represented the only
governmental party in the case, it petitioned for cert. to obtain
the review sought by the Congress, the aggrieved branch, which

..

- 15 had appeared only as amici below.

This Court granted cert. and

decided the case.
The CA9 followed an analogous procedure here.

Finding no

opposition from the INS to Chadha's claim that the legislative
veto is unconstitutional, the Court successfully sought the
participation of both houses of Congress as amici.

As in

Lovett, the amici, though not technically parties, were the only
representatives of the position adverse to the private party.
Assuming Lovett is good authority, sufficient adverseness
exists in the present case, albeit between Chadha and the
Legislative Branch, which appeared below not as a party but as
amici.

The authority of Lovett, however, is not beyond

challenge.

Though Lovett itself is supported by earlier case

law, see United States v. Smith, 286 u.s. 6 (1932), the Lovett
Court did not discuss the case-or-controversy questions raised by
the posture of the case.

Its precedential value is thus limited,

and so it remains open to this Court to reexamine those questions
now.
E.

Can the INS invoke this Court's appeal jurisdiction?

The H&S contend, in Motions to Dismiss to this Court, that
the INS cannot bring an appeal as of r .ight under 28 u.s.c.

§

1252

( 1976) bee ause it is not an aggrieved party, since it agreed with
the result and therefore prevailed below.

They urge this Court

to dis miss the INS appeal, and instead grant the cer t. pet it ions
of the H&S.

The advantage to the H&S in this procedure seems to

be that, as petitioners, they would be entitled to file a reply
brief as well as the initial brief framing the issues.
The SG, in his Memorandum for the Federal Respondent, does
not answer the H&S, but instead proposes that the court hold the
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cert. petitions of the H&S pending a decision on the INS appeal
in No. 1832.

The SG suggests that, if the court should
~

ultimately conclude that

~ oes

not have jurisdiction under§

1252 over the INS's appeal in No. 1832, it could, even after oral
argument, then grant the cert. petitions of the H&S to dispose of
the other issues presented by the case.

Under this scheme, the

H&S, as appellees, would still be entitled to brief and argue in
No. 18 32.
Section 1252 provides that: "[a]ny party may appeal to the
Supreme Court from an interlocu ,t ory or final judgment, decree or
order of any court of the United States, . • • holding an Act of
Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or
proceedings to which the United States or any of its agencies, or
any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is
a party.

"

The H&S argue that the aggrieved-party rule is not rendered
inapplicable because the jurisdictional statute uses the term
"any party."
under

§

For example, the rule is applied in cases brought

1253, which permits "any party" to appeal to this Court

from three-judge court orders granting or denying injunctions.
Moreover, the rule has been applied in cases brought under the
cert. statute,

§

1254 (1), which permits "any party" to petition

for review, except in those rare cases in which the winning party
in the district court seeks cert. before a judgment of the court
of appeals, to which the losing party has taken the case.
The H&S finally argue that Lovett, supra, does not suggest
that under the special circumstances of this case a nonaggrieved
governmental party may take an appeal, because in Lovett the
amici representing the Congress had no access to this Court,
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whereas in the present litigation the H&S have now intervened as
parties and are entitled to bring their own cert. petitions.
The SG argues that, technically speaking, the INS did lose
in the CA9 because the CA9 rendered judgment against the INS and
ordered it not to deport Chadha.
appeal serves the purpose of

§

The SG also argues that the INS

1252 to afford immediate review in

cases in which the United States or its officers are parties and
thus will be bound by a holding of unconstitutionality.
Discussion.
supra, if good

As with the question of adverseness, Lovett,
authority, would seem to answer the objections of

the H&S to the INS appeal.

As noted above, however, the

continuing vitality of Lovett can be questioned.
4.

RECOMMENDATION:

Dismissal of this appeal without some

explanation for want of a substantial federal question or a
properly presented federal question would be inappropriate.
Nonetheless, there are substantial threshold questions of
jurisdiction and justiciability present here.

Unless the Court

can resolve these issues without further assistance from the
parties, the Court should order argument, postponing
consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on
the mer its.
There are ootions to dismiss and memoranda of the federal
and private respondents.
September 8, 1981

Cartwright

Opn in juris. statement

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 25, Sheet 1
No. 80-217 0
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES

~o

CA9 (Kennedy, Ely, Hug)

v.
IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION
SERVICE, et al.,

Fede ral/Civi 1

Please see Preliminary Memorandum in No. 80-1832:
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.
September 8, 1981

Cartwright

Opn in petn

Timely

j)

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
Summer List 25, Sheet 1
No. 80-2171
UNITED STATES SENATE

CA9 (Kennedy, Ely, Hug)

v.
IMMIGRATION AND
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meb 09/14/81

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

No. 80-1832, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
(appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it
agrees)
No. 80-2170

House of Representatives v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service
(petn for cert to CA9

No. 80-2171

brought by House)

Senate v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate)

I am attaching the papers and have come up with two ways
to avoid review without finding that the case does not present a
substantial federal question.

Before discussing them, I thought

just a few words on the SG's suggestion might be hepful.

The SG's suggestion is at 2-3 of his Memorandum for the
Federal Resp. in Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2171.

The SG argues that the INS

appeal in No. 80-1832 has "an inherrent priority that petitions for
a writ of certiorai do not share."

The SG concedes that there is

some question as to whether this case is within the Court's

2.

:'f &appellate jurisdiction, however, and suggests a way in which the
case could be handled so as to avoid wasting this Court's time in
the event it finds there is no proper jurisdictional basis for the
INS appeal:

the Court could hold the petns for cert in Nos. 80-2170

& 80-2171 pending determination of the jurisdictional question in

No. 80-1832.

If, after argument, the Court finds that there is no

jurisdiction, it could then grant these petns and use them to
dispose of the substantive issues.
This of course presumes that the Court wants to dispose of
the major sustantive issue (the constitutionality of the one-house
veto) in a case with as many quirks as this one.
The SG is, of course, right in saying that the Court must
decide whether it has jurisdiction over the INS appeal, just as it
must decide whether it has jurisdiction over any other appeal.

It

is also true that the most common reason for dismissing an appeal-the lack of a substantial federal question--would not appear to be
available for disposing of this

case~

the constitutionality of the

one-house legislative veto presents a quite substantial federal
question.
There are, however, two bases I see for dismissing this
appeal without hearing further argument on jurisdiction (or any
argument on the merits):

(1)

dismiss and deny because there is no

aggrieved party seeking this Court's review in the appeal (No. 801832) and the Court chooses not to exercise its discretionary cert
jurisdiction~

and (2)

federal question.

dismiss for lack of a properly presented

3.

1.

Dismiss and deny.

Only an aggieved party may seek

this Court's review of a decision of a lower court.

The parties to

this appeal are the INS and Chadha (the individual whose deportation
is at issue) with the House and Senate appearing as amici.

Of these

participants, only INS and Chadha seek this Court's review by way of
appeal, and neither of them is aggrieved by the decision below.
Indeed, both of them agree with it.

The House and Senate disgree

with the CA9's decision, but they have filed amicus briefs in No.
80-1832 (the appeal) arguing that it should be dismissed because it
has been brought by the parties that prevailed below.
I think the House and Senate are right and the appeal
should be dismissed, qua appeal, on the ground that no one who is
aggrieved has appealed.

The jurisdictional statement can then be

treated as a cert petn and denied, along with the cert petns filed
by the House and Senate, because the Court chooses not to exercise
its discretionary jurisdiction.
The discussion of this point--whether there is a
sufficiently aggrieved party to sustain this Court's review--in the
pool memo is somewhat unfocused.
questions distinct:

(1)

It is important to keep two

is there an aggrieved party seeking review

by way of appeal in No. 80-1832?

and (2)

is there sufficient

"adversariness" to present a case or controversy to this Court
should this Court wish to consider the issues presented in the cert
petns (Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2071) filed by amici who were opposed to
the decison below?
The two cases cited in the pool memo on this point, United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946);

United States v. Smith, 286

4.

u.s.

6 (1932) both involve grants of cert in cases in which the only

party seeking to overrule the lower court were amici (the Senate in
Smith and both houses in Lovett), though the petns themselves seem
to have been filed by the SG or Attorney General to give amici a
forum.

Although the Court did not, in these cases, consider whether

amici could create "adversariness" when a cert petn was filed, the
Court did allow each suit to continue.

I think these cases do,

therefore, provide strong support for the proposition that an
aggieved amici can be an aggieved party for purposes of envoking
this Court's review.
Fortunately, however, the aggrieved amici in our cases
only seek the Courts' review by way of cert not appeal.

As

mentioned above, they actually oppose the grant of the INS' appeal
and have filed their own petns for cert.
Since no aggrieved participant, whether amici or pltf or
deft, seeks this Court's app~late review, I think the appeal in
No. 80-1832 can be dismissed with, perhaps, a few words to that
effect in the dismissal order.
2.

Dismiss appeal for want of a properly presented

federal question.

Assuming, arguendo, that there is an aggrieved

party seeking this Court's appellate review, the appeal in No. 801832 could be dismissed for want of a properly presented federal
question.

The pool memo states that Chadha is now married to an

American.

Because Chadha's wife has not filed an "immediate

relative" petition with the INS, he is still deportable if the
decision of the CA9 is overruled.
unlikely that he will be deported.

Actually, however, it seems most
Presumably, the wife has not

5.

filed a petition because she does not want to moot this controversy,
but, if she did file one, it would, presumably, be granted because
such petitions seem to be granted on a routine basis.
Moreover, it appears that the CA9 was wrong in thinking
that, at the time of its decision, Chadha retained a live interest
in the outcome of this controversy because, if he were allowed to
become a citizen as a result of this case, the five-year waiting
period for citizenship would have expired already, whereas he will
have to wait five years if his wife files an immediate-relative
petition.

{See n.6 of CA9 decision at 18a of Jurisdictional

Statement in No. 80-1832.)

As the Senate points out in its petn in

No. 80-2171, n.lO at 15, the CA9 has ignored 8

u.s.c.

§1254{d),

which provides that the five-year period begins to run from the time
the deportation order is cancelled {the time of the CA9's decision).
The changed situtation may not, perhaps, technically moot
the case--because Chadha's wife has not filed an immediate-relative
petition--but the case can be now be treated as one in which there
is no properly presented federal question under Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497 {1961).

In that case, married persons and their doctor

sought a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of a
Conneticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices or
the giving of medical advice about them.

The state courts upheld

the statute, even as applied to married couples and despite
allegations that conception would pose a serious threat to the
health of the plaintiff-wives.

There was no opinion of the Court.

Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice warren and Justices
~~

Clark and Whittaker, found the case not meet for adjudiction.

He

6.

stressed the absence of any specific threat of enforcement and the
long history of non-enforcement, despite the open and well-known
sale of contraceptives in drug stores in the state.

He found the

controversy inappropriate for constitutional adjudication.

Justice

Brennan concurred in the result, stating that there would be time
enough to decide these constitutional issues when a "real
controversy flares up again."

Id. at 509.

I think the Court could dispose of the case under Poe v.
Ullman.

It is most unlikely this Court's decision will have any

practical impact.

Moreover, all the participants, even Chadha, want

this court to review (either on appeal, see papers of Chadha & INS
in No. 80-1832, or on cert, see House and Senate Petitions in Nos.
80-2170 & 80-2171) the legality of the one-house veto.
the suit a somewhat collusive air.

This gives

Indeed, it seems liklely that

the case would be completely moot--Chadha's wife would have
petitioned for a change in his status--but for the desire of all the
lawyers to see the constitutionality of the one-house veto resolved
in this case.

It seems inappropriate to resolve a major

constitutional issue in a case which is kept alive only to have this
Court determine the issue, rather than because this Court's decision
will have a practical impact.
This appeal is, therefore, like that in Poe v. Ullman, an
inappropriate vehicle for adjudication of the very difficult
questions presented and should be dismissed for want of a properly
~r"-.ps 1

federal question.

The dimissal

could~onsist

to this effect, citing Poe v. Ullman.

of a brief statement

meb 09/15/81

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

No. 80-1832, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
{appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it
agrees)
No. 80-2170

House of Representatives v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service
{petn for cert to CA9

No. 80-2171

brought by House)

Senate v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
{petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate)

I want to clarify a point that may have been confusing in my
earlier memo.

Although the House and Senate were amici below, it

might have been possible for them to appeal as well as petition for
The words of both statutes {proper party to appeal or
fli'e
-cert.
for cert)
the same: "any party" {the "aggrieved-party"

to file

~

requirement is judicial gloss needed to ensure the presence of a
case or controversy) .
Although the two earlier cases in which amici were allowed to
supply "adversariness," Lovett and Smith, both involved cert
petitions, I am not sure that there is a principled reason for
distinguishing an appeal brought by such a participant.

We do not

need to worry about whether our amici can appeal or provide

2.

adversatness in an appeal brought by a non-aggrieved party, however,
~

because the House and Senate not only did not appeal, they oppose
the grant of the appeal brought by INS.
d~

I may be missingJobvious reason why the House and Senate
cannot appeal.

Gressman (of Stern & Gressman) is on the brief for

the House and would not have filed a petition (rather than
supporting a note of jurisdiction in the appeal) unless he saw some
reason for preferring review by way of cert. (Perhaps he thought the
Court would be more likely to hear the merits if it could narrow the
issues it would consider, which would not be possible in an appeal.
This concern would not, however, eliminate all the threshold
questions since many of them are jurisdictional.)

meb 09/26/81

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

No. 80-1832, INS v. Chadha.
(appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it
agrees)
No. 80-2170 House of Representatives v. INS
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by House)
No. 80-2171 Senate v. INS
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate)

I took another look at this case to analyze the SG's reply
brief.

But that got me thinking, and now I have a whole new theory

that may explain why Gressman wants the Court to take the case on
cert rather than review on appeal.

2.

Briefly stated, if this Court decides that the case is
neither moot nor an inappropiate vehicle (given Chadha's marriage to
an American) for the resolution of a constitutional issue under Poe
v. Ullman, 367

u.s. 497 (1961) (inappropriate to decide

constitutional issue in case in which its resolution will have no
practical effect, see discussion in my memo of Sept. 14 at 5-6), and
if the Court reviews the case as an appeal under §1252, it is most
likely the Court will reach the one-house legislative-veto issue.
Congress prefers review by way of cert, because that form of review

r - -to result in -overruling
- - - - -the CA9 opinion, thus removing a
is likely
CA holding that a one-house legislative veto is unconstitutional,
and yet avoid this Court's resolution of the one-house legislative
veto issue.

-

Instead, the basis of decision will probably be the

"statutory" issue:

----

was the CA9, rather that a DC, the proper forum

for Chadha's challenge?

--------------------This memo first

explains why the Court will not have to

decide the "statutory" question if review is by cert rather than
appeal.

It then discusses the other threshold issues very briefly

to show that they are unlikely to stand in the way of reaching the
one-house legislative veto issue.

Third, it discusses whether

review by appeal is possible (arguing that, on the basis of the
papers now before the Court, the Court is in the very unusual
position of being free to either take or deny the appeal).

This

portion of the memo includes a discussion of the SG's reply brief
which argues that INS has standing'"' to bring an appeal despite its
I

I

-------~------~·-------------

~ agreement with the decision below.

Fourth, the memo discusses

3.
whether the Court should vacate the CA9 opinion if it decides not to
take the case.
DISCUSSION
A.

Why Does Form of Review Matter?
The usual rule is that an appellate court lacks

jurisdiction to review a lower court decision if the lower court
lacked juisdiction.

Thus, for example, this Court will not usually

review (on the merits) a decision made by a DC if the DC lacked
jurisdiction because the case should have been brought in a threejudge court.
Appeals under

§ ~2

are an exception.

In McLucas v.

,____

Champlain, 421

u.s.

21 (1975)

(Powell, J.), it seemed likely the

pltf should have asked for a three-judge court.
was jurisdictional.

If so, the failure

The Court nevertheless reached the merits and

held that this Court's jurisdiction over a §1252 appeal does not
depend on whether the lower court had jurisdiction.

The Court

explained this exception in terms of the policies and purposes of
§1252:

prompt S. Ct. review of civil actions in which the U.S. is a

party and an act of Congress is held unconstitutional.

This policy

would be thwarted if the parties were required to go back to a
three-judge court and begin another proceeding prior to invoking
this Court's review.

5~
In the case at bar, the "statutory question" is whether ~

Chadha should have begun with a habeas petition in DC rather
seek CA review under Immigration and Naturalization Act (Act)
§106(a), 8

u.s.c.

§1105a(a).

than~
~

~

As the pool memo notes at 5-7, the CA9

may have erred in concluding it had jurisdiction.

~

The statute ~ ~}.1f

4.
itself states that §106(a) review is available for review of §242(b)
administrative proceedings.

u.s.

And in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392

-

206 (1968), the Court held that jurisdiction under §106 is limited
to review of administrative proceedings conducted under Act §242(b),
8 U.S.C. §1252(b).

In Cheng Fan, the challenge was to the AG's

discretionary exercise of jurisdiction, and the Court ruled that
that challenge could not be brought in a CA under §106(a) even
though those actions were the logical prerequisite to administrative
proceedings under §242(b).

Similarly, in this case, Chadha seeks

review of Congress' exercise of its discretionary veto power, not
the review of any administrative proceeding under §242(b).

-

As this discussion suggests, it is most likely that if this
Court were to consider this statutory question, it would reverse and
hold that the CA9 did not have

-

to his deportation order.

'urisdiction over Chadha's

challeng~

Thus, if cert were granted, it is most

unlikely the one-house legislative veto issue could be

~

reached. ~~

If, however, the Court were to review on appeal, McLucas

~

..~~

seems to indicate that the question of whether Chadha should have
sued in theCA or the DC need not preclude this Court's review of
the other issues in the case.

McLucas seems directly applicable,

and I am somewhat puzzled by the SG's failure to argue this point.
Instead, the SG makes the difficult argument that the CA was the
proper initial forum.

Perhaps the SG missed the case.

cite it, but only to show the general purposes of §1252.

(He does
See SG's

Jurisdictional Statement n.9 at 13).
There will be one disadvantage to this approach--ignoring
whether the case was brought in the proper lower court--in terms of

~-i

5.

the record before the Court.

As the memo points out at 7-8, the

record only contains the administrative record, not information
about the exercise of the legislative veto, and the latter
information would presumably be before the Court if the case had
begun as a habeas proceeding in DC.
B.

The Other Threshold Issues
As mentioned in the introduction, this discussion presumes

that the Court does not consider the case an inappropriate one in
which to resolve a constitutional issue under Poe v. Ullman and that
the Court decides there is appellate jurisdiction.

(Whether the

case can be reviewed on appeal is discused in the next section).
The purpose of this section is to show that (given these
assumptions) if the case were considered on appeal, and the
"statutory question" was therefore avoided, it is quite likely the
Court would reach the legislative-veto issue.
The other threshold issues (threshold to whether the onehouse legislative veto is a justiciable question and, if it is,
whether it is constitutional) are (1)

Chadha's standing (a

sererability-of-statutory-provisions question);

(2) mootness; and

(3) adversariness.
1.

Chadha'standing.

The argument here is that Chadha

cannot have standing to challenge Congress' veto of the AG's grant
of an exemption for him because Congress would not have given the AG
the power to grant excemptions if it had not been able to retain the
power to overrule them.

Thus, the provision giving the AG the power

to overrule an exemption is not severable from the legislative-veto

6

0

provision, and, if neither provision had been enacted, Chadha would
have been deported.
Although the Act contains a severability provision (if one
provision is invalid, other provisions remain in force} the
legislative history provides strong support for the proposition that

--

--------------~'-----------------------------------------------------Congress
would never have passed the statute had it not been abl~ to

_______

retain
veto power •
......_
.--""\

If the Court were to rule that Chadha has no standing for
this reason, however, Congress would be able to limit judicial
review of constitutional issues by careful drafting.

I think it

likely, therefore, that the Court will find that Chadha has

---

~

standing ~

regardless of whether the grant of a power to the AG is severable

/JL~

from the veto provision.
2.

Mootness.

I I

"\

The case is not technically
moot--if the
.........._...___.
..........._.__

Court were to reverse the CA9, Chadha would be subject to a
deportation order.

It is true that he is now married to an

----------------------------American, but that does not
moot the case, though it suggests that
it may be an inappropriate vehicle to resolve an important
constitutional issue under Poe v. Ullman, 367
discussed in my memo of Sept. 14 at 5-6.

u.s.

497 (1961}, as

This discussion presumes,

however, that Poe v. Ullman is not considered a barrier to this
Court's review.

Given that presumption, the mootness argument

should not bar this Court from reaching the merits.
3.

Adversariness.

As discussed in the pool memo at 14-15

and my memo of Sept. 14 at 3-4, the presence of the House and Senate
as amici is sufficient to provide adversariness for case-andcontroversy purposes under Lovett and Smith.

7.

Thus, the "other" threshold issues are not likely to
fragment the Court's decisional basis or bar review of the one-house
legislative veto issue.
C.

Is an Appeal Possible?
There are two distinct questions to be considered here.

The first is whether the SG is right in arguing that the INS has
standing to seek this Court's appellate jurisdiction in the absence
of any disagreement with the decision below.

The second is whether

the Court can review the CA9 decision as an appeal under §1252.
1.

The SG's argument:

jurisdiction in this case.

the Court MUST exercise i i( §l252

In his reply brief, the SG argues rather

vehemently that INS has standing to bring an appeal regardless of
whether it agrees with the decision below.

(If you agree with the

SG that this is a proper appeal, there is still a way out:

dismiss

for want of a properly presented federal question under Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), as discussed in my memo of Sept. 14 at
5-6. ) •
The SG presents four arguments.

First, despite its

concurrance with the CA9, the SG argues that INS's dual role as part
of the Executive and as enforcer of the laws of Congress forms a
basis for its appeal to this Court.

The second argument is that the

Lovett case, discussed by the House and Senate as the basis for
their right to seek this Court's review on cert, indicates that
there is jurisdiction over the INS appeal.
that §1252 authorizes this appeal.

The third argument is

The fourth argument is that the

House is wrong in maintaining that there was no case or controversy
in the CA9.

8.
(a)

The SG's first argument is that the INS can appeal

because of its dual role as part of the
enforcer of the laws of Congress.

ex~cutive

branch and as

In the first part of this

argument, the SG focuses on the fact that, had the CA9 not acted,
Chadha would have been deported by the INS regardless of how the INS
felt about the constitutionality of the one-house legislative veto.
This only proves that the CA9 had a case or controversy before it.
That case was a type courts often hear despite the lack of any
opposing party.

As Wright and Miller point out, when a judicial

decree is needed to establish a right or status, or assist in their
enforcement, courts consider suits (such as suits seeking to
establish title or obtain a certificate of naturalization) even
though there is no adverse party.

See 13 Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure §3530 at 167.
The fact that the CA9 was presented with a case or
controversy does not, however, mean that this Court faces one.
Here, Chadha's right to remain in the

u.s.

has already been

established, and the INS does not argue that the grant of that right
was improper.

It is hornbook law that one who consents to a

judgment can not challenge it on appeal, see 9 Moore's Federal
Practice ,1203.06 at 3-27, and INS seems, in effect, to have

-------

consented to the

t.

In the next portion of this argument, the SG attempts to
distinguish the cases cited by the House and Senate for the
proposition that INS is not an aggrieved party.

The SG argues that

in those cases, a pltf had received the requested relief, whereas
here, the CA9 has issued an injuction restraining the INS from

9.
enforcing the deportation order ordered by Congress.

The SG argues

that since it is a deft against whom injunctive relief has been
granted, it can necessarily appeal.

This argument ignores the

principle mentioned in the preceeding paragraph:

a deft who

consents to entry of a judgment against him cannot appeal.

INS

seems to have consented to the entry of the injunction--indeed, it
argued that that was the proper result to the CA9.

I do not see how

it can say it is aggrieved by getting precisely what it said it
wanted.
(b)
Lovett, 328

The SG's second argument is that United States v.

u.s.

jurisdiction.

303 (1946) supports this Court's appellate

As discussed in my earlier memo, that was a case in

which the Court exercised its cert jurisdiction despite the fact
that the U.S. and Lovett agreed with the decision below.

But, in

that case, amicus appeared for the Congress arguing the Act's
constitutionality.

If the House and Senate supported the appeal in

their role as amicus in this case, I would agree that mandatory
review is unavoidable under §1252.

Instead, however, the House and

Senate oppose the appeal.
(c)

-

The SG's next argument is his strongest:

the language

and purposes of §1252 support jurisdiction over the INS appeal.
Section 1252 is rooted in the Act of Aug. 24, 1937, which was
designed to curb onslaughts--what the Roosevelt administration
regarded as guerilla raids--by federal courts upon the
constitutionality of federal statutes.

A direct appeal under §1252

is restricted to judgments against constitutionality of acts of
Congress, and the provision is designed to protect federal statutes

10.

against

pr ~tacks

this Court.

---such, this

and provide for speedy resolution by

See 12 Moore's Federal Practice ,[411.04 at 5-18.
Court has usually construed it generously.

Champlain, 421

u.s.

21 (1975)

As

In McLucas v.

(Powell, J.), the Court held that a

§1252 appeal can be brought regardless of whether the lower court
h ~ ion.

(In that case, it seemed likely the pltf should

have asked for a three-judge court.
jurisdictional.).

If so, the failure was

This construction is generous because the usual

rule is, of course, that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction if
the court below lacked jurisdiction.
Against this background, a strong policy argument can be
made supporting the INS's position.

The executive may often

disagree with Congress regarding the constitutionality of a statute.
Moreover, the statute may not even be supported by the current
Congress.

In such a situation, unless the executive can seek this

Court's review under §1252, an act will be held unconstitutional
without the prompt consideration of this Court Congress intended to
ensure when it enacted §1252.

-

The problem with this argument is that, under the
~--------------------

Constitution, the jurisdiction of Art. III courts is limited
cases or controversies.

Congress cannot create a case or

controversy by identifying a policy interest served by this Court's
review;

advisory opinions would often serve important policy

interests.
Although there are no cases on all fours with this one
(with an agency a party), the caselaw certainly suggests that this
is not a case or controversy.

In Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg

11.
Board of Education, 402

u.s.

47 (1971)

(per curiam), for example,

both sides supported the consitutionality of North Carolina's AntiBusing Law.
busing.

They sought an order enjoining a DC from ordering

The Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal

because it was "confronted with the anomaly that both litigants
desire precisely the same result, namely a holding that the antibusing staute is constitutional.

There is, therefore, no case or

controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution." Id.
at 48.

After so holding, the Court went on to state that the lower

Court also lacked jusdiction under §2281 because the suit was not an
action brought to restrain a state officer from enforcing an
unconstitutional state statute, i.e., there was no statutory
jurisdictional basis.
The SG argues that Moore
"is readily distinguishable" because "[t]here the Court
concluded that it did not have statutory jurisdiction over
the appeal ••. because neither party sought an injunction
prohibiting enforcement of a state statute alle ed to be
unconstitutional. No such difficulty is present ere.
The Court also concluded, after briefing and argument,
that there was no controversy withing the meaning of Art.
III •••. But, unlike in Moore, there could be no
suggestion in the present case that the proceedings below
constituted a feigned suit .••. " Reply of SG n.9 at 11
(emphasis in original).
I find this characterization of the cases somewhat
disingenpous.
r--

The first holding in Moore is the lack of a

constitutional case or controvesy.

The fact that the suit below was

collusive below there, but not here, seems irrelevant to the
question of whether this Court has jurisdiction if the action is
collusive now.

Surely the SG would not suggest that once

jurisdiction is found, there will always be jurisdiction over a

12.

case.

Indeed, I find Moore persausive authority for the fact that

Congress could not give this Court juisdictlon over an appeal
brought only by the INS, a party that agrees with the decision
below.
(d)

The SG's final argument is that the House is wrong in

arguing that the CA9 did not have jurisdiction.

I agree with the SG

for the reasons given in discussing his first argument--courts often
decide question of status without opposition.

Neither Chadha nor

the INS seeks a change in Chada's status at the present time,
however, so the fact that the CA9 had a case or controversy does not
mean that this Court does.
2.

Can the Court review under §1252?

I think the House

and Senate oppose the appeal but petition for cert in an attempt to

-

----

control the Court's decisional basis.

If the case is reviewed on

cert, the threshold "statutory" question (what lower court should
have been used--CA9 or DC?) will likely be tha basis for overruling
the CA9's decision without allowing this Court to hold that the onehouse legislative veto is unconstitutional.

On appeal, the Court

could skip that issue, as discussed at 3-5 supra.
There was only one decision below.

-

Yet the House and

Senate have each filed briefs in two "cases" here:

the oppositions

to appeal in the INS appeal and the petitions for cert in their own
cases.

The oppositions argue that the INS appeal cannot be brought

because INS is not aggrieved and there is, therefore, no case or
controversy.

That is, however, true only because the House and

Senate are not arguing a position opposite to the INS's in their

'
13.
oppositions.

They do, however, take such positions in their cert

petitions.
I think the Court is free to ignore the captions the House
and Senate have placed on their briefs.

They seek this Court's

review of the CA9 deicision--a decision that comes within the terms
of §1252:

the

u.s.

unconstitutional.

was a party and an act of Congress was held
They have indicated that they will argue that

that decision is wrong, so there is a case or controversy for the
Court to

consider ~

think the Court can therefore look beyond the

--

oppositions to the appeal, consider the petns for cert, and "note"

-

~

the appeal on the basis of all the briefs fired by those who have
submitted jurisdictional
appeal.

s~ements

or oppositions in the INS

On the other hand, I think the Court is equally free to

dismiss the appeal because the only party seeking the appeal (INS)
has no standing to object to the CA9 decision.
It is stange to say that the Court has discretion to decide
whether to exercise §1252 appellate jurisdiction:

the purpose of

the statute was to create non-discretionary jurisdiction in
instances where Congress thought S. Ct. review should not be
delayed.

This result is, however, consistent with the policies of

§1252 in that it will enable the Court to take an appeal described
in the statute and thus one Congress thought should be considered
quickly--and Court will be able to do so without dismissing just
because the proceedings began in the wrong lower federal court (see
McLucas, discussed at 3-4 supra).
D.

Should the CA9 Decision be vacated if this Court declines

review?

~
w.-L

~

Clt1(

~t-1
~~

~

14.
If this Court declines review of the appeal either because
(1) INS, the only party seeking appellate
do so,

r~view

has no standing to

or (2) this case is an inappropriate vehicle for the

resolution of a difficult constitutional issue, you might want to
consider whether the CA9 decision should be left standing.

At the

time the CA9 decision was handed down, Chadha was already married.
{)

The Court could therefore vacate it in the light of Pe v. Ullman
(inappropriate vehicle) regardless of which reason this Court has
declined review.

I have no strong feelings on this point and merely

present it as a possibility.
RECOMMENDATION
I have no firm recommendation.

For some reason I cannot

understand, these legislative-veto cases do not seem to come up very
frequently.

The last case before the Court was Atkins v. United

States, 556 F. 2d 1028 (Ct. Clms. 1977)

(en bane)

{upholding constitutionality), cert denied 434

(per curiam)

u.s.

1009 (1978).

That case involved a one-house veto barring an increase in salary
for federal judges, and the Court probably considered it an unseemly
case in which to decide the issue.

As far as I can tell, that

decision and the CA9 decision below are the only rulings on the
constitutionaliy of legislative vetos.

See J. Henry, The

Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J.
Legis. 735, 7738-39 (1979).
The rarity of cases cannot be explained in terms of the
rarity of Congress' use of the legislative veto.

A 1979 article

reports that, between 1932 and 1975, 295 legislative veto provision
were enacted in 196 statutes (most of these were enacted between

15.
1966 and 1979).

Id. at 736 n.S.

Nor can the rarity be explained in

terms of general acceptance of their legality.

Every President

since Woodrow Wilson has questioned their constitutionality;
Attorney Generals have often argued against them, legal scholars
have engaged in extensive debates over them, and even many members
of Congress have doubted their constitutionality.

See id. at 737-38

n.7.
Perhaps these cases come up so seldom because of standing
(standing to challenge an act of Congress) problems--that is,
however, a pure guess.

If I knew more about the 295 statutes, I

might be able to see other explanations.
It

I tend to think this case is probably not an appropriate

\'

vehicle to resolve the dispute under Poe v. Ullman.

I have now

convinced myself that the Court is free to take or decline the
appeal and, were it not for the Poe v. Ullman problem would tend to
think the appeal should be noted.

It is true that even if the case

is considered under §1252 (thus avoiding the "statutory" question)
it is not the cleanest of cases.

On the other hand, I do not think

any of the other issues are either extemely close or impossibly
difficult.

Given that these cases do not, for some strange reason,

appear before this Court very often, I would probably take the
appeal (were it not for the Poe v. Ullman problem).
SUMMARY
If you think that Poe v. Ullman, discussed in my memo of
Sept. 14 at 5-6, bars review of the case, then the appeal should be
dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question and the
petns for cert should be denied.

16.

On the other hand, the fact that Chadha will actually be
subject to a deportation order if this Court overrules the CA9 may
be regarded as sufficient practical impact to avoid any Poe v.
Ullman problem.

Mrs. Chadha is, of course, a third party to the

suit and there are doubtless lots of situations in which third
parties can moot an action, but courts nevertheless resolve the
controversy without worrying too much about Poe v. Ullman.
If you see this case as distinguishable from Poe v. Ullman,
the next question is whether there is any difference between noting
(or postponing) the appeal and granting cert.

I think that the most

difficult threshold issue (whether Chadha should have sued in DC
rather than in the CA9) can be avoided only if the case is heard on
appeal.

If you agree, it would be appropriate to deny cert

regardless of whether you want to hear the merits of the case.
If you do not agree that the difficult "statutory" question
can be avoided in a §1252 appeal, then you will probably not want to
consider this case either on appeal or cert.

It is quite likely the

case should have been brought in DC rather than the CA9:

if the

"statutory" question (which is proper court?) is before the Court,
it is therefore unlikely the Court will be able to reach the
constitutionality of the one-house legislative veto in this case.
The next question is whether the appeal must be noted (or
postponed) .

Because the House and Senate oppose the CA9 opinions in

their petitions for cert, though not in their briefs in the INS
appeal, I think the court is free to take the appeal or dismiss.

It

can dismiss the appeal because no aggrieved party seeks this Court's
appellate jurisdiction.

On the other hand, it can note (or

17.

postpone) the appeal because the House and Senate do oppose the CA9
decision, thus providing the necessary constitutional adversariness,
and the appeal comes within the terms of §1251:

an appeal from a

decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional in a case in
which the

u.s.

is a party.

The next question is whether you want to take the case on
appeal.

At this point, you have agreed that the "statutory

question" can be avoided by a §1252 appeal, that the House and
Senate provide the requisite adversarines, and that Poe v. Ullman
does not bar this Court's review.

Only two threshold issues remain.

The first is whether Chadha has standing to challenge Congress'
action because two key provisions of the Act are not severable:

the

provision giving the AG discretion to exempt someone from
deportation and the provision in which Congress retains the power to
override the AG's exemption with a legislative veto.

The argument

is that if neither these two provisions were in force, Chadha would
be deported, and since Congress would not have enacted one without
the other, he is not harmed by Congress' exercise of its veto to
order him deportated.

This argument is not likely to succeed,

however, because it would allow Congress to insulate these actions
from judicial review.
The remaining threshold question is whether the case is
moot, and it is easily resolved.

If the Court were to overrule the

CA9 decision, Chadha would immediately be subject to a deportation
order.
moot.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the case is technically

lH.

Because these legislatve-veto challenges do not come before
the Court often, you might want to take thi's case if you think the
Conference will agree to take the case as a §1252 appeal (skipping
the "statutory question") and if you think the conference will not
split on the decisional basis--i.e., the Conference will agree that
(1) the appeal can be noted (or postponed) because the House and
Senate provide the necessary adversariness;

(2) the case is neither

moot nor an inappropriate vehicle to resolve the constitutional
issue under Poe v. Ullman;

(3) a §1252 appeal avoids the "statutory

question" of what lower court Chadha should have used; and

(3)

Chadha has standing to challenge his deportation despite the fact
that Congress probably would not have given the AG the authority to
grant an exemption if it had not retained the power to veto (Chadha
would therefore have been deported anyway had the challenged statute
not been enacted).
If the Conference is likely to disagree on any of these
threshold issues, you will probably want to avoid review.
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It happens that this tenth anniversary of Justice Powell's ascension to the bench-the event this volume justly celebrates- falls
during the judicial term that may well bring us the Supreme
Court's first decision on the constitutionality of the legislative
veto, in the case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha. 4 Much ink has been spilled in scholarly battles over this
long-simmering issue, and it would serve little constructive purpose to cover here, yet again, all the ground staked out and fought
over in those earlier articles. 11 Instead, a volume dedicated to one

' •! ~

' 50 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981) (postponing further consideration of jurisdiction to
hearing on the merits), reviewing Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1980). The case will be argued with two companion petitions for certiorari filed
by the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, who appeared as amici curiae before the
Court of Appeals. U.S. House of Representatives v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 50
U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981); U.S. Senate v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 50
U.S.L.W. 3244 (U .S. Oct. 5, 1981) .
The Court has declined earlier opportunities to decide the constitutionality of the device.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140 n.l76 (1976) (per curiam), the Court did not reach the
question of the vnlidity of the legislative veto power over agency rules, because it held that
the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) was constituted improperly under the Appointments Clause. See id. at 282-86 (White, J., concurring in pflrt and dissentiqg in part) (suggesting that the legislative veto does not necessarily violate the Constitution, "in light of
history and modern reality" of interbranch relations). In Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (en bane), affd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmett, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) , the Court
of Appeals, sitting en bane, found unripe a challenge to the legislative veto applicable to
rules tendered by the reconstituted FEC, over strong dissents-one of which, Judge McKinnon's, argued strenuously that the veto was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed
summarily sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977). In Atkins v. United States, 556
F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), a divided Court of Claims sustained a congressional veto of proposed executive pay raises, claiming that the holding was narrow and need not govern other
legislative veto cases. !d. at 1059. The Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment.
434 U.S. 1009 (l!l78). See also McCorkle v. United States, 5.59 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977)
(declining to consider the validity of the pay-raise veto, because the veto provision was held
inseverable from rest of Salary Act of 1967 and the plaintiffcould not win enhanced pay in
any event). The legislative veto also played a significant role in the basic administrative
scheme under consideration in two other cases, although its constitutionality was not an
issue in the Supreme Court. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.. Serv., 433 lJ.S. 42.'i, 4:!6-39
(1977). See id. at 500 n.4 (Powell, J ., concurring) (facial challenge to certain provisions of
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act found without merit; validity of
veto provisions not then at i~~ue) ; Pressler v. Blumenthal , ~:H U.S. 1028 (1978), afl"g mem .
Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. :102 (D.D.C. 1976) (sustaining Salary Act of 1967 against
claim that congressional salaries must be fixed by statute).
• Commentary generally favorable to the legislative veto device, both on prudential and
constitutional grounds, includes Abourezk, Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response
to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 Ind. L..J. 323 (1977); Boisvert, A
Legislative Tool F'or Supervision of Administrative Agencies: The Laying System, 25 Ford-
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who exmplifies responsible fulfillment of the judicial role prompts
exploration of a somewhat neglected element of that debate: the
implications of the legislative veto for c~ngressional responsibility,
or more precisely, the opporttiiii'ties it opens for avoidance of congressiq_nal. r~sJ>onsibiljty. Tliis element, it will appear, should play
a significant role fn assessing the constitutionality of the veto.
I.

THE DEVICE

The legislative veto is a procedural device that permits Congress
ham L. Rev. 638 ( 1956-57); Coope r & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 467 (1962); Dry, The Congressional Veto and Constitutional Separation
of Powers, in ThP Presidency in the Constitutional Order 195 (J . Bessette & J. Tulis eds.);
Javits and Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analy sis, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1977); Miller & Knapp, The Cong ressional Veto: Preserving the
Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L.J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and
Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the " Independent" Agencies, 75
Nw. U.l. Rev. 1064 (1981); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of
Laws- Should Legislators Supervise Adminis trators?, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 565 (195:1); Pearson,
Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U. Kan . L. Rev. 277 ( 1975);
Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Actions, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 489 ( 1974);
Schwartz, Lel(iAlnlive Veto Rnd 1lw C:onstitution - A Recxn rninAtion , ~li r.e't' WaHh . 1.. RPv.
:151 (197!!) lfa·rcinufiN cil.1•d UH ll<~l : xuminulionl; Srhwurlz. l.t •J.:i~ lul . l vl' Conlrol of Adrninis
trative Rules and Regulations: I. The American Experienre, :!0 N. Y.U. L. ){cv. 10:11 ( 195f,);
Stewart, Constitutionality of the Lel(islative Veto, 1.3 Harv . .). Legis. fi9:l (1976); Note, "Laying on the Table"-A Device For Lel(islative Control Over Delel(aled Powers, 65 Harv. L.
Rev. 637 (1952).
Commentary g1 ·nerully unfavomhle to the lcgislut.ive veto, on constitutional or prudential
grounds, or hoth, inc:l11dcH ,J. Bolton, The Legislntivc Veto: I lnsl'pural ing thr l'owcrs (I 977);
Bruff & Gellhorn. Congressional Control of Admini8lrnlive l{egulalion: A ::itudy of Leg i8la tive Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. H.ev. 1369 (1977);.0ixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive On Leas h?, 56 N .C .L. Rev . 423 (1978) ; FitzGerald, Conl(ressional
Oversight or Congrc~Hionul Fore~il(hl: Guidelines From the Foundinl( Fathers, 28 Ad . L.
Rev. 429 ( 1976); (;innnne, The Coni rol of Federal Administmtion by Congri'Ha ional H.cHolu tions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Hev. 569 (1953); Henry, Th e Legislative Veto: In Search
of Constitutional Limits, J() Hurv . . J. Legis. 7:15 (197!)); Sculiu, The Ll'~iHlative V!!lo: A FaiHc
Remedy For System Overlond, Regulation, Nov.- Dec. 197!), ot 19; Wutson, Con~ress Steps
Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 6:1 Ca lif. L. ){ev. 9H:l ( 1975); Co mment, Congri'HHionnl Oversight of Administrative Discretion : Del'inin~ the l'ropPr J{olc• of
t.hl' Legislnt.ivt• Vr ·lo, ~ ()Am . ll .l.. !lev. 1018 (1977) ; Noll', ('ongn·ssionnl Vr ·lo of Adminis trative Action: Tire Probable Response to a Constitutional Challt·nge, 197t) Duke L.. J. 2!!5;
Recent Development H, The Legislative Veto In The ArmH Coni rol Act of IU76, 9 Law &
Pol 'y Int.'l Bus. 1029 (1977).
See a lao Symposium, 28 Ad . L. Rev . ()()I ( 1976) (views of Con~-:r1· ssman Lt•vitns, Assistant
Attorney General Scalia, and olhrrs); McGowa n, Congress, Cou rt , a nd Control of Delel(ated
Power, 77 Colum. L. Rev . 1119 (I 977) (avoids slulernents impl yi ng ultimate approva l or
rejection of the lt·gislative veto, but poses pointed ques t ions ubout itH exerciHe and stales a
preference for other means of controlling delegations) .
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to control executive or agency actions 6 outside the ordinary legislative process, although the scheme must originate in a statute
passed by the usual means, including presidential approval or a
two-thirds vote of both houses to override the President's veto. In
typical form, the device works as folllows. The underlying statute
provides that the agency must report proposed actions of a prescribed type to Congress beTore theY._ take effect. TnYsuch action
may proceed after a statea period (usually thirty to ninety days 7 ) ,
unless Congress formally states its disapproval within that time.
The statute specifies the precise congressional response necessary.
s~ schemes permit a single committee to block the initiative.
More commonly, single House's adoption of a resolution of disapproval is needed. Other schemes require disapproving action by
both houses, in the form of a concurrent resolution. 8 In any such
case, the expression of disapproval does not go to the President for
his consideration and possible veto; the action oj C,2,.ngress alone
prevents the proposal from becoming effective. 9
-

a

~ -~d

bot~ecutive

respons~ ~ ~~

• The term "ag(·ncy ''
here to denote
bra nch units directly
ble to the Presid l'nt !!_a-Inde pendent ag;_nci es insul ated from JHes idential ('ontrol.
7
See L. Fisher. Th e Politics of !:l'flared Power: Congress and th e Exec utive 92 ( 1981) .
Often the waiting peri od is measured by legislative days or days of co ntin-uous sess ion of
Congress, rather than calendar days, leaving the a~:e ncy un a ble, a t the tim e of submi ssion,
to predict when th e review period will end and som etimes making it possible for Congress to
prevent or delay the effectiveness of regulations wi t hout having to vote a resolution of di sapproval. See Clark v. Val eo, 559 F.2d 64 2, 679 n .2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon , .J., di sse nting) , aff'd mem . sub nom . Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 9f, () (I 977 ) (describin g how t.h(• FEC
was left without operative regulation s for the 1976 election when t.he necessary 30 legisla tive
days had not elapsed within th e 44 calendar days between submission a nd congressional
adjournment) .
"'
• A simple resolution is a motion passed by the members of a single leg islative House. A
concurrent resolution . for most purposes, is merely a simpl e reso lution des igned for passage
by both houses. I lnd er established congressional practice, it is not presented to the I' resident for hi s approvnl or rejection . Outside the legislative veto context., it genera ll y is used
only for an express ion of congressional views or wishes, or to rli s posl' of matters relating to
legislative mechanics. See Watson, supra note 5, nt 9Bti - LOUO. Those resolutions that are
presented to the President are designated as joint resoluti ons and have th e full for!' e and
effect of a law wlum thus approverl or passed by a two-thirds vote over a pres idential veto.
See generally Gibson , Congressional Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid Ito! Statutory lnterprevation?, ~7 A.B.A. ,J. 421 (19fil); FHE Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150 F.:2d 857 (fith Cir.
1945)(concurrent r!'solution was not. law, hut merely an opinion on a point. of lnw ('nt.it lt>d to
respectful considna t ion) .
• There are oth er varieties of legislative veto, but th ey ne<' d not he examin ed in detail for
purposes of this inquiry. They include (1) schemes requiring a ffirmative approval by one or
both Houses belore a proposed agency action becomPs effe ctive, see, e.g., 8 U.S. C. §
1254(c)(3) (1976) (suspension of deportation for certain classes of deportable ali ens- not the
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The blocking resolution differs from__ ordinari: legis,.eon in another way. It must assume a skeletal form, stating simply tnat
Congress disapproves the proposed action. If it passes, the status
quo ante remains in effect. The resolution of disapproval cannot be
a vehicle for affirmative provisions to change the status quo;
changes of that sort must come by means of full-scale legislation. 10

suspension provision at issue in Chadha); (2) schemes providing that a disapproving vote by
one House can be overridden by simple resolution of the other House, thus permitting the
proposed agency act ion to take effect, see, e.g., H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1976);
and (3) rare schemes vesting the veto power in a single committee chairman, see Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 82-547, 66 Stat. o61, Ch. 14, § 141:1 (1952).
Some pending bills also would permit either House, by simple resolution, to direct agency
reconsideration of older regulations already on the books. Those rules would lapse JHO days
after passage of the resolution unless repromulgated by the agency, but the repromulgated
rules, like new rules, would be subject to legislative veto by a single House. See, e.g., H.R.
1776, § 4, 97th Con g., 1st Sess. ( 1981).
Other congressional review devices sometimes are grouped under the heading "legislative
veto," but do not raise the same constitutional questions, and that label will not be applied
to them here. The so-called Levin-Boren provision (named for its principal Senate authors)
would delay the effective date of proposed "major rules" and set a strict timetable for congressional review and possible disapproval. Disapproval, however, would be accomplished
only by means of a joint resolution presented to the President. See S. 1945, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 4 (1980); Boren & Levin, Regulating Federal Regulators, N.Y. Tim(ls, May 2!i, 1980,
at A23, col. 1. "Report and wait" provisions delay the effective date of certain agency actions for a stater! period after the agency's proposal is reported to Congress. See Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., :312 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1941); Watson, supra not.e 5, at 1018, 1060-63. During that
time, of course, Congress may enact legislation that would block or modify the proposed
action, or it may employ less formal methods in an attempt to induce the agency to change
its proposed action.
For a general description of veto devices and related measures and a useful account of
their evolution, see id. at 984-1029. Watson also provides a lengthy compilation of statutes
authorizing vetoes by simple or concurrept resolution, id. at 1089-92, and those authorizing
committee vetoes, id. at 1093-94. References to comprehensive lists of such statutes through
1978 (including ''report and wait" provisions) prepared by the Congressional Research Service appear in Kaiser, Congressional Action 'to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the
"Legislative Veto," 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667, 702 n.103 (1980). See also Congressional Research
Service, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., StudieR on the Lrgislntiv(' Vet.o (Comm. Print. 1980).
10
Some statutes ostensibly allow Congress u wider revisionury authority, picking and
choosing portions of the proposed regulations or other administrative action that may be
vetoed, leaving the surviving portions to take effect. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 358-:159 (1966) (allowing veto of "all or part" of the pay raises recommended by the President); Bruff & Cellhorn, supra notP 5, at 1403 (GSA's rules under Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation ). Because such an "item veto," if used to edit a package of proposed rules too
severely, would be functionally similar to "the disclaimed power to rewrite agency rules
without legislation," Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1403, it raises additional constitutional questions. Many supporters of the veto device make no claim that this sort of selective authority is constitutionally valid, see, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 5, at 486, and
agencies often have responded to attempted item veto by withdrawing the entire package of
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The device first appeared in 1932, in legislation giving President
Hoover authority to reorganize-the Executive Branch. Any proposed reorganization plan was to be reported to Congress and
would take effect in sixty days unless either House voted a resolution of disapprovaL 11 Similar provisions, requiring one or both
Houses to veto, have appeared in most, but not all, later statutes
conferring reorganization authority on the President. 12 Starting
with the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Congress also employed the device to render certain statutory authorities conferred on the President amenable to termination upon concurrent resolution of the
two Houses. 13 Such termination provisions were in vogue throughout the 1940's, but have lost their popularity since then. Other veto
provisions appeared sporadically in other contexts, the hardiest
survivors being certain provisions of the immigration laws 14 - one
of which is contested in Chadha-and legislation subjecting to

'·'

regulations and redrafting the whole. See McGowan, supra note 5, at 1158-59 11. 174; L.
Fisher, supra note 7, at 101-02; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1401 -03. Congress also
has displayed some sensitivity to these concerns. For example, the Federal Election Campaign Ad giw,; C:ongrPRH the power to wto Repnrotl' "n1lcs" s11hmitterl hy the FI·X~. The
l!J7(i amendment~ cluril'it·d thiH power hy defining "n d< ·" "" "" proviHioll or Ht·rit·H of illl.t·rn:
Ia ted provisions stating a single, separable rule of law." Federal Electi~n Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 110(6)(2), 90 Stat. 475 (emphasis added). The
conference report emphasized that Congress did not claim the power to rewrite regulations
through item vetoes. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52 (1976) . Sec also S.
Rep. No. 94-3()8, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (I 975) (committ!'e reco mmended veto of all regula tions in package, although many were deemed acceptable, because agency saw problems in
implementing only the portion" the committee approved).
11
Act of June :JO, 1932, ch. :! 14, § 407,47 Stat. 414 (19:12).
" See Reorl(anization Act of 1945, g_h. 582, § 6(a), !i!J Stat. 6 16; Reorganization Act of
1949, ch. 226, ~ 6, 63 Stat. 205; Reorganization Art of 1!177, ch. 9, § 906, 91 Stat. :12 (1977) .
13
See, e.g., An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States (Lend -Lease Act of
1941), ch. 11 , § 3(c), 55 Stat. 32 (1941); First War Pow e r ~ Act, 1941, ch. f>93, § 401,55 Stat.
841; Second War Powers Act, 1942, ch. 199, § 1501, 56 Stat. 187. Corwin emphatically supported Congress's use of the legislative veto in thi s fashion, reasoning that an effective check
on excessive delegation of legislative powers could be maintained only by "rendering the
delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate." E. Corwin, The Presi dent: Office u11d Power~. 1787 1057, at 1:10 (4th t'd. I !);m.
President Franklin D. Roospvclt. accepted the veto provision atl.ached to the L('nd -Lease
Act for political reasons, but. planted with his Attorn ey General a private memorandum
stating his constitutional object ions, to be made public at. a later time. Roosevelt apparently
hoped that giving delayed publicity to his resistance would deprive th e Lend -Lt•ase veto
provision of any force as a precedent manifesting unalloyed exec utive acquiescence in the
practice. See ,Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1:15:1 (195:!).
" 8 U.S.C. ~ 1254 (1976) (originally enacted in somt'what diff'erent form as part of the
Alien Registration Act, 1940, ch. 439, § 20(c), 54 Stat. fi72).
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committee veto key decisions relating to government construction
projects. 111
Congress renewed in earnest its resort to the device as part of its
struggle to defend its prerogatives against the Nixon presidency.
For example, legislative veto provisions play a role in the War
Powers Resolution and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. 16
The new congressional assertiveness also ushered in an important
and novel phase in ilie use of the legislative veto, ~s Congress began to a - 1 the device to' kgency rulemaking. Beginnmg in the
ear y 1970's, a ew ey statutes require cer am agencies to submit
new regulations to the Congress and forbade implementation if one
oi: both houses disapproved. Since then, in adopting new programs
or revising the authorities of older agencies, C..£.._ngress ever more
freguently has subjected future rulemaking to legislative veto in
.......
....
----- ......
some form. 17
As part of its current regulatory reform drive, Congress may well
plug the remaining gaps in its review of agency rules, for many

-

10
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 4, 1944, ch. 165,58 Stat. 190; Aclof Sept. 28, 1951, ch. 4:14, ~ 601,
65 Stat. 365; Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 726, § 407,66 Stat. 625; Public Buildings Act of 1959,
§ 7, 73 Stat. 481 -82.
•• War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 9:!-148, § 5, 87 Stat. 55fJ (197:l) (codifieci at 50
U.S.C. § 1544 (1976)). Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. 1.. No. 93-344, §§ 1011 - 101:~.
88 Stat. 333-35 (codified at 31 U.S.C . §§ 1401 -03 (1976)). Actually, the legislative veto device
plays only a relatively minor role in each of these statutes. The main provi~ion of th e War
Powers Resolution forbids the President to introduce troops, and in any event requires
withdrawal of troops within 60 days, unless Congress has declared war or passed a specific
statutory authorization (or certain emergencies obtain) . The veto device 's only role is to
enable Congress to insist on withdrawal o( troops l'nrlier than the fiO -dAy dPndlirw t.hnt oth erwise applies. Under the Impoundment
"recissions" of hiJ(Igct Authority urc forhidd<•n
without full-dress recission legislution. 31 U.S.C . § 1402(h) (1976) . The President. re tains the
lesser authority of "deferral,'' meaning executive ad ion to delay spendin~.: for n spl'cific pur pose or project, hut he may delay it no longpr than the end of t.h!' existing fiscnl yl'ur. /d . §
1403(a). The President must report such deferrals to the Congress and must make the deferred budget authority avuilable if either House disapproves the deft-rral lry simple resolu tion. This is tht- .mly instance in which t.he veto plays a role under the lmpoundmt•nt. Ad.
See J . Havemann, Congress and the Budget 179-87 81978) .
17
See, e.g., Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 9:3 -526, §
104, 88 Stat. 1691>-97 (1974) (rules relating t.o public access to pres idential materials) ; Motor
Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Puh. L. No. 9:!-492, ~ 109. HH Stat.
1482-83 (rules n·lating to automobile passive restraints) (codified nt If> li.S.C. ~ 1410h
(1976)); FedcraiJ•:It>l'lion Cnmpnign Art Anwndm<•Jits of 1!171, l'ulr . 1.. No. !1:\ .11:1, ~ :!0!1, HH
Stat. 1287 (legislativt' veto of FEC rules) (current version At 2 lJ.S.C. § 4:JH(d) (Supp. III
1979 & Supp. IV UJHO)); Federul Trade Commission Improvements Act of I!JHO, l'ulr. 1.. No.
96 -252, § 21, 94 Stat. 393 (all FTC rules subject to veto lry wncurrent re8olution) (codified
at 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a- l (Supp. 1981)) .
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pending reform bills would subject virtually all future rulemaking
by administrative agencies to legislative veto. 18 Similar bills have
been around for years, but prospects for passage seem especially
bright during this Congress. The present administration has endorsed the broad reform effort and is headed by a President who,
in sharp contrast to his predecessors, 19 embraced the legislative
veto during his campaign. 20 More recent attempts by administration spokesmen to trim back on that campaign pledge 21 have been
far from decisive. Enactment of such a broad review authority over
rulemaking would represent the legislative veto in full flower .
Legislative veto qf a~Elncy ,!Ulemaking will claim the bulk of attention in what follows, for two principal reasons, even though it
22
lies at a far remove from the use of the device at issue in Chadha.

11 See, e.g., S . H90, 97th Cong., l st Sess. (1981) (introdu ced by Se n. Grassley); H.R. 1776,
97th Cong., 1st SesR. (1981) (introdu ced by Rep . I.evitas ). Other pe nding regul a tory reform
measures employ the Levin-Buren approach (explained in note 9 supra) , see, e.g., H.H. 746,
97th Cong., lRt Sess. (1981) (introdu ced by Rep . Danielson ), or do not employ the l eg i ~ l a tive
veto at all , see, e. g., S . 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (introdu ced by Se n. Laxalt.). Significant earlier bills employing the legislative veto includ e H .H. 1776, 96th Cong., hl Sess.
(1979) ; S . 104, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H .R. 12048, 94th Cong. , 2d Sess. (1976) . See
Administration Hacks Regulatory Reform Hill, :19 Cong. Q. Wee kly H.epoJt 627-28 (1981)
(hereinafter cited as " Administration") . On regulatory reform proposals gen erall y, see G.
Robinson, E . Gellhorn & H. Bruff, The Administrative Process 825-83 (2d ed. 1980) .
" All ten Presidents from Wilson through Carte r have gon e on record at some point in
opposition to tht• veto, although they have not always held to that oppos ition with consistency. See Henry, supra note 5, at 737-38 n.7 (coll ecting citations to pres idential

statements).
•• Administration, supra note 18, nt 628. Support of th e congr,ssional Vl' to nlso appeared
as a plank in the 1980 Republican platform . 36 Cong. Q. Alm a nac 71 -B (1980) .
21 Brown, Administration Backs Some~Legislative Veto, Was h. Post, May 8, 198 1, at Dl,
col. 2 (statement of James C. Miller Ill that Administration supports two -house veto of
rules iss ues by independent agencies, but not of rules issued by executive-bra nch age ncies );
Hearings Concerning S . 890- Legislative Veto Before th e Subcomm . on Agency Admin.,
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, (mimeo; Apr. 2:1, I 981) (state mpnt of Theodore B. Olson,
Ass't Atty Gen.).
n The Chadha case presents t.he Court with a somewha t 1in achronis tic, and pe rh a ps un usual!Y..vul'iTh~ ie. use of the legislali~veto. Since 1940, Congress hns bee n reviewing imli vlcTli'SI immigrAtion ndjUct lcnt ions an d ove rt.urninl( , inn tiny pern·ntugc of I' ORCH, t.he Attor ney General's dl'cision to sus pend deportation bast>d on hi ~ judgnwnt tha t expulsion would
work an "extreme ha rdhip." Sec McClure, Legislative Veto Provi~ions Und er the Immi gra tion Laws, in Studi es on the Legislative Ve to, supra not e 9, at :l78-95. Chadha is the fir st
alien thus nffect.Pd to win n conHt.itutional challenl(e Ul(ainst this procedure. Unlike thl' more
common application uf the device tu agency rulemaking or "inl'ormal" octionH Hu ch uti t.h e
siting of federal facilities, where the main constitutional dis putes relate to the distribution
of powers between the executive and legislative branches, thi s use to reject individual adju dications raises additional questions under the due process and bill of attainder clauseH. See
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First, the current political interest in the veto clearly focuses on its
application to rulemaking, and constitutional doubts about the
vefo nave'""IOoiliea"T~rge Tn the political struggles. 23 Particularly because the Court has been so silent on all forms of the veto during
the device's controversial fifty-year life, both sides in the political
debate will pore over the Chadha opinion for any implicit blessing
or rebuff the Court administers to the device in its other, more
u,.J/...~--~
significant uses. The most important stakes in Chadha, therefore,
consist not in Con ress...,.s a"6ilrtyto ~on'ti"nue review of irurrvidual
~~~
im~a... Ion ecisi_Qns, !ill.t m 1ts capac1 y to cont1~ue or ~pand
t..••~J..cA~
the d~e 2C~lie _y~o that currently claims t he center of its longstan mg fascination with the device.
A second reason for concentrating here on the veto of agency
rulemaking may be more significant. The rulemaking context
reveals in sharper relief both the virtues claimed for the device and
the serious but elusive problems the legislative veto entails.

~

II.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

The normal legislative process involves passage of legislation by

- - - -- ·- - - - - - - - - -- --- - - ----------

--

Buckley v. Valt·o, 424 U.S . I, 285 (1976) (per curiam) (White, ,J., concurrin~ in part nnd
dissenting in purl) . See generally Bruff, Presidentiul Power und i\dministrutive Hul('makin~ .
88 Yale L ..J. 4flt, 4HI -80 (197!l); Ciroppi v. Leslie, 404 U .S . 496 (19n) (due process limits on
state legislatur(''s udjudicntion of contempt for disruption of its proceedin!(s ). (Tlw Ninth
Circuit did not. base its decision in Chadha expressly on these ~rounds, se e fi:\4 F. 2d ut •t:l.'i
n.42, but due process considerations, eve n if no sn label ed , d ea rl y figured in its d ec is ion that
this legislative ve to invaded t.h e powers of the judicial br a nch. See id . at 428 -:12. ) In addi tion, this kind of case -by-case n·vie w, b~cause it is cuml)('rsome a nd ineffi cie nt., is criti cized
increasingly on non constitutional grounds, and <h e re an• s tron~ calls for its elimination in
any forthcoming revision of tlw immigration laws. S pe S('lect Commission on lmmi ~ rntion
and R efugee Poli cy , U.S . Immigration Policy und llw Nut ionul Interest 27H -7\J (1-'inul lteport, Murch l , l!lH I) .
uSee, e .g., 1-1.1\. Hep. No. 9f>- lllfi, 9 fl th Con~ .. 1st. St·ss. :Hi (1!!77) (ndditionul vi1·ws of
Chairmun BrookH, who fnvon•d 11 different hill with no 1\-gis lul.iw vPlo, sl.11ting th111 pr('s iden tial reorgani1.ot ion authority subject to le~.:islutiw ve to , 11s ultimut.ely provid ed in W77 reor ganization legi , lution , is um·onHI.itution a l); Cinnane , suprn rwlt· r,, ut f>HH (urgtrrrwnt. of tlll constitulionnlit~· 11s key l'lt•nwnl of opposition to v('(o irwl111h•d in l .('nd -l.l'llS!' i\c( of t!l~t) ;
Cooper & Coopt•r, s upru rwll' ;,, nl. 471 -72 fi n.t :! (coll eclin~ in s laru·ps wh('rt! cons lrlut.ionul
attacks have rt ·sull ed in modifil'ation or uhand o nrnenl of proposl'd l t>~i, lutivt• ve l•>) . That
constitulionnl ··nru·c rns should plu y this nitil'nl rolr• in n >~r g n·ss ionlll nllr s id!•rntion is no!
surprising. To pn•ss lhP uvuil uhl !' prud•·ntinl nrgtrrnl'ni H 11~11in s l. tlw d t•v in ' o ften r!'qtrirr>s
the s penke r to ;rssNt t.hut. the s lew11rd of the rww n•vit'w powers the ( :wr gn •ss il s!!lt would
exerciRc t.lwrn llnwist•ly or with unfortunule t.fft>l'l s. Till' hall s of Con ~ n·ss un · r11rlikl'l y t.o
provide n forum for rt•ct•ptivl' nlllsidPmtion of strl'h n dairn .
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both Houses and submission to the President for his approval or
veto. The legislative veto marks a sufficient departure from that
model that any first-year law student would spot a !ieparation~f
powers issue. Yet proponents of the legislative veto over agency
rUlemaking do not shrink from this test. The device, they assert,
not only does not violate separation of powers; it actually promotes
the aims of that doctrine. 24
The bedrock on which this argument is founded is unquestionably solid. The Constitution does not separate powers in any artificially absolute fashion, by some kind of a priori sorting into three
abstract categories. 2 ~ Instead, the Constitution blends and links IJ"'f~~
the various powers in such a way thaf each branch may serve ' as-;_n
L4~ 4.t-<~
effective check "7>n abuses or usurpations b tlie otliers. Writin'g in rl-~1~
The Federalist, Ma ison a m1tte t at the structure decided on in
26
Philadelphia might depart from the "beauty of form" implicit in
strict and pristine separation of powers. These departures, however, were adopted in the service of a higher necessity, in order to
"contriv[e] the interior structure of the government lso] that its
several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
27
means of keeping each other in their proper places."
The Framers, in their day, identified the legislature as the
branch most likely to encroach on the powers of coordinate
branches unless carefully restrained. 28 They drew that lesson from
their experience with the national government under the Articles
of Confederation and from their acquaintance with the dominance

24

For this argument, see, e.g., Javits 8i: Klein , supra note 5, at 479; Stewart,

~upru note 5,

at 615-19; Abourezk. supra note !\, at 327 & passim.
•• See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Sen·s., -1:1:1 \ I.S. 4:1f">. .142-4:1 ( 1977); 1\u<"klcy v.
1
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-124 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Nixon, 11~ U.S. liH:I, 707
(1974); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1066-70 (Ct. Ct. 1!:.177), cert . denif'd , 4:14 U.S.
1009 (1978); L. Fisher, supra note 8, at 1-20. There are several earlier rases, howPver, in
which the Court has appeared to accept a more rigid view requiring strid se paration. See,
e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 34:3 U.S. 1\79, [>87 -88 (1952) (majority opinion
per Black, J.); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. l~!J, 201-02 (l~l2H ); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 10:~ U.S. 168, 190-92 (1880).
•• The Federalist No. 47, at :l:l6 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
21 ld. No. 51. at 355. See also id. No. 37, at 269:
Experience has istructed us that no skill in the science of government has ye t been
able to discrimnate and define, with sufficiPnl certainty, its t.hree great provinces- the legislative, executive and judiciary; or even the privilet(eS and p11wers of
the different legislative branches.
•• See id. N<>. 48 .
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of the legislatures in the early state governments. 29 They adopted a
bicameral legislature and gave the President a qualified negative-a veto that can be overridden by supermajorities in both
Houses~largely to contain this threat of legislative usurpation. 30
The Framers' day, however, is not our day. 'T'he branch that n..Q_w
thr,_eatens to expand ,!Jey.Qnd j ts E.r212er ,pl~ce, assert the proponents
of tile legisTative veto, is theexecutive branch. The rapid growth of
administrative agencies over the last half century has resulted in
executive exercise of a wide array of powers that more traditionally
lodged within the other two branches.
Proponents of the legislative veto also identify broad delegations
of legislative authority to dministrative a encies as the main
source of this executive ag ran 1zement. 31 A I too frequently, in
creating a regu ory agency as the means of addressing a problem
the public deems pressing, the governing statute has supplied little
guidance as to the standards the agency is to apply, the precise
aims it is meant to achieve, or the methods it is to use. On occasion, agencies have received a mandate as broad as the injunction
to go forth and regulate in service of the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." 32 Whatever the wisdom of broad delegations of this character, they have become an established fixture,
and, the argument continues, certainly will remain.'so, given the
complexities of modern government. 33
When delegative legislation is this broad, the agencies' familiar
•• See L. Fisher, President and Congress: Power and Policy 1-27 (1972); G. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 40:1- l:l, 544-61 & pa~sim (1969).
30
See, e.g., 2 M. Farrand, Re cord~ of the Federal Convention of 1789 7:1-80. 298-:100
(1966) ; The Fed«.>rali~t No. 73, at 468-69 (R. Wright eel. 1961) (i\ . Hamilton) . See also id. No.
48, at :!43-47 (J. Madison); id . No. 51, at 356-fi?; id . No. 62, at 409-12; id. No. 71, at 460-G2
(A. Hamilton) ; Watson, supra note 5, at JO:l0-48; L. Fisher, supra note 2!l, at 18-22; Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 285 (1976) (per curiam) (White, .J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See generally Black, Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 87
(Spring 1976).
" See, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 5, at 5011-514; JavitR & Klein, Hupro note 5, at
459-65; Reexamination, su pra note 5, at 353-54; Stewart, supra note 5, at 616-l!l.
" This language is from the Communications Act, 17 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976), hut other
similar examples are legion . See H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The
Need for Better Definition of Standards 8 (1962). But cf. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of
Legislative Power: II, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 574 (1947); Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal
Administration, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1183, 1191 -92 (1973) (ostensibly vague "public interest"
standard may have more precise meaning in light of context and history (hereinafter cited
as Ideal Administration] .
" See, e.g., Javits & Klein, supra note 5, at 460; Ahourezk, supra not e 5, at :J:\4.
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power "to fill up the details" 34 in a statutory scheme amounts to
authority to m,!lke sweeping choices among ' eolicies~' choices with
far-re~ching cons~g u~s. Such choices amount to making law,
and lienee they bring agencies a good distance into what was once
the clear preserve of the legislature. The end result, assert the proponents of the legislative veto, is a major threat to our constitutional structure of balanced and coequal powers.
The JJxpanded role~·of the executive branch, it is argued, also
weakens tlie governmenr s acco unta6'irityto the public. 311 Unlike
the Congress, the executive branch contains only . two officials
elected by the people, and only one of consequence: the President.
Although all employees of the executive branch agencies are formally answerable to him, the scope of modern government is so
vast that he becomes involved personally in only a small proportion of agency decisions. Thus a great many key policy decisions
actually are made in the a encies by persons who never face t he
electora e. T e so-called "i~depen ent a&_encies s an even more
dramatically outside any framework of accountability, for their
members are shielded formally from direct responsibility even to
the President. The agencies, unlike the elected Congress, therefore
mny ad without regara to the will ...of the electorate or with a narrow-mind;r=disregard fu r what the pu iJlic wiJJ :*'tulerute . The ill fated 1974 regulations that would have required seat-belt interlocks in all new cars furnish an oft-cited example. 36
In earlier years, in the wake of the Schechter Polutry decision, 37
it appeared that the third branch, the judiciary, might play a significant role in protec~ing against the executive agrandizement
that can result from broad delegations. Any such promise has~ng

I
34
Un ited S ta tes v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. [>06, 517 ( 19 11); Wayma n v. So ut ha rd, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 42 (1 825).
"• See, e.g. , Mill er & Knapp, s upra note 5, at :176, :11:l:l; .Javits & Kl ein , surHa note f>, at
460.
'" 49 C. F.R. § 57 1.20!) (1 974). Th e Motor Ve hicl e a nd Schoolbus Safet y Am e ndm e nts of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 4 9~. § 109, 88 Sta t. 14 70, required t he Sec reta ry of Tra ns por ta ti on to
rescind th ese interl oc k requireme nts and subjected future rul es co nce rnin g passive restraints to legisla tive ve to.
" A.J..A. Schec hter Poultry Corp. v. l lnil eo Stnt es, ~!If> li .S. 4!l!'> (19:l!i). See al so Pa na ma
Refinin ;.: Cu. v. Rya n, ~!J : l U.S . :l8!l ( 19:lf>l. On I he evo lution of lm >ad d e l q~a li o n s a nd t he
courts' res ponse thereto , see G. Robinson & E . Gellhorn , Th e AdministratiVP Process :14 12.')
(l sed. 1974) .
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since dissipated. 38 Although some signs may point to a revival of
the nondelegation doctrine, 39 today it probably remains available
only to strike down delegations so wide that they amount to utter
40
abdication of legislative responsibility.
If it is unrealistic in the modern world to expect Congress to
d!,lega,te, .Il-;;rowiY, and if the court! no longer serve as a bulwark
against inadequately restramed agency authority, then the system
badly needs other mechanisms to return the executive branch to
its proper place within a well-functioning system of checks and
balances.• 1 In this way, the argument runs, the legislative veto
faithfully serves the aims of the doctrine of separation of powers.
It is a device that adds a streamlined check, in the sole control of
Congress, against the errors or abuses of administrative agencies.
Moreover, proponents assert, the legislative veto reestablishes
the link of accountability that is broken when unelected administrators make important policy decisions. Congress cannot be expected to foresee all the recise a plications of a regulatory
sc erne 1 aunc es. nstead, t e agency, composed o specialists
who can devote full time to the endeavor, undertakes this more
detailed function when it proposes and promulgates specific regulations to implement a broadly-worded statute. At that point, after
the agency has fulfilled its role but before those more precise provisions take effect, it is argued that Congress should have another
look. The veto allows Congress, the branch that is allegedly "clos-

-

•• See, e.g., FPC v. New England Power Co., 41 5 U.S. :345, 3!12-5:3 (Mars hall, J., concurring and dissenting) (nondelegation doctrine, "which was briefly in vogue in the 19:30's, has
been virtually abandoned by the Court f,pr all practical purposes"); Gellhorn & Robinson,
Perspectives on Administrative Low, 75 Colum. L. Rev . 771, 77tl -79 (197f>) .
•• See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan , 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2507- 10 (Rchnqui st, .J.,
dissenting); lndustrinl Union Dept. v. American Petroleum lnst. , 148 U.S. 607, 671 -88 (1980)
(llehnquist, J .. concurring in the jud~ment); J . F.ly, Democra cy and Distrust 131 -:14 ( 1980);
T . Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy and the Crisi~ of l'ubli c Authority :ltl7-U9
(1969); Gewirtz, Thr Courts, Congress, and Executive l'nlicymaking: Nott•s on Thr!'e Doctrines, 40 Law & Contemp. Prob. 46 (Spring 197()); Wri~ht., Rook Review, HI Yale I. .. J. 57!1,
582-87 (1972).
' 0 See, e.g., Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workm en v. Connally, :l:l7 F. Supp.
737 (D.D.C. 19'i I) (~ustaining the constitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970, whi ch gave thl' President the power to take action "aapropriate to s tabili ze prices,
rents, wages and salaries").
" See, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 5, at 5 11; Mill(•r & Knapp, supra notr
77.
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est and most responsive to the needs and will of the citizenry," to
bring its heightened responsiveness to bear on the specific provisions. In that fashion, the government's ultimate accountability to
the people is reestablished.
All of these assertions of course rest in part on the observation
that the legislative veto does not expressly contravene any explicit
provisions of the Constitution. But proponents also press a more
fundamental argum!nt for the constituhonaT va1iaity of the aevice.
Congress, if it Chose and l'i"ad the ftme;\inaeniabfy could legislate
in great detail in any area now delegated to the administrative
agencies, 43 leaving only the most minor ministerial functions to the
bureaucrats. 44 The Internal Revenue Code provides a modern example of the depths of detail to which Congress may descend if it
chooses.~ 11

This greater power- so the argument runs- should be recognized as including the lesser. 46 In other words, if Congress may
strip away virtually all discretion of the a encies by nchly detailed
leg1s a 10n, su:e y the agenci_!ls oug_!!t n~ object if they retain wide
substantjye_d~cr.e!J.on, \Jut oecome subject only to the les0ntrusive ~~of the legislative veto. Under the legislative
veto, the initial policy discretion remains at all tiflles with the
agencies. Even after a first round of regulations have· met with disapproval, the agency, not the Congress, drafts alternative regulations. In this view, the device simply provides a more streamlined
mechanism for Congress to control the discretion that it could, if it
wished, take away entirely.
" The quote is taken from one of the recent regulatory reform bills, S. !04, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., § J!b)(6l (1979).
" There may be certain fields, especially affecting the President's foreign affairs and
Commander-in -C hief powers, where Congress could not deprive the President of a reasonable degree of discretion . The boundaries of any such protected are are, to say the least,
indistinct. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 34:3 U.S. 579, 6:\4-6:38 ( L9fi2) (,Jackson, J., concurring); L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 89-123 (1972). See generally Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981) .
.. As early as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. I Cranch) 137, 165-66 (180:3) , the Court recognized the legislature's authority to confine executive .d iscretion, by law, and leave the officer with only ministerial functions to carry out. See Rruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68 Va. [,. Rev. I, _ (1982) .
•• Or perhaps one should say the heights to which it may ascend.
•• See Boi,vert. supra notP 5, . at 657; Cooper & Cooper, supra note 5, at 497; .Javits &
Klein, supra note 5, at 472- n.
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DEFECTS IN THE ARGUMENTS

These principal arguments in favor of the legislative veto are
grounded in a sound understanding of the Constitutional Convention's handiwork, including the Framers' attention to subtly interacting and complex checks and balances. And the arguments appeal to an important thread in recent public thinking, properly
concerned about agency excesses and broadly skeptical of executive power-a legacy of the Vietnam war and the Watergate
scandal.
The arguments nonetheless are flawed. We may uncover their
weaknesses most readily by focusing on the claim that the legislative veto is merely a "lesser" exercise of Congress's "greater"
power to narrow its delegation and confine agency discretion
through detailed enactments. This claim implies that the veto
makes no significant change in possible outcomes, but merely furnishes a more streamlined and efficient way of reaching equally
achievable results. Comparing the exercise of the veto with the
"greater" power of statutory specification, however, reveals that
the former lmmcheH a distinctive process hs=wing its own particular
dynamics and bias ~ . That proce!:l!:l muy well yieill u different out
come, especially when sharp political controversy makes the sustaining of consensus difficult. Too often that outcome may be
deadlock. In addition, the veto may debase the kind of accountability the framers envisaged, and in the end it probably perpetuates many of the problems associated with broad delegations.
A.

-

The Luxury of Being Negative

Assume that an agency promulgates controversial regulations
and that its regulations are subject to a one -Hom;e veto. The
agency must transmit its regulations to both Houses and wait
before implementing them. In the interim, any member of Con- ~ AC4 ~·•· J..e.,gress may introduce a veto resolution, which can serve only to dis~UC.~
approve the r-;;gt'ilatio~ 7lnde"r""co-;;;ideration and cannot be the ve"'~h>
hicle for enacting Congress's preferred alternative. This restriction
on the resolution's function is no mere accident in the drafting of ~
the statutes establishing legislative veto schemes. The very conceptual foundation of the legislative veto mandates carefully confining
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those resolutions to mere disapprovin&_ acti2_ns. 47 If the resolution
purported to do more than disapprove, its authors scarcely could
deny that it constitutes full-dress legislation, unquestionably required under the Constitution to be passed by both Houses and
submitted to the President.
This fundamental feature of disapproval resolutions invites a
pu~ly ne~ative a~Qroacb in the congressional debate and vote.
When sue a resolution is the pending item of business, it is not
strictly Congress's job to compare the a ency's regulations against
any particula!, alteq~l!t~e e age~cy might have consi cred. Other
alternatives -are notbefore the Congress and cannot be brought
there by amendment of the resolution of disapproval. Because the
agency alone will dictate whether any particular substitute comes
before the Congress, why should members undertake the added labor needed to spell out the alternative they prefer? The resulting
congressional debate is tailormade to bring forth eloquent recitations of the disadvantages of the agency's proposed regulations,
uncluttered by acknowledgment of the difficulties with any alternative scheme.
There results a market imbalance in the respective roles of the
agency and the Congress. The agency's officials doubtless could recite, with equal eloquence, the disadvantages of the scheme chosen.
But they never had the luxury of simply voting up or down on a
particular package, leaving the resulting mop-up and response to
someone else. Instead, in promulgating the regulations, they had to
weigh the relative merits and drawbacks of several possible implementing plans, each having its own peculiar set of advantages and
disadvantages. The significarlt question for the agency was not
whether any particular alternative had drawbacks; on important issues, all possible alternatives come with noted disadvantages. The
question was which set of disadvantages the agency would choose
to live with. 48
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 284 -1:!6 (1976) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Javits & Klein, Hupra note fi, nt. 4Hfi. Even where Congrt•ss has
formally retaim•d power to veto parts of llf{l'IH'Y rules nr PI h!'r proi><>Red ut"t ions, il IIHIIIllly
has been careful to preserve this conceptuul foundntion . Spe noll• 10 supra.
•• Of course, the agency also <'An act in certain ways that may obscun · the choi ,· •· it is
making or allow it lo avoid the toughest choices. Its ruiPs or ord<•rs can employ broad or
vague language compatible with several possible interpretationh, see, e.g., I•'TC v. Ruhcroid
Co., 343 U.S. 470, f>H5 -86 (Jackson, J _. , dissenting), or it can choose to ael via case-hy· case
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An example based on a longstanding and still undecided policy
debate will illustrate. The Department of Transportation (DOT)
has promulgated two different sets of regulations (not subject to
legislative veto) to define local transit authorities' obligations to
accommodate the needs of the handicapped, obligations established, in very general terms, by the Rehabilitation Act of 197:3 and
other federal statutes! 9 DOT voluntarily withdrew the first set
when it issued the second in 1979. The second, which imposed high
costs on many transit systems, provoked each House to pass fulldress bills to modify the regulations, but the 96th Congress ended
00
before the respective versions could be reconciled.
Shortly thereafter, however, a court vacated the regulations and
returned them to DOT for reconsideration, without narrowing the
range of substantive options available to the agency.~
The choice once again before the agency is not a simple one. In
roughest outline, there are five major positions that could be taken
on the question of the federal government's role in assuring the
accommodation of the handicapped in mass transit systems. The
first is the simplest: one might ordain that there be no federal involvement in the issue whatever. The second option invokes federal policing in the area, but only to the extent of assuring nondiscrimination. DOT would move against any local transit authorities
1

adjudications rather than through rulemaking, leaving its ultimate policy deci sions hidden
until a pattern emerges over many years, or perhaps avoiding any clear and consi~tent pattern altogether. See Rohinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication, 118 U.~Pa . L. Rev. 485, 526-:19 (1970); H. Friendly, supra
note 32, at 97 -105.
" The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. ~ 794 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979); Urban
Mass Transit Act of 1964, § 16, 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976 & Supp. lil 1979); Federal-Aid
Highway Act of Hl73, § 165(b), 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (I H76). The first rr~ulations appeared
at 41 Fed. RE'g. 18.2:{4 (1976). hut were withdrawn in response to new guidelines promulgated by the Department of HE>alth, Education and Welfare (I-lEW) pursuant to an Executive Order. The 8t•qucnce of evt"nts is described in dcl.uil in i\rn!'Tican l'uh . Transil i\sH'n v.
Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1273-76 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The second set. of regulations appeared at 44
Fed . Reg. 31.442 ( 1979).
•o See N .Y. Tim es, Dec. 5, 19tl0, at BIO, col. 1; id ., Dec. 6, 1Htlll, at. 10, ('ol. I; id .. Dec. 1:1,
1980, at A54 , col. 6 Earlier statutory provisions enacted to address the pending DOT
rules- by requiring the agency to perform more detailed studies, imposing "report and
wait" provisions, and prescribing short-term appropriations limitations, rather than mnking
substantive changes to the underlying legislative authority- are recountPd in American Pub.
Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F . Supp. 811,818-19 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Amer ican Pub. Tmnsit AsR'n v. Lewis, 655 F .'2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
•• 655 F .2d at 1280.
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gratuitously excluding the blind or the retarded, for example, from
any mass transit system, but it would not require costly affirmative steps to accommodate those physically unable to use ordinary
facilities. ~
The other three options all presuppose that the federal govern ment will require some level of affirmative expenditures to meet
the needs of the handicapped. The agency might, for example, require each local jurisdiction to modify all its facilities and equipment to make them accessible to all handicapped individuals, especially to those in wheelchairs, for whom accommodation is the
most difficult and expensive. The 1979 regulations embodied this
third approach, usually referred to as "mainstreaming." Under the
fourth option, the federal government instead would mandate provision of special wheelchair-equipped vans, known as paratransit.
Such vans would respond, like taxicabs, to phone calls by individual patrons, but the service would be provided at public transit
prices. Fifth, the federal government could leave to each local jurisdiction authority to choose its own mix of mainstreaming and
paratransit to meet the needs of the handicapped in its locality.~ 3
DOT hecurne involved in the iH~lW hecau~e Con~reHH Hquarcly re jected the first .option-no federal involvement- when it adopted
the Rehabilitation Act. A section of that statute, widely praised
and noncontroversial when enacted, forbids discrimination against
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in any project or program receiving federal funds.~• But like many statutes broadly delegating implementation responsibilities to regulatory agencies, the
highly general phrasing of the provision allowed Congress to end
2

•• In ce rtain fed e ra lly fund ed programs, LIH• l{e hnhilit.ation Act. requires only l.hi s form of
ba s ic "evpnhanded t.reatmt·nl" nnd does not requirP s uhj Pc t. a~ e n c iP s to in cur s ubsta ntial
cos ts l.o implemt•nt. "affirmative efforts to ovl' rconw th e di s abiliti es <'U IIHed hy ha ndicaps ."
HouthcaBlt•rn Community Collt·~e v. l>nvis, •1-1 2 li .S. :t!J7, ·110 ( I!J7!)). llut thi s ;lltlhorit.nti VI'
I'OilHt.rudion or I ill' l!ehnhilit.nt.ion Ac t hy t lw Suprt'llll' C'ourt docs not di c t.att · I)()' J"s ult imnt.e ehoit·t• 11111nn~ the options, for !lOT nl so mus t irnplt•n•t·nt two otht•r statutory provi
sions. See note .I!J s upra . llnlike t.he ){ehuhilit.ation Al'l , th ey e xpress ly r<•quirl' "s(H'I'ial d
forts" or "spet·ial plnnnin ~ o r d esign" to un:omrnodatc lhP e lderly nnd th,, handi cnpped .
Because DOT's 1979 regulntion s were ground e d almost exclusively on th e ugt·ncy'H undPr s tanding or the l{e habilitation Act (prior to the lJuuis dec is ion), the r c vi e win~ murt vu cal cd
them and remanded the mutte r t.u the agency for it t.o dete rmine, in th e first in s tance , tlw
8ignificunce of I he other t.wo s tatutes. fi5!'> F.2d at 12HO .
•• See g"nerully 4H5 F. Supp. ut RI fi -81 !I, H27 -2H; w·,;, F.2d at 127 :1 -711 , 127!1.
•• Se<:t.ion 50~ of the Rt·huhilitation Act of 1H?:l, 2!J \J .H.C . § 7!H (I B7fi and Supp. Ill
1979) .
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its role at the point where the politically difficult choices began.t~t~
Partisans of each of the other four options, to varying degrees,
stand ready to contest the choice of the precise implementation
scheme in the mass transit context. Any choice by DOT exposes
the agency to criticism, because each implementation option carries noteworthy disadvantages.t~ 6 The agency thus bears the
toughest responsibility. If, before repromulgation, Congress subjects DOT's new regulations to legislative veto, members of Congress debating any resulting resolution of disapproval may confine
themselves to unearthing and parading the none-too-secret disadvantages of whatever option the agency selects.
One should not exaggerate the likelihood that the congressional
debate will assume such a soleiynegabve character. Any COngressilliiilwho takes fiis role seriouSTY of course wiiT not wish to d isapprove one set of regulations unless he sees his way clear to another
alternative with fewer disadvantages. A committee reporting a disapproval resolution to the floor often will state the alternative it
seeks to have implemented following rejection of the current proposal. And, in any event, only a small percentage of proposed rules
is likely to provoke an actual floor vote on a resolution of
disapproval. 67
•• See J . Ely, su p ra note 39, a t 131-33 (1980) ; Ideal Administra tion , s upra noll· :12, a t
1190-92 (broad delegations ofte n amount to "little more than a di sposition to pass the
buck"); T . Lowi , s upra note 39, at 288-99.
Neil Goldschmidt, who became Secretary of Tra nsportation in 1979, as ked seve ra l Con gressmen involved in passage of the Rehabilitation Act exac tly wh a t th ey e nvi sion l'd with
respect to mass tran sit. He re ported himself enormous ly frustrated a t th e fruits of 1 hat in quiry: "None of the m know, because none of th em really thought ahout it too much." Rob erts, Harder Times Make Social Spenders Hard Mind ed," N.Y . Times, Augus t :J, 1980, at
E3, col. 1.
•• A nondiscrimination posture may be criti cizPd for failure to address th e real 11 eeds of
those physically unable to usc ordinary buses or subways. Ma instreaming , whi"h DOT
adopted in its 1979 r·egulations, drew heuvy ait.ici s m for the fantastic expr•nse it. W<•trld im pose on local jurisdictions; whee lchair lifts for buses eun cos t as mu ch ns $I f>,OOO per bus,
and the retrofit of existing subway facilities entails expenditures in the millions. Para tra ns it
is subject to thP charge that it revives a system of separate- but-equ a l in Ameri ca n socia l life.
And local option will assume the disadvantages assigned t.o whi cheve r of the previous two
schemes the local a uthority chooses. See Roberts, suprn note f>5; 44 Fed . Reg. :1 I ,4/if>-60
(May 31, 1979) (O .O.T .'s discu ss ion of the various alternatives in its state ment accompa nying promulgation of the final 1979 rules) .
67 This apparently is the judgment of most supporters of such revi ew, and, give n limitations on congrE>ssional staff, time, and attention, th e vi ew seems justified . See 2 Sen. Comm .
on Gov't Affairs, 9f> th Cong., 1s t Sess., Study on Federal Regulation 1:!0-22 (Comrn. Print
1977) [hereinafte r cited as Senate Study!: McGowan, supra note !'i, at I 146-47.
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But the interesting and important case for our consideration is
not the ordinary one. It is rather the limiting case, where the underlying issue provokes storms of intense political controversy and
tempts members of Congress, pressed hard by affected interest
groups/~ 8 to act irresponsibly. In these circumstances, the imperatives of the regulatory program-to arrive at some coherent and
prudent scheme for implementation-diverge from the political
imperatives constraining the representative.l) 9 From the vantage
point of a member of Congress, the political art consists not only
in choosing the right substantive option, but also-and perhaps
more importantly-in controlling when one makes such a choice.
To take the floor and declare squarely for one of four options
alienates three interest groups. Coming out against one option, the
one the agency has chosen, alienates only one. The member then
retains an important degree of flexibility as to future choices.
Indeed, the legislative veto holds out even better possibilities for
a Congressman who feels extremely vulnerable. Unlike the agency,
•• House members increasingly look in fear or for favor to the special intere~ts. and especially to the Ringle-issue groups who, they believe, can defeat them back in their dis trict. The result, if not chaos, is something like the traditional .picture of the eighteenth -century Polish Diet, where hundreds of independent members, bound hy no
ties of party and each as proud as a sovereign, jealou~ly guarded the power to block
anything the king might attempt, without ever organizing any means of putting for ward alternative policies of their own.
G. Hodgson, All Things to All Men: The False Promise of the American Presidency I :lH
(1980). See also id. at 179-82.
•• [I]T is simply easlier, and it pays more visible politi('al dividends, to play errand-hoy
cum-ombudsman than to play one's part in a genuinely legislative pro<·ess. How mu('h
more comfortable it must be\imply to vote in favor of a bill calling for safe cars.
clean air, or nondiscrimination, and to IPave to others the chon· of fleshing out what
such a mandate might mean. How much safer, too- nnd here we got to the nub. I-' or
the fact seems to be that on most hard issues our representatives quite shrewdly pre
fer not to have to stnnd up and be counted but rather to let some executive-branch
bureaucrat, or perhaps some independent regulatory commission, "take the inevitabiC'
political heat." As Congressman Levitas put it, ''When hard decisions have to be
mad<•, we pass the buck to the agencies with vaguely worded statutes." And as Con gressman Flowers added, wat what comes later is a virtually no-loss situation:
"[TJhen we stand back and say when our constituents are aggrieved or oppressed hy
various rules and regulations, 'Hey, it's not me. We didn't mean that. WP passed this
well-meaning legislation, and we intended for those people out there . . . to do ex actly what we meant. and they did not do it."
J. Ely, supra note 39, at 131 -32 (footnotes omitted). The legislative veto furnishes a show of
Congress's doing something about the activities of those agencies, but still stopping wC"II
short of Congr!'ss's assuming the responsibilities and ngonies inherent. in "a genuinely legislative process. •·

I

e

D.rby

0 2- Feb- 8 2

1979]

02: lB

STYLE: SY: (STY LESlVA.BSl¥1, ll

H l t : SY : (DARBY 3)~7007 (7 0,22>

Darby Printing Company .

Si:Q: 21

21

he is under no obligation to state the reasons for his vote. He need
not take the floor and speak at all. He may simply vote to disapprove, thereby appearing as an ally of three of the contending
groups. If he is later pressed by the fourth, perhaps he can explain
his vote by declaring that he is no diehard foe of that group's basic
approach. Rather, he simply found certain technical flaws in the
details of the precise regulations the agency sent up. The fourth
group, to be sure, may not credit this explanation. But the explanation is entirely consistent with the only solid record evidence,
because a legislative veto generally calls for a single up-or-down
vote on the full package of regulations, with all their attendant
details. 60
"
One can understand readily why the preservation of such flexi bility makes the legislative veto attractive to members of Con ress.
Nevertheless, Congress is electe to un erta e t e difficult policy
choices needed to address .public issues, even at the cost of personal anguish and possible election defeats. Whether the veto is
attractive from the point of view of the public, to whom the representatives stand accountable, therefore presents a much different
question. The veto simply mny add to the ori~inal technique of
broad delegation a new means for Congress to make a public Hhow
of addressing an important issue, while yet evading direct responsibility for the affirmative choices that ultimately are essential.
If Congress instead must respond to unpopular regulations by
means of a statute because no legislative veto mechanism applies,
the odds are somewhat better that the product will escape the negative mode. Even if the opponents of the regulations begin with a
bill that serves solely t.o block them and says nothing about the
alternative that should replace them , amendments designed to implement an alternative usually are not precluded. Furthermore, the
supporters of the regulations, by skillful introduction of amendments and insistence on recorded votes, may force their colleagues
to take a stand on alternative courses open to the agency. Such
votes would help to strip the members of the luxury of ~eing only
negative. Beyond this, the President could veto a measure that
•• There are a few limited exce ptions where Congress oste nsibl y may ve to ce rta in st•ve rable portions of a regulation package, but Congress has used this a pparent power ra rely, and
the agencies have resi~ted it through withdrawal of I he package when port ions have hee n
vetoed. Sec note 10 supra.

,.

e

D.rby

02-Feb-62

22

02:16

STYLE: SY:tSTYLESIVA.BS~(l,ll

FIL E: SY:<DARUYJI57007(70,221

Virginia Law Review

SEQ: 22

[Vol. :31:1

serves merely to block and insist that Congress choose among alternative implementation schemes before he acquiesces in striking
down the one the agency selected.
None of these potential benefits of the statutory response is inevitable, of course. A statute can be used in a solely negative way.
The agency's supporters may not be sufficiently skillful in offering
amendments, or they may lack enough support to force a record
vote. Alternatively, the opponents of the regulations might seize on
certain forms of bills, such as appropriation riders, that preclude
most amendments manifesting an affirmative choice. 61 The President might choose not to veto a statute that is solely negative, or
the Congress might tie the blocking provision to a piece of legislation the President feels he cannot afford to veto. 62
Acknowledging these possibilities, however, drains little force
from the observations above. The statutory process can bring with
it a direct facing of Con~ress's responsib ility to choose among competing impl;m'Emtab on alternatives, aithough it cannot guarantee
that outcOme. Thel egislative v;fo is not subject to such a use. The
very logic of the veto device requires that resolutions of disapproval play ~wlely a negative role.
~

B.

Effects on the Process of Legislative Compromise

Even if Congress chooses to move beyond negative reaction,
other problems arise. Suppose, contrary to the usual political logic,
that a congressional majority, before vetoing controversial agency
regulations, takes upon itself ~the added labor and political risk
needed to agree on the precise alternative it wishes the agency to
11 Congressionnl rul es forbid attaching legislative provisions to appropriations hill ,. Sen.
Rule XVI, 11 2 & 4, SPn. Doc. 239, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (19tl:l). House Rult' XXI, 11 ~. H.R.
Doc. No. 812, 77th Cn ng., 2d Sess. 383 (1943). See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 4•12 U.S. :w,, ::15961 (1979); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-91 (1978) . A rider forbidding the use of ap )•ropriated moneys to carry out certain programs or enforce certain r e~u l at ion s nevertheleh'< may
have a significant suh8tantive effect, but only to negatP . SPe ~rnc rally l'arnell , Cong ressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The I.R.S. ExpcriciH'P, 89 Yalt• I...J . 1360. t:17275 (1980).
02 United Statrs v. Lovett, :128 U.S. 303, :105 & n.l (l~J.Ifil. furni~hes an rxamp iP oi' such
congressional action. Congress secured the Preside nt's si~nnt.ure 1111 a hill 1nduding ~~ measure the President rleeply opposed (essentially tl'fminuting the appointments of three
named employees) h:v attaching it to an urgent supplempntal oppropriatinn to provide ad ded funds for tht> wur effort. The Supreme Court dcdared t Jw mt·Hsure ur11·onstitution;d a~ a
forbidden bill of attainder.
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adopt. How should the legislators embody their compromise and
communicate it to the agency?
One avenue clearly is foreclosed. The majority cannot enact its
alternative by amending the resolution of disapproval. Instead,
each member of the majority supporting the compromise could
make a floor statement outlining and declaring support for the fa vored substitute. A more efficient course, one occasionally used in
past veto battles, would be to incorporate a careful statement of
the alternative in the relevant committee report accompanying the
63
proposed resolution of disapproval to the floor of that House.
The usual process of judicial construction of Congress's more familiar product, statutes, has accustomed us to look to the committee report as perhaps the most important indicator of detailed congressional intent, the full expositor of the compromises reached
during enactment, and at times a guide to more precise legislative
standards that can help sustain the statute against any challenge
based on the nondelegation doctrine. 64
But any similarity between committee reports in these two settings ends precisely at that point. Consider the process following
disapproval. Assume that the agency, following public notice and
comment, duly promulgates a second set of regulations care fully
tracking the approach outlined in the committee report that. accompanied the resolution of disapproval. 6 ~
Mere correspondence between the new regulations and the committee report does not authorize the agency to bypass another
round of congressional review. The new regulations, like the first,
must lie before Congress. Even if the earlier committee report gave
an accurate picture of the alternative that a majority of a particular House was prepared to support at the time of the first resolution of disapproval, no member is obligated to hold to that view
when the second set of regulations materializes, probably several
83 See S Rep. No. \H -:~68. 94th Cong., 1st Scss. -t- 1[> (I B7fl ) \ w to of (;SA rq(ul ut ions n• garding presidenl ial materials); S. Rep. No. 94-409, 94th Cong., l st Ses, . (1975) (Vl'tq of
certain regulations proposed by th e Federal Elect ions Commission ).
" See Zuber v. Allen, :196 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) ; Unitl'd Stall's v. O'Bri f' n, :191 li .S. :lfi7,
385 (1968); Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States H<Hising Auth., 41iH F .2d I , li 7 n.7
(8th Cir. 1972). rt'ft. denied, 410 ll .S. 927 (197:l) .
•• There is no ~uamntee that the agen cy record will wind upor up furni shing ad(•quate
support for regulntions in a form that the House or Sena tc favors. In contrast, direct lf' gislative action, by stntute, is not equally bound to the requirement of precise support in a par-

ticular record.
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months later. 66 From the day of the first veto, partisans of approaches other than the one blessed in the committee report may
continue their lobbying. Indeed, their efforts may gain strength
during that period. Knowing in some detail the alternative the~
must contest, they have months to sharpen and refine their arguments. They may succeed in changing some congressional minds,
and if there is an intervening election, they may change several
bodies as welL No matter how carefully negotiated the first compromise may have been, the agency simply has no guarantee that
~ts second set of regulations will escape congressional veto.
s ...:a::.:n~d::;..;r:-=e~li..;:a~b.;;;;il~it~y---"o.;..f....-9
Con_!.r as t th-~-!::.~.~.It wJ.th ~he~.~e:..;f;fe:;c;.;t~iv~e:;.n;.:e..:,s:..
statutory response to unpopular regulations, where the cowproeiiibodied"'in new standards included in the statute itself,
mfse
amplil'led,ir necessary, in t he accompanying committee report. If
the agency follows guidelines of this character, it need not worry
about additional lobbying in Congress, because later changes in
congressional sentiments are irrelevant. The later Congress simply
will not be seised of the matter, unless of course it takes upon itself the overall discipline required by the usual legislative process
and formally amends the statute. If the agency is challenged in
court, the committee. report fortifies the flf.{ency's
. cas/ 'fhe court,
unlike the later Congress, is bound by expreHHiom; of JegiHlativc illtent properly voiced in connection with the passage of full-fledged
legislation, whether they be taken directly from the statutory text
or derived from the legislative history. Even when that legislative
guidance is vague or ambiguous, by design (to fudge a tough political issue) 67 or by inadvertence, it remains controlling. The agency
may guess wrong about the legislative intent-which is to say, differently from the guess finally settled upon by the reviewing

is

•• Of course, if the scheme allows veto by a single House, any such committee report will
spell out the views of only one House. There is no mechanism equivalent to a conference
report to iron out any differences between the two Houses, and one House's commitlee' report does no't purport to give the agency guidance as to the views of the other chamber.
87
See American Textile Mfrs. lnst. v. Donovan, 101 S . CL 2-17H, 2509 ( IHHl) (Rt•hnquist,
J., dissenting) ("Hat he r than make that choice und resolvl' that difficult policy isslH', how ever, Congress passed . . . . The words . . . were used to mask a fundamental polir v disa greement in Congress."); J. Ely, supra note :19, at t:H-:14; Ackerman & Hassler, Bey<111d the
New Deal: Coni and the Clcnn Air Act, H9 Yule L..J. I"()(). J!·,o!l - 1 I (I !JHO) (i<·gislotiVP history
can be loaded up with hopelessly inconsistent and confusinl{ statemen!s in an effort to
please diverse constituencies; therefore, greater weight should be given to the text of the
statute).
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court. 68 But it can base its guessing on a fixed and familiar body of
past legislative materials. It need not follow the day-lo-day psychology of the current legislators.
With ordinary legislation, in other words, the agency receives authoritative guidance to congressional intent. Compromises reached
in the legislative veto process have no equivalent st"a)hng powe r .
Any committee repor t accompanymg a resotufion '01 a 1sapproval
and outlining alternative regulations conslilules a mere snapshot
of the current congressional mood. At best, it predicts the mood to
be expected when the agency returns with new regulations. At
worst, it is a mirage, holding out an oasis of congressional approval
that may recede into the distance as the agency labors to reach its
pretended location.
Some proponents of the legislative veto have recognized obliquely the difference in authoritativeness sketched above, bul understandably they have not pursued the implications. Jacob Javits
and Gary Klein (the former Senator and a staff aide) have written:
"Certainly no exercise of the congressional oversight role, including
the legislative veto, can replace or infringe on the judiciary's role
as the ultimate interpreter of legislative intent." That is, the
agency remains bound by any standards laid out in the original
legislation, amplified by that enactment's legislative history. They
go on:
The purpose of congressional oversight is to insure that the Executive is administering the law in accordance with a dynamic political intent based on Congress's current interpretation of the public
interest... . If the device is used, not only must the exercise of
administrative discretion be consistent with the original statutory
intent- the juducial standard-but it must also meet the test of
current public interest as determined by Congniss.""

•• Thou~:h thP court. ~en e rully defers to the agency's constru ct ion of th e stat utl' it nd ministerM, see Lldall v. Tallman , :180 U.S. l, 16- 17 (196f>), that dcfcrcrH'< is not. aut"mat.i c.
See Southeastern Community Collel(e v. Davis, 442 li .S. :l!l?. 4 ll (I \!79) ; T Pam sters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) .
•• Javits & Klein , supra note fi, at 472-73 (emphasis added).
This statement represents a more sophisticated and straightforward vi ew of the us<' of the
congressional veto th an was common at earlier stages of th e de bate when support er' sometimes claimed that Congress's role was to veto only those rul es that strayed outsid e the
original congressional intent underlying the agency's ba ~ i r authori zing statute- providing,
in essence, for expeditious striking down of rules I hat wert• in excess of ll'gn l auth ority. S ee
Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 5, nt 1419. Some statutes still on th e books t•xpressly limit the
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However fancy the label, an agency scrambling to match "dyveto's use to thi~ kind of legal review. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1:!:\~(d) (1~J7(i c'« Supp. !II 1!179). as
amended by Puh. L. No. 96-:374. § 1302, 94 Stat. 1497 (lHHO) (vrto power over certain rules
relatin!( to education). Sec 43 Op. Atty. Gen., No. ~fi ( I!JH()) (ar~uin~ that this kind of veto
invades the cost itutional domain of the ,Judicinry).
One should greet. with skepticism any claim that the actual exercise or congressional veto
power will observe such limits. Congress is far better suited for policy rl'view of rulPs than
for legal review, and probably en~ages in the former even when its veto comes clothed in the
language of the latter. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 5, at I~ J 9 - ~.w. See M('(;owan, supra note
5, at 1136-37. The views of later legislators as to the intent of' earlier Congressl's are too
easily colored by subsequent developments that were not even remotely within contemplation at the time of passage. For similar reasons, courts, when construing statutes, traditionally have viewed post-enactment statements by legislators or committees as poor indicators
of the original statutory intent. Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, •I I 9 U.S. I 02, 132
(1974); United Statrs v. Phi!adl'lphia Nat'! Bank, :l74 U.S. :l21, :\4H-49 ( 1961).
This approach amounts to judicial insistence on the inte~rit.y of the statutory process.
Statements thai might inform understanding of the statute's meaning should be on record
at the time of f:'nactment. If they are, the other members voting on the bill may hase their
voting decisions- at least in theory and often in practice- on their understanding of the
subtle shades of' meaning imparted to ambiguous legislative text by more precise statements
in the legislative history. In addition, the President can be equally informed when he decides to sign the bill or veto it. Obviously, post hoc statements cannot fulfill this function.
See generally Landi~. A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 4:l Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888-89
(1930).
Bills enacted with broad delegations to agencies or vaguely phrased stafldards often re flect two diffei-Pnt kinds of situations. First, Congress simply may not have taken the time
to think through thP standard's precise aaplication in the difficult settings that ultimately
arise as the scheme is implemented. Such congressional inattention is especially <"ommon
when the statute sets the regulatory gears in motion toward a popular and noble aim that
one cannot plausibly attack. See J. Ely, quoted in note 59 supra. The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which passed hoth Houses by overwhelming margins, affords an example. See notes 54
& 55 supra and accompanying text. In these circumstances, when the agency's implementation brings to view I he difficulties that are inevitable in any parti('ularized impll'nwntation
scheme, nwmlwrs of Congress may find it easy t.o claim. in good faith, I hut COJl~n·ssionnl
intent has been violated, because the pro"blems of implementation truly were not wilhin the
congressional contemplation at the time of passage. See generally Scalia, supra note fi, at 2325.
Secondly, va~ue phrasing in the underlying statute may reflect an uneasy compromise
between widely divergent approaches to regulation held by sep11rate fnctions within the
Congress or among contending interest groups. See American Textile M frs. lnsl. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2509 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ackerman & HaHsler, supra
note 67, at 1500-01; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1419 & n.21l7. Hather than st'lect one
of the approaches, Congress enacts a vague formula both sides temporarily can tolerate.
(Each may be hetting that the agency, and ultimately the revi!'wing court, will com.true the
formula in a way favorable to its position.) The agency, however, almost. surely will find it
necessary t.o adopt one of the competing regulatory approaches as it carries out its statutory
duties. The losing faction then ('an claim plausibly that the agency has committed the sin of
violation of ron~ressional intl'nt, and it probably can find support in fra~ments of the statute's legislativP history. But had the agency selected the irnplement.tttion approach favored
by the faction now ('Omplaining, it would have committed an equivalent sin; it simply would

------ ----~ ~ ·-
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namic political intent" or "current public interest" remains hostage to changing congressional moods. Such moods need never go
through the purging procedural discipline ordinarily required
before congressional moods metamorphose into binding requirements-the procedure that leads to enactment of full-scale legislation. The resulting situation exemplifies perfectly a danger against
which the Framers warned. "It is one thing to be subordinate to
the laws, and another to be dependent on the legislative body,"
wrote Hamilton in The Federalist. "The first comports with, the
last violates, the fundamental principles of good government
"70

C.

Accountability

If-as is usually the case-congressional moods change in response to changes in the desires and pressures of the public, or of
the more specialized publics that closely watch their own pet issues, then subjecting the agencies to these fluctuations yields a
species of accountability. But this ultrasensitive responsiveness is
not the concept of accountability that undergirds our constitutional system:
The rcpubli<.:un principle demandt~ thul. the dclibcrutc :-11'11:-11' of the
community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an
unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to
every transient impulse . . . . 71

Responding to unpopular regulations by statute is more cumbersome than exercising a legisliitive veto, but it is so by design. This
very cumbersomeness helps filter out reactions based on transient
impulses. To be sure, that ordinary legislative process provides an

find itself condemned by a different set ·of preachers.
70 The FedPralist No. 71, at 460 (B. Wright t•d. 1961) (A. Hamilton) .
.
71 Id. at 45'1. Ha milton expanded on this view:
There are ~ho would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive
to a pn•vailing current, either in the community or in the legislature, as its best recommendation . But ~uch men entertain vPry crud•· notions, as w1·ll of tlw purposes for
which government wnR instituted, as of the trut· means hy which the public happiness may be promoted.
ld. This general theme reappl•ors throu!(hout. the Feth-rnlist . s,.,. id . No. ~\7, at :lr.? -fiH (.J.
Madison); id. No. ·19, at. a51 ; id. No. 62, at 409 - 1'2 (,J. Madison'!); id . No. li:l , al ~I!">; id . No.
68, at 441 (A . Hamilton); id. No. 73, at 470.
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imperfect filter. While screening out negative responses to agency
regulations based only on temporary passions, it also may clog responsive measures that are more broadly and permanently based,
thus leaving unpopular or unwise regulations on the books.
Such an outcome, however, does not necessarily mean that accountability is thwarted. Accountability depends in large measure
on public clarity as to the party responsible for a particular action-or for lack of action, when intolerable deadlock develops.
This conception figured importantly in the Convention's choice of
a single chief magistrate rather than a plural executive. With a
multiheaded executive, The Federalist explains, the public could
easily be "left in suspense about the real author" of unpopular
measures. 72 When this happens, the restraints of public opinion,
which serve as one of the "greatest securities [the people] can have
for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, ... lose their efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure attendant on
bad measures among a number, as on account of the uncertainty
on whom it ought to fall. . . . " 73
On whom should public censure fall if successive legislative vetoes lead to impasse over implementation of a statute? The
agency? The Congress? Only one of the Houses? One of the subcommittees? Who stands responsible for problems cropping upon
in the implementation of the statutory program under regulations
that were the agency's third or fourth or fifth choice?

71
Id. No. 70, at 455 (A. Hamilton). "A single man would feel lhe greates t responsibility
and administer the public affairs best ." 1M. Farrand, supra note :lO, at 65 (remarks of J ohn
Rutlidge). See generally L. Fisher, supra note 29, at 11 -14, 260.

75 The Federalist No. 70, at 456 (B. Wright ed . 1961) (A . Ha milton) . This conce pt ion of
accountability appears at many points throughout the FedPralist. See id. No. 15, at I liO; id.
No. 48, at 347 (J . Madison) ; id. No. 63, at 414 (J. Madison ?); id . No. 76, at 481 (A . Ha mil ton); id . No. 77, at 486-87. Clearly targeted public censure obviously se rves as a more potent
check if that cen ~ ure also may carry direct consequences at the next election . This poss ibility is clearest- even though remote- if the agency is an exec uti ve branch agency. Then a
sufficiently odious agency action may incude some voters to base their votes in the next
presidential elect ion on th eir out rage at the agency's ac t ion . The independ ent regulatory
agencies fall outside this scheme of direct electoral m·countnhilit\' , t> nj oying an ind epend ence
whose wisdom now is called into question more oftl'n. S Pe gP nerall y Bruff. supra nol l' :!2, at
475-85, 498-99; Cutler & ,Johnson, Regulation and the l'olili('nl Process, K·t Ya le L.. J. J:l!Jfi
(1975); T. Lowi, supra note :19, at 72-93.

'*----------....._--~-------........._
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The Risk of Impasse

The Dimensions of the Risk

In the leading empirical study of the legislative veto over agency
rulemaking, Pro(essorSBrutf and Gellhorn identified as a significant problem the risk of impasse between the agency and the Congress.74 Their study""re"counts anaexprai"ns ex~ples where an
agency met with repeated rejection, by one House or the other, of
the regulations it tendered in attempts to implement its statutory
responsibilities. 76
Several features intrinsic to the legislative veto device, in addition to the reasons for deadlock detailed in that study, make impasse a significant risk under any such scheme. First, as indicated
above, in many-circui'mtances the safest vote for a legislator feeling
vulnerable is an unexplained vote to disapprove. If a large number
of congressmen vote in that way, they may leave the agency with
an impenetrable puzzle as to just what sorts of regulations would
survive congressional scrutiny. Alternatively, under a one-House
veto scheme, the agency may find itself whipsawed as the two
Houses hold out for mutually inconsistent positions. Finally, if the
agency's paralysis becomes a major public issue, members of Congress have a ready means of deflecting the blame. They can deny
responsibility for the impasse and simply point their fingers at the
agency, filled with "faceless bureaucrats" who were so misguided
as to continue to send over unacceptable regulations.
The legislative veto also makes disapproval coalitions somewhat
more likely than if Congress had no way to respond to unpopular
regulations but by statute. C6nsider an instance where three or
more different implementation approaches, each with significant
interest-group support, contended for agency adoption in the implementing regulations. If Congress is to replace the agency's
choice with a different scheme, by statute, one of the groups that
lost before the agency must secure majorities in each House for the
view it favors, or else must construct some affirmative compromise
around which it and the other disappointed contenders can coa-

" Bruff & Gellhorn , supra note 5, at 1410-12, 1426, 14:12-:J:l ( 1977). See McGowan. supra
note 5, at 1147.
,. Bruff & Gellhorn , supra note 5, at 1397-1403 (General Services Administration) ; id. at
1408 (Federal Elections Commission) .
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lesce. The more diverse the options the agency rejected, the less
likely that such an alliance can be forged and the more likely that
the agency's regulations will go into effect. In contrast, when Congress can respond to the initial regulations with a legislative veto,
the losing groups need not go through the messy business of compromlSlng on alternative affirmative schemes, because Congress's
resolution of disapproval cannot implement such an alternative
anyway.
Examination of possible disapproval coalitions reveals an even
more disturbing element that enhances the risk of impasse. Return
for a moment to the mass transit example. Assume that any new
regulations DOT now selects must come before the Congress for
possible legislative veto. A substantial group in the current Congress may disagree with the fundamental policy of the underlying
statute, the Rehabilitation Act, although perhaps without trumpeting their views publicly. Such disagreement need not mean approval of discrimination against the handicapped; it simply may
signal opposition to any federal role in local decisions about the
access of the handicapped to mass transit facilities. This position
coincides with the first of the five option~ ~kcl<'hcd above-~no fed eral involvement.
Such views, of course, are not admissible in the agency's consideration of regulations to implement the Rehabilitation Act. If
somehow the agency did issue regulations accomplishing this end,
the courts quickly would declare those regulations invalid, for they
would embody the one policy option the Rehabilitation Act clearly
rejected. Because the agency's choices, at their widest, embrace
only the other four options sUggested above- nondiscrimination,
mainstreaming, paratransit, or local option- symmetry would seem
to require the same discipline for members of Congress as they decide whether or not to disapprove the agency's proposed
regulations.
Individual members of Congress, however, are not in the habit of
trimming their own policy positions to conform to choices made by
the corporate Congress in the enactment of earlier statutes. Moreover, they should not be encouraged to pick up that habit, for the
fundamental character of their role in the American constitutional
system demands that each member remain free to decide that an
earlier statute no longer serves the public interest. Agencies, being
unelected, draw their legitimacy from acting within the bounds set

~--------------------------------------~--~~-----------~----l _.
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by enacted statutes and the Constitution. But legislative leKitimacy springs fr om a different source. Because members of Congress are elected, and because their policy views ordinarily must
pass through the careful procedural discipline the Constitution
spells out before those views become law, the Constitution more
comfortably assigns to Congress remarkably broad authority to
choose among substantive outcomes, regardless of what earlier
Congresses may have decided, subject only to the broad limits
marked out by the Constitution. 76 The system accommod ates
needed change precisely because Congress retains this ultimate authority to repeal or amend earlier enactments. Therefore , t o ask
individual congressmen to abjure any opposition to the policy embodied in earlier statutes is to demand behavior fund a mentally inconsistent with their basic roles as elected legislators.
Should new DOT regulations arrive in Congress for review and
possible legislative veto, those legislators who oppose all fed eral involvement are not obligated to swear fealty to the policy embodied
in the original statute. They are entitled- and likely- to vote
against any conceivable implementing regulations. Those who are
sensitive to the oddity of this position- because they , know that
the agency cannot possibly issue lawful regulations in the form
they prefer- may keep the real reasons for their disapproval votes
to themselves. Unlike the agency, they are not required to explain
their reasons nor to justify their votes based on a particular record
and set of statutory requirements. Even a member who spreads his
views of total opposition to the underlying statute on the pages of
the Congressional Record, however, does not become ineligible to
cast his vote for disapproval. If the core group of representatives
who totally oppose the basic regulatory scheme is large, the odds
favoring deadlock mount, and the legislative veto winds up giving
remarkable potency to those whose views fall completely77 outside
the range of policies the agency lawfully may consider. Disap-

See Fletcher v. P eck, 10 ll.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 ( 18 10). See gem· rally McC ulloch v.
76
Maryland, 17 t i.S. (·I Wh eat) :J l6, 421 (1 819) ; The Fedt>rnlist No. 4R at :14 4 (B. Wri ght ed .
1961) (J . Madi son) (" [the legislature's] co nstitutional powe rs \are ] at once more t>x t.ensive,
and less susceptihle of precise limits" ).
The Federalist 's authors, who generall y were Ra ti sfi ecl to preve nt has ty en ar t me nt of
77
ill-advi sed measure~. see The F ederalist No. 62, al 409 ( 1\. Wri ght ed . 1\)6 1) (J . Madiso n? );
id. No. 43, at. 470 (i\ . Hamilton ), also were sensitiv~ to th r problem of impasse wh en action
was required :
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proval of any agency proposal then can be secured by the addition
of only a few votes from members having other disagreements with
the proposed regulations or from members having unrelated quarrels with the agency and seeking other means for leverage. 711

2.

The Significance of the Risk

If the case against the legislative veto rests importantly on the
risk of impasse, a skeptic may ask legitimately whether such stalemate is worse than the more familiar deadlocks that often prevent
enactment of legislation desired by a substantial portion of the
population. 79 No categorical answer is possible, but often an important difference appears. Failure to pass a statute ordinarily leaves
When the n>ncurrence of a large numher is required by I he Constitution to the do in!(
of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing im proper will be likely to be done; but we forget how much good may be prevented, and
how much ill may be produced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be
necessary, and of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may
happ1·n to stand at particular periods.
ld. No. 22, at 195 (emphasis in original). Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 4lfi lJ.S. 2:12, 242 (1974)
("The concept of immunity I for policymaking officials] assumes [that officials may err[ and
goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from suchh error
than not to decide or act a I all."
7
" Some !'nmmentators have argued that. the lef.(islat iv!' v!'(o should be held vnlid because
its effect is littl1• different from the informal power Congres~ already exercises by means of
its unquestionably legitimate oversight function. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 5, at 49~ 99; Miller nnd Knapp, supra note 5, at ~69 - 70: Stewart, supra note S, at fil:l. To be sure,
such informal measures, under stattnes not subjectinf.( the agency to the legislative veto,
often prove effective in securing agency outcomes desired by the Congress, Sl' e Cooper &
Cooper, supra note 5, at 492-99; L. Fisher, supra note 7. at 81 -83, or perhaps desired only by
the subcommittPe that holds or threatens hostile oversight hearings, or indeed, only by the
committee ··hairman who pla<'eS the strategic phone call to the agency head . Rut occasional ,
even freqlll·nt, congressional successes of this kind should not obscure the changes wrought
by the presence of veto authority. It may make considerable difference in the kinds of demands made by Congress and in the agency's decisions whether or not to yield to congressional pressure if each side knows that congress cannot dictate the outcome its members are
suggesting short of statutory enactment. See generally Newman & }(eaton, supra note 5, at
594.
The legi~lative veto's effects probably are especially significant in those marginal cases
that claim the rent ral focus here, involving o polarized coni roversy tempting the congressional ployPrs to ohje<'t to the agency's proposal, but leaving them vulnerable if they declart·
too clearl~· for on alternative. In this setting, the legislative veto can block the agen!'y·~
proposal and cnn thwart implementation of the statutory mundote. Without the lel{islativP
veto, however, t>ven an ordinarily pliant agency is likely to push ahead with its initial proposal when Congress offers it only paralysis as an alternative.
70
See generally J . Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 25 - ~7
(1980).
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the federal government in a posture where there is no pretense of
the stalemated activity or regulation. An impasse over implementing regulations, however, may leave the agency charged with an ostensible statutory mandate but unable to secure congressional approval of the tools needed to accomplish the agency's stated ends.
The original legislation, posing as a full-fledged response to some
policy issue, is reduced to a hollow shell.
The objection to such pretense is not merely aesthetic. Those
who labored for passage of the original statute thought they had
secured governmental action. Passage doubtless dissipated the
more intense public attention to the central regulatory questions
that enactment of major legislation can attract. Interest groups
disbanded or became preoccupied elsewhere, and newspapers
ceased publishing editorials on the issue. For Congress then to
thwart that action through the low-visibility veto process is to
erode Congress's own accountability to the public and perhaps to
skew the ultimate implementation in favor of better-organized and
80
wealthier groups who do sustain their attention.
These observations may not fully answer the questioner's skeptici~;m. however. CongreRH oft.<~ tl dot·:- ~ leH:- ~ t.hun initially meelH t.he
eye, without fatal damage to the polity. For example,
juHL lm;L Lcrm
1
the Supreme Court decided that a "bill of right.s· ' for the menLally
retarded, appearing in a statute brightly packaged as the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, actually established no rights as such, but merely furnished a hortatory
listing of desired aims. 81 Congress, the Court observed, "sometimes
legislates by innuendo." 82 The skeptic therefore mighL argue that
Congress, by attaching !l legislative veto provision, merely reserves
a familiar option, albeit in subtler terms, to reduce an ostensibly

•• This hi us also opPrules, to som e deg ree, when Con grrsR choosl'S to ut tn ck a probl em hy
means of a broad delegation that does not resolve all the poli cy ch oi~cs required heforl'
imple mentation. In such circumstances, affected groups becom P in volved in the initi al ;;trug gle for passage of the sta tute, but th en find that enac tm ent still leav es much, to be fough t
out in th e agen cy. Some weaker groups will nul he abl e to ma in ta in th eir in te res t and effectiveness nt this second, less vis ible \t>w l. Th e legi s\at ivc ve to co mpound s the probl em by
imposi ng yl't a third layer of ha t.t\ e , where an a ffected group must sus ta in its effort s to
protect an~· ga ins obta ined in th e ea rli er stages. See ge ne rally Bruff & (;ellhorn , supra note

5, at 141:1 14. 1419; .] . Ely, supra note :Ill, at 'L4 1 n. 8f).
•• l'ennhurst S t ate ~khool 6 Hos p. v . H a ld e rman. Ill I S . Ct. I :,:11 , 1!>4 I ( 198 1).
•• 1<1. Th e obse rvation was first penned by Justice Harla n in Rosado v. Wyman, :197 U.S.
397 , 'tl :l (1970) .
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genuine regulatory scheme to mere legislation by innuendo.
Misleading enactments of this general character certainly do exist. But one may react to them in two quite different ways. It could
be that congressional slipperiness of this kind is so common that
adding the veto to the congressional repertoire makes no significant difference. Or one may conclude that, although the system
cannot be purged of misleading measures entirely, there is no
merit in opening new avenues to this form of escape from congressional responsibility. If one sees Congress's doing less than meets
the eye as a malfunction of the system, an impediment to electoral
accountability, then one is more likely to adopt the second view.
3.

Protection us. Efficiency: The Effects of Friction

Veto proponents might yet portray this heightened risk of impasse as merely another manifestation of a healthy interplay between the political branches invoking Justice Brandeis: "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from
autocracy. " 83
· This familiar passage, however, despite its undeniable appeal
and rhetorical force, distorts the Convention's accomplishments
and presents only part of the necessary picture. The Framers
plainly did want to protect against autocracy. But they were
equally interested in the separ~tion of powers as a means of promoting efficiency. They had experienced years of woeful performance in the management of the government under the Articles of
Confederation, at a time when both executive and legislative powers were united in the hands of the Continental Congress. Prior to
1787, Congress had tried various unsatisfactory arrangemen is to
improve the discharge of its executive functions, entrusting man agement first. to committees composed of members, then to boards
of prominent outsiders responsible to Congress, and finally to sin gle executives appointed by Congress. Each step was marked by

•• Mye rs v. Uni ted States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brand eis, .J. , dissenting). See United
States v. Brown, :181 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) .
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bickering and stalemate, delayed appointments, and early resignations amid widespread frustration. 84 Against this background, several key figures, looking ahead to the Philadelphia convention, expressed strong interest in the separation of powers as a way of
securing a more efficient stewardship of governmental powers, although without ignoring the need for checks to protect against
abuse or tyranny practiced by any branch. 8 ~ Ultimately, the Convention opted for "energy in the Executive." 86 It chose a unitary
chief magistrate as the repository of executive powers, rather than
a council, largely because it viewed this structure as more conducive to effective governance. 87
This history hardlybespeaks any single-minded devotion on the
part of the Framers to friction among the branches, nor docs it
reveal them as proponents of endless multiplication of checks
against arbitrary power. 88 The Convention instead established a
framework meant to maximize both efficiency and protection,
seeking a delicate balance between the two aims. The Federalist
sounds this theme at several points. 89 It speaks of the arduous task
. that confronted the Convention as it tried to provide for "a due
responsibility" 90 of the rulers to the people in order to protect liberty while making enough allowance for "energy" and "stability"
in the government, the twin requisites of efficiency. 91
I

•• L. Fisher, supra note 29, at 1-27.
•• Id. at 241-70 (detailing the views of Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton , .Jay, Adams, and
Madison).
•• The Federalist Nos. 70, 71 (A. Hamilton).
87
See L. Fishrr, supra note 29, at 6-17.
•• See generally E. Corwin, supra note 1:f, at 3-16; W. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 3~-36, 126-28 (1965); Miller & Knapp, supra note 5, at 389-90; Bruff, supra
note 44, at_; Sharp. The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 385 (1905) .
•• See The Federalist No. 63, at 416, 417 -18 (B. Wright ed. nl61) (.J. Madison?); id. No.
77, at 484 (A. Humilton) . See also J. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Ken nedy and Johnson Years 9 (1968).
•• The Federalist No. 70, at 452 (B. Wright. ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) .
" Madison wrnte:
Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very important ont· must
have lain in combining the requisite stability and energy in government, with the
inviolable attention due to liberty and to the republican form. Without substantially
accomplishing this part of their undertakinl(, they would have very imperfC'rlly ful filled the object of their appointment, or the expectation of the public; yet that it
could not be easily accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray
his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to that security
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Proposals for a legislative veto therefore pose an historically_iamiliar dilemma. The measure is promoted in t he name of protecting against arbitrary exercises of power. Does it come at too high a
price in the coin of "energy" and "stability"? An answer requires
clarity as to the current status of efficiency within our polity and
our true exposure to executive abuses if the veto device is not
available. 92
As to efficiency, ours is a SY§tem already rich with opportunities
for stalemate and irresOl ution~hn~en La tors has explfued this phenomenon, many of them marveling at the system's
capacity for deadlock, especially in comparison with the parliamentary systems of other Western democracies. 93 Although prime

agai nst external and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of
the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in ~ove rn 
ment is e~sential to national character and t.u the advantages annexed to it, as well as
to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people , which are among the chief
blessings of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more a n ev il in
itself than it is odious to the people; and it may be pronoun ced with assuran ce that
the people of this country, enlightened as they are with rega rd to the nature, and
interested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good government, will
llf'Vt'f iw ll tli tdit·d til] Hlllllt' rt· nwdy ht• II)Jplif'd )o !Itt• Vt<"iH•tifudt ·:, 111/d llllt 't•tluinfii'H
whkh chururtcrize the Stute udmini~trut.ioiiH. 011 rolli!JIIItllg, hoWI' V<'l', lltt·H,. , ... luuhh·
ingredient s with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive at once the difficulty
of mingling them together in their due proportions. The genius of rep ublican liberty
seems to demflnd on one side, not only that all power s hould he derived from the
people but that those intrugted with it should be kept in depend ence on the people,
by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the
trust should be placed not in a few, but a number of hand s. Stability, on the co ntrary,
requires that t.he hands in which power is lodged should rontinue for n length of time
the same. A frequent change of me~ will result from a frquent return of elections; and
a frequent chnnge of mea sures from a frequ!'nce change of men: whilst energy in gov ernment requ ires not only a certain duration of power, hut the execution of it by a
single hand.
How fu•· the conve ntion may have succeeded in t.his part of their work , will bet ter
appear on a more accumte view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must
clearly appear to have been an arduous part.
Id. No. 37, at 2G7 -6H.
" It is probably appropriate, in this volume, to notP that .Jus tice Powell has writ ten eloquently about the need for "rpsponsible nnd efficient govern11nct•," Hranti v. Finkel, 4411
U.S. 507, 526 (Powell, J ., dissenting), and has been keenly sens itiv e to the ways that. super fi cially attractive constitutional innovations may undermine the institutions that st•rve this
goal, see id. at G27 <{2; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. :147, :!76-89 (1976) (Powell, J., disse nting) .
•• See, e.g., <:. Hodgson , supra note .')8, at 16. a:J, 48, 126, I GH -60, 2!iH; .J. Burns, The
Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Pnrly Politics in America 1-7, 26!'>-6li (1963); Cutler, To Form
a Government, r,g Foreign Af'f. 126 (1980) ; Rose , Government Ag-ainst Suhgoverntllents: A
European Perspective on Washington, in Presid ents und Prime Ministers (R. Hose & E .
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ministers generally can count on party responsibility and es tablished bureaucratic tradition to facilitate implementation once a
cabinet decision is reached, a President must bargain and trad e at
many levels, using the stock of political capital and favors available
to him, to forge coalitions strong and enduring enough to implement the elements of his program. Few institutional mechanisms
today aid that process materially; certainly he cannot count on automatic party loyalty in putting together a legislative majority. Instead, he must create a new coalition on each discrete issue, and
time and political capital are limited.94 The veto adds another
layer of trading.
If the efficiency side is relatively neglected in the current state
of our structural balance, the protection side is not nearly as illserved in the absence of a veto as some proponents would suggest.
To the extent that broad delegations to agencies pose the risk, they
can be contained. Broad delegations are not an inevitable affliction
visited on Congress by some outside force. 9 G They are inevitable
only in the sense that the courts are not currently disposed to .employ the nondelegation doctrine to save Congress from the consequences. But Congress itself, provided it musters the political will,
can curb its delegates through more precise standards that channel
the exercise of delegated power. 96
•
One should state carefully what this alternative means of protection entails. It does not require Congress to strive for an unrealistic
Suleiman eds. 19~ 0) ; TRB from Washington: White House Boo by Traps, Th e New HPp ublic, Sept. 23, 198 1. at ·I; Will, The Madison Legacy, Newswee k, Dec. 7, 198 1, at 124.
•• See G. Horl!("on , <upru note fiH , nt 11 5-i H. I fi1 -H2. 2f,(): lto<P. suprn nol P !J:l, nt :\( ):, :11 2.
Beca use of th ese important diffen·nces between pnrlinmenta ry systems und our own, arguments for a legislntive veto <>Ver rulemnking based with the Bri t ish <·x perien <'e with tlH! ostensibly similar " layin;:" sys tem, s r•e , e.g., Boisvert. suprn not e fi, un· hnzard ous a t h• ·st..
•• Statutes of the las t decade have tended to presc ribe stand ards more prec isely t ha n was
common earlier, demonstrati ng th at Congress has the capacity wh en it find s th e will. See
generally Marcus. Environmental Protection Agency, in The P olitics of Reg ulation 2fi7 -:l0:1
(J. Wilson ed. 1980); Wilson, The Politics of Regul ation, in id. at 392; Ack erman & H ass l e ~ ,
supra note 67, at 1474-79.
•• "Congress has th e Secretari es' decisions before it and may decide th ey have been
wrongly decided, because th ey misjudged cost-benefit factors or because of fi sca l, policy or even political considerations. If so, Congress can revok e or amend th e
regulation8."
American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F . Supp. 811 , 82f) (IJ.D. C. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds suh nom. American Pub. Transit Ass' n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (emphasis ndd ed) . See Arizona v. California , 373 U.S. 546, 59,1 (1963) ; FCC v. !'ottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 146 (1940); McGowan, supra note 6, at 1174 .
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level of detail in the standards it enacts when it launches a brand
new regulatory venture. Such detail at that point, before adequate
knowledge has been gained, may prove counterproductive. 97 Moreover, a specialized agency, more efficiently than Congress, can
amass the detailed factual data and undertake the reflective professional thought necessary for intelligent regulation. But Congress's initial launching of the agency need not be its last statutory
word on the subject. Congress will be watching what the agency
does. If the agency begins to act in ways deemed intolerable, its
regulatory action will have generated detailed experience in the
regulatory field· that can be the basis for more specific standards. 98
In a kind of dialectic, Congress then may react to perceived abuses
by means of a statute that states, with a precision now rendered
possible by experience, where the agency went wrong and what
paths are closed to it in the future. Of course, a Congress that
merely wishes to shout "abuse," without grasping the nettle 99 and
specifying what the agency should do instead, may be unable to
exercise this statutory check-even though it might be able to vote
a legislative veto. But we should count that difference a virtue and
not a defect. Congress occasionally has engaged in this dialectic
with agencies in the past, undoing the disfavored action ,by statute
and often writing more detailed statutory standards in the process.100 But there is also significant evidence that the availability of
a legislative veto interrupts this healthy dialectic; 101 Congress
07
See .gcnerall.v Ackerman & Hn8sler, supra notE' 67.
•• See T . Lowi, supra notP 39, at 146-56: ,Jaffe, An Essay on Dcle~:ution of Le~:islative
Power: I, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 364-66, 369-71 (1947) ,
•• Judge friendly used this phrase in similar fashion. urging agencies to should er their
responsibilities and make clear substantive choices. H. Friendly, supra note 32, at 105
(1962).
100
See McGowan, supra note 5, at 1147 & n.122. For example, in the FTC lmprnvl'ments
Act of 1980, Congress narrowed the· FTC's discretion in the regulation of children's television advertising nnd the funeral industry, Pub. L. No. 96-252, §§ II, 19, 94 Stat. 39:1 (1980),
based on experience with the agency's earlier attempts at such regulation. Further stAtutory
specification of this kind is unlikely in the future, however, be c au~e all FTC rulemaking
henceforth is subject to legislative veto. For a comprehensive listing of recent statutory re sponses to agencv actions Congress did not like, see Kaiser, supra note 9, at 669-73.
101
The Bruff and Gellhorn study describes instances where Co ngress, at a tim e when it
was upset about ce rtain agency regulations, had under consideration, and eventually passed,
significant pieces of substantive legislation affecting the agency. This was legislation to
which amendments setting forth Congress's specific will concerning the subjects addressed
in the regulations could have been attached readily. Rather than use these vehicles, how ever, Congress invariably spoke in negative terms, by means of a veto. Bruff & Gellhorn,
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thenceforth takes up its differences with the agency through the
Delphic approach of the veto and not through the more enduring
and responsible process of statutory specification. 102

supra note fi, at 14ml -!0, 14 27.
This evidence dramatically undermines any claims that t.he legis lat ive veto is indi~pensa 
ble because s statutory response to agency action is "too cumbersome and time-consuming."
Dry, supra note 5, at - · When Congress already has substantive legislation (as opposed to
an appropriations bill, see note 61 supra) working its way throu gh to enactment, there will
be no need to crank up the legislative machinery anew to put the agency on a different
course from that chosen in the regulations, and no requirement that legislation undoing the
regulations leap the presidential veto hurdle separate and exposed. These "cumbersome"
legislative processes a re already in motion. All Congress need do is add a si ngle ame ndment
addressing the n•gulations. That Congress, even in th ese circumstances, should chooS<' to act
by legislative veto rather than statute, suggests that far more is operating here than a mere
desire for streamlining. It s uggests instead that the legislative veto permits different substantive outcomes through a more comfortable avoidance of direct legislative responsibility
for the crucial polic~· choices.
It might nevertheless be objected that such legislative ve hicl£"s arP not always thi s easily
available. Congress, however , has been acting recently to ensure t.lw more regular consideration of such substantive legislati on, for example, hy replacing open -ended fundin g authori zations with authorizations available only for a one- or two -year term. (Such authorizing
legislation merely authorizes appropriations; actual spending is not possible until a separa te
appropriations nwasttre also passes. This two-step proct>ss is not n·quired hy the Constitu tion; it. uff'ordH '' '"''llllH lo hono; 1111' juriHdi..t.ion of' dill• ·fl •lll. ,.,,J:r• "IHilllud ,·.,llllltiii• ·•·H. All
thorizing leg isla I ion goes through the BUbstuntive oversight com1111tlt•es, whereas t.lu · ncluul
funding bills fall within the purview of the appropriations committees. See Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. :147, 359 n.l8; Senate Study, supra note 57, at 1.5-21, 44-48). It is within
Congress's power, clearly, to place all agencies under the requireme nt that they secure annual funding authorizations. Alternatively, Congress could adopt the more potent d<·vice of
"sunset" legislation, which does not merely place the funding authorization on a periodic
basis, but instead terminates the entire statutory authority of the agency at a time certain.
It thus requires de novo enactment of tha basic ftuthority (including any dPsired m•>difications) if the agency is t.o continu e at all. See id . at J 29-:l.">; T. Lowi, supra not e :l9, at :lU9-10;
Adams, Sunset: A Proposlll for Accountable Government, 28 Admin. L. Rev. 5 11 ( 19/(i). The
point is not necPssarily to endorse either kind of measure in a ny given sell in~. but m•·rely to
show that other mean s a re in place or at hand, giving Con~ress rel(u larl y available sl a tutory
vehicles that help overcome the alleged cumbersomeness of the statutory process.
102
This discussion of th e competing demand s of protection and effi ciency sug~-:e s ts that
the functional urguments supporting the legislative veto will Ill' stronl(est. in those selti ngs
where, unlike the rulemaking context, two conditions are fulfillt•d: (I) the alternativt· means
for Congress to control or correct agency errors and abust>s by statute arc distinctly limited;
(2) the risk of impasse or disruption from a veto is minimal. But even without th e detai led
examination of those other seltings that would be necessa ry for a full evaluation, one still
might. voice a ft•w s kepti rn l remarks about. the significance of the s tren gthened f'unctionftl
arguments.
The first critc·rion is most lik ely to be satisfied in non routine art>as of guvernment activity
where the diversity of the subject matter, or the ran g<' of variables, or I he need for quick
and flexible action, mak es precise statutory specification of s tandards t·xtrernely diffi cult,
even after the government has gained extensivP ex perience from long involvement in the
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particular field. Perhaps the only s uch exumpleB fall in th e forri~-:n aflairB uren ; at least the
most significant ('Xomplcs will he found there. And in fa<·t statutes have applied the v<•to to,
e.g., foreign arms sales and the use of American troops abroad . Con~-:ress has long struggled
to find appropriate mechanisms to fulfill its role in foreign affairs, see generally G. Gunther,
Cases and Materials on Constitutionul Law 408-24 (lOth ed. 19HO); L. Henkin, supra note
4:1, at 89-12:1, and this difficult hi~tory may give these uses of th<? legislatiV<' veto a special
functional attractiverwss. Nevertheless, it would be somewhat ironic if the legislativr veto
were found justifiable in the foreign affairs, area, where the Preside nt has Cl'rtuin "delicate,
plenary and exclusive" powers, United Stutes v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 lJ .S. :104,
320 (1936), while at the same time held unconstitutional or unwise in all or most domestic
applications.
The second <·rilerion , mnndntin~-: lhnt thr risk of irnpnss<' he minimal or nonrxi sl•·nt, is
most likely to he fulfilled when• the choice is stroightforward, and dPniul hy Congrt.. ss of the
agency's proposul twcessurily puts it. on re<·ord in favor of anollwr dearl y identil it'd approach. Such <'!lSI'S, howeve r, mav nrise far l<•ss often I hnn initially appt•ars. Considt·r th e
recent near -veto nf t lw Prt·~ idt>nl'' proposed sale of AWACS airnaft t.o Saudi Ambia. Sec
127 Cong. Rec. S 12,4f, ~ (daily ed .. Oct.. 28, l!l!ll) (Senute defeat. of disapproval resolul iun hy
a vote of li2 -48) . This 111ighl seem n simple y<·s-or-nll quest ion involving one JJUrticular I rans action . In fact., I he picture was far more complicated. Many Senutors who cxpres,;pd nn
initial inclination to di sa pprove the sale (and several who actually did vote against it) ;;tated
they could approve a sale under somewhat different terms strengthening the United States'
joint control over the aiccral't. See, e.g., N.Y . Times, Sept. 28, 19!:11, at A-7,-'col. 1 (SPnators
Laxalt, Hollings, Glenn): id., Sept. 29, 1981, at A-7, col. I (Senator Quayle). Had the disap proval resolution passed, the Administration would not have received a perfectly clear signal
as to what it should do next. It mi~:ht have been tempted to try to negotiate new sales terms
in an effort to meet the elusively sketched wishes of this group of Senators.
Similar line-drawing problems beset proposals tendered by other commentators to carve
out some small !'ategnry of legislative vetoes that might be held constitutionally valid . For
example, several writers generally hostile to the legislative veto have tried to save the veto
as applied to ext>cutive branch reorganization. The veto is permissible, they argue, in those
relatively rare instances wh ere the propd'sed action is submitted by the President and re lates, not to ong11ing programs of exercises of the substantive powers of th e fed eral government, but rather to purely structural or procedural matters. St>c, e.g. , 4:! Op. Atty. Gen.,
No. 10 (Jan. 31. 1977) (Carter Administration opinion supporting the constitutionality of
the legislative veto over presidt>ntial reorganization plans; the Carter Administration
strongly opposed the veto on constitutional grounds in other seet ings, see 4:! Op. Atty. Gen.,
No. 25 (June 5, 1980)); Dixon, supm note 5, at. 4!ll -S9; Watson, supra note li, at I O?li -78. To
be sure, there is somt>thing of n difference between suhstnntivl' actions, on th e orH· hand,
and proct>dural or structural changPs, on thl' other. But th e line can hardly he drawn n e~ tly,
and the distinct ion probably will not bear all the constitutional weight these writers seek to
place on it. The National Education Association, for example, lobbied strenuously for a Sl'P ·
nrate Depnrtment of Education. not. because of t>nchantment with the geometric structural
heauty of or~-:nnizotion charts sh11wing 1:1 ft·deral departmcntR, hut hecmrsc it expl't'l<'d different substantive outcomes over the long run, outcomeM more favorahl" to its inten•sts. Sec
Stanfield, Then··s a Lesson To Be Learned Over a Department of Edu ca tion, 9 Nat'l .). 1149
(1977); N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1979, at A-20, coL 6; id., Oct. 18, 1979, at A-16, coL 4. Reo rgan ization always has bPen a politically touchy subject precisely because it carries major impli-
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up the crucial defects of the veto over rulemaking. He once remarked t1lat leg1sla~ co..nt~ning broad del~!I}tions to administrative agencies ""m ay beuridei'STood' ''as unfinis ed law which the
administrativ o must complete before 1t 1s ready 1orapplication. . . . The Congress 1s not a e or willing to finish the task of
prescribing a positive and precise legal right or duty by eliminating
all further choices between policies." 108 There is little merit in unfinished legislation of this kind. 104 Yet, the legislative veto puts

'

~I

.;

.,

cations for substantive policy. See G. Hodgson, supra note 58, at 81-85; Knrl, Executive
Reorganization and PreMidentinl Power, 1977 S. Ct. Rev. I; Stanfield, The Best Laid Reorganization Plans Sometimes Go Astray, 11 Nat'l J. 84 (1979).
It may be that a clean, straightforward congressional choice of alternatives is implicit in a
legislative veto only when Congress reviews the outcomes of individual adjudications- the
kind of legislative veto at issue in the current Chadha case. But, as noted, congressional
review of adjudications, as opposed to review of broader agcn\'y policy choices, ma y be particularly vulnerable to other sorts of constitutional cha llenges, particularly due process objections. See note 22 supra.
Although a careful consideration of functional implications shou ld play a role in the
Court's initial constitutional decision on the legislative veto, see text accompanying note 105
infra, the Comt is not necessarily well-advised to embark on a course of selectively sustaining some forms of legislative veto and striking down others based on a case-by-case
functional exnmination. AdminiHtrability is an important consideration in cons tit ul ional a<i judication. See J . Ely, supra note 39, at 124-25 (administrability concerns justified the
Court's use of the seemingly simplistic "one-man -one-vote" standard in the reupportion ment cases). Case-by-case fun ctional consideration of various legislat.iVP vetoes would present serious administrability problems. It would tempt Congress repeatedly to draft new
models of the device in order to test the uncertain limits of the Court's holding (especially if
the available functional dividing lines are as hazy as suggested above). II would em broil the
Court in a string of politically sensitive decisions, perhaps requiring the intrusive and poten tially unseemly building of factual records in lower courts regarding details of ('Ommittee
and floor consideration of veto resolutions of the kind at issue.
The position taken here is that the serious functional problems in most sl'ttings, com bined with important indications from the constitutional text (discussed below) and the
desirability ul' a crisply marked dividing line, should result in a holding declaring all forms
of the legislative veto invalid.
0
' ' FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1952) (j< ·bon, ,J., dis~enting) (footnote
omitted). See McCowan, supra note 5, at 1166.
10
' To say this is not necessarily to state a preference for regulation rather than leaving a
particular arPa of activity unregulated, but only to urge that Congress be thoughtfully serious about whichever or the two options it chooses. The veto is not necessarily a friend of the
movement for deregulation; it actually may blunt th e for<' e ol' such efforts. Commentators
have suggestt·d that the veto probably will make hroad Hnd incompletely thou~-:h t - out dele gations more likely, see Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note r,, at 14~7 - 28; McGowan , supra note r, ,
at 1147-48; Scalin , supra notP 5, at 2:1 - ~6. by consoling IPgislntors with the thought thnl
Congress can exl'reise control later, through the vPto, and thus need not answer a ll thP
tough questions about what burdens· are imposed and whether they are worthwhile be for e
launching a regulatory effort. (The momentum for m·w regulation, to he sure, draws on, and
feeds, deeper - and problema! ic- societal currents wherein "injustices are readily perceived,
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Congress in a position to block agency attempts to "finish" the law
without giving Congress the immediate means- much Jess the in ducement-to finish the law itself. Using the legislative veto to police broad delegations, Congress may never completely assume re sponsibility for the "further choices between policies" ultimately
needed t.o reach the aims proclaimed in the original statute, and
yet it does not leave the agency alone to assume that responsibility
itself and stand accountable for the results of its choice.

IV.

THE CoNsTITUTIONAL QuESTION

A.
•

The above discussion presents prudential considerations counseling against the wisdom of the legis1attve veto. But they amount
to more than simply functional arguments addressed to Congress
and the President; they have a significant bearing on the constitu tional decision under the general rubnc ol the separabon of powers
doctrute. When the Framers drew the broad outlinP-s of our govern mental structure, they did so based on careful reflection about the
functional implications of each structural possibility. They were attuned to subtle but important differences to he cxpeded under
each variation. In deciding whether new practices not explicitly
validated or rejected by the Constitution properly fit into that
structure, the .Qourt is called upon to exercise the same cnreful and
nuanced 'ud ment offunctional impacts. Jl is no objectiOn that the
defects discusse a ove are not present in the routine majority of
cases, hut instead will b~ felt only in the occasional cases at the
margin where political controversy tempts evasive or irresponsible
behavior. Much of the ordinary busines~>f government could be
expected to come out the same way undtr a variety of different
structures. Separation of powers adjudication is about effects at
the margin. 10 ~ ~

I

'I

I

I

.'
·t

Generally

their tru('lahilit.y is wide ly assumed, and ('oll ccli Vl' inlc rVP ntion hy t c~ul rui P a ppl'urs l.o he
the re medy of c hoi ce ." S('huc k, Book JleviPw, ~JO Yalt• I ... J. 70'2 , 7'2fi ( J!)H I ).1 If Con~ress's
options nrc more sh a rpl y dive rgent -· eith e r do rwl re~ula l e or clst· ld go of r• ·g ulntion into
th e hand .~ of the age ncy, subject only lo l.ht• lc~H tacil e method of n>11trol hy st ul. ute- Con :,: reRs has H gre ntt'r induce me nt to satis fy itsl'lf on those more dillit ·ult questions
before

1(1.'1

tin!( involved in regulation .
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B.

The Constitutional Text

~ts have n"o general mandate, however, to review the func tional wisdom of structural innovations and strike down those
deemed imprudent. Their role is anchored in, and constrained by,
the constitutional text. Close atTention tO those provisions relevant
to tlie fegiSfative "veto, informed by knowledge of the functional im plications, is therefore in order.
Article..!. sectio~_l , lays out the basic bicameral structure of the
Congress, for it vests all granted legislative powers "in a Congress
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." Article I, section 7, clause 2, a provision tha t received lengthy scrutiny in tfie Constitutional Convention, gives the
President an important but qualified role in the law-enacting process. It requires that al!_ bills be erese~g to...,!he President for his
approval or ·veto, althougli any veto is subject to the prescribed
congression al override. Having agreed to that provision, the Convention went on to make sure this presidential role was honored. It
added a trailing clause meant to squelch any evasions of the presentation requirement: 106 clause 3 subjects "[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which tlie conc~rence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except on a que~tion of adjournment)" to the same procedure of presidential review and possible veto that applies to legislative actions forthrightly labeled
"bills."
This antievasion provision comes in language that is somewhat
cryptic. Section 7 does not say what makes the concurrence of the
two Houses "necessary." There is, however, a generally accepted
interpretation, which harkeng! back to article I, section 1. If the order, resolution or vote amounts to an exercise of "legislative powers," the Constitution makes concurrence necessary, by virtue of
that initial section, regardless of what provisions of lesser force,
like statutes or house rules, may say. 107 The classic examples of

,.
I

.•

I

'

••• The history of t he Conventi on 's cons idera ti on of the veto powe r is recounted in Watson, supra not P 5, at 104 3-48. See 2 M . F a rra nd , s upra note :JO, a t 2!)4 -:lU!i.
'"' Th e clea rest 1·x positi on of this view appea rs in S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Con!(., 2d Sess.
(1 897 ). That report is regarded wid ely as a n authorita ti ve sta teme nt of th e mean ing of a rt. I,
§ 7, cl. :J, and is r<·prin ted in 4 Hind s ' Preced ents of th e H ouse of Represe nta tiv!'s § :1483
(1907). The co mm it.tee the re stated :
We .conclude thi s branch of the subj ect by d ec iding th e !(Cneral question s ubmi tted
to us, t.u wit , " whether concurrent resolutions a re required to be s ubmi t ted to the
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President of the United States," must depend, not upon their mere form, but upon
the fact whether they contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in
its character and effect. If they do, they must be presented for his approval; otherwise, they need not he. In other words, we hold that the clause in the Constitution
which declares that every order, resolution, or vote must be presented to the PreHident, to "which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may he
necessary," refers to the necessity occasioned by the requirement of the other provi sions of the Constitution, w!M!reby every exercise of "lel{islative powers" involves the
con<·urn•nce of the two Houses; and every resolution not so requiring SU{'h concurrent
action, to wit, not involving the exercise of legislative powers, need not he presented
to the President. In brief, the nature or substance of the resolution, and not its form,
controls the question of its disposition .
108
For versions of this argument, see, e.g., Cooper & Cooper, supra note 5, at 747 -7ti;
Abourezk, supra note 5, at 327. 336-41. The argument often is fortified by reference to Con gress's broad residual powers to "make all Jaws which shall he necessary nnd proper to carry
into Execution ... all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in th<> Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. Const. art. I, ~ 8, cl. 18. But
cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-39 (1976) (per curiam) (rejectinl{ the claim that the
necessary and proper clause empowered the appointment scheme there struck down). See
generally Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the Presi dent and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 40 Law & Contemp. Probs. 102 (Spring 1976).
109
42 li.S.C. § 4332 (1976). See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.::!d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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congressional votes where concurrence is not "necessary" relate to
legislative mechanics such a the printing of bills and reports, requests directed to the executive branch for information, and expressions of congressional opinion, as in "sense of the Congress"
resolutions.
To square the legislative veto with clause 3 thus requires an argument demonstrating that a vote on a resolution of disapproval
does not amount to "legislative" behavior. Proponents of the device believe they have found such an argument. A vote adopting a
resolution of disapproval, they contend, is not a legislative act, but
rather a mere phenomenon that leaves unfulfilled a condition precedent to the exercise of the agency's delegated authority-a condition required, moreover, by a full-fledged statute enacted in full
compliance with the presentation clause. 108
Conditions precedent are familiar in administrative law. For example, with certain exceptions, no "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" may proceed unless a legally sufficient environment impact statement has
accompanied that action from the proposal stage. 109 In other
words, a specific form of bureaucratic behavior-the preparation
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and inclusion of the impact statement-forms the condition precedent to valid agency action. To take another example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration may not implement
safety standards more severe than industry consensus standards
without a finding, supported in the record, that there exists "a significant risk of harm" at the consem@s level that is remedied by
the stricter standard. 110 The condition precedent to such regulation, then, is a valid finding about certain scientific facts or natural
p4enomena.
Proponents of the legislative veto can point to a yet stronger example, derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Currin v.
Wallac e,111 which shows that even votes of some kinds can serve as
conditions precedent and yet not be counted as legislative behavior. Under· the statute there challenged, Congress has authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to establish uniform tobacco grading
standards and to inspect and grade tobacco to be sold in designated auction markets. The Secretary could not designate a particular auction market unless two-thirds of the growers using that
market voted in favor. When Oxford, North Carolina, became a
designated market following such a vote, the affected warehousemen and auctioneers filed suit. The Supreme Court found no con stitutional defects in the statutory scheme. In the crucial particular, it held that the local growers were not wielding any improperly
delegated national legislative power when they voted in favor of
designation of the market. That legislative power, the Court held,
already had been exercised fully by the proper body, the Congress,
when it passed the statute establishing the basic regulatory
scheme. The vote of t~e growers was not legislative. It was merely
fulfillment of a condition precedent to the administrative acti on, a
condition spelled out in full in the original legislation.112
What. stronger foundation could be hoped for the legislative veto
proponents' case? If the vote of mere tobacco farmers in North
Carolina can be a condition precedent to the authority to regulate,
and is not then deemed an exercise of legislative power, then, a
fortiori, the vote of some or all of the people's representatives in

11 11

lncluRtrial Uni o n D e p 't v. Am e ri ca n P e t rnl c um ln s t., 44 H lJ .S. flO?, li44 ( 1980) .
I (19:!9). !:lee Unite d S ta tes V. Roc k R oya l C oop ., In c., :\07 u.s. s:n. fi7 7-7H
(193H) ; ,J. W . H a mpton , Jr. & Co. v. U nited States, 276 U .S. 394, 407 ( l!J2H).
"' aOti U.S . at 15· 16 .
Ill
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Congress should enjoy the same privilege. Such votes should be entitled to serve as a condition precedent to valid regulatory action
and receive equal recognition as nonlegislative behavior. To hold
otherwise would seem starkly anomalous. This assertion lies at the
heart of any argument attempting to square the legislative veto
with sections 1 and 7 of article J.1 13
The seeming power of this attractive argument, however, proves
chimerical once one examines the careful limits placed on the congressional role under our constitutional scheme- limi ts that, l'rom
som e perspectives, seem '"e~allyanomalous. Simply put, the Constitution does not assign members of Congress a roving commission
to represent the people in any manner those members may choose.
Precisely because their potential powers are so broad, the Constitution carefully channels their representative activities into narrowly prescribed forms.
The presentation clause and the requirement of bicameral approval are not the "'OnlY sucnprescripbons conTuiTng members of
COllg;ess-and only members of Congress, for all the majesty of
their elected positions-to cer@n precise ways for affecting government outcomes. For example, the appointments clause!•• requires
the President to name certain governmentar"offi ciafssubject to the
advice and con,.s_~nt of the Senate. It goes on to allow Congress to
vest, by statute, t he appointme nts of other officials in the courts of
law or in the heads of departments. Members of Congress certainly
may be thought~s important, thoughtful, and responsible as any
of the individual who may hold a position to make appointments.

·~
j

'

~

' 13 The then-recently decided Currin case was used prominently, in precisely this fnshion,
in arguments favoring the inclusion of the congressional veto in legislation that became the
'Reorganization Act of 19:19:
(T]he Supreme Court of the United States said in that case: . . . Co ngress has
merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by withholding its operation as to
a given market 'unless two thirds of the growers voting favor it.'

If we can say to a group of individuals who are int.erestrd in the marketing of tobacco that a solemn enactment of Congress does not go into effect until they them selves haw decided to adopt it .. . surely we in Congrc~s can say that the Pr1's1dent's
order shull not go into effect until that order has come herP nnd has r<'moined lu•re 60
days, and khall not then go into effect if both Houses join in a concurrent rPsolution
t.o the effect that th e order is not to become the luw of the land.
84 Cong. Rec. :JU.t4 (I H:l9) (remarks of Sen. Hrown).
"' U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
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Nevertheless, Buckley v. Valeom reaffirmed that neither Congress
nor its leadersh1 rna exercise the authority to ap omt fticials
w o wield significant admmtstratlve or en orcement powers 116-no
matter that the statute authorizing such appointments was passed
originally by both Houses and signed by the President. 117
In a similar fashion, the Congress places few limits on who may
hold "office under the United States." North Carolina tobacco
farmers are as eligible, in constitutional terms, as are law professors, actors, or Wall Street tycoons. Only one class of persons is
barred absolutely from holding such positions: sitting members of
Congress, under the incompatibility clause. 118
If this one class of persons may not participate in administration
directly by holding executive office, then it seems less of an anomaly to conclude that Currin does not authorize its indirect participation through the legislative veto. 119 That same class of persons
may not ordain that its will, expressed in some manner not explicitly provided in the Constitution, shall serve as a condition precedent to the exercise of administrative powers, even though a remarkably wide range of natural phenomena, bureaucratic behavior,
or votes of private citizens constitutionally may serve as such
I

116
424 U.S. 1 ( 1971)) (per curiam).
"" Id. at 140-•11.
117
Federal Ell'ction Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Puh. L. No. 9:1-44:1, H~ Stat.
1263.
Note that the President's acquiescence in this appointment scheme, whi ch reduced hi s
own constitutional authority, did not save it from constitutional invalidity. No more should
the President's opportunity to veto the cl'iginal enabling legislation establishing a congres sional veto scherne be held sufficient to ensure against any se paration-of-powers violation,
although veto proponentR have suggested as much. See Stewart, 11upra note 11, nt fi I~ . It is
quite possible that a combination of political circumstances · will induce a particular President to sign such a measure-either changing the appointments sc heme or acquiescing in a
legislative veto provision- to serve political ends that seem urgent at the mom cnl. S uch
statutes, however, can operate in perpetuity, affecting later incumbents of the pres idential
office, and gradually ceding largPr chunks of executive authority. See McGowan , supra note
5, at 1157. One reason we have politically immortul judges is to prese rve the basic co ns titu tional structure ••ven whe n politicully mortal Presidents hnrgnin uway portions of thl'ir con stitutional birthright .
118
U.S. Cons I., arl. I, sec. 6, cl. 2, provides in part: "IN Jo PerHon holding any Office
under the Unitt-d States, shnll he n Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office."
"' This is not an usse rtion that legislative vetoes violate the inco mpatibility clause. Comparison with the clause instead rPveals that denying Congress n power Currin authorizes for
private citizens is no nnomaly, but rather part of a careful pattern of restrictions the Constitution places on the congressional role.
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conditions.
The basic reason for this superficially anomalous result stems
from concern over conflicts of interest. If an administrative system
where the votes of tobacco farmers play a crucial role begins to
show bad results, we have a relatively dispassionate judge, Congress itself, available to alter the role such votes play or perhaps
simply to terminate the administrative scheme. If the very judge
thus relied on is also the beneficiary of the enhanced powers conferred by the design of the condition precedent, however, needed
120
corrective changes become less likely.
Veto proponents yet may respond that all these restrictions on
the congressional role stemmed from the Framers' basic fear of legislative aggrandizement and that times have changed. But even if
we agree that the concern that animated the 1787 Convention has
subsided and is replaced by a legitimate fear of the imperial presidency, we should hesitate to abandon the cited restrictions. The
bic&.mera requirement and the presenta~on clause have proven
importanf not only because of fheir implications for any interbranch struggle over powers. Those clauses, and the elaborate legislative process that has grown-up to impl ement them, serve to enhance the integrity and seriowmess of th~ craft of enacting
legislation b}-t"mposmg a cer~pline on Congress's internal
deliberations. Any major shift from statute to legislative veto
portends, as the discussion above has developed, the blurring of
clear lines of accountability for "finishing" enacted legislation. It
may erode the usual staying power of congressional compromises.
It magnifies the risk .of corrosive impasse, binds agencies closer to
mere mood changes in either House, and makes it easier, at least at
the margin inhabitated by the hottest political controversies, for
Congress to act in an unhelpfully negative fashion. The Framers
may not have focused on these · matters internal to the legislature
as much as they did on the perceived need to defend the other two
branches. Hut that relative inattention should not blind us today
to these important and salutary results of their handiwork. In con-

----------------------------------------~-----------------

""See gene rally Th!' Federalist No. 10. a t J:ll (B. Wri~h t l' d . 1961 ) (.1. Ma di so1l) :
No m n n is allowed to be a judge in his own cause . her a use his inte res t wo uld ee r·
t a inly bi as hi s judgme nt, and , not improhahly, rorrupt hi s inte grit y. With e qual , nay
wit.h l(reater rl•ason, a body of men nrc unfit to h1! both judi(CS a nd parties a t. 1 he sam e
time . . . .
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sequence, both section 1 and 7 of article I should be held to apply
to that peculiar form of legislative behavior manifested by the legislative veto, and the legislative veto should be ruled
unconstitutional.
V.

Agencies have been known to choose among policy options unwisely or narrowmindedly or with stark insensitivity to the obvious
wishes of most of the public. If they range outside Congress's originally specified intent, we do not need the legislative veto to call
them to account. The courts are positioned to do that, and we can
be relatively certain that litigants will step forward to invoke this
judicial chastening. If instead the agencies act unwisely within the
options left open by the original statute, a constitutional remedy
lies in the hands of Congress. Congress may narrow the range of
substantive discretion, by statute, either at the outset of a new regulatory venture, or later, when the agency's activity has brought
the precise problem into focus .
Well-designed procedures of course help secure sound substantive decisions. But fixation on procedure can be carried to extremes. Ultimately, procedure cannot shelter us entirely from the
121
need for painful substantive choice.
•
T. S. Elliot once warned of men
try to escape/
ii-Oifi the dartmess outsRre- an.a w'"'ithi:q'( B dreaming of systems so
perfect that no one will need to be goo ." 122 The legislative veto is
more. ft alfows Congress to
a product of system-tinkering,
miil{e a great show of determination to slap down errant agencies,
yet it quietly spares Congress much of the agony of difficult substantive choice. If agencies are "good"-and our complicated polity
necessarily presumes they have that capacity most of the
time-then the veto is not needed. When they fall short, the right
answer, the needed answer, does not lie in another layer of procedure. It lies in Congress's finding the courage "to be good" itself-through statutes that embody, rather than evade, the neces-

..

wlJ.~"constantly

'

'

CoNCLUSION

noth~ng

"7
~_
S"'Po,-c•...._

F£,..4~~

"' Cf. T. Lowi, ,; upra note :19, at 232-39 (blaming much of the failure of the Co mmunity
Action l'rogrulll on the fnet that the underlyin>: statute wa s "rornplet.ely procpss oriented
non-law" and on the refusal "to make moral choices und se t clear legislative st.a ntlard s" ).
"' Choruses from "The Rock," in T.S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays 1909-1950,
at 106 (1962).
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sary substantive choices.
The Supreme Court cannot guarantee that Congress will shoulder that responsibility with wisdom or courage. But perhaps it can
make the odds a little better, by calling a constitutional halt to
Congress's current fascination with one particularly beguiling procedural diversion, the legislative veto.
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SCHOOL OF LAW

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
United States Supreme Court
Washington, D.C.
20543
Dear Justice Powell:
I had hoped o
hington next week, in time
for arguments in the
ut that has proven impossible.
Nevertheless, I anted to send ou a copy of the galleys of my
article on the 1 gislative
o, which I mentioned when you were
here in Charlotte Yille
st October. Although the precise focus
is not on the type o veto employed in Chadha, the article explains
the major reasons why I conclude that the legislative veto is unconstitutional.
In order to conserve the time of anyone who may wish to look
this over, I offer the following "reader's guide." Pages 1-14 can
be skipped by anyone familiar with 1 the general issues, and nearly
all the footnotes can be ignored ~ithout loss of anything significant to the argument.
I think I would except only footnotes 78,
101, 102 and 117 from that statement (and I confess to a personal
fondness for footnotes 58, 59, and 92). The first page is missing
from your copy because it has been substantially rewritten.
I am especially pleased that this article will appear in the
February issue of the Virginia Law Review, since that is the festschrift celebrating your tenth anniversary on the bench.
I hope
the article, in its final form, reflects, in some small measure,
my feelings of warmth and respect, as well as gratitude for all
I have learned from you over the years.
Sincerely,

David A. Martin
Assistant Professor of Law
DAM:mar
Enclosure

meb 2/20/82

)~~~-jt--17
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BOBTAIL BENC;rEMO
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:
Re:

Mary
No. 80-1832, INS v. Chadha (appeal of INS from CA9),
No. 80-2170, House v. INS (cert to CA9 filed by House) &
No; 80-2171, Senate v. INS (cert to CA9 filed by Senate)

Questions Presented
1.

Did the CA9 have jurisdiction over this case?

2.

What if the CA9 did not have jurisdiction?
(or, how far can one get with McLucas v. DeChamplain?)

. 5-6

3.

What about Chadha's marriage to an American? . .

7-8

4.

Severability of statute--does Chadha have standing? . . . 9-10
Any absence of "adversariness:?

o.

.

.

.

. 1-4

. 11

Is the constitutionality of the legislative veto a political question? . 12

11

7.

The merits:

n

Conclusion .

is this one-house veto constitutional?

. 13-16
.17-18

Each section begins on a new page--r swear I have not gone over
my page limit.* Indeed, this memo is very sketchy, and does not even
address many arguments--including such major ones as the presentment
Co~t_,rec:.S

clause ~ust present legislation to the President) .

Please ask for

additional briefing on any other points--or more thorough briefing on
anything herein--if it would help you prior to Conference.

*

The fact that the memo is triple-spaced so I can read it easier should

also be considered.

/,

DID THE CA9 HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE?
When I annotated the
not have jurisdiction.

~

cert petn, I concl'uded that the CA9 did

After closer examination of the statutes, I

think that it did have jurisdiction.

This makes the case easier!

Judicial review was sought under 8 U.S.C. §1105a(a), which
provides for CA review "of all final orders of deportation, heretofore or
hereafter made against aliens within the U.S. pursuant to administrative
.
'V
proceedings under sect1on 125J(b) of this title or comparable provisions
of any prior Act, except that

The key point

II

·- -

-

~s

that

Chadha

_

went t:o Lire c:;:Rbto the CA9 to protest an order of deportation
~

........--....---..

ent9 red, not

__,

by the House, but by an administrative agency.
Initially, Chadha sought leave to change his status to

%17.~'{

of a permanent resident

a ·l ien

under 8 U.S. C.

that

'

~(a)

( 1) , which allows

the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of any alien who
meets the standards of that section, which include good character,
residence in the U.S. for 7 years, and "extreme hardship" if deported.
A hearing was held before an ALJ (to whom the AG had delegated this
responsibility) and the ALJ suspended Chadha's deportation on the ground
that he met the statutory standard.
I

\\

Although the ALJ's decision to .~ llow Chadha to stay was not appealable
to any court, it could be vetoed by either house of Congress by that
And the

body expressing its disapproval within certain time limits.
House did so.

ppm

O,,o"'

On Dec. 12,

~975,

the chairman of the Subcommittee

on Immigrati:on, Citizenship and International Law of the House

Judiciary Committee injte£a"ti''t'£

~

t't'ae:fe:y±on ye

v:sftV~~

introduced

a resolution for the purpose of vetoing the deportation of Chadha
\

and five other aliens.

The bill was introduced on the floor four days

/ater without being printed or made available to other members of the

House.

The sole explanation was given by Congressman

~berg.

Eilberg explained that it was "the feeling of the committee, after
reviewing 340 cases, that the aliens contained, in the resolution did
not meet the[] statutory requirements, particularly as it relates
to harrdship; and it is the opinion of the committee that the deportation
should not be suspended."

121 Cong. Rec. 40800.

Under 8 U.S.C. §1254(c) (2), Congress is empowered, through either ~use,
to pass a resolution ~a~ab~ ab sy~s€aeee ega~~

"stating in substance

that it does not favor the suspension of such decportation," and when it
does so, the same provision states that the "Attorney General shall
~

voluntary

thereupon deport such alien or authorizie the alien's
departure at his own expense under the order of deportatioon

in the manner provided by law."
Pusuant to this provision, the ALJ held another hearing on Aug. 4, 1976.
(reprinted in Joint Appendix to certs and jurisdictional statement (J .A.) a:J= t.J.fr)
At that hearing, the ALJ agreed with Chadha that the legislative veto
appeared unconstitutional, but explained that he had no authority
statutes.s~&

to decide the constitutionality of
~

~~8se~uefi~l~,

Ofi

At the hearing, Chadha declined to apply for voluntary departure

as allowed under §1254(e) and refused to name a country of deportation.
The ALJ indicated that he would enter the United Kingdom (where Chadha
((.~

had spent 12 days in transit to the
reserved his right to apply for

-K.t cou,t:r'1 of

u.s.)j{

d-epod:a.+•~"'•

and Chadha, at the hearing,

asylum under 8 U.S.C. §1253(h).

As a result of Congress' expressed disapproval and the results of
this hearing, an order of deportation was subsequently entered on Nov. 8, 1976
That order was appealed to the Board of

e,,og~atopm=~

Immigration

Appeals, and on Feb. 11, 1977, that body concluded that it had no
power to declare an act of Congress unconstituional and therefore
affirmed the order of deportation.

J.A. 55-56.

Review of the order in the CA9 was, therefore, warranted.

§1105a(a)
exclusive
Tit. 8 U.S. C ~~~g ~ provides fo;J!eview in the court of appeals
of any "order of deportation ••• pursuant to administrative proceedings
under §1252 (general determination of deportatability provision)
~comparable

final administrative

provisions."
~

Chadha was ordered deported by a
order entered at the close of an

administrative proceeding not unlike §1252.

Moreover, the legislative

history indicates that Congress intended §ll05a(a)
separate form of judicial
tation of aliens."J"

"or

t~'create

a single,

review of administrative orders for deptor-

Foti v. INS, 375

u.s.

217, 255 (1963)

(quoting

H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1961)).
Arguments can, of course, be made the other way, and my analysis
s-/.14-kr-y
is necessarily sketchy and less than thorough.
But the only_Lform
of judicicial review of administrative orders of deportability is to
the CAs.
in DC.

The alternative procedure is a non-statutory habeas proceeding
Congress apparently meant the CA review mechanism to be exclusive

in the deportation-order administrative-proceeding context, and the
fact that, at a mid-point in the administrative process, Congress expressed
disapproval of a substantive result does not seem

~change

the fact that

the deportation order was made, not by Congress, but by an administrator
in an administrative proceeding--one in which Chadha might not have
been ordered deported even

~£

fi~

after the exercise of the legislative

veto--for example, the Attorney General could, thereafter, have granted
him asylum.

Even the House would not

argu~hat

the order of deportation

could not be appealed to the CA after exercise of legislative veto
in order to challenge the Attorney General's refusal to grant asylum.
And in Foti , the Court clearly stated that the statutory appeal
may include issues relating to suspension of deportation as well as
deportability.

See Foti,

375 U.S.

Court has not extended §1105a(a)

, at 222-223.

The fact that this

jurisdiction to challenges to stays

of deportability, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968), does not
preclude CA review in this

case dealing, not 'with a stay, but with

a final administrative order of deportation.

~-

WHAT IF THE CA9 DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THIS CASE?
(Or, how much does McLucas v. DeChamplain

help~)

Ordinarily, if the lower court(s) lacked jurisdiction, this Court
lacks jurisdition.

This is certainly true for certs, and the

of the House and Senate cannot be used to reach the merits if
not have jurisdiction.
With an appeal, things might be different and are certainly more
confusing.

In McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U.S. 21 (1974 or 1975)

(Powell, J.),

the Court held that it could reach the merits of a constitutional challenge
regardless of whether the ~challenge should have been brought before
intia~lly.

a three-judge court

\'

in which this case can be read.
a §125 L appeal (appealing a

There are, unforuntately, two ways
The first, urged by the SG, is that on

holding that a~ act of Congress is

I ·,

unconstitutional in a case in wbich the U.S. is a party), if one of

r

two lower federal

~ourts

should have heard the case initially but it

is not clear that the proper court did so, this Court can nev~rtheless
review the merits of the constitutional issues (because of the pOlicy
reasons for which &125~ appeJs were instittuted1 to provide certainty, etc.).
If this reading of McLucas

prevails (and I would joinj

this Court can consider the

consitu~onality

e¥eft-~fiett9fi

the SG in urging it),

of the legislative veto

regardless of whether the challenge should have been brought

in the CA or by way of habeas in DC.
On the other hand, McLucas can be read much more narrowly.

The Court

was careful to note that, regardless of whether the constitutional
issue was substantial at the time the suit was brought (and a 3-judge
court should therefore have been used), the constitutional issue was
clearly insubstantial now, and a single DC judge would now be appropriate.
(or noi:.J
Id., at 20-21. Although the Court ~ state that "whetherlthe District ,'J, J-2.0
4

Court had jurisdiction to act, this case is properly before us under §125;,"_1_

the Court also stated that "[a]t this point, however, no purose

~ could be served by our deciding whe~r, when the complaint
was filed, DeChamplain's constitutional claim was or was not substantial,"
ibid.

The post-McLucas cases are similarly ambiguous, see Williams

v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358,tJ .. s.

~:b-,

32

1'~9115?

367-368

n.lO (1980).

&

Thus, a quite respectable argument can be made htat McLucas
to situations in which, at least by the time this Court

is limited

revie~the

§1252 appeal, it is clear that the original action was, despite earlier
uncertainties, brought in the proper forum.
If the narrower reading of McLucas is adopted, then this Court
--.,

lac~s

jurisdiction, even in the §1252 appeal, to consider the constitutional

issue unless the case was properly brought before the CA in the first
place.

I would argue that the Court need not reach this question because the
CA9 did have proper jurisdiction.
jurisdiction.,

But if you disagree on the CA9's

I would then argue for

th~roader

reading of McLucas,
,......,

at least in the absence of any factors which would make this Court' s
review impossible--because, for example, there is no record.

Here,

of course, there is an administrative record which appears sufficient.
Section 1252 was enacted to provide certainty regarding the constitutionality
of

statut~s

in cases in which the U.S. is a party, and review under

it should be declined only when it is not possible--not just
because there has been a technical defect in court selection.

3.

WHAT ABOUT CHADHA'S MARRIAGE TO AN AMERICAN?
On Aug. 10, 1980, more than two years after oral

- CA9, Chadha married an American citizen.

-$

argumen1~o

the

./

He is now eligible to change

his status to that of a permanent resident alien pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
& §1430(a)
§115l(b) :[which provide that a person whose spouse is a U.S. citizen
may be naturalized (become a citizen) after three years of residence and
marriage.
This may not affect the existence of a case or controversy at all,
depending on one's view of thff ' merits.

The INS ALJ's decision to suspend

Chadha's deportation was made on June 25, 1974.

If the action of the

House in vetoing this suspension was a nullity because unconstitutional,
Chadha would be eligible for citizenship now, rather than
in Aug., of 1983, the date on which he would be eligilble as a result
of his marriage.

This is because, after suspension of deportation

f or hardship under §1254, §1427(a) requires only that the immigrant
have been a resident of the U.S. for five years of residence "after
being lawfully admitted for residence."

It has already been more than

five years since the ALJ's pre-veto suspension of his deportation order,
and, if the legislative veto
~e~efore

is regarded as a nullity, he is

eligible for citizenship immediately.

An intermediate position is also possible.

Perhaps, even if

the legislative veto is invalid, the date on which Chadha was "lawfully
admitted for residence" is the date of

th~

decision rather than

~e

date of the ALJ's dec~ision, since the latter was subsequently vacated.
If this approach were taken, Chadha would be eligible for citizenship
~

(absent marriage) five years from th~CA's decision (Apr. 10, 1979)'
./

i.e. , he would be eligible in

Apr. of 1974. This date is later than

the date on which he would be eligible because of marriage--but

even under this scenario, the case is not moot because he must remain
{anJ f,·~ IAJ ,·111_ h.vl. -lao ! )
married_f!.hrough Aug., 1983, in order to be qua'lified for citizenship on
that earlier date.
In sum, if the legislative veto is invalid, the case has not
been mooted by

Chadha's marriage to an American.

not in any
way moot or unripe if the veto is unconstitutional, the mootness quuestion
,.-,

should not preclude this Court's r eaching the merits.
'-

-

L/

SEVERABILITY:

DOES CHADHA LACK STANDING BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
PROVISION CANNOT BE SEVERED FROM THE GRANT OF POWER TO
TO SUSPEND DEPORTATION ORDERS TO THE EXECUTIVE

The arument can be made that Chadha does not have standing
to challenge the denial of an exemption for him because Congress would
not have given the Attorney General the power to suspend deportation orders
had it not retained the power to overrule the suspensions.

And if

both parts of the statute are struck (because of lack of severability),
Chadha will be in precisely the situation he is in now:

deporta~le.

This argument should be rejected for the reasons given by the SG
1-..iA ~o.:f -..;;;,_
-------....
I
inJ30-65:
(1) there is a general presumption of constitutionality of
statutes, and this presumption includes the presumption that an uncconstitutional provision is

severa~ble

( 2) this statute does

e

from an otherwise constitutional statute;

fac§"hav~

"strong severability clause'"

8 U.S.C. §1101 note, and such a clause greatly enhances the presumption
of severability;

(3)the House and Senate's representations about legislative

history are not enough to overcome the statutory severability provision.
On the last point, the SG concedes that every grant of power to suspend
deportation orders to the executive has been accompanied by the retention
of some form of legilative veto.

But the legislative history also

indicates that Congress thought it was beyond its resources to to

~

handle the large volume of these requests · . ~
current provision was enacted in 1949 after an experment with a method
under which both houses had to affirm any suspension of deportation.
This proved unworkable because the new responsibilitities placed on
the JQdiciary Committee (of

the House) were ~

"of purely administra-

tive nature and they seriously interfere with the legislative work of
the Committee ... and would, in time, interfere with the legislative
work of the House." H.R. Rep. No. 362, Blst Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).

Thus, the 1949 legislation was a rejection of 'something akin to the
private-bill model as unworkable, and a return to an earlier version
under which the executive's suspension of
in all but the most exceptional cases.

depor~on

would be final

Consequently, there is no

adequate basis for the conclusion that, if the legislative veto
provision had been unavailable, Congress would not have granted power
suspend to the executive.

to~

..5_

HAS THERE BEEN AN ABSENCE OF "ADVERSARINESS"?

The House argues that because Chadha and the INS both argued
the unconstitutionality of the veto provision to the CA9 below, and
because they are still the only "petr" and "resp," there is a lack
of the requisite case or controversy.

The CA9 did not, however, make

any decision prior to its request that the House and Senate

I

appear as amici, which they did.
U.S. 303

(1946~

Plilliiur United States v. LOvett,

328

and Granville-Smith v. Granville Smith, 349 U.S. 1

both involved cases in w~ there were no adverse "parties."
ville-Smith, the Court appointed qualified counsel to

(1955~

In Gran-

represen~he

side of the issue not represented by petr or resp (with regard to domicile
in a divoffce
proceeding).
\..:.,...

In Lovett, the lack of adversariness (Justice

agreed with the individual plaintiffs that their rights had been
violated) was cured by the appearance of congressional amici.
also Brown v. Hartlage, No. 80-1285, 50 U.S.L.W. 3300 (1980)

(~~t~i,\:ounsel
Kentucky case) .

See
(order

to appear as amicus to defend decsion below)

(our

12-

h,

IS THE LEGISLATIVE VETO'S

CONSTITUTIONALITY

A POLITICAL QUESTION?

The House only devotes one page (48) to this argument and does
tred at 23-25 J
not appear to take it very seriously. As resp Chadha polnts out,lthe
fact that the Congress and the Executive have broad substantive powers
in an area (i.e., immigration and naturalization) is simply irrelevant
to a challenge that they have exercised the powers in a
violates another portion of the Constitution.

way which

Indeed, all concede that

Congress has enough substantive power over immigration and naturalization
to allow suspension only by private bills passed by both Houses and
signed by the President.

But the question remains whether that same

r-..

br•oad substantive power can be exercised in a way in which Congress
\..J

itself acts part~y as executive rather than legislator .
...:::1

/.THE MERITS:

IS THIS ONE-HOUSE VETO CONSTITUTIONAL?

The one-house veto before the Court is one 1n which Congress

•
delegated to the executive the ability to make decisions in ind.vidual
cases under a statutory standard.

(see question l at pages 1-4, supra).

The executive decision is made by an

A~

at a hearing and there is QA

appeal to the courts challenging the order of deportation on the ground
that the executive should have exercised its discretion under §1254.
See brief of Chadha (red) at 41.

But when the denial is the result

of the exercise of the legislative veto, there is no hearing

~:•• H

and little consideration, apparently, by anyone but staffers on a Judiciary
Committee.

See question 1, pages 1-4 supra.

If the legislative veto

is constitutional, the refusal to suspend deportation on grounds of
hardship is final and unappealable to any court.
The veto operates as a form of either executive action, cutting
off judicial review, or as a form of judicial review, but in either
event without a hearing, a record for decision, or any requirement

__

of........ a ~tionale.
'-'::_
__,

(Here, one Congressman merely stated that the 5

aliens involved in this veto had not met the "hardship" requirement) .
The meaning of the hardship requirement, supposedly incorrectly applied
in these 5 cases, was not explicated, clarified, or modified in any
way.

Indeed, Congress itself has referred to this type of decisionmaking

as "purely administrative."

See 9, supra.

[The legislative veto reminds

me of denials of bar admission by this Court without a hearing and
when the state bar has allowed admission.]

1

14

This legislative veto is therefore quite different from such
in the rulemaking context--involving, after

al~a

legislative

function--such as the case considered by the CADC recently.

If this

L-.... - -

_.,....

egislative veto is struck, I would recommend that it be done narrowly--on the
-

..,______,

ground that here Congress has established a law granting itself purely

executive or judicial powers, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
See, e.g., Madison in Federalist No. 48:
"It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging
to one of the departments ought not to be directly and
administered by either of th~other departments.

~letely

It is equally

evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the

o~heir respective powers. It will not be denied
that power ~n enroaching nature and that it ought to be

administration
ef7

ually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it."

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137-143 (1976), the Court considered
the constitutionality of a commission consisting partly of members
of Congress.

The Court noted that the Commission had three basic

types of powers:

~
~nformation-flow

functions;

(2) statutory-interpretation

functions; and (3)informal proceedings, administrative proceedings,
and civil suits.

The Court held that insofar as the Commission's

powers were within the normal category of

co~ressional

and informative), they were constitutional.

powers (investigative

The Court then stated:

ea
H lRJeqpiJM3
when we go beyond this trpe of authority
"But w~
to the more substantial powers exercised by the Commisssion,

we reach a different result.

The Commission's enforcement

power, exemplified by its discretionary power to seek
judicial relief, is authority that cannot possibl.y be
regarded as merely in aid of th9~egislative function of Congress.
Id., at 138.

lai~CfLJ

The Court then explained thatlas a general matter, the Congress may create

.

...

»

15
,d fill offices, Congress may not itself

w.

Id., at 129.

admin~ster

or enforce the public

I would agree with the SG that this legislative

veto is unconstitution under Buckley v. Valeo and under the other cases
discussed in the brief of the SG at 53.
And, like the SG, I would also reject the argument that executive
executive
action is mere "agent of Con1ress" action when it is pursuant o power
Id., at 53-56.
con f erre db y Congress un d er th e necessary and proper c l ause. -'A

heleiill~
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I would recommend that this legislative veto is unconstitutional
under, inter alia, Buckley v. Valeo because it retains to Congress a
-------.,

. pure l y 1/a d m1n1strat1ve
. .
.
I\.
d' . 1""-.b ut 1n
. no way l eg1s
. l at1ve,
.
power t h at lS
or I!JU 1c1a
~

despite the fact that Congress has broad power to legislate in the area
/"'.

of naturalization and immigrati-on
.
.....;:./
A narrow holding on this ground would leave for next term the
~ onstitutionality

of legislative vetos in the context of rulemaking (a

much more "legislative\ function)--and it would be that decision that
would have to consider the presentment to the President and other
based on the constitutional

req~ments :. for

argument~

enactment of legislation.

A narrow decision would not determine the outcome of the Court's review of the
decision just reached by the CADC (involving rulemaking).

Nor would

it decide Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, No. 80-1832 (D.C. Montana
Dec. 16, 1981), in which the aee'y of
s+=etMreee-!Jf pen ,

e:

B!!'S8H!!'-

(~ant

~fie

Il"l~8~!i!83!'

en8W8~@le8

fl:ii! -----

to a legislative veto by legislative

committee), the committee passed a resolution ordering the Sec'y
of the Interior to take certain "emergency" measures, temporarily ceasing
@Ill

J;;;s+Ig

new leases for mineral exploration in certain wilderness

reas in order to maintain the status quo (which would otherwise supposedly
be irretrievably lost during the interim period) pending determination

16
~

of proper action by Congress.
if you would like to see them.

I have copies of both of these decisions

17
R.

CONCLUSION
1. I would recommend a holding that the CA9 had jurisdiction over

challenge~Altern~tively,

Chadha's

I would recommend holding that,

even if the action should have been brought in DC, this Court

has~

under McLucas in a §1252 appeal, regardless of whether the action was
<b5~t~

brought in the proper lower federal court.
If you think the CA9 lacked jurisdiction, the certs must be

decided on that basis and no other issues can be reached.

If you agree

with a broad reading of McLucas, it is still possible to go on

to reach

the other issues in the §1252 appeal.
3.

Chadha's marriage to an American n

e case nor

I

makes it an~ropriate vehicle for
W~8~8~~

question presented.
~come

resolving the constitutional

If the veto is unconstitutional, he can frob"-bl1
-

a citizen sooner (and possibly immediately) than as a result of
I

his marriage (as a result of the marriage, he cannot become a citizen
until Aug. of 1983).
The statute has

4.

of the one-house veto

provis~o

The

rovision.

unco~tutionality

not, therefore, destroy Chadha's

standing on the ground that the grant of power to suspend deportation
'

.

orders to the executive must fall with the fall of the one-house veto.
5.

The presence of the House and Senate as amici throughout these

proceedings (including before the CA9) has cured any Tack of adversariness.
\

The House and Senate have strongly and consistently opposed Chadha and

'

the INS and have argued that the one-house veto is constitutional.
6. The constitutionaiity of the one-house veto i

------

question despite the , fact that Congress has broad
_n this area.
7.

This legislative veto is unconstitutional because it reserves

to Congress a PrOwer t at is either purely administrative or judicial.

----

18
The constitutionality of other legislative veto schemes now being challenged in
courts (the CADC and oversight of rulemaking by an agency; the DC
Montana and a temporary suspension of an executive power to preserve
the status quo on an emergency basis) can be left for another term.

80-1832

INS v. CHADHA

Argued 2/22/82

ti-~
'

~~

.

~~f~

y 1-s-~~~~.

~ ;_,__., ~

/'1t_ ~~~Lui
tv'A-J~~A:J

W}A
~

{?7A-

-

~z

4

~

#

~~/J&~~~

~ /1:1

e::L

~k-41

1/l.UJ .

/1-6-~)~~~
~~· ~ht~~c:
f./YII'"~~"""""-- ~ ~ d,ul,~ ~ ~ ~

~(~'0

ld.~~·~-t~h~l~~

~e~~A.-~~.

~~~~

~H>~~--~~~

''~i:c_ 'I~''.
~ ~·.·

~ ~~ Jto ~

~~~;_:f

,Lc; ~JL~~~ ~ &-f~.

~~(rv~)
'1

~ ~~-~-tf!uz?~~
~~ ~. ?~ ~ /~t./.-0~ ~

~

~~~.

-j· 2 <iL</- ,_,__. ~ ~. ~4
~~~~'-'~--~~

~~~~~

cA 1 ~
- >j

"J . u..-

~ ~ ~

~~ C/9-tf- ~

..

~~~

. .

L.-tA..

~·,J-

~J

d.-1.~~\

t9-f~~
/'

X.

'1c:"

~

~~ ,Lo~~~-tr
L..~;/~~~~
~IJ.(CA1Jcy. U ~~~
-~~_;J- ~9(~· 4J ~

~(s& -~~/J~_).

~.

TWo~~~lo~-~·

tfh.--1-:C~ 1

1

I. 8~-~~Aa-G.-~Ly

~4--.~4~-;~

----

4-~ j/~:.4; ~~If~

2.~rrP~.

~~~vt4JArn~.
__...

'?t;l.f

~u~~5z~~~
~ M ~~ ' Jj d-!::!:::_-'~ ~k;..._)
~l(~,~~~~~

~

~

~~

,1-o

~

~~
f#l ,

~

c<)(zJ

-tv

t::2--l-.:r.

.:v

.9 ;.. J-

~ -t!-'?f. A-L-~, ~n.-D ~

~·f. ~~~A-

~4 ~~~ ~r-(
{tl)

.

)

·~;-:~~

~~~,f~~

tN-~$~k~

~~~~~~
~r~-f-- ~~a-~~
~~~~~~~

~/A-.

•

Jii3/f~ ~~

~-~~~ad-~~

~~~~2..¥t..f c;t~ ~

~'

{~

~~-~

U-Pc.~ ~ ~~ 4

(J ~ v 1/A-it-D

~4 ~
~!

¢X...

lJ71,.L-

~h

"'-~

~ ~~

.

~ '·
· fW

.•.

•'

·.

(p
80-1832

1-v

INS v. Chadha

&.#·

{/)lv

'

~~~.,~

I ii; ~
fz. ~~=do:~ ,

No.

Conf. 2/24/82

~
•
~~~~~J-6>~ .

Justice Brennan

~~

.

~k<tlll.P_ct(.(,4ce'ct~~~,

k

~~ ~~4J~~~~~"
~..._z;.~~~L.o-"J

)

~

s c:;..s

~ ~~.

/'k_ ~ ~L,.:be.~kLt.t ~~

1-fe;l..Lt,

..Jo ~
~~ ..4> ~~ ~.

9~ ......... ~-7--~~~

~kt-~.

~''.

7ftv-<-~~~ ~ ~·~ ~

W-(__

~

~--<£~~ ~ ~ ~ ~j
~~

~~-~~~~~~
h~~~lr. ·

.J

Justice Rehnquist ~~~f.

~h~ ~~ ~
~~~~ .
'

IA.J

~,< ~- ~ ·~

tv.,L--~~~~~~

~~~~~~~,

~ ~ttfk..~.J~~~ ~-~,.~~u\

k

:J:P~~ -~·s~~·

~~~~~56-

~~~~~~~

~~~~

p~ . '24-f-A--1-~f
'/'~ ~ · ?(~~ ~f--4, ~ -7 ~~~. ~ ~ '-t-J

Justice O'Connor

~.
7~

~-~~~4-t_

~~

----------------------------;;-&--~-..,. .-.,_..-~---~~?L ~ k ~
~~~40

February 25, 1982
80-1832 INS v. Chadha
Dear Chief:
I have not seriously considered the severability
issue, as I assumed we would reach it only after addressing
the merits. From the discussion at Conference, I under.stand
that both Byron and John think we properly could reach this
issue in advance.

I share the concern expressed hy you and others
about havinq to decide the one-house veto issue. The
Executive and Legislative Branches havP. lived with it for
decades - even though uncomfortably at times. tf there were
a principled way to avoi.d the issue, I would welcome it.
Severability, if we could reach it first, may hP a
possibility. But even if we avoided the merits in this
case, I doubt that we could justify denying certiorari in
the CADC case. The present case seems easier to me, and
possibly the two cases would be decided differently.
In any event, it seems to me that the issue is of
sufficient national. importance to merit further discussion,
perhaps at a Conference after we come off the bench March a.
Meanwhile, perhaps we could be enlightened on tha
severability issue. Also, I would not foreclose the
possibility of carrying this case over for reargument next
Term back to back with the CADC case.
In sum, although I adhere tentatively to the view
expressed yesterday on the merits, my preference is to
have a further discussion at a time when we are not pressed
with any other business. The fssue merits it.
I

Sincerely,

~he

Chief Justice

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

56

L~~AM~

~

t
~

tnined in the enacting cln.use of section 27, unless it is within
the exception contained in the first proviso of thnt section.
That proviso, however, ns its 1 guage clearly indicntes, only
t•xcepts from the opern.tion f the enncting clause, merr.h an elise trn nsported bet wee points within the United
Stntcs over through routes in%
' art over Canndin.n mil lines
nnd their own ot· other conn ting wnter incilities, recognized by the Interstate Commet e Commission nncl for which
routes rate tnrifl's have been filtd with the Commission. It
follows therefore, that such trn ' sportntion is in violn.tion of
section 27.

~

)

~~

t

i

t·

r

Section 27 prescribes a penni for tho trnnsportntion of
merchnncliso in violntion thoreof,}viz: that such merchandise
shall be forfeited to tho United Slntcs. Thus, tho nnswcr
to your fourth question is th11t f 'r a. violntion of section 27
you may apply the penn.lty presc ibod therein.
Hcspcctfully,
To the SxcnETAHY

OF

WIL~IJAM D. MITCHELL.
Co:r.rM''

CONSTITUTIONALITY 01~ PUOPOST!JD LT!JGISLATION
AFFECTING 1'AX 111DFUNDS

Th~ proviso In th~ urgent deflclency !Jill (II.

(
l

n. 1307G, 72d Oong,, 2nrt
'sess.), authorizing n joint committee o! Congress to mnke the flnnl
decision ns to whether rc!unds o! tnxes over $20,000 shnll be mndo
nnd to !lx the amount thereof, Is obnoxious to tho Constitution ot
I he United Stntcs, l>ccnuse, Inter nlln, It attempts to entrust to memIJcrs o! the lcgislntlve l>rnnch, nctlng ex o!Jiclo, executive functions
In t!Je execution o! the lnw, and It attemp ts to give to n committee o£ the leglslntlve l>rnnch power to npprove or cllsnpprovo execu·
tlve nets.
DEPAnnmNT OF JusTICE,

January ~4, 1933.
Srn: I hn.ve your letter of Jn.nuary 23, reln.ting to the
urgent deficiency bill, H. R. 13975, recently pnsscd by both
\ Houses of Congress and submitted for your npproval.
You call particular attention to the parngrnph appropriating a. lump sum for refunding tn.xes illegn.lly or el'l·oneously collected, nncl nsk for my comment upon it. It is n.s
follows:

!I
I

t

I·

7fffS

TAe President
nunn:Au o!r INTERNAL

n~

" :Refunding tnxes illegnlly or erroneously collected: For
refunding tn.xes illegnlly or erroneously collected, as provided by law, including the payment of clnims for the fiscal
yenr 1933 and prior yenrs, $28,000,000: Provided, That a.
report sho.ll be ronde to Congress by internal-revenue districts nnd nlphabcticnlly nrranged of all disbursements hereunder in excess of $GOOns requirccl by section 3 of the Act of
?l'frty 29, 1928 (U. S. C., Supp. V, title 2G, sec. 149), including
tho nnmes of all persons nncl corporations to whom such
payments nrc mnclc, together with the n.mount paid to each:
Provided, 'l'hnt 110 refund or credit of nny income or profits,
cstntc, or gift tnx in excess of $20,000 shnll be maclo nfter tho
enactment of this Act unLil n report thereof giving the nnme
of tho inclividunl, trust, estnte, partnership, compnny, or corporntion to whom the refund or credit is to be mncle, the
amount of such refund or credit, nnd tho facts in connection
therewith aro su bmitlecl l>y tho Commissioner of Internal
Itovcnue to tho Joint Committee on Internal Hevenue Taxntion and action thereon lnken by said committee. The said
committee or its duly nuthori;,ecl stnlf shnll have full access
to all the pnpers and shnll examine into and pnss upon the
case, nnd no refund or credit in excess of $20,000 shnll be
made until the Joint Committee on Internnl Revenue Tn.xution shnll hnve so pnssecl on such refund or credit, fixed , the
amount thereof, n.ncl mnclc its report to the Commissioner of
Internn.l Hcvcnuc; ltncl no refund or credit in excess of $20,000 shall bo made without the a pprovn.l of snicl committee.
This proviso shn.ll not ttpply to refunds or credits mncle pursuant to a judgment of 11 court hnving jurisdiction over the
subject matLor, or n. dcr. ision of the United Stn.tes Bo11rd of
'l'nx Appeals, which has become finn!."
Question nriscs nt once whether the proviso authorizing
the joint committee of Congress to malce the final decision
lLS to wh-ether refunds over $20,000 shnll be mnde and to fix
the a.mount thereof presents consLitutionn.l objections.
By other existing legislation the Congress has set up in
the Treasury Department an administrative system of exnmining into clnims for refund . of tn.xcs n.llegod to hnve
been erroneously or illegally collected, nnd nnthorizing the

5~
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· J•JLe President

lllministl'fitive nllownnce of such cln.ims, nnd the system in
o1·ce involves the nppropri1ttion from t.imc to· time of lump .
ittnt~, not for nny pnrticuln.r clnim, uut avnilnblc genernlly
for ndministmlive repayment of tuxes determined in tho
l'rc:tsnry to Ita vc been illegally or erroneously collected.
his legislation estnblisltes n.dministrn.tivc or executive ftlnclions, nnd the process of applying and executing tho ln.w
Jn-olvcs ndministt'lltive nnd executive action.
Under the proviso in the urgent deficiency bill the action o.f
lto executive ofliccrs in tho Tren.sury Department chn.rgccl
•ith the duty of executing thcln.w respecting refunds wot1ld
1c subject to review by n joint committee of the Congress,
nd tho members of that committee would exercise finn! uullOri ty and make tho decisions us to whether rofuncl shonld
~ mndc nncl in whnt nmounts . . Tho Constitution of the
Jnitecl States divides tho functions of the Government into
lu·eo great -dopnrtments-thc legislative, the executive, and
ho judicin1-ancl estrtblishes the principle that they sh:tll be
~pt scpnrn.Lc, n.nd that neither tho legislative, cxeautive,
or judicial brunch mn.y exercise functions belonging to the ·
lthcrs. The proviso in the urgent deficiency bill violates
'1is constitutionnl principle. It attempts to entrust to mcm.
,crs of the legislative brnnch, ncting ex ollicio, executive
mctions in the execution of tho ln.w, nnd it nttempts to
ivc to n committee of tho legislntivc brnnc!t power to itp~·ovc or disapprove executive nets. If the functions to be
•c dormcd by tho joint committee nrc ndministrative or cxccti ve in character, the bill is suj oct to tho further obj cction
1nt the selection of the personnel by the Congress is nn ·
lfringemcnt of tho constitutional function of tho Exccutivu
1 make appointments und is 1111 n.ttcnrpt by tho legislative
:nnch to Jllnke appointments of officials performing ndtinistrative or executive functions.
If the process of cxi11ninat.ion n.nd nllownnce of n clnim
l' refund of taxes mn.y be viewed ns n. legislative function,
e proviso in this bill is equally obnoxious to the Constitu.
on because n joinL comr11ittee hn.s not power to legislate,
1d legislative power can not be tlelcgnted to it. These
inciples nrc settled by many decisions of the Supreme
ourt of the Unitcu States, to only n. few of which need
ct·encc bo mn.de. In United States v. Fc7'1'ch·a, 13 I-IowrH·J

39, 4.G-1Sl,· the court considered a .stu.tute purporting to authorize n cl istrict j udgo to p1tss upon claims nrising under
tho Spnnish treaty, but which provided thnt the claims
should only be paid by tho Secretary of the Tren.sury if
deemed by him to be just and equitn.blc. 'l'hc court held thttt
the functions of the juclge muler this statute were not jutl.icirtlttncl could not be conferred upon him as a judge, but that
Ire might l.>tl considered us ucting us a commissio!lct·, !llll1
i'll i d :
"The duties to be performed are entirely alien to tho
legitimate fnnctions of n judge or court of justice, and havo
no tmrtlogy to the general OL' special powers ordinarily nncl
lt•gn.lly conferred on judges or courts to secure the due aclminisLration of the ln. ws . . And, if they n.rc to be regn.rdcd
us oflicers, holding ofllces under tho government, the power
of appointment is in the l)rcsiclent, by uncl with tho advice
nnd consent of the Senutc; and Congress could not by law
rlesignn tc the persons to fill these offices. And if this be th1l
constt·uction of tho Constitution, then us tho judge designated could not net in n. judicial character as u court, not•
Hs n. commissioner, because he was not appointed by the
l)rcsiclent, every thing thn.t has been clone under · tho nets
of 1823, und 1834, n.n<l 184 9, would be void • • •."
In Kilbourn v. TILOnLJJSon, 103 U. S. 1G8, tho court h~ld
thn.t duties which the House of Representatives nttempted
to confer upon n. committee were judicial in chamctor nnd
not susceptible of exorcise by tho lcgislntive department. See
also Crenshaw v. United Stat.es, 134 U. S. 99; Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52. A very recent cn.sc is that of
Springer v. PlriUppine Islands, 277 U. S. 180. The Orgn.nic
Act, under which the Philippine Government opern.tcs, provides :for sepnrntion of legislative, executive, IUH1 judicinl
functions, us docs the Constitution of t.he Unilecl States, n.ncl
vests in tho executive the power of appointment of executive
olliccl's. The Philippi11 Legislttture pnssecl nn uct attempting to cren.te n. board of control, consisting of the Govcrnot•
Ocncrnl, tho president of the senn.te, and tho speaker o£ the
house of representatives, to vote the stock in nncl huvc u voice
' in the management of the Philippine Nationn.l Bunk and
other governmental corporutious, 'l'he court sn.id:
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"Legislntivo power, ns distinguished from executive power,
s the nuthority to mnlce lnws, but not to enforce them or
[ppoint the agents chnrgecl with the duty of such enforcencnt. 'I' he latter nrc exec uti vo functions. ... ... ...
"Not having tho power of appointment, unless expressly
~rnntod or incidental to its powers, tho logislnturo cnn not
ngraft executive duties upon n legislative oll1ce, since thnt
would bo to usurp tho power of nppointment by indirection;
!tough the case might be cliil'ercnt if tho adclitionn.l duties
1vero devolved upon nn appointee of tho executive."
It held the net o£ the lcgislo.tmc violative of the Orgn.nic
~ct.
There nrc vnrious wnys in which refunds of illegn.lly colccted tuxes mny be provided for. Congress, if it chooses,
cting under the power to mn.ke npproprin.Lions from the
jublic Treasury and Lhc powor to mnintnin tho immunity of
hj c Feclcro.r- Govommcnt from suit in tho courts, may with~old the power to mnkc refunds from Lhc executive Ut'ttnch
lncl from tho courts, aucl itself clenl with tho subject by tho
bethod of mnlcing specific appropritttions from time to time
o pny specific cl(tims which it deems just. Dealt with in
hut mn.nncr, tho ltuthorization of tho refmll1 constitutes tt
cgislntive net. If Congress confers jurisdiction on the
lourts to cxttmino such cl~tims and ltwnrd judgment ngainst
lhe Government, the function of nllownncc becomes n judicin.l
although thoro still remains tho necessity for legisltttivc
lction in the form of appropriations to pay the judgments.
Vherc, as under existing law, machinery has been set up in
he Treasury Department for udmiuistrativc examination
nd allowance of these claims by executive officers, the funcion of executing this law becomes nn executive one and must
'e left with executive oflicers appointed not by the legislaive brunch but by the Executive.
It will be seen, therefore, that the matter of making re'unds mny involve either lcgislutivc, executive, or judicial,
unctions, depending on the system ndoptcd, but in the presnt cusc it is unnecessary to make any close analysis of the
aturo of the function of refunding illegally collected tn.xes.
:f it be nn executive or judicial function, clottrly o. joint
ommittee of tho Congress may not execute it, and if it is
. legislative function it is equally cletn· thut n joint'commit-
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tee mny not perform it. Action by o. committee is not
legislation, and u' commi ttce of the Congress can not
legislate.
If the process attempted by this bill were reversed nnd
n joint committee were required merely to examine these
clnims and mnlco recommendations to the Congress us to
their nllownnce, to be followed by nppropriuto legisln.tive
action in tho form of n statulc for their payment, pnssccl
in the usual way, n.nd n.pprovccl by tho President or passed
ovor his veto, u diffcrcn t situation 'voulcl exist.
This proviso cun not be sustained on the theot·y that it is
n proper condition nttn.ched to an npproprin.tion. Congress
holds the purse strings, n.nd it may grunt or withhold.approprintions us it chooses, and when mnking nn appropriation
mn.y direct tho purposes to which the appropriation shall be
dcvotednnd impose conditions in respect to its usc, provided
always that tho COilllitions do not require operation of tho
Government in n way forbidden by the Constitution. Congress may not, by conditions n.ttttchcd to appropriations,
provide for n. discho.rge of the functions of Government in
u manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such n.
prn.ctico were permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution. It might make appropriutions on condition tho.t
tho executive dcpttrLmcnt nbrogttte its functions. It might,
for cxnmplc, appropriate money for the Wnr Department on
condition thnt the direction of military oper!ttions should
be conducted by some person designlltcd by the Congress,
thus requiring the President to nbdicntc his functions us
Commander in Chief. During the ndministrntion of President Buchanan n bill provided for nn appropriation for the
completion of tho Washington Aqueduct n.ncl prescribed
thnt its expenditure should be under the superintendence
of Cnptnin Meigs. In o. specinl message to the House (June
25, 1850) the President said:
"I deemed it impossible thnt Congress could hnve intended to interfere with the clenr right of the President to
command the Army !tnd to ordet· its onlcers to n.ny duty he
might deem most cxpcclicnt for the public interest. If they
could withdmw n.n ollicer from the command of tho l)resiclcnt nnd select him for the performance of an executive
duty, they might upon the snnto principle annex to un npo~D07'---BO--vo~37----B
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1roprintion to curry on a war a condition requiring it not to
•e used for the defense of the country unless n. pnxticulur
1erson of its own selection should command the Army."
Attempting to have committees of Congress approve ex·
1cutive nets, or execute administrative functions, or pn.rtici)ate in lhe execution of ln.ws is not n. new idcn.. Cunied to
ts logical conclusion it wmdcl enttble Congress, through com·
uitlecs or persons selected by it, gradually to tLtlce ovet· all
~xecutiyo functions ot' at least excl'ciso n. veto powct· upon
~xecutive action, not by legisln.tion withut·n.wing authority,
mt by the action of committees, ot· of either house acting
;epal'lLtcly from the other. On May 13, 1020, President Wil;on vetoed ttn npproprin.tion Act on the ground thn.t it con;nined u proviso tbn.t certn.in documents shonlc1 not be prin tecl
)y any executive brunch or oJlicer except with the n.pprovtLl
)f the Joint Committee on lJrinting. Among other things,
te sn.id:
"The Congress n.nd the Executive shonltl function within
heir respective spheres. Otherwise cll\ciont and responsible
no.nngcment will ue impossible ttn<l progress impetlecl U,\'
1vasteful forces of disorgani:t.n tion nnd obstruction. 'l'ltu
l:ongress has the power and tho right to gmnt or fltmy nn
'l ppropriution, or to cnttd or refuse to ennd tt lttw; b11t
once 1tn appropriation is made or a law is pnsscd, the appropriation should be administered Ot' the law executed by the
~XeGutive bt·n.nch of tho Government. In no other wny cnn
~he . Government be efllcienUy mn.nttgcd and rcsponsil)ility
lcflnitcly fixed. 'l'he Congress hus the right to confer upon
its committees full authority for purposes of investigtttion
1tnd the nccnmuln.tion of informn.tion for its guidance, but
r clo not concede the right, and certainly not the wisdom,
of the Congress endowing n committee of either House or a
joint committee of uoth Houses with power to prescribe' reguln.tions' under which executive depn.rtments mn.y oper<tte. * • •
"I regard the provision in question us n.n invasion of tht!
province of the Executive nnd cnlculn.Led to result in \tnwurrnnted interference in the processes of 0CYOOd t:'lO"Overnment '
producing confusion, irritation, and distrust. The proposnl
assumes significance as nn outstanding illustrn.tion of n
growing tenc1~ncy wh1ch I am sure is not fnlly renli1.erl by
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the Congress itself nnd. certainly not by the people of the
country."
President Wilson then went on to call nttention to other vio.lations of the same principle and referred to the law creating
t.ho I)11blic Buildings Commission, tho membership of which
included two Senators and two Representatives, acting ex
oflicio--the Senators nppointed by the President of the Senate and tl1e Representatives n.ppointed by the Speaker of
the House-nnd to the fact tltrtt, so constituted, the commission was exercising ttdministrative functions and that
its members were performing executive nets; thnt Members
of Co11gress, as such, were engaged in executive functions
us members of the commission; and that the Congress under
this statute wns mn king appointments to executive offices.
In the Act of June 30, 1032, mnking nn n.pproprintion for
the legislntive brnnch of the Government for the fiscal year
ending Juno :lO, HJ33, and for other purposes, and with a
view to economy in tho operntion of tho Government, the
Congre~s gtwe authority to tho President, by Executive
order to consolidate, reel istribu le, nncl transfer vn.rious
Government n.genc!es rtncl functions; n.nd esbtblished a genol'ltl formuln. for his guidance. Dy section 407 it Wtts provided thnt the Executive order should be trn.nsmitted to the
Congress in session n.nd should not become e:!Iective until
tdtor tho expil'l\tion of GO cln.ys from snch transmission n.nd
that "if either bmnch of Congress within such GO cnlenuur
dn.ys shall pttss a resolution disapproving of such Executive
order or nny part thereof, such Executive order shn.ll become
null n.nd void to the extent of such disapprovnl." It must
be assumed thn.t the functions of the President under this
net were exccntivr in their nn.tme OJ' they could not httve
been constitntionn lly con:fened npon him, nnd so there wns
set up n mcLhod by which one house of Congress might
tlisn pprove Executive action. No one would question the
power of Congress to provide for delny · in the execution
of snch nn administrative order, or its power to withdrnw
the ttuthority to mnlce the order, provided the withdrn.wn.l
Lakes the form of legislation. The attempt to give to either
House of Congress, by action which is not legislntion, power
to disapprove nc1ministrnLive n.ets, rn.iscs a grave question 11.s
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to ·the validity of the entire provision in the Act of June
30, 1932, for Executive reorgo.nizntion of governmento.J
functions.
Since the organization of the Government, Presidents .
have felt bound to insist upon the mn.intenn.nce of the Exccuti ve functions unim pn.red by legislative encronchment, just
as the legislative branch ho.s felt bound to resist interferences
with its power by the Executive. To acquiesce in legislation
hn.ving o. tendency to cncron.ch upon the executive o.uLhority
results in estn.blishing clrmgct·ous prr.ccclcn(s. The first
presidential defense of the integrity of the powers of the ·
Executive under the Constitution wn.s made by ·washington
himself when the House of Reprcsentn.Livcs insisted on being
recognized as part of the treaty making power, nnd in his
mcssnge then tD Congress he sn.icl:
"It is -essential "to the due aclministrn.tion of the Government that the bounclnries fixed by the Constitution bclwcen
the different depnrtments should be preservet1 1"
From that day to this the I>rcsiclents, with very few exceptions, have felt the necessity for refusing to overlook encroachments upon the executive power. John Acln.ms, Je1Terson, Madison, John Quincy Aclnms, in succession, hn.d occnsion to resist interference with the executive power. On
nt least six occasions President Jaclcson found it necessary
to resist encroachment. On one occasion he said:
. "I deem it an imperative duty to maintain the supremacy
of that sacred instrument (the Constitution) and tho immu- •
nitics of the clepo.rtment entrusted to my care."
In 1877 President Grant vetoed nn Act of Congress which
attempted to make the Clerk of the House of Representatives
an officer to perform executive duties, on tho ground thut it
wus an encroachment upon the constitutional right of the
executive branch to ll.ppoint officers of the United States.
President Hayes vetoed appropriation bills containing riders
attempting to interfere with the President's power as ComJllnnder in Chief of the Army. On June 4, Hl20, President
Wilson vetoed the Budget bill which created the office of
Comptroller General because it provided that tho incumbent
could only be removed by n joint resolution of Congress.
In his message he said:
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"I am convinced thnt tho Congress is without constitutional power to limit the appointing power nnd its incident,
the power of remoyal derived from the Constitution. • • •
I can find in tho Constitution no warrant for the exercise of
this power by the Congress. • • • Regarding as I do
the power of removal from office us o.n essentio.l incident to
the o.ppointing power, I co.n not escape the conclusion that
tho vesting of .this power of removal in the Congress is unconstitutional • • *."
A similnr bill was enacted and approved in tho next administmtion, but the soundness of President "Wilson's views
on the constitutional question wn.s subsequently established
by the decision of th~ Supreme Court of the United States
in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52.
Many other instances might be referred to. An excellent
historicll.l account of these will be found in nn address delivered by the lion. Charles Warren on Presidential
Declnmtions of Independence (l3oston University Law Review, Vol. X, January, 1930, No. 1). Each President hn.s
felt it his duty to pass the executive authority on to his
f:illecessor, unimpaired by tho adoption of dangerous precedents. Yon have not hesitated to net when occasion ha.~
arisen (United States v. George Otis Smith, 28G U. S. G,
~8 Note :3). 'l'l1e proviso in this deficiency bill nitty not
be importrmt in itself, but tho principle ttt stalce is vitnl:
Encroachments on the executive o.uthority are not likely to
be dclibern.to but thn.t very fn.ct makes them n.ll the more
insidious. In the present instrmce there is no bn.sis for sug·
gesting that the Congress intentionally transgressed consti(.utionallimiLu.tions. One House did not consider the point,
and in the other it is not clear tho.t o.ny definite conclusion
wns reached respecting it.
During the Senate's consideration of this urgent deficiency
bill, the constitutional objections to the proviso relating to
tnx refunds do not seem to ho.ve been mentioned. 'Vhcn
tho proviso was considered in the House, constitutional objections to it were presented in an able address by Congressman Vfood, whoso views were supported by other Members
or the House, learned in constitutional law, and no serious
nttempt in deb~tto nJ"ipears to have been mnr1e to controvert
the arguments thus 1tclvnnced.
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There is ono other factor in the case bearing on the disposition you· may mn.ke of this men.sure. If this bill is
\ spread upon the stfltute books through ~ccciving your ttpprovn.l or being passeLl over a veto, not only wou ld tho proviso respecting tho power of the joint connnittcc to ttH thori7.o
refunds bo void, but the deficiency ttpproprin.tion foL' pttyment of refunds would fnll with it. Whenever n provision
in a stntnte is found invn.lid, question flrises as to whethct· ·
tho whole net fn lis or only the objectionable secti on. This
cl<1pends on whether the unconstiLutionnl p1·ovision is sopamble from the rest of lhe act, nnll in deciding t hn.t q11estion
tho co11rts endcn.VOL' to nscertnin from the terms of t ho net
nnd its subject matter whether Congress would httvo in·
!ended tho bn.l nnce of tho net to stn.nd without tho obnoxious
provision. Do1·ohy v. J(ansCUJ, 20<1 U. S. 280, 280, · Under
t.hese principles tho provision in this bill npproprittti ng
m~noy for rcf11n<.l of tn.xes, together with the proviso respecting powers of the joint comluittoc, are clettrly scptu·nblo
from the rest of tho net, but not from each other. In my
opinion the n.pproprintion for tnx refunds o.nd the proviso
nttnched to it must stand or full together. Who cnn srty
thn.t Congress would have mude this nppropria tion without
the proviso? I hn.vo no basis for such on assumption. If tho
Congress makes nn o.pproprintion n.t tnching to it an invalid
condition, we would hardly be justiflecl in rejecting the condition ns void o.nd treating the npproprin. tion as available. ·
The sufo course is to treat the two !\S inscpitrllblc.
The result is that if this bill should talco tho form of a.
stn.tute the Secretary of the Trensury woulcl be confronted
with the fact that the npproprintion for tnx rcfun<ls, · ns
well ns the proviso attached to it, is void, and would not
uo available for pn.yment of refunds, with the result tlutt if
no prior npproprintions nrc available, payment of nll refunds of any nmount would stop until further approprin.tions :for that purpose were mude by the Congress. This
would be unfortunnte, in thnt it would result in delay, nnd
injustice to tnxpo.yers, and the nccumulntion of interest
charges against the Government.
·
It n.ifords nn additional reason why this measure mn~v
well be retumed to the Congress without your approval
w give thnL borly Lho opportnnity to eliminate the proviso,
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or if it be dissntislied with tho existing machinery it hns
estnblished by ln. w for the mn.king of .tax refunds, to substitute some other method not open to constitutional objections.
Rcspecti vcly,

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL.
To the
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VAT,IDl'l'Y 011' PHOPOSlCD SICK LlllAVID ImGUI,ATJONR
The lnst proviso o( section 2Hi ot the so-cnlleu lDconomy Act o! .Tune
110, JU32 (·17 Stat. •107), ves ls !.he l'resltlcnt with nuthorlty, wltl1ln
the llm!ts now nutliorlzc<.l by Jaw, to fix the max imum period. f<Jr
and to preRcrlbe the conul tl ons unller which sick lenve mny be
grnnte<l In t!Je executive departments un<l Independent estnbllsh·
mcnts.
The propoRed slclc leave reguln!lons, referred to herein, nre In keeping
wllh t.ho IHH'{JOse of nn<l coustltute u vulld exercise or nu thorlty by
tlle President under tho lust proviso o( section 21Ci, supra,
DEPAH1'MENT OF JUSTICE,
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Februa1·y ~, 1933.
Sm: I hn vc the honor to refer to your letter of Septemuer
1, Hl32, in which you request my opinion o.s to the validity
of nn enclosed dro.ft of sick lenvc of absence rcgnln.tions suumitted to you lJy the Director of the Bureau of the Buugct
for promuJgo.tion in nn Executive Order under section 215
of the so-called Economy Act of Juno 30, l!.l32 (47 Stut.
407), which provides:
"HcrcafLcr no eivilinn oflicot· or employee of the Government who receives annual leave with pn.y shall be grunted
nnnuo.l leave of absence with pny in excess of fifteen days
in nny one yen.r, exclud ing Sundays nnd legn.l holidays:
ProvMcd, That the pnrt unused in nny yenr mo.y be cumulative for nny succeeding ye1tr: Provided fw·tlte1· 1 Thnt
nothing herein shnll n.pply to civilinn officers nnd employees
of the Pnnnmn. Cnnnl located ·on the Isthmus nnd who nre
American citizens or to oOicers nnd employees of the Foreign
Services of the United States holding oflic.in.l station outside the continental United Stntes: P1•ovidcd further, 'l'hnt
nothing herein shall be construed as ttfl'ecting tho pct·iocl
during which pny mny be allowed under existing· laws for
so-culled sick lenve of absence: Provided fw·t!ter, Thnt tlte

I

.:iu.prmtt Clflturlltf tlft ~b ,jhtf.tg
Jru~ ~.
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February 25, 1982

CHA MBERS O F

.J US T I CE

Of.

BRENNAN, .JR.

Re:

I.N.S.

v.

Chadha (No. 80-1832)

Dear Lewis:
I do not think that I can agree with your note of
this morning to the Chief suggesting that we might explore whether a finding of lack of severability could be
an appealing way of avoiding decision of the constitutional issue. Although such an expedient finding could
arguably dispose of this case, such expedience would not
be just to Chadha if it resulted in his immediate deportation. But also, it would not settle the persisting
controversy between the Executive and the Congress concerning the lawfulness of these one-house veto provisions . We surely have not reached the stage at which the
likelihood that no private party will have standing to
challenge a particular legislative or executive action in
an Article III court, authorizes the political branches
to disregard their own constitutional duty to consider
the constitutionality of their actions .
As the position taken by the Executive in this case
surely indicates, the Executive Branch has a direct and
immediate interest in this controversy. For example, if
we were to declare the veto provision nonseverable from
the rest of 244, and the Executive persists in its view
that the veto was unconstitutional , what is the Executive
to do with the many hundreds of applications it receives
each year under 244? In light of our holding that the
veto is nonseverable, must not I . N. S . then refuse to hear
those applications on the logical view 244 is unconstitutional in its entirety by virtue of the veto provision?~
clearly even Congress wants these cases heard in the
first instance by the Executive . Or, suppose the Executive was willing to disregard its own understanding of
its constitutional duties and continued to hold hearing
pursuant to 244~ surely , now that the issue has been
brought to the fore, some Art . III court will soon declare that the existence of this Congressional revisory
power precludes its own Art . III jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the I . N. S . under our ruling in Waterman ,
333 u.s. , 113-114 .

These problems highlight for me the essential correctness of treating severability as an aspect of remedy,
rather than as some sort of preliminary jurisdictional
question. That has, of course, been our continuing practice, and, for me it is the only logical way in which a
court may conduct its business. If we take the route of
deciding severability first, how could we justify our
practice of reaching the constitutional issue whether
some statute is violative of equal protection as
underinclusive without first deciding whether the proper
remedy would be to expand the class to encompass the
plaintiff within its benefits, or to abolish the program
entirely, in which case the plaintiff may take nothing.
Cf., e.g., your opinion in Califano v. Wescott, 443 U.S.
at 93. Such an approach to problems of remedy as "preliminary questions" thus presents a potentially uncontrollable doctrine that could effectively halt all constitutional determination in Art. III courts.

-.

,-

Sincerely,
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

'.

•.::,.

•"

TO:

MR. JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

DICK FALLON

RE:

Congressional Veto Material

The library has sent me a large package of materials on the
legislative veto.

I have attached the two most helpful items.

The first includes a statistical summary of the types of
legislative veto provisions that have been adopted.

It appears

that there are 272 laws now on the books that provide for one or
another form of legislative veto.
The second item summarizes the use of the congressional
veto.

There was one item I found of particular interest.

When

immigration questions are excluded, legislative vetoes have
actually occurred on only 60 occasions since_J 932, out of
slightly over 1000 cases in which veto resolutions have been
introduced.
Although still thoroughly unfamiliar with this case, I would
of course be glad to do anything I could to help.

Congressiona rResearch Service
The Library of Congress
Washmgton. D.C. 20540
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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL ~.~~)
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Clark F. Norton
Specialist in American National Government
Government Division
September 14, 1981
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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL
LEGISLATION, 1932-1980

This report provides information on the quantity and types of congressional
veto measures that have been enacted by Congress.

Based on data compiled in

various searches during the last few years, an attempt has been made to locate
all relevant statutory provisions adopted since 1932.

Despite possible omissions

or errors in counting, it is believed that the totals are sufficiently accurate
to indicate the overall quantity of such provisions as well as the relative number
of the different types of congressional veto procedures adopted by Congress.
The data is presented in three tables.

The first summarizes statistics for

such laws adopted since 1932 according to the type of procedure authorized by those
/

acts.

The second tabulates according to procedure the number of provisions enacted

during the year 1980 only.

Tt~

third lists the various types of congressional veto

procedures in descending order according to the number of such provisions passed
since 1932.

CRS-2 •

TABLE 1.

Number of Acts and Provisions by Types of Procedure

Types of procedure

Number of
acts

Number of additional
provisions in acts

Total number of
acts and provisions

DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS
1.

Simple resolution,
either House pass

56

36

92

2.

Concurrent resolution,
both Houses pass

40

14

54

3.

Concurrent resolution,
both or one House
alternative pass

1

0

1

4.

Joint resolution,
both Houses pass

5

1

6

102

51

' 153

16

11

27

4

10

Total disapproval resolutions
APPROVAL RESOLUTIONS
1.

Concurrent resolution,
both Houses pass

2.

Joint resolution,
both Houses pass

6

Total approval resolutions

22

15

37

9

2

11

2

0

2

11

2

13

---

DISAPPROVAL BY COMMITTEE
1.

Committee in either
House

2.

Committees in both
Houses

Total disapproval by committee

CRS-3.

TABLE 1.

Number of Acts and Provisions by Types of Procedure--Continued

Type of procedure

Number of additional
provisions in acts

Total number of
acts and provisions

1

0

1

45

10

55

Number of
acts

APPROVAL BY COMMITTEE

1.

Committee in either
House

2.

Committees in both
Houses

3.

Come into agreement
with committees

5

0

5

4.

Joint committee

1

0

1

5.

Subcommittees in both
Houses

2

0

2

6.

Committee chairman,
one House

1

0

1

Total approval by committee

55

10

65

APPROVAL BY ACT OF CONGRESS

2

1

3

APPROVAL BY CONGRES~10NAL
AGENCY (OTA)

1

0

1

193

79

272

Totals

-
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TABLE 2.

Number of Acts and Provisions by Types of Procedure
for Year 1980

· Types of procedures

Number of
acts

Number of additional
provisions in acts

Total number of
acts and provisions

DISAPPROVAL RESOLUTIONS
1.

Simple resolution,
either House pass

3

13

16

2.

Concurrent resolution,
both Houses pass

7

1

8

3.

Concurrent resolution
both or one House
alternative pass

1

0

1

4.

Joint resolution,
60th Houses pass

Total disapproval resolutions

1

1

2

12

15

27

APPROVAL RESOLUTION
1.

Concurrent resolutions
both Houses pass

1

3

4

2.

Joint resol•ttion,
both Hous~s pass

2

2

4

Total approval resolutions

3

5

8

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

1

DISAPPROVAL BY COMMITTEE
1.

Committee in either
House

2.

Committees in both
Houses

Total disapproval by committee

CRS-5 ..
TABLE 2.

Number of Acts and Provisions by Types of Procedure
for Year 1980--Continued

Types of procedures

Number of
acts

Number of additional
provisons in acts

Total number of
acts and provisions

APPROVAL BY COMMITTEE
1.

Committee in either
House

0

0

0

2.

Committees in both
House

2

0

2

3.

Come into agreement
with committee

0

0

0

4.

Joint committee

0

0

0

s.

Subcommittees in
both Houses

0

0

0

6.

Committee chairman,
one House

0

0

0

Total approval by committee

2

0

2

2

1

3

0

0

20

21

APPROVAL BY ACT OF CONGRESS

\
APPROVAL BY CONGRESSIONAL
AGENCY (OTA)
Totals

41

CRS-6TABLE 3.

Numbers of Statutory Provisions According to Major
and Minor Types of Procedures

Types of procedures

Numbers of provisions

MAJOR TYPES
1.

Disapproval by either House
(simple resolution)

92

2.

Disapproval by both Houses
(concurrent resolution)

54

3.

Approval by committees of both Houses

55

4.

Approval by both Houses
(concurrent resolution)

27

228

MINOR TYPES
1.

Disapproval by committee of either House

11

2.

Approval by both Houses
(joint resolution)

10

3.

Disapproval by both Houses
(joint resolution)

6

4.

Come into agreement with committees

5

5.

Approval by both Houses
(Act of Congress)

3

6.

Approval by subcommittees both Houses

2

7.

Disapproval by both or by one House
alternative (concurrent resolution)

1

8.

Disapproval by committees of both Houses

!

9.

Approval by committee in either House

1

CRS-7 "'
TABLE III.

Numbers of Statutory Provisions ,According to Major
and Minor Types of Procedures--Continued
Numbers of provisions

Types of procedures
MINOR TYPES
10.

Approval by joint committee

1

11.

Approval by chairman of a committee

1

12.

Approval by a congressional agency (OTA)

1

44
Total

CFN/mhb

272

f'ongressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Wash•ngton. D.C. 20540

USE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: INTRODUCTION OF AND ACTION ON
CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS OF APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL,
1932-0CT. 6, 1981

Clark F. Norton
Specialist in American National Government
Government Division
October 23, 1981
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USE OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: INTRODUCTION OF AND ACTION
ON CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS OF APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL,
1932-0CT. 6, 1981*

Since 1932, when Congress enacted the first known law authorizing legislative
veto!/ of certain kinds of proposed executive actions, at least 1,064 .legislative
veto resolutions have been introduced.

Somewhat more than

one-third"(39~)

of

these were •ubmitted in the Senate and the remainder (655.) in the House of
Representatives.
two-fifths

(42~)

authority.

The largest number

(46~)

were concurrent resolutions, but about

were simple resolutions other than proposals to defer budget

About one-fifth

(16~)

were resolutions to disapprove Presidentially

proposed deferrals of appropriated funds, all introduced since adoption of the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act in 1974, the bulk
before 1978.

(14~)

of which were submitted

Only 4 introductions of :Ooint resolutions of disapproval have been

located, 2 submitted in the Senate and 2 in the House during the 96th Conrress,
none of which were adopted.

* Sources used for this report, include the following: the Contressional
Record; the Congressional Record Index; the Calendars of the House of
Representatives; and the Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions
(published by CR~). Statistics have been compiled from data gathered d~ring
the past few years in several separate studies that spanned different periods
of the last half century and from additional research to fill in taps. They
have been assembled here for the first time in a single document coverinr
all years since 1932. Although care has been taken to make the overall count
- as accurate as possible, a few resolutions may have been missed or miscounted.
Nevertheless, such omissions or errors are believed to be so minimal in nu~rer
as not to detract from the significance of any conclusions that may be dra-n
from the data.
!/ i.e. requiring advance approval or authorizing prior disapproval
or both Houses (or committes thereo~) •

·~either

•

ett'tl
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More than one fifth (22~) of all resolutions introduced became effective
because of passage by either or both Houses as required by law.

Of this

number, 138 were Senate resolutions and 88 were House resolutions.

The

Senate actually passed a total of 144 of .i ta own resolutions plus another
46 House concurrent resolutions, but 6 Senate concurrent resolutions did
not become effective because of non-passage by the House.

Similarly, ·the

House passed 94 of its own resolutions and 87 Senate concurrent resolutions,
but 2 Bouse concurrent resolutions were not passed by the Senate.

If the

duplicate passage by each House of concurrent resolutions originatinE in
the other House is counted, the Senate passed a total of 190 and the House
a total of 181 resolutions of all types.
The number of approval or disapproval resolutions rendered effective
since 1932 by the requisite passage of either or both Houses of Congress
(22~),

if considered only as a percentage (21.3

percen~)

number of such resolutions introduced in the same period

of the total
(1,06~),

can be

very misleading with respect to the significance of congressional veto
usage.

This is true because a large proportion

of all such effective

(16~)

resolutions were either one or the other of only two types; the first did
not involve any major policy issue and the second was concerned only with
whether the expenditure of funds already appropriated should be delayed.
The first group, comprising about half

(11~)

of all such effective

resolutions adopted since 1932, were concurrent resolutions to approve
proposals by the Attorney General of the United States to suspend the
deportation ·_of certain aliens.
only eleven years

(1949-195~)

They were introduced and passed during
under the Immigration Act Amendment of

1948 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (see Table 3 for
'

.,..

detail~).
.

Nearly all were adopted in both Houses by consent without
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debate or opposition, and only one auch reaolution during those years
failed to be adopted.

It appears from the evidence that these

resolutions were largely non-controversial and were passed by both
Houses in a routine fashion.

Because passage of such a concurrent

resolution upheld auspension of deportation proceedings by the Attorney
General, while failure to do so in effect would cancel the proceedings
and order deportation, the overwhelming number of resolutions adopted
indicates congressional support for determinations made by the Attorney
General.

At least as used for this purpose, the congressional approval

procedure aeems to have posed little threat to executive authority.
The second group tending to lessen the significance of the aizable
percentage of approval or disapproval resolutions that have become
effective consists of so-called budget deferral resolutions.

The

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 authorized
either House of Congress to re5ect a proposal by the President to defer
authority (withhold the obligation or expenditure of appropriated
by passing a simple resolution of disapproval.

fund~)

Since then 168 such

disapproval resolutions have been introduced in the Senate and House
and 55 of them have been passed by one or the other.

Most of these

(14\) were submitted and adopted between 1974 and 1977; in the 3 1/2
years from 1978 through September, 1980 only 24 budget deferral
resolutions were introduced and 7 passed by either chamber.

Instead

of acting on separate deferral resolutions, it has become the practice
in

re~nt

as

rescission~)

years to incorporate and enact numerous deferrals (as well
as parts of different titles in appropriations acts.

Adoption of a budget deferral resolution, which denies a request
~to delay obligation of certain appropriated funds, obviously can hav e
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an impact on carrying out an affected program.

Nevertheless, unlike

a rescission, which repeals already enacted appropriations, legislative
action on a deferral resolution is limited to determining the time-frame
for the implementation of a previous act.

Approving or disapproving a

postponement for the execution of a program usually would not aeem to
be as important as the decisions necessary for its original enactment.
Without denigrating the consequence of the budget deferral procedure,
it may be fair to conclude that exercising a legislative veto in certain
other matters of basic public policy could be of more lasting significance.
In view of the apecialized and restrictive nature of alien deportation
auspensions and budget deferrals, it can be argued that greater significance
should be attached to action on other, more substantive purposes for which
the congressional veto has been used.

If the number of concurrent resolutions

approving alien deportation suspensions passed since 1932 (11\), as well as
the number of budget deferral resolutions adopted since 1974

(5~),

are both

deducted from the total number of approval or disapproval resolutions made
effective by congressional action in the same period
(6~)

(22~),

the remainder

is comparatively small.
Excluding these two types of congressional veto usage, Congress has

approved or rejected during the last half century less than 61. of the
resolutions introduced.

This amounts on the average to little more than

one executive proposal per year.

Averages can be somewhat deceptive in

this respect, however, because the rate of adoption of approval or
disap?roval resolutions has varied considerably through the years.

A

tabulation of the number of such resolutions (other than deportation
suspensions and budget

deferral~)

that were passed and became effective
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since 1932 provides the following distribution by decades:

1932-1939--1

resolution; 194o-1949--3 resolutiona; 1950-1959--14 resolutions; 1960-1969-15 resolutions; 197o-1979--20 resolutions; and 1980-oct. 6. 1981--7 resolutions.
Thus. in the first 28 years of the period only 18 resolutions were passed.
while in the last 21 years 42 have been adopted.

Of course. this in part

is a reflection of the increased number of statutory congreasional veto
provisions that have been enacted in recent years. especially since 1970.
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Number and type of resolutions
introduced
Number

Type

TABLE 1.

Introduction of and Action on Congressional Resolutions
of Approval or Disapproval, 1932-0ct. 6, 1981

Number and type of resolutions
passed by Senate

Number and type of resolutions
passed by House

Simple

Simple

Concurrent

Joint

Concurrent

Joint

Final disposition of
resolutions
No. res. made
effective

No. res.
ineffective

ll-

c

io

•c
0

SENATE
134

Simple
Hud~u' t

Cnn .

Deferral

~ e~.

Joi nt Re s.

68
195

25
26
93

25
26
87

87

2

"z•
I
"z

109
42
108
2

..
~

•i
~

i

•
0

'Ill

All Types

399

51

93

87

138

~

n

261

"

-

HOUSE OF RF.PRESENTATIVES
Simple
Budget Deferral
Con. Res.
Joint Res.

292
100
271
2

17
29
46

48

All Types

46

46

665

17
29
42

--

48

--

275
71
229
2

-

88

577

226

838

ROTH llOUSF.S
All Types

1,064

51

139

0

46

135

0

,i....
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TABLE 2. Number of Approval and Disapproval Resolutions Passed,
by Type and Chamber of Passage, 1932'- 0ctober 6, 1981
Chamber

Total

All types

Senate

190

All types

Bouse

181

All types

Both

371

All types, effective

Both

226

All simple {other than
budget deferra\),
effective

Both

42

All budget deferral,
effective {1974-198~)

Both

55

All concurrent

Senate

139

All concurrent

House

135

All concurrent

Both

274

All concurrent,
effective

Both

129

Concurrent to suspend
deportation proceedings,
effective {1949-195~)

Both

111

All concurrent other
than deportation
suspensions, effective

Both

18

Type

I
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TABLE 3.

Number of Concurrent Resolutions Approving the Suspension
by the Attorney General of the Deportation of Certain Aliens,

1949-1959*
Senate
Year

Introduced

Both Chambers

House of Representatives
Passed

Introduced

Passed

Passed

23

23

1949

23

23

1950

10

12

2

12

12

1951

12

17

5

17

17

1952

8

9

2

9

9

1953

5

8

3

8

8

1954

5

7

2

7

7

1955

2

7

5

7

7

1956

4

9

5

9

9

1957

6

9

3

9

9

1958

3

4

1

4

4

1959

5

6

1

6

6

83

111

29

111

111

TOTALS

Not passed

1

1

* These concurrent resolutions were introduced under authority of the Immigration
Act Amendment of 1948 (62 Stat. 1206; P.L. 81-864; approved July 1, 194&) and the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (66 Stat. 163; P.L. 82-414; approved June 27,
195~).
The 1952 Act also authorized either the Senate or the House to disapprove by
simple resolution deportation proceedings against certain other aliens. An Act adopted
in 1957 authorized either House to disapprove by passing a simple resolution adjustments
by the Attorney General to permanent residence status of up to 50 aliens in any fiscal
year who had been admitted as nonimmigrant& but had failed to maintain their status
un~er provisions of their admissions (see the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments
of 1957, 111 Stat_. 642; P.L. 85-316; approved Sept. 11, 1957.).
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March 9, 1982
80-1832 I.N.S. v. Chadha
Dear Chief:
In thinking further about this worr.i.some case, I
am now inclined to think a reargument next ~erm ia
desirable.
I would grant the CADC case and set the two for
back-to-back argument. The two cases present diffe~ent
subject matter types of vetoes. Whether the validity of
vetoes may be answered differently, depending upon whether
the function reserved normally would be executive or
judicial rather than legislative, is a question that I am
not prepared to answer at this time.
On an issue such a~ this where the fundamental
structure of our government is implicated, it may be
desirable to have more time for conside~ation, and also to
have the benefit of arguments in both of these cases.
In order to come to some decision, I will move
that we set Chadha for reargument.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

~.ttprt.ntt

C!Jttttrl ttf ut~ ~lt ~hrl~g

~a:.s-Jrittgtttn. ~·

cq:.

20,;tJI.~ '

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 10, 1982

Re:

80-1832) - INS v. Chadha
80-2170) - u.s. House of Representatives
v. INS
80-2171) - u.s. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
Although I am a firm believer in not reaching out
to decide constitutional questions prematurely, I think
Harry is correct in pointing out that there is no
legitimate basis for refusing to decide this case this
Term.
If we are to have another conference on the
case, it should be held as soon as possible because it
will be difficult to complete the opinion writing
before adjournment in all events.
The case will not get any easier by having it
reargued with an even more difficult case.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§u:p-rmu <!fourl of flr.t ~b .§taUll'

...a,gfrington. ~. <!f.

20.?'1~

CHAMBERS OF

March 10, 1982

JUSTicEw... J.sRENNAN,JR.

RE:

No. 80-1832- INS v. Jagdish Rai Chadha
80-2170- U.S. House of Representatives v. INS. ·
80-2171 - U.S. Senate v. INS.

Dear Chief:
I feel just as strongly as Harry that, for the reasons
he stated in his memorandum to you, this case should be decided this Term.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

'•

<!fcnrl of tfrt ~ni:t.t~ ~taUs
~~fringfott. ~. <!f. 20giJ}~ '

.§u:vutttt

March 10, 1982

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-1832) - INS v. Chadha
No. 80-2170) - U.S. House of Representatives
No. 80-2171) - u.s. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
I write to express basic disagreement with Lewis' suggestion that these cases be set for reargument next Term.
The
following are my reasons:
1.
Chadha's deportation proceeding began on January 11,
1974. On June 25, 1974, his deportation was ordered suspended.
Since then, the suspension of his deportation was vetoed by the
House (December 16, 1975), he was ordered deported again
(November 8, 1976), he petitioned for review to the CA9 (March
24, 1977), his case was argued and submitted to the CA9 (April
10, 1978), submission to the CA9 was withheld pending
supplemental briefing (Apr i 1 18, 19 7 8) , the case was finally
decided by a different CA9 panel two and one-half years after
oral argument (Dec. 2 2, 19 8 0) , and the case was argued here
(February 22, 1982).
The CADC case was decided on January 29, 1982, barely
three weeks before oral argument in this case.
I understand
that one party below already has petitioned for r e hearing and
rehearing en bane.
Thus, the time period for filing ~ cert
petition or jurisdictional statement in that case will run from
the date the CADC denies rehearing en bane.
That period will
be followed by a 30-day period in which responses may be filed.
Thus, the CADC case may not be here until June or July, and
might not be grantable until the October Conference.
In that
case, the two cases would not be heard until November 1982 at
the very earliest.
Even if the CADC case should get here
sooner, is granted at the end of this Term, and the two cases
are set for argument in October, probably no decision would
come down regarding Chadha until January 1983 at the earliest.
Thus, if the case is reargued, Chadha will not receive a
ruling until nine years after his deportation proceeding began
and eight and one-half years after his deportation was first
ordered suspended.
Lewis correctly observes that this issue is
important to the relationship between the Executive and
Legislative Branches.
But Chadha has waited a long, long time
for a ruling on the merits of his claim.
I see no reason why
he should be denied a prompt ruling.
We are here to decide
cases and he and the Government deserve answers to the issues
that are raised.
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2.
Lewis' March 9 letter states that the Court may r equire further briefing and argument to decide whether the veto
at issue in Chadha should be treated differently from the one
at issue in the CADC case.
It is not at all clear to me,
however, how extra briefing and argument will educate the Court
further about the merits of this case.
The principal briefs in the CADC were filed by Eugene
Gressman (for the House) , Michael Davidson (for the Senate) ,
Alan Morrison (for the petitioners), and Acting Assistant
Attorney General Larry Simms (for the Justice Department).
Those four were the main authors of the principal briefs in
Chadha.
Since the Solicitor General probably would argue the
CADC case for the Government if that case were granted and set
for argument next Term, the cast of oral advocates would be
identical to the cast in Chadha.
Presumably, none of these
advocates would renounce his earlier position in Chadha, even
if that case were set for reargument and argued back-to-back
with the CADC case. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the Court
will receive any new briefing or argument in the Chadha case.
If the Court were to decide Chadha narrowly this Term,
leaving open the question of the constitutionality of legisla~
tive vetoes of agency rulemaking, then the advocates would at
least have the benefit of the Court's Chadha opinion when arguing the CADC case here.
Without a Court opinion, we have no
reason to believe that the parties would adopt positions different from those that they took before the CADC.
In any case,
those positions are fully illuminated by the massive 104 page.
CADC slip opinion.
Furthermore, the chambers assigned to write
the Chadha opinion would be free to refer to the parties'
briefs before the CADC to determine whether Chadha could be
decided on a narrow ground which did not foreclose a different
decision in the CADC case.
It is perhaps of interest that a
Note in 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1721 (1981), which arrived today,
argues that Chadha can be decided without settling the question
of the constitutionality of the legislative veto in all
contexts.
3. As Bill Brennan pointed out in his letter of February
25, 1982, to Lewis, postponing decision in Chadha leaves the
INS in the anomalous position of proceeding under a statute
declared unconstitutional by both the Executive Branch and the
CA9.
The proposal for reargument in Chadha would preserve that
anomalous position for at least another year.
Bill also pointed out that even if the INS continues to
conduct proceedings under a statute it deems unconstitutional,
an Ar t i c l e I I I co u r t mi g h t take the po s i t ion that i t i s
powerless to render advisory opinions and therefore refuse to
review the results of the INS' "unconstitutional" proceedings.
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It is this Court's duty to resolve promptly just this type
of uncertainty about the constitutionality of federal statutes.
Allowing uncertainties about a particular statute to linger
seems plainly inconsistent with that duty.
4.
present

Finally,

Lewis states that Chadha and the CADC case

"different subject matter types of vetoes.
Whether
the validity of vetoes may be answered differently,
depending upon whether the function reserved normally
would be executive or judicial, rather than legislative, is a question that I am not prepared to answer
at this time."
The short an s wer is that the Court is not being ask e d to answer
that question at this time. The issue in Chadha is not whether
different legislative vetoes infringe differently on the functions of other branches, but whether this veto does.
If a
majority of the Court concludes that this veto does not violate
Article I or the separation of powers doctrine, then it should
reverse.
If a majority of the Court believes that this veto
does violate either Article I or the separation of powers doctrine, then it can, and should, promptly affirm.
I strongly feel that this case should be
opinion writing and should be decided this Term.
Sincerely,

J~

------

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

assigned

for
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 11, 1982

Re:

Nos. 80-1832 - INS v. Chadha
80-2170 - U.S. House of Representatives v. INS
80-2171 - U.S. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
I see no reason to reargue these cases along with
other cases not yet decided.
I see no reason for a special conference on these
cases.
Sincerely,

j./71.
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

,:%u:puuu
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

!
March 11, 1982

Re:

80-1832 - INS v. Chadha
80-2170 - ~- House of Representatives
v. INS
80-2171 - u.s. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
If the reargument question is to be resolved by
written responses rather than a Conference, my vote is
not to reargue.

Respectfully,

jL
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§uvr.cmt qmtrf o-f tlt .c Pnittlt .§ taft~
~CU¥qington. ~·

<!f .

2llc?Jt~

CHAM B ERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CO N NOR

Ma rch 11, 1982

No. 80-1832
No. 80-2170
No. 80-2171

INS v. Chadha
House of Rep. v. INS
Senate v. INS

u.s.
u.s.

Dear Chief,
In response to the flurry of memos concerning this
case, I agree we should discuss it again. Saturday will not be
possible for me due to a previous commitment.
With regard to having Chadha reset next Term, it seems
to me Mr. Chadha would not be unduly inconvenienced because he is
in no danger of deportation in the meantime, and there is no
intervening national election in which he might otherwise be able
to vote. Although the case has proceeded slowly, I believe
n~ither Chadha nor any of the parties have wanted to expedite it.

..

4

The decision in this case would not necessarily resolve
the issue in other cases involving different types of
"legislative vetoes."
I would be willing to grant and
consolidate it with another appropriate case should one be here
in time to do so. Regardless of that, I am willing to consider
resetting this one next Term if our discussion indicates the
wisdom of that course.
I do not believe it is essential that it
be decided this Term.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

cf tlrt 1!inittlt ~hrlt.G'
:.lt9'1tf.ngfctt.1fl. ~ 2.0gt'!-$

~U:Vrtmt ~Llltti

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 11, 1982

Re:

80-1832) - INS v. Chadha
80-2170) - U.S. House of Representatives
v. INS
80-2171) - u.s. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
Saturday at 9:00 a.m. (or earlier) will be
convenient for me, but I have a commitment which will
require me to leave at noon.
Respectfully,

J~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.§npumt <!fottrl of flrt 'Jl:Tnittlt .§taU~
'J'zur~ l9.

QJ.

20gtJ!.~

CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE W>< . J . BR E NNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 80-1832
80-2170 80-2171

March 11, 1982

INS v. Chadha
U.S. House of Rep. v. INS
U.S. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
I have difficulty seeing what purpose a Saturday conference would serve. · As Harry's .memorandum stated, the proceedings in your former court in the FERC cases have not yet been
completed. Accordingly,there is neither a petition for certiorari nor a jurisdictional statement bringing those cases
here. It would not be at all unusual that the Court of Appeals
would delay acting on the motion for rehearing until after we
have decided Chadha. In any event, I don't see how we can vote
on a motion to reargue Chadha and set it with cases not yet
here. Frankly, a Saturday session to discuss such a motion
seems to me a waste of time.
Sincerely,

-.'

/~

J.

/}

11

;u~

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

.§u.pumt <q"ou:rt of tl!t1bfuitt~ ~talt.«

:ntruriritt¢-cn. tEl. <q.

20~J!$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 11, 1982

Re:

80-1832 - INS v. Chadha
80-2170 - U.S. House of Rep. v. INS
80-2171 - u.s. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief,
I

shall be out of the city on Saturday

and will not be back until Wednesday.

But if

there is a special conference on these cases,

:

please record me as voting for the motion to
reargue and set with the CADC case.
Sincerely yours,

The ' Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
cpm

;§upumt <!J"4lurlllf tqt ~tb ~hrltg

2-tcH~Jrington, ~. <!f. 20,?Jk~
CHAMBERS OF

7

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 11, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1832) INS v. Chadha
No. 80-2170) U.S. House of Representatives v. INS
No. 80-2171) U.S. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
While I like to think that I am fully sensible of the
weight of the arguments which Harry advances against the
setting of this case for reargument, on balance I come down
to favor it.
I think the question is one of such unusual
importance -- and one which so little lends itself to
disposition on the basis of abstract, deductive type of
reasoning -- that we would fulfill our responsibilities
better in the long run by having the two cases argued
together.
I therefore vote in favor of Lewis' motion
made in his letter of March 9th.
I

Sincerely~

.

'

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.§u:vr~ <!Jtmri cf tltt ~ ~ .§udtg
~asfringLrn.tB. <!f. 2LT.?'!t~
..J
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF -JUSTICE

March 12, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
It appears there is no occasion for a Conference
on Saturday, March 13 .
Regards,

.:§n.prtmt Qfourlllf tlrt ~b ~ta41l
~ag!p:nghtn. ~.

<!J.

2.(}~~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

March 15, 1982

RE:

(80-1832 - INS v. Chadha
(

(80-2170
(

(80-2171

- u.s.

House of Re:12resentatives v. INS

-

Senate v. INS

u.s.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
I did not get to review the exchanges in connection with
this case until after the close of the Judicial Conference
late Friday.
As I indicated at our original Conference on this case,
I think it is one of the most difficult we have had in a
long time, and this is why I felt that a further Conference
would be useful.
Neither of the dispositions, which seemed
quite clear to five or six members of the Court, seemed
that clear to me, and this reaction was shared by the
three of us who deferred voting on the case.
I find it difficult to understand why there is any
time pressure in this matter,
I suspect that if we were
to consult Mr. Chadha's views on the subject, he would
hardly be anxious for a swift disposition of his case,
since he r e mains in the United States until he hears from
this Court.
Under the circumstances, I will vote to set this case
for reargument,
If that can be done in conjunction with
another case, particularly the case out of the D.C. Circuit,
so much the better,
If the case is reargued, we can
address the questions that John raised in his memo sometime
before the date of reargument.

.:§uyrtntt ~cn:d of tq~ ~ttit.tb- ;§mt.tg
~aslpn.ghm, ~. ~· 20c?J!.$ ·
CHA~BERS

OF'

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 25, 1982

Dear Chief:

~ ~ ~~ent

schedule, with its postscript, covers,
..; believe,/a11
pending
cases except No. 80-1832, ---INS v.
~
Chadha, and 1ts companion cases, No. 80-2170 and No. 802171.
have never been assigned for opinion
wr
While no final vote has been taken at conference,
I have assumed that it is the intention to have them set
over for reargument.
If and when they are placed on an
order list with this disposition, I wish to be shown on the
public record that I dissent.
If anyone should suggest that
this has never been done, I cite Crist v. Cline, 434 U.S.
980 (1977}.

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

j)u.prmu {!fettrl cf tqt ·~nitt~ ~taitg
~agftingtttn.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

June 25, 1982

Re:

(80-1832 - INS v. Chadha
(

(80-2170 (

(80-2171

u.s.

House of Repre sen tat i ves v. INS

u.s.

Senate v. INS

Dear Harry:
I have your memo of June 25 regarding the above. There were
five votes at Conference to put this case over; whether, to call
this "formal" or "final" vote I am uncertain. It seems clear
that everyone has assumed the case is to go over. You may recall
I suggested a special conference be held to discuss the matter
and there were no "takers"
You are, of course, aware that appeals have been filed in
the four cases on this subject decided by the CAOC. See 81-200
8, 81, 2020, 81-2151 and 81-2171. They will be on the September
Conference List. We will then likely consider whether and how we
relate these cases to the above.

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

........
~u:puntt C!fcnrlcf flrt 'J!:lnittb ~tait.S'
~ag!pnght~ ~. C!f. 20,?'!-;l
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE

w ... .

J . BRENNAN ,

RE:

JR ~

No. 80-1832
No. 80-2170
No. 80-2171

June 28, 1982

-

INS v. Chada
U.S. House of Representatives v. INS
U.S. Senate v. INS

Dear Chief:
I too would like to be noted on the public record as
dissenting from the Order putting these cases over for reargument.
Sincerely,

~

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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The primary question presented is whether Congress' use of
the legislative veto violates the doctrine of separation of powers,
bicameralism, or the Presentation Clause.

These cases also present a variety of threshold questions.
The issues presented by Chadha are:

2.

Whether theCA had jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the
Immigration Act, 8 u.s.c. §1105(a)~ to revi ew Congress'
exercise of the legislative veto;
Whether the INS lacks standin~ to appeal in No. 80-1832
because the INS argued below that the legislative veto was
unconstitutional;
Whether the fact that both Chadha and the INS agree that
the legislative veto is unconstitutional deprives the case
of the necessary adverseness;
Whether Chadha's subsequent marriage to an American
citizen has mooted the case;
Whether Chadha has standing to raise a separation of
powers argument;
Whether the provision allowing Congress to veto the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
determinations is severable and, if it is not, whether
Chadha lacks standing; and
Whether the constituionality of the legislative veto is a
political question.
The threshold issues presented by CECA v. PERC are:
Whether § 506 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)
provides for review in the courts of appeals of PERC
decisions to revoke its orders;
Whether § 202(c), the legislative veto provision of the
NGPA, is severable; and
Whether the issue is moot since PERC has revoked its rule.

I. Threshold Issues:
A. Background in Chadha
Chadha, a native of Kenya and a holder of a British
passport, lawfully entered the United States as a nonimmigrant
student in 1966.

His student visa expired in 1972.

In 1974, the

INS issued an order to show cause why Chadha should not be deported.

3•

A special inquiry officer held a deportation hearing
pursuant to

§

242(b) of the Immigration Act.

At the hearing, Chadha

conceded his deportable status but requested that deportation be
suspended pursuant to

§

244 (a) (1).

This section provides that the

Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation if the
alien has been physically present in the United States for not less
than seven years, is a person of good moral character, and is a
person "whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in ~p to the ~~en ••• • "
hearing Chadha's claims, the hearing officer
met all the conditions specified in

§

244 (a)

de~~

(1)

;/G.)
that Chadha

and .suspended

deportation.

~-----

Section 244(c) requires that when the INS has suspended
the deportation of an alien under

§

244(a) the INS shall submit to

Congress a detailed statement of the facts and law together with the
reasons for the suspension.

Sect ion 244 (c) ( 2) further provides that

if:
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a
resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the
suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall
thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's
voluntary departure ••.• If, within the time above
specified, neither the Senate nor the House of
Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney
General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
Pursuant to

§

244(c), the INS submitted a report of its

-

action to Congress.

The House passed a resolution disapproving the

---

suspension of Chadha's deportation.
~

Because the House's disapproval

overrode the INS's decision, the hearing officer reopened the
~----------~----------------

-

deportation proceedings and entered a final order of deportation.
~

-

-'

"---

r.-

.......

4.
Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and then
petitioned the CA9 for review, pursuant to section 106(a) of the
Immigration Act.

The CA considered Chadha's petition and found that

the use of the legislative veto was unconstitutional.

B. The Proper Route of Review.
Chadha presents three consolidated cases.
an appeal by the INS from the CA9's judgment.

No. 80-1832 is

No. 80-2170 is a

~

petition for cert by the House of Representatives, which appeared as
~

an amicus during the initial proceeding before the CA9 but
intervened in order to petition for rehearing.

No. 80-2171 is a

petition for cert filed by the Senate, whose posture before the CA9
paralleled that of the House.

Both the petitions for cert and the

appeal pose different jurisdictional problems.

The cert petitions

raise the issue of whether the CA had jurisdiction to consider
Chadha's claims under § 106(a).

While the INS's appeal may avoid

the§ 106(a) jurisdictional problem, see McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421

u.s.

21 (1975), the appeal raises questions about INS's standing and

whether there is a case or controversey under art. III.

1.

TheCA's Jurisdiction under § 106(a).
Section 106(a) confers jurisdiction on the courts of

appeals to review "final orders of deportation •.. made against
aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative
proceedings under section 242(b) of the Immigration Act."

TheCA

rejected the argument that because Chadha was challenging the
House's decision to deny his suspension rather than the order of

.·

5.
deportation, he should have brought suit in the district court
rather than the court of appeals.

It reasoned that the phrase

"final orders" includes all matters on which the validity of the
final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations
actually made at the hearing.
1968)

See waziri v. INS, 392 F.2d 55 (CA9

(order rescinding permanent resident status prior to

deportation hearing reviewable under §106(a) since it was the
logical predicate of the deportation order).
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392

u.s.

The CA determined that

206 (1972), was not to the contrary

since the alien's request for a stay of deportation in that case was
denied several months after the deportation order had been entered.
Because the request for a stay was separate from the deportation
order, the alien in Cheng Fan Kwok was not challenging his
deportation order as section 106(a) contemplates.

Moreover, theCA

reasoned that immediate review of Chadha's claim advanced the
purpose of the section, which was to expedite the deportation of
aliens by preventing duplicative appeals to various federal courts.
Requiring Chadha to challenge the constitutionality of the
procedures employed in his deportation in the DC and the accuracy of
the procedures in the CA would defeat Congress' purpose.

--~t
LA_;J- CA3 •
ft

The CA9's position is directly at odds with that of the
See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (CA3 1981).

In

Dastmalchi, Iranian students petitioned for review of their
deportation order.

They claimed that but for an unconstitutional

INS regulation, requiring Iranians to report to INS, they would not
have been deported.

The CA3 found that it lacked jurisdiction under

§ 106(a) to review their petition.

It reasoned that§ 106(a) only

6.
provided for review of final deportation orders or orders made
during a § 242(b) deportation proceeding.

Because the

constitutionality of the underlying regulation can not be placed in
issue during a§ 242(b) deportation proceeding, the INS could issue
no order on that subject and there was nothing for the CA to review
under § 106(a).

The CA3 specifically considered Chadha and found

that Chadha conflicted with its decision.
Although the CA9's "logical predicate" rationale does
conflict with the CA3's reasoning, the factual situations can be
distinguished consistently with previous Supreme Court decisions in
the area.

The difficulty in interpreting§ 106(a) appears to have

arisen because of the phrase, "final orders of deportation."
Because orders of deportation are technically separate from orders
suspending deportation, it was initially unclear whether Congress
intended to limit review only to deportation orders themselves.
This Court first considered the scope of § 106(a) in Foti v. INS,
375

u.s.

217 (1963).

In Foti, the alien had conceded that he was

deportable but had requested that deportation be suspended.

When

the hearing officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied
relief, Foti petitioned for review in the court of appeals pursuant
to§ 106(a).

TheCA rejected his claim because an order denying

suspension was not a final order of deportation.
reversed.

This Court

It relied on the legislative history to determine that

Congress intended to provide review not only for orders of
deportation but also for orders issued during and incident to the
adminsitrative proceedings.

The Court observed that § 106(a) was

enacted against an administrative background in which determinations

7.
of deportability and rulings on applications for suspension of
deportation had been accomplished in a single administrative
proceeding.

See id. at 223.

Moreover the legislative history

showed that Congress had understood the phrase, "final order of
deporatation," to refer to the final administrative order.

In a

colloquy during consideration of the bill, two congressmen had
observed that there could be no final order of deportation until the
question of suspending deportation had been determined.
224.

See id. at

Finally, the Court observed that the purpose of the section

was to eliminate successive dilitory appeals.

Because the plain

objective of§ 106(a) was to create a "single, separate statutory
form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deporation
of aliens •.. ," the Court determined that not allowing review of
the suspension order would violate Congress' purpose.

See id. at

225.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968), the Court
reconsidered the scope of § 106(a).

In this case, the alien had

conceded his deportability and obtained permission to depart the
United States voluntarily.

The administrative proceeding was ended

and a final order was entered.

When the alien failed to depart

voluntarily, he was ordered to surrender for deportation.

He then

requested a stay of deportation from the district director of
immigration.
review.

When the stay was denied, he petitioned the CA for

The CA dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction and

this Court affirmed.
The Court noted that the denial of the stay was "not
literally a 'final order of deportation' nor is it, as was the order

8.

in Foti, entered in the course of administrative proceedings
conducted under § 242(b) ."

392

u.s.

at 212.

Instead, the Court

observed that the order was issued more than three months after the
entry of the final order of deportation and in proceedings entirely
distinct from those conducted under § 242(b).
In determining that the denial of the stay did not fall
within the scope of review permitted by§ 106(a), the Court relied
on legislative history which recognized that § 106(a) was intended
to provide review for only those issues that were brought up in the
course of deportation proceedings.

The Court did not determine

definitively Congress' purpose but noted that Congress may have
"visualized a single administrative proceeding in which all
questions relating to an alien's deportation would be raised and
resolved, followed by a single petition in a court of appeals for
judicial review."

Id. at 215.

The Court therefore held that the

"judicial review provisions of § 106(a) embrace only those
determinations made during a proceeding conducted under §242(b) .••. "
Id. at 216.
The House and the Senate contend that because Chadha's

--

petition for review challenged a decision of Congress it did not
........___,
come within the scope of § 106(a). Congress' decision was neither a
final order of deportation nor was it a decision made during the
administrative proceeding by the hearing officer.

They argue that

the CA9's decision is in conflict with both Cheng Fan Kwok and
Dastmalchi.

TheCA 9 found that orders on which the final order was

contingent were reviewable.

However, Cheng Fan Kwok and Dastmalchi

.•

9.

rejected an argument that all determinations "directly affecting the
execution of" a final deportation order were reviewable.
Although the CA's result conflicts with the language in
Cheng Fan Kwok, there appear to be two ways in which the cases can
be reconciled.

Cheng Fan Kwok found that only those determinations

made during the course of the administrative hearing were reviewable
under § 106(a). Although this language would appear to exclude any
determinations that were not made at the hearing, Cheng Fan Kwok did
not consider a determination that was made by another body incident
to the administrative proceedings.

Instead, Cheng Fan Kwok involved

a determination that was made more than three months after the final
administrative determination.

The only connection that the denial

of the stay had with the order of deportation was that it allowed
the order to take effect.

In Chadha, however, the congressional

determination was made incident to the administrative proceeding.
Final agency action was stayed pending submission of the suspension
to Congress, and the final order was entered only after Congress
disapproved suspending Chadha.

Congress' action was intertwined

with the agency determination and a step toward the final
administrative order.

Additionally, allowing review of the

legislative veto advances the purpose of minimizing the number of
appeals.

I realize that this type of analysis is fairly mechnical,

but it seems as if Cheng Fan Kwok drew a fairly mechanical line
between determinations made during the course of the agency
proceedings and those made outside of it.

Because Congress'

determination is tied closely to the adminsitrative proceedings, it
appears to fall within the scope and the purpose of §106(a).

•

<

This

:
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reasoning would not affect Dastmalchi since that challenge did not
involve a determination made during the administrative proceeding.
Alternatively, it could be argued that even if the
Congressional determination were not part of the administrative
proceeding, the fact that Chadha raised the issue of
unconstitutionality before the hearing officer was sufficient to
bring it within the scope of

§

106(a).

There is some support for

this line of reasoning in the legislative history.

In a colloquy

that has been cited in both Foti and Cheng Fan Kwok, Representative
Walter stated that

§

106(a) would apply to the disposition of stays,

"just as it would apply to any other issue brought up in deportation
proceedings." 105 Cong. Rec. 12728.

The primary difficulty with

this argument is the one noted by Dalmalchi, that the administrative
agency lacks authority to pass on the constitutionality of acts of
Congress.

While Congress may have intended to provide for review of

issues raised during the course of the proceeding, there is no
indication that Congress intended to allow for review of issues that
could not be properly raised at all.

2.

Jurisdiction over INS's appeal.
If the Court finds that the CA lacked jursidiction under

§

106(a) to review the constitutionality of the legislative veto, that
does not necessarily preclude this Court's jurisdiction over an
appeal under 28

u.s.c.

§

1252.

~

McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U

31 (1975), established that "this Court's
in no way depends on whether the district court had juris
On the contrary, an appeal under

§

1252 brings before us, not only

11.
the constitutional question, but the whole case, ••• including
threshold issues of subject matter jurisdiction •••• "
theCA lacked jurisdiction under
alternate route for review.

Thus, even if

106(a), § 1252 provides an
Because ~
Mary's Bench Memorandum of
§

9/26/81 examined this issue thoroughly, I will only summarize the
major points made by her and the parties.
The primary difficulty with the appeal is that the INS
argued in the court below that Congress' exercise of the legislative
veto was unconstitutional.

Because the CA's opinion gave the INS

everything it sought, both the House and the Senate argue that the
INS is not an aggrieved party, and thus lacks standing to appeal.
INS advances three arguments in support of its standing.

First, it

contends that its dual position, as a litigant in this law suit and
as a part of the Executive Branch with a duty to enforce the laws
passed by Congress, leads to the anomaly that it can both support
the opinion of the court below and still be aggrieved by its
judgment.

Because the CA9's decision barred it from carrying out

its statutory mandate of deporting Chadha, it was sufficiently
aggrieved to initiate this appeal.

However, even if one assumes

that the INS enjoys this dual capacity, the difficulty with its
argument is that it is not proceeding before this Court in its
capacity as an aggrieved part of the Executive Branch.

It would

seem that the INS only has standing to present an argument that
would remedy its grievance.
The INS also relies on United States v. Lovett, 328

u.s.

303 (1946), as support for this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Lovett, Congress had passed an appropriations bill that cut off

In
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funding from certain workers employed in government agencies because
it regarded them as undesireable. The employees had sued in the
Court of Claims to recover back pay.

They urged that the

appropriations bill which stripped them of their pay was
unconstitutional.

The United States had appeared in the Court of

Claims on behalf of the agency and had agreed with the employees
that Congress had acted improperly.

The House and the Senate were

represented as amici before the Court of Claims and had argued in
support of the appropriations bill.

When the Court of Claims held

in favor of the employees, the House and Senate were unable to seek
cert.

The United States therefore sought cert on behalf of the

Congress, and this Court heard the case.
The INS argues that, as in Lovett, the Executive is
obligated by due respect for Congress to seek review of a decision
adverse to Congress.

The difficulty with this argument is that in

Lovett the House and the Senate were precluded by statute from
seeking review of the Court of Claims' judgment.

Thus, even though

the executive had agreed with the decision below, there was a reason
for the executive to appear on behalf of Congress in this Court.
Because the INS has not appeared here on behalf of Congress but has
continued to present a side of the argument with which Congress
disagrees, Lovett appears inapplicable.
Finally, the INS argues that the policy behind §1252
supports allowing the INS, even when it prevailed below, to put the
question of a statute's constitutionality before this Court.
Section 1252 was passed to allow the United States to secure a
prompt and uniformly binding resolution of a statute's

13.

constitutionality. It would seem, at least to me, that Congress'
recognition of the United States' interest in achieving such a
determination is sufficient to establish standing.
Assuming that the INS does have standing to appeal, the
last issue that arises is whether there was a case or controversy
between the INS and Chadha.

-----

--

The only parties before the CA9 were

the INS and Chadha, who both agreed that the use of the executive
veto was improper.

I agree with Mary that Moore v. Charlotte-

Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 4 7 (19 71)

(per curiam) ,

indicates that there
may be no justiciable
controversy before this
...._
__..,-.

--

Court.

~

~

In Moore, the Court found that when both the petr and the

resp argued that the state statute was constitutional there was no

controversy between them and dismissed the case.

My difficulty,

however, with the House's argument is that the House argues that
there was no justiciable controversy in the CA9.

It seems that to

the extent Chadha was subject to deportation and the CA had
jurisdiction to review, he clearly had a right to have the
administrative order reviewed.

c.

Mootness.
There are two factors which suggest that this case is

moot.

First, Chadha married an American citizen prior to review of

his petition by the CA.

Although this fact made Chadha eligible for

an immediate relative petition suspending his deportation, see 8

u.s.c.

§§

115l(b) and 1154, theCA noted that an immediate relative

petition does not ensure certain and immediate relief.
Alternatively, the CA determined that by invalidating Congress'

14.
resolution disapproving his suspension of deportation, Chadha's
status as a legal resident was retroactive to 1974, the year in
which the suspension was originally granted by the hearing officer.
This retroactive residency conferred certain benefits that would be
lost if Chadha were forced to file an immediate relative petition.
The other factor that suggests this case is moot is the
passage of the Refuge Act of 1980.

This Act provides that the INS

shall not deport an alien if it finds that the alien will suffer
racial
persecution
if deported.
.._.
.....................
~

The two reasons for which the CA

refused to consider Chadha's marital status would apply here as
well.

The availability of this relief is neither immediate nor

certain and, like an immediate relative petition, would have
collateral consequences for Chadha.
The Senate argues that the CA's assumption that Chadha
would have been entitled to retroactive permanent residency is
incorrect.

Section 244{d) provides that the INS shall record an

alien's admission for permanent residence "upon cancellation of
deportation."

Because the deportation proceedings were never

cancelled, Chadha's permanent residency could not be made
retroactive to 1974. This argument appears somewhat disingenuous
since the reason the deportation proceedings were not cancelled was
the intervention of Congress. Had Congress not intervened, it
appears from the 'hearing officer's initial order that cancellation
of the proceedings would have followed automatically from the INS's
suspension of deportation and that Chadha would have been granted
permanent residency.

'M>f~~~
Although it seems to me that this case is not technically
moot because of the reasons given by the CA, Chadha's marriage to an
American citizen makes the reasons for deciding this case less
compelling.

I am troubled by the issue Mary noted, whether this

case is an appropriate vehicle to resolve a constitutional question
of this magnitude.

See Poe v. Ullman, 367

u.s.

v. Southard, 10 Wheat (23 U.S.) 1, 46 (1825)

497 (1961): Wayward

(Marshall, C.J.)

("the

precise boundary of [separation of powers] is a subject of delicate
and difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter
unnecessarily").

D. Standing.
The House and the Senate raise two challenges to Chadha's
standing. The House claims that there is no nexus between Chadha's
injury and Congress' action.

It is the executive whose interests

have been violated by any breach of separation of powers, and Chadha
lacks standing to assert the executive's interests.
is, however,

'refut~ by ~ckley

v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

This argument
at

117 (1975),

which noted that "[p]arty litigants with sufficient concrete
interests at stake may have standing to raise constitutional
questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency
designated to ajudicate their rights."
of General Services, 433
concurring)

u.s.

Cf. Nixon v. Administrator

425, 502 (1977)

(Powell, J.,

(former president has standing to assert interests of

the Executive Branch).
Of more substantial weight is the argument that Chadha
lacks standing because the provision that allows one house to veto

16.
the INS's determination is inseverable from the provision that
allowed the INS to suspend Chadha's deportation in the first place.
If the legislative veto were found unconstitutional, then the INS
would not be authorized to grant Chadha any relief.

Because a court

lacks the power to grant Chadha the relief he requests, Chadha lacks
standing.
There are two ways to resolve this issue.

The first is to

accept Congress' premise that if the offensive provision cannot be
severed a litigant lacks standing and proceed to determine whether
the provision is in fact severable. Alternatively, it is possible to
question the premise since this proposition allows Congress to
insulate much of its legislation from review.
The CA adopted the first method.

It relied on the

existence of a severabilty clause, which provides that "[i]f any
particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and
the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby."

8

u.s.c.

§ 1101.

TheCA determined

that the parties had failed to overcome the presumption of
severability created by this clause.

The parties had not shown that

the rest of §244 was not "functionally independent' or that a "total
frustration" of Congress basic purpose would result from the
invalidation of § 244(c).
The most convincing argument against the result reached by

l

the CA is that made by the House.

The House notes that when the

President initially recommended legislation allowing the executive
branch to grant otherwise deportable aliens permanent residence,

17.
Congress refused because it "grants too much discretionary
authority."

Similar legislation was proposed to the next two

Congresses and failed to pass.

Congress granted the executive the

power to stay deportation permanently only when the bill included a
provision allowing congressional review of the executive's
determinations.

The INS does not attempt to refute the House's

construction of the legislative history.

Instead, it argues that

the Court should consider what Congress would have done if it had
known that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.

Because there

is overwhelming evidence that Congress was simply unable to handle
the many private bills requesting suspension of deportation, the INS
suggests that Congress would have necessarily chosen to delegate its
power to the INS.
I cannot help but think that the House has a strong

----

argument.

It does appear that it was important for the Congress to

retain control over this area and that it consistently refused to
delegate its power unless it retained some minimal control over the
individual decisions made by the executive branch.

Were it not for

the severability clause, the evidence would be persuasive that
Congress did not intend for

§

244(c) to be severed from the

remainder of the section.
JL

'l

The alternative approach is to ask whether severabilit0
should be considered as a threshold matter or deferred until
consideration of the remedy.

Two arguments can be advanced in

~---------------------'
support
of deferring consideration of severability.

First, finding

that inseverability precludes review would be tantamount to saying
that Congress can insulate its statutes from review whenever it

18.
pleases.

The INS argues that the Court has not previously accepted

this premise.

Instead, in considering equal protection challenges

to underinclusive statutes, it has treated this issue as a question
of remedy rather than as a matter of standing.
Westcott, 443

u.s.

76, 93-96 (1979)

See Califano v.

(Powell, J., concurring); Orr v.

Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
(1975).

u.s.

7, 17-18

In each of these cases, a party raised an equal protection

challenge to an underinclusive statute.

Although a finding of

unconstitutionality could have resulted in a complete loss of
benefits, the Court did not find that the party lacked standing to
raise the issue.

Instead, it declined to speculate on whether the

legislature would expand or contract benefits.
These equal protection cases can, however, be
distinguished.

A private litigant who is denied a benefit by an

underinclusive statute is injured in two respects.
denial of the benefit constitutes an injury.

First, the

Second, being

subjected to discriminatory treatment constitutes a separate and
distinct injury.

If the challenged statute is struck down, it is

true that the litigant will not have achieved the benefit previously
conferred by the statute.

However, he will have achieved a measure

of equal treatment. A court's power to remedy the second injury in
such a situation is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of
standing.

The difficulty with this distinction is that none of the

cases cited relied on it.

Instead, severability has for the most

part been treated as a question of remedy.
A second difficulty with

on severability to

determine standing is that it will lead to inconsistent results.

If

:

19.
the Court should find that a particular section authorizing a
legislative veto is severable and unconstitutional, comparable
provisions may be insulated from review by the fact that they are
inseverable.

This would lead to the anomaly of statutes with

concededly unconstitutional provisions being insulated from review
and remaining in force.

Such an analysis allows Congress to rely on

unconstitutional provisions to impose palpable injuries on
individuals.

I am not sure that the fact that Congress intended a

provision to be inseverable provides a sufficient explanation of why
individuals who suffer direct injuries by its operation lack
standing.

E.

Political Question.
The House is the only party to raise the question before

this Court.

It contends that because the CA's separation of powers

analysis did not rest on an explicit textual basis, there are no
judcially manageable standards for deciding this question.

Although

the CA's separation of powers reasoning does involve amorphous
standards, it does not appear to go beyond what has normally been
accepted under the political question doctrine.

This doctrine

involves three inquiries: 1) is the issue to be resolved committed
by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
government; 2) would resolution of the question require the court to
make judgments outside of its area of expertise; and 3) do
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention.
See Baker v. Carr, 369

u.s.

186, 217 (1962).

In this case, the

question of separation of powers is not committed to any particular

.

20.

branch and has been decided on a number of occasions by this Court.
See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

1, 123 (1976}.

Determining

whether Congress has exceeded its powers does require a court to
make difficult judgments.

However, the Court has previously made

such judgments and admitted no reluctance to do so.

See id.

Finally, even though this question does involve the judiciary in a
dispute between two other branches, that fact has not previously
prevented judicial review.

See id.; The Pocket Veto Case, 279

u.s.

655 (1929}.
Although the political question doctxine has atrophied
over the past few years, this case demonstrates the wisdom of the
doctrine.

It seems to me that the House is correct in saying that

determining when Congress has overstepped its bounds is a difficult
task that involves judicial intervention in a political
determination.

It also seems arguable that so long as Congress'

action is not egregious, the courts should refrain from interfering.
At least up until a few years ago, Congress was sufficiently
concerned about the constitutionality of the legislative veto that
it hesitated to use it.

The executive's frequent denunciations and

the President's occasional veto of bills were sufficient to work out

--

a political accomodation in which the legislative veto was included

-

in bills infrequently and exercised even less frequently.

~

Relying on the political process seems to me the

~

.~

preferrable solution.

As Justice Frankfurter noted, "Constitutional

ajudications are apt by exposing differences to exacerbate them."

~

un stown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

~ (Frankfurter,

~~
_..,.

J., concurring}.

u.s.

579, 595 (1952)

By entering the dispute between the

I
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Congress and the President, the judiciary runs the risk of
displacing any political resolution of this issue with judicial
supervision.

The one factor that counsels against restraint is that

the executive and the legislature appear to have reached an impasse.
Congress has begun to include legislative vetoes in an increasingly
greater number of bills and to exercise it more frequently.
Additionally, the Executive is actively seeking judicial review of
Congress' action.

Resolution of the issue appears to have become an

unwelcome obligation.

II. Threshold Issues in CECA v.

FERC. ~~~-~ ~

A. Background.
Title I of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)
provides for phased deregulation of natural gas prices.

It defines

certain categories of gas and sets new NGPA price ceilings in each
category.

Title II of the NGPA establishes an incremental price

program that was designed to pass a higher portion of the increased
cost of gas to certain industrial users.

By increasing the cost of

gas delivered to large, price sensitive customers, Congress sought
to bring pressure on the pipelines to prevent them from bidding
excessively high prices for the new deregulated gas.
Title II provides for implementation of incremental
pricing in two phases. Section 201 requires FERC to issue within one
year a Phase I
See 15

u.s.c.

incremental pricing rule covering boiler fuel users.
§3341.

Section 202(a) provides that within eighteen

months "the Commisssion shall, by rule, prescribe an amendment to
--------------~~
~
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the [Phase I] rule •.. "to extend incremental pricing to other
industrial users. See 15

u.s.c. §3342(a) (1).

This new rule would

take effect thirty days after being submitted to Congress unless
"either House of the Congress adopts a resolution of
disapproval .•.• " 15

u.s.c. § 3342(c) (1).

On May 6, 1980, three days before the statutory deadline,
the Commission adopted regulations extending incremental pricing to

--------------------- -

--------------------~------~--a variety
of industries. In adopting this new rule, the Commission

-- ' - 'unusual
took
a somewhat
stance.

In response to comments that no

section 202 rule or only a narrow rule should be implemented, the
Commission noted that the structure of Congressional review
precluded it from making social and policy judgments.
The Commisssion believes that it was neither requested nor
authorized to second-guess the social and economic
judgments that the Congress made in enacting Title II.
The role of the Commission under Section 202 is more
limited. Instead, the Commission is instructed to bring
its technical expertise to bear on the decision of a
workable Phase II rule that can best advance the purposes
set by the Congress. It is up to the Congress to decide
whether this Phase II submittal meets adequately the
social and economic goals of the incremental pricing
program or indeed, whether those goals are still
appropriate.
The Commission's rule was submitted to the Congress.
After conducting hearings, the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce issued a resolution disapproving the rule.

The

committee saw its role as determining "whether the risk of economic
dislocation in requiring certain industrial custormers at this time
to shoulder increased gas costs is outweighed by the benefits in
sheltering higher priority users from some cost increases and
whether an expansion of incremental pricing at this time is
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..

consistent with current national priorities."

Because the energy

market conditions had changed drastically since the passage of the
NGPA and because the value of incremental pricing was still
uncertain, the committee recommended disapproving the rule.
Comments during the floor debate on the resolution generally
followed the analysis suggested by the Committee.

Congress appeared (

to use the congressional veto provision as a way of taking a second
look at what had been a controversial policy.
The Consumer Energy Council of America (CECA) petitioned
for rehearing before FERC.

CECA contended that the legislative veto

was unconstitutional and requested FERC to remove a provision from
the Phase II rule conditioning its effectiveness on Congress'
failure to disapprove it.

The Commission declined to rule on the

constitutionality of the veto or remove the condition.

It

determined that sound administrative practice required an agency to
presume the statute valid.

--

vetoed Phase II rule.
....

However, the Commission revoked the

It reasoned that if the legislative veto were

.......,

subsequently ruled! unconstitutional, the rule might take effect.
Because the Commission had not, in deference to Congress, considered
the social and economic aspects of the rule, the Commission sought
to ensure that an ill-considered rule would not become effective.
CECA then sought rehearing of the revocation order,
arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act required notice and
comment before revocation.

The Commission denied the petition on

the ground that §§ 201 and 202 of the NGPA permitted revocation by
giving FERC the power to amend the rule.

Alternatively, the

:

..
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Commission found that there was good cause to amend the rule.

CECA

then petitioned for reveiw in the CA DC.

B.

Jurisdiction in the CA.
In an argument remarkably similar to that in Chadha, the

Cogressional amici contended that the CA lacked jurisdiction.
Section 506 of the NGPA gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review final orders and rules issued by FERC.

The amici contended

that CECA was not challenging a final order or rule of the
Commission.

Instead, they were seeking to compel FERC to adopt the

incremental pricing rule over the House's objection.

The proper

course of action was a petition for mandamus filed in the DC, not a
petition for review filed in the CA.
The CA rejected this argument on two grounds.

It noted

that the CA DC had previously held that it had jurisdiction to
review an allegation that an agency had abused its discretion by not
adopting a proposed rule.

Alternatively, it found that CECA was in

fact challenging the final rule.

In its petition for rehearing,

CECA had requested FERC to remove the provision in the rule
conditioning its effectiveness on the failure of either house to
veto it. Section 506 allowed CECA to challenge whether FERC were
required to remove an unconstitutional provision from the rule
itself.

Additionally, CECA was also challenging FERC's decision

that it had the power to revoke the rule without notice and comment.
Jurisdiction is much clearer here than it is in Chadha.
~

'

......

'-= ---

---

Incorporating the provision conditioning the effectiveness of the
rule on Congress' action makes it clearer that the constitutional

:
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challenge is part of the challenge to the order enacted.
Additionally, the problems that plagued the interpretation of the
jurisditional statute in Chadha are absent here.

It has generally

been recognized that even if FERC lacked authority to pass on the
constitutionality of the enabling statute, that challenge could be
raised on review of the FERC's order.

c.

Severability.
The House bill initially provided for incremental pricing

for gas sold by interstate pipelines, intrastate pipelines and local
distribution companies.

The Senate bill provided for a more limited

use of incremental pricing applying it only to gas sold by
interstate pipelines.

Neither bill provided for legislative review

of its incremental pricing rule.

The conference took ten months to

resolve the differences in the bills.

The bill that ultimately

emerged from conference provided for incremental pricing to go into
effect in two stages and also provided that the second stage would
be subject to a legislative veto.

The final bill did not contain a

severability clause.
The CA determined that the section establishing the
legislative veto was severable.

While it observed that the presence

of a severability clause creates a strong presumption that
provisions of an act are severable, the absence of such a clause has
not resulted in a uniform rule.

u.s.

672, 684 (1971)

Compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403

(plurality opinion)

(cardinal principle of

statutory construction is to save and not to destroy) with Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298

u.s.

238, 312 (1936)

(absent a severability
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provision, the presumption is that the "rule is against mutilation
of a statute").

The CA eschewed reliance on a presumption and

looked instead to Congress' intent.

TheCA noted that the

legislative history admitted of two interpretations.

However, it

found that while there were two references to the fact that the
legislative veto allowed Congress to reconsider its decision to
extend incremental pricing beyond Phase I, these were the only
references that occurred during several days of intense debate.
Proponents of incremental pricing did not stress the fact that
Congress retained control over extending such pricing.

Instead,

they argued for incremental pricing because it provided residential
users of natural gas with protection against large price increases.
This fact was sufficient to convince the CA that Congress would have
passed Phase II in the absence of the legislative veto.
For the Conference Committee to have separated the
incrimental pricing provision into two phases and made the second
phase, but not the first, subject to a legislative veto suggests
that the legislative is not severable.

Moreover, for the

legislative veto to have emerged from the Conference Committee as
part of a compromise between the extensive incrimental pricing
provision enacted by the House and the more limited provision
enacted by the Senate adds to the suggestion that the two provisions
cannot be separated.

However, the Conference Committee's report

does not indicate that the presence of the veto was important to the
extension of incremental pricing.

Moreover, it appears from the

debate that occurred on the floors of both houses that Congress did
not consider the veto essential to the second phase of incremental

27.
pricing.

In light of the different concerns expressed by the

members of Congress, theCA's decision does not appear unreasonable.

D.

Mootness.
Because FERC revoked the regulation extending the

incremental pricing provision it had enacted, FERC contended below
that the case was moot.

TheCA rejected FERC's argument on the

ground that FERC's failure to provide notice and comment before
revoking the rule rendered the revocation invalid.

The CA noted

that the Administrative Procedure Act defined rulemaking, for which
notice and comment is a prerequisite, to include the repeal of a
rule.

It rejected the proposition that the previous notice and

comment was sufficient, since the question of repeal had never been
raised.

Alternatively, it rejected FERC's argument that it had good

cause for failing to give notice and comment.

The CA observed that

FERC had failed to explain, as the APA requires, why good cause
existed.
The intervenors argued that the FERC was not required to
provide notice and comment since the rule was not final.
merely a proposed rule that was being reheard.

It was

They note that the

agency retains the power to change a rule on rehearing without
notice and comment.

The difficulty with this position is that FERC

did not adopt any change that was proposed by any party or that it
had previously considered.

Instead, it chose to void the rule, an

action that no one anticipated.
Alternatively, it might be argued that Congress'
disapproval of the regulation made notice and comment unnecessary.
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The validity of this argument appears to turn on the reason why FERC
chose to void the statute.

If, on rehearing, FERC had merely

declined to rule on the constitutionality of Congress' action and
had declared the rule void on the basis of Congress' disapproval,
such an act would have been merely ministerial, not an act of
rulemaking requiring notice and comment.
simply carry out Congress' mandate.

FERC, however, did not

It went a step farther and

determined that in the event that Congress' action was declared
unconstitutional that it was not proper for the present rule to go
into effect.

Because FERC reached a determination that the

concerned the merits of the rule, it would appear that notice and
comment were required.
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III. Legislative Veto.
A. The Decision in Chadha.
The CA advanced two arguments for finding the legislative
veto unconstitutional.

It relied primarily on the doctrine of

separation of powers and subsidiarily on the doctrine of
bicameralism.

Because Congress' use of the legislative veto did not

encroach on a power specifically delegated by the Constitution to
another branch, the CA applied an "essential functions" analysis to
the issue of separation of powers.

The CA determined that because

the boundaries between the three branches of government are not well
marked the judiciary should not act unless one branch's actions
represented a clear invasion of the other's power. TheCA defined a
constitutional violation of separation of powers as:
an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or
essential to the operation of a coordinate branch,
provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate
branch in the performance of its duties and is unncecssary
to implement a legitimate policy.
The CA determined that the use of the legislative veto
disrupted an essential function of both the judiciary and the
executive.

If the legislative veto is seen as correcting a prior

judicial misapplication of the statute, then it renders
interpretations of the statute impermissible advisory opinions.

The

CA reasoned that the judiciary's determinations of what the law is,
such as what constitutes hardship, may be disregarded by Congress in
future cases.

Because the uniformity that would otherwise be

achieved through stare decisis is disrupted, judicial determinations
become mere advisory opinions with no precedential force.
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Alternatively, if the purpose of the veto is for Congress
to share in the administration of the statute, that purpose is
equally invalid.

The executive's administration of the statute

reflects a considered application of the policies articulated by
Congress to the facts of a particular case.

Summary reversal by the

legislature without any indication of a need to change the standard
employed by the executive detracts from the authority of the
executive branch.

Because there is no indication that the

complexity of the area prevented Congress from articulating specific
guidelines, there is nothing to justify the legislature's intrusion
into the province of the executive.
Finally, if the purpose of the veto is allow Congress to
apply a standard different than the one previously enacted, such a
use of the veto violates the principle of bicameralism.

By

requiring that bills pass both houses, the framers established an
important internal check on legislative power, which the use of the
veto avoids.

Central to the CA's reasoning is the question of

whether the agency's suspension of deportation created a right for
Chadha to stay in the country that could only be changed by
legislation.

TheCA, however, did not pass on Chadha's argument

that prior to the House's action his status was one of
"nondeportability."

TheCA reasoned that even if it accepted

Congress' contrary premise that the INS's determination was a mere
recommendation establishing no rights,
If the agency action creates no rights,

244(c) was still invalid.

§
§

244(c) would allow a mere

recommendation by the INS to become law whenever Congress fails to
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take action.

This would violate the proposition that all changes in

the law must derive from congressional action.

B.

The Decision in CECA v. FERC.

-

{~!~)

The CA DC took a ____.........__
slightly different tack in determining
that the use of the one house veto was unconstitutional. The CA
~

relied primarily on art. I,

§

7, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which

provides that "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States."

TheCA also noted

cl. 3 of the same section which provides that "Every Order,
Resolution, or Vote, to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United
States."

Clause 3 was added primarily to prevent Congress from

evading the requirements of cl. 2 by merely calling its action
something other than a bill.
The CA noted that although every action taken by Congress
did not have to be receive the concurrence of both houses and be
presented to the President, the exceptions to that rule have been
narrowly construed.

Two exceptions have received judicial approval.

Congress may direct an agency to investigate actions and report back
to it.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

1, 137-38 (1976), however,

recognized the crucial difference between investigation and
rulemaking.

That one house of Congress may require an agency to

investigate does not mean that one house may act on a rule
promulgated by the agency consistent with the Presentation Clause.
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The second exception recognized is that Congress may
initiate a constitutional amendment without presenting the amendment
to the President for approval.

u.s.

(3 Dall.) 378 (1798).

See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3

This holding, however, is based on the

provisions of art. V, which sets forth the procedure for amending
the constitution.

Neither of these exceptions is relevant to the

use of the legislative veto.
Because the CA found that the use of a legislative veto
did not fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the
Presentation Clause, it considered whether there was any reason why
the legislative veto should be deemed different from the kind of
legislative decisions the Constitution requires to be made by both
houses and presented to the President. The CA noted that the
Presentation Clause serves two purposes.

It preserves the use of

the Presidents's veto power and the requirement of bicameralism.
The President's veto power in turn serves two functions.

It allows

the President both to prevent Congress from encroaching on the
Executive Branch and to prevent Congress from enacting legislation
with which the President disagrees.
ends.

Bicameralism also acheives two

It provides an internal check on the power of the legislature

and preserves state power by making one branch of the
legislatureresponsible to the states.
Having explored the purposes of the Presentation Clause,
the CA considered whether the use of the one house veto was a
legislative act requiring presentation to the President.

The CA

determined that a rule promulgated by an agency is more than merely
a proposed law.

Absent disapproval by one house, it becomes
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effective.

Indeed, the rule promulated represents the agency's

implementation of the policy embodied in the original statute.

The

operation of the legislative veto allows one house to change the
scope of the agency's discretion.

This is contrary to requirements

of the Presentation Clause which requires that any change in the
existing law be made by both houses and presented to the President.
In this case, the Phase II rule promulgated by FERC
embodied Congress' previous determination that incremental pricing
should be extended beyond industrial boiler fuel users.

In vetoing

the rule, the House stated that it made a social policy judgment
that an extension of incremental pricing was unnecessary in light of
changed economic conditions.

This shift in policy is exactly the

kind of decision that the Constitution has determined requires the
procedural protections embodied in the Presentation Clause.
The CA also found that the use of the legislative veto
violated the separation of powers doctrine.

The CA rejected the

argument that because FERC was an independent agency separation of
powers was not applicable.

The CA reasoned that FERC performed an

executive function in administering the NGPA.

Because FERC is

functionally identical to an executive agency for the purposes of a
separation of powers analysis, there is no need to distinguish the
two types of agencies.
Although the CA recognized that the rule promulgated by
FERC involved a legislative policy decision, it still found that
Congress' participation in rulemaking through the legislative veto
constituted an executive act in violation of the principle of
separation of powers.

It relied primarily on a passage from
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Buckley v. Valeo which determined that the Federal Election
Commission's authority to make rules was an administrative function
that could only be exercised by persons who are officers of the
United States. See 424

u.s.

at 140-41.

Although Buckley only

addressed the issue of who could make such rules, the CA reasoned
that if rulemaking were such an executive function that only Art. II
officers could engage in it, Congress was necessarily prohibited
from interfering in the rulemaking process itself.

C.

Discus~n.

1.

Background.
The legislative veto has been in use for .the last fifty

years.

Although there are some earlier manifestations, the

legislative veto first appeared in its modern form in a governmental
reorganization act in 1932.

From 1932 to 1970, the device was

included in acts only infrequently and used even less frequently.
Beginning in 1970, legislative veto provisions began to appear in
greater numbers.

Recently bills have been introduced that would

extend the use of the veto to almost all delegations of authority to
administrative agencies.
Basically, the legislative veto provisions require that
agency action be submitted to Congress for its approval before it
becomes effective.

A variety of techniques have been developed.

Normally, the statutes require that the administrative action be
submitted to Congress and provide that the action will become
effective if it is not disapproved by one house, or sometimes by
both houses.

The converse of this procedure, which is less
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frequently used, is to provide that the agency action becomes
effective only if it is affirmatively approved by one house, or
sometimes by both houses.

Most legislative vetos only give Congress

the option of accepting or rejecting the whole proposal before it.
However, some provisions give Congress an item veto, which allows
Congress to veto only parts of an agency's proposal.

A second

variation on a typical legislative veto is to allow the veto to be
exercised by a committee or by a single member of a house.
The use of the legislative veto has met with grudging
acceptance by the executive.
is on record as op osed to the

Almost every President since Roosevelt
of the veto in some form.

Most

appear to have gone along with the veto because of the need for the
legislation that contained it.

However, some Presidents have vetoed

legislation on the ground that the veto was an unconstitutional
infringement on their executive power.

President Ford, for example,

vetoed seven bills expressly on this ground.

Others, such as

President Carter, accepted the veto in executive reorganization acts
but rejected its use in other contexts.

This distinction derives

mainly from the characterization of the reorganization acts as
involving a "reverse veto," a type of veto which is not present in
either case.
Although not of constitutional dimension, the legislative
veto has met with frequent criticism on policy grounds.

It leads to ~

stalemates between Congress and the administrative agencies.

Rather

than make hard policy choices, Congress may simply reject
administrative proposals and shift any blame for inaction on the
agencies for failing to arrive at workable solutions.
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Alternatively, some commentators have noted the degree of control
which a legislative veto gives Congress over the decisions made by
the agencies.

Because administrators often try to accomodate

Congress' will in drafting proposed rules, the independent judgment
that agencies should bring to bear on a task is subverted.

See

Bruff & Gelhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation:
~Study

of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1977).

Finally, the veto power is criticized as not being an effective
means of accomplishing Congress' stated goal, overseeing agency
action.

Congress simply lacks the time to review all the agency

determinations thoroughly.

--

The primary constitutional arguments against the
--------------~'---'

legislative veto are that it violates the Presentation Clause,

--

Bicameralism and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Both the

Presentation Clause and the Bicameralism argument present rather
strict limitations on the exercise of the legislative veto.

If

these two requirements are found applicable, then any exercise of
the legislative veto is unconstitutional since action by one house
without the President's concurrence violates express procedures
established by the Constitution.

The applicability of these

provisions turns on whether the use of the legislative veto is in
effect a legislative act which requires presentation to the
President.

It is the position of this memo that it is not.

Elimination of these two rationals leaves the doctrine of separation
of powers.

This doctrine allows for a more flexible analysis and a

balancing of interests between the different branches.
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2.

Article I, s.:_ction_ 7. {
Art. I,

§

'fJ~~-~tv

J

7 requires that every bill passed by Congress be

submitted to the President for his approval.

There are two

arguments that this provision is inapplicable to the legislative
veto.

The first is perhaps best expressed by Justice White in

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 283-85 (1976)

(White, J., concurring).

He observed that any bill empowering an agency to issue regulations
is required to pass both houses of Congress and to be approved by
the President. Once that has occurred, the President typically lacks
the power to veto any regulation issued by the agency.

The

intervention of a legislative veto does not alter this accepted
limitation on the President's veto power.

If a regulation which is

subject to a congressional veto is submitted to Congress and allowed
to go into effect, the President's power is no more affected than if
the regulation had never been submitted to Congress in the first
place.

If one house choses to exercise the veto power, that does

not affect the President's authority since the house has not acted
affirmatively.
effect.

It has merely prevented a provision from going into

This is no different than if one house of Congress had

proposed a bill and the other had disapproved it.
The validity of this position depends on the
characterization of the underlying agency action.

If the agency

action is seen merely as a recommendation, then Justice White's
position is clearly correct.

One house has simply decided not to

act on a recommendation made by the agency.

In vetoing the

proposal, one house has not legislated; Congress has failed to
legislate.

This position has been taken almost unanimously by the
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supporters of the legislative veto.
seem apt, however.

This characterization does not

A regulation or order proposed by an agency has

more independent force than a recommendation.

While a

recommendation will have no effect if Congress fails to act on it,
Congress' inaction allows a proposed law to go into effect.

As the

CA 9 reasoned in Chadha, if the agency's determination is a mere
recommendation, then the fact that Congress has established a
procedure which allows a mere recommendation to take effect by
inaction violates the principle that Congress must legislate before
it changes the existing state of things.
Alternatively, if the underlying agency action is seen as
final agency action which establishes the existing law, then Justice
White is clearly wrong.

The use of a one house veto would alter the

rights that the agency had granted a particular individual.

Such

change may only be made by the enactment of positive law with the
full panoply of procedures established in the Presentation Clause.
Chadha takes this tack in his argument.

He claims that his status

after the hearing officer's determination was that of
"nondeportability."

The INS also takes this approach in suggesting

that the exercise of a one house veto effectively constitutes an
amendment changing the status of an alien who has been granted a
suspension of deportation.
However, neither of these characterizations appears
completely accurate.

The agency's order obviously has some effect.

Its determination represents an exercise of delegated power and,
under the delegation doctrine, embodies the policy choice made by
Congress.

However, the agency's determination is not immediately
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effective; it is subject to one house's disapproval.

By definition,

the status contemplated by the agency order has not yet been fixed.
Because the agency proposal is a more than a recommendation but less
than existing law, the validity of the legislative veto can not be
determined simply by characterizing its effect one way or the other.
This middle position, which I believe is the most accurate
characterization, does not answer any questions.

It merely

rephrases the question, whether this arrangement infringes on the
purposes the Presentation Clause was designed to protect.

---

The CA DC correctly identified the two purposes of the
'---

Presentation Clause.

It allows the President to veto a bill to

prohibit encroachment on the power of the executive branch.

Second,

it allows him to prohibit policies with which he disagrees from
going into effect.

The President's ability to veto the enabling

bill when it is initially proposed allows him to fulfill the first
purpose of the Presentation Clause.

The subsequent exercise of the

legislative veto does not expand Congress' power.

The use of the

legislative veto simply reflects the allocation of power that was
initially established when the enabling bill was passed.
The more difficult question is whether the exercise of the
legislative veto frustrates the second purpose of the presidential
veto, disapproving an unwise policy.

It is possible to say that

there are three purposes for which Congress might choose to exercise
the legislative veto: i} Congress believes that the initial
delegation of power to the agency was improper; ii} although the
initial delegation was proper, Congress has determined that the
agency acted outside the scope of the delegation; and iii} even
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though the initial delegation was proper and the agency has acted
within the scope of the delegation, Congress disagrees with the
particular exercise of delegated power.
If Congress vetoes a particular agency determination
because it disagrees with the policy embodied in the enabling
statute, it has effectively repealed the delegation.

Congress has

changed the existing delegation of authority and that change can
valid only if accomplished in accordance with the procedures set out
in the Presentation Clause.
However, if Congress exercises the legislative veto
because it determines that the agency acted outside of the authority
delegated to it, then Congress has not altered the existing
delegation of authority.

Congress' negation of the agency's action

does not constitute a legislative act that is required to be
submitted to the President any more than a court's finding that the
agency has exceeded its statutory authorization.

Although such a

congressional determination may violate the doctrine of separation
of powers, it does not appear to be a legislative act that violates
the Presentation Clause.
Finally, if Congress vetoes an administrative
determination because Congress disagrees with the agency's
application of the policy embodied in the enabling act, Congress has
not rejected the policy embodied in the enabling act.

Congress has

made an administrative decision that the policy should not be
applied in a particular situation.

Again, Congress' action may

violate the doctrine of separation of powers, but arguably the fact
that Congress has acted within the scope of the original policy
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embodied in the enabling legislation obviates the need to present
its actions to the President.
If the veto is justified on the basis that the use of the
veto is not a legislative act, then the congressional veto in Chadha
is permissible.

Congress did not purport to reject the policy

embodied in the Immigration Act, it merely determined that Chadha
did not establish hardship.
result.

CECA, however, leads to a different

In CECA, Congress rejected the proposed regulation

bee~

changed conditions revealed that it was no longer desireable to

~

extend incremental pricing beyond the first group of industrial
boiler fuel users.

This decision effectively revoked the grant of

authority to FERC to promulgate some type of extension.
The primary difficulty with drawing these distinctions
lies in determining Congress' intent in vetoing a particular agency
action.

Although the House appears to have acted within the scope

of the policy embodied in the Immigration Act, CECA involves
differing statements by congressman explaining why FERC's regulation
was vetoed.

When a veto is accompanied by conflicting statements or

no statements, this method of analysis becomes untenable since it is
difficult to tell why Congress acted.
~

The second argument for the constitutionality of the
legislative veto is that inclusion of the legislative veto in the
enabling act constitutes a condition on the delegation of power
itself.

This argument relies primarily on two cases, United States

v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307
U.S. 1 (1939}.

u.s.

533 (1939} and Currin v. Wallace, 306

In Currin, Congress had passed a statute authorizing

the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations for designated
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tobacco markets.

The Secretary, however, was not allowed to

designate a market unless two-thirds of the affected farmers voted
in favor of designation.

The Court rejected the argument that this

statute involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority:
"So far as growers of tobacco are concerned, the
urn oes nof 1
any delegation of
legis l at iVe au~no~ty. Congress has merely placed a
restriction upon its own regulation by withholding its
operation as to a given market "unless two-thirds of the
growers voting favor it." ... Here it is Congress that
exercises its legislative authority in making the
regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its
application. The required favorable vote upon the
referendum is one of these conditions." 306 u.s. at 15re~uire ~ r!~eren

16.

Currin has been distinguished from the use of a legislative veto
because the condition approved by the Court in Currin prevented the
Secretary from issuing regulations.

The condition thus operated on

the statute, not on the administrative determination which was made.
However, Royal Rock approved a statutory condition on regulations
already issued.

Royal Rock, correctly I believe, found no

difference between the two situations and simply cited Currin to
show that the condition was not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.

See 307

u.s.

at 577-78.

If Congress can condition the effectiveness of
administrative action on acceptance by private citizens,
supporters of the legislative veto question why the same veto power
cannot be reserved to Congress.

The argument runs that Congress'

veto has no more effect on the President's veto power than the
disapproval of a private group, which Currin allowed.

Even if

either Congress' or the private group's veto constitutes a repeal,
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neither has done anything that was not contemplated when the statute
was originally enacted.

The delegation of authority to agency was

always conditional and subject to revocation.
The most quoted response to this argument is that made by
Professor Dixon:
"[a] court decision to allow a congressional delegation of
power to private groups on grounds so unstructured yet
conclusive, however bad as public policy, involves in
constitutional terms solely a question of delegation
doctrine. No other constitutional considerations come
into play. Such a ruling could furnish no constitutional
warrant for the quite different situation when, by a
congressional veto device imposed on administrative
authority, the Congress tries to blur or wipe out the
constitutional prescriptions of article I, section 7
(regarding the scope of the congressional role in
policymaking) and of article II (regarding the role of the
Executive in executing statutes)." Dixon, The
Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers~6 N.C.L.
Rev. 423, 455 (1978) .
Professor Dixon's argument, however, indicates that the vice of the
legislative veto is not that it circumvents the President's veto
power by allowing the effective repeal of delegations of power to an
agency.

Presumably conditioning the effectiveness of regulations on

the approval of private groups has this very effect.

The vice

identified by Professor Dixon is that Congress has given this power
to itself.

It can be argued that the result of this argument is to

restate the issue as a question of separation of powers.

Does the

use of the legislative veto upset the Art. I and Art. II functions
that the Constitution assigns to the Executive and the Congress.
3.

Bicameralism.
Bicameralism protects interests different than those

protected by the presidential veto.

It was adopted as part of the

"Great Compromise" on state representation, allowing both the states
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and the people to have a voice in making law.

Separating the

legislature into two houses was also seen as a way of providing an
internal check on the legislative power.

Although bicameralism

serves different interests than the Presentation Clause, it does so
by requiring the consent of both houses to any legislative act.
Like the presidential veto, the purposes of bicameralism are
frustrated only if the exercise of the congressional veto can be
fairly characterized as a legislative act.

Bicameralism is thus

typically invoked by the parties along with the Presentation Clause
as an argument against the use of the legislative veto.

Its

presence does not require independent consideration so much as it
gives added weight to the argument that the Presentation Clause is
an important aspect of the constitutional scheme.

4.

Separation of Powers.
Supporters of the legislative veto begin from the

proposition that the doctrine of separation of powers is pragmatic
and flexible, reflecting the contemporary realities of our political
system.

The rise of administrative agencies reveals the degree to

which the doctrine has moved from a concept of separate powers to
one of blended powers.

This modern doctrine not rely on a formal

separation of powers.

Instead, it embodies the purpose underlying

the doctrine, that of check.

At the core of this blending process

is Congress, which allocates power among the other branches.

In

both Chadha and CECA, Congress has not encroached on a power
specifically delegated to another branch.

Instead, Congress has

augumented executive power since it has delegated to the executive
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authority over areas traditionally within Congress' control.

Having

delegated this power, the use of the legislative veto advances the
purpose behind the doctrine of separation of powers, providing a
check on the accretion of power by the executive.
Supporters of the veto also contend that Congress' power
to structure relationships among the three branches is established
by its authority to make laws in the areas of immigration and
commerce coupled with the authority contained in the Necessary and
Proper Clause.

Congress has determined that it is necessary to

delegate authority to accomplish its constitutional duty to make
laws.

Congress has also found it necessary to retain some measure

of control over the broad grants of authority that are entailed in
delegation.

Additional support for allowing Congress to allocate

power is found in the second, or forgotten, half of the Necessary
and Proper Clause.

This provides Congress with the power to make

laws for carrying into execution "all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."

One commentator has suggested that

this forgotten second half provides Congress with the power to say
"what additional authority, if any, the executive and the courts are
to have beyond that core of powers that are indispensible, rather
than merely appropriate, or helpful, to the performance of their
express duties under articles II and III of the Constitution."

See

Van Alystne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers
of the President and of the Federal Courts, Law & Contemp. Prob.
102, 107 (1972).
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Opponents of the legislative veto contend that the veto
power allows Congress to participate in the execution of the law.
This violates one of the most fundamental tenets of separation of
powers, that the body that makes the law may not also execute it.
Opponents of the veto in Chadha argue that once Congress has
determined the conditions that will justify suspension of
deportation, Congress may not participate in determining whether to
apply those conditions in a particular case.
Although a similar argument is made in CECA, it is
somewhat more difficult to show that the congresssional decision in
that case was an executive function.

Indeed, all parties agreed

that the decision was "a general legislative policy decision."

The

argument that the House's decision constituted the exercise of an
executive function relies primarily on a passage from Buckley v.
Valeo.

See 424

u.s.

at 140-41.

Buckley determined that a

commission, composed in part of members appointed by Congress,
lacked the authority to engage in the task of "fleshing out the
statute," i.e., rulemaking and issuing advisory opinions.

Although

the Court acknowledged that this function was more legislative in
nature than other functions performed by the commission, it found
that "each of these functions also represents the performance of a
significant governmental duty exercised pursuant to a public law."
424

u.s.

at 141.

The Court further determined that "none of [these

functions] operates merely in aid of congressional authority to
legislate or is sufficiently removed from the administration and
enforcement of public law to allow it to be performed by the present
Commission."

Id.

The opponents of the veto in CECA argue that if
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rulemaking is not sufficiently removed from the administration of a
statute to require that it be exercised by a person appointed by the
President, Congress' participation in rulemaking is similarly
forbidden.
Short shrift is normally given to the argument that
Congress was e: titled under the

~cessary ~d

reallocate power among the branches.

Proper

Clau~L t~

Although the Necessary and

Proper Clause authorizes Congress to take action within the scope of
its constitutional authority, it does not authorize it to violate
the doctrine of separation of powers.

u.s.

See Buckley v. Valeo, 424

at 134-35. Opponents of the veto argue that because Congress

has clearly assumed the authority exercised by another branch,
reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause is improper.
Analyzing these competing claims is a difficult task.

The

Court has not had occassion to lay out definitively a method of
analysis for separation of powers claims because of the relatively
few cases that have raised the issue and because of the diversity of
circumstances in which the cases have arisen.

Functionally, it

would seem that there are two ways in which the doctrine of
separation of powers can be violated.

One branch may take an action

that directly frustrates another branch from exercising its powers.
See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433

u.s.

425 (1977)

(considering whether Congress might require that presidential papers
be preserved).

Alternatively, one branch may violate the doctrine

by assuming powers that are entrusted to another branch.
Youngstown

Sheet~

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

u.s.

See

579 (1952)

(President's duty to execute the law refutes the idea that he also
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make the laws).

Although this distinction often breaks down in any

particular case, it is perhaps a helpful starting point.
Another variable that is introduced is the degree to which
there is textual or historical support for assigning a particular
function to a one branch.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424

u.s.

1, 120-143,

for example, relied on the textual support of the Appointments
Clause, to find that in appointmenting commissioners to the Federal
Election Commission Congress assumed powers specifically committed
to the Executive.

A corollary of this type of analysis is

demonstrated in Myers v. United States, 272

u.s

52 (1926).

Chief

Justice Taft's majority opinion relies extensively on the intent of
the framers, demonstrated by the debates during the first Congress,
to find that the President's power of appointment implied a
corollary power to dismiss executive officials.

See id. at 174

(summarizing the sources of the decision).
Absent such textual or historical support, the Court has
appeared to have adopted a different method of analysis depending of
the type of separation of problem before it.

When dealing with a

question of whether one branch has assumed a power that belongs to
another, the Court has engaged in characterizing the power assumed
as either executive, legislative or judicial.

This method often

limits analysis since the characterization presupposes the outcome.
In Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277

u.s.

189 (1928), for example,

the Court determined that the doctrine of separation of powers was
violated when the Phillipine legislature established boards of
directors for essentially government owned corporations and provided
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that the legislature could appoint the members of the boards.

In

analyzing the legislature's action, the Court stated:
"[I]n acting in respect of the proprietary rights of the
government, [the legislature may not] disregard the
limitation that it must exercise legislative and not
executive functions. It must deal with the property of
the government by making rules, and not by executing them.
The appointment of managers {in this instance corporate
directors) of property or a business is essentially an
executive act which the legislature is without capacity to
perform directly or through any of its members." 277 u.s.
at 203.
This type of analysis is also exemplified in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343

u.s.

579 {1952).

opinion for the Court makes the point succinctly.

Justice Black's
"In the framework

of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Id. at 587.

Justice Black then determined that both the style and

the substance of the Executive Order in Youngstown revealed that the
President was making law.

The difficulty with both Springer and

Youngstown is that they provide little guidance for analyzing a
separation of powers claim when the assumption of power is less
egregious.
When the Court has, however, considered conflicting
interests, it has engaged in a more subtle balancing approach.

In

~-------------------------------determining whether the President
could be required to respond to a
subpoena, United States v. Nixon, 418

u.s.

683, 703-13 {1974),

recognized that there were two competing concerns, the executive's
right to confidentiality, which the Court explicitly recognized to
have art. II underpinnings, and the judiciary's duty to vindicate
the guarantees to a fair trial embodied in the Fifth and Sixth
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Amendments

It found that a generalized claim of privilege was

insufficient to overcome the fundamental duty of the judiciary to
provide a fair trial.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433

u.s.

425

(1977}, reaffirmed this balancing of interests:

"In determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper
inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the
Executive Branch from accom lis~ co~I1u t1onally
ass1gne
unc 1on. On y w ere
e po e 1
or
di~ present must we then determine whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote
objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress." 433 u.s. at 443 (citations omitted}.
Although the balancing approach adopted by the Nixon cases
provides a more subtle way than characterization of handling what
seems to me a complex issue, it is not clear that an assumption of
power by one branch is susceptible of a balancing approach.

The

problem posed by an assumption of power is that one branch will
aggregate too much power.

Thus, the issue is not which branch's

interests should prevail, an issue that a balancing approach is well
suited to answer.

Instead, the issue is whether the actions that

the one branch takes pose a danger of vesting too much power in that
branch.

The end result is that characterization, informed by

tradition, often provides one of the few ways to determine whether
one branch is exercising a power that should only be exercised by
another branch.
Characterization is perhaps clearest when the function
being considered has been traditionally assigned to one branch.
if for this reason that I believer few people would disagree with
Justice White's statement in Buckley that it would be an improper

It
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assumption of power "if Congress purported to usurp the functions of
law enforcement, to control the outcome of particular ajudications,
or to pre-empt the President's appointment power . • . . " 424
285.

u.s.

at

However, once . one moves away from functions traditionally

committed to one branch, it becomes more difficult to determine if
the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated by
characterizing the function undertaken in a particular way.

Even

Chadha, which seems to be a fairly clear usurpation of judicial or
executive functions, is not without its problems.

Although applying

law to particular individuals is a job that is typically judicial or
executive, the difficulty with this characterization is that
Congress has historically passed private bills to suspend
deportation.

Even though this kind of individual determination

seems particularly outside of Congress' traditional function, the
history of private bills suggests that making such individual
determinations does not extend congressional power.
Conversely, Congress' participation in rulemaking would
seem to involve a purely legislative judgment that is particularly
within Congress' competence.

However, Buckley v. Valeo's treatment

of the functions that a commission, composed of members selected by
Congress, could perform reveals the difficulty in characterizing
Congress' participation in rulemaking as solely legislative.

As the

opponents of the legislative veto note, Buckley found that
rulemaking was sufficiently connected with the administration of a
statute that it could be performed only by people appointed by the
Executive.

Thus, even though the rulemaking is legislative in
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nature it forms part of the executive function of administering the
statute.
There are at least two considerations that may provide a
principled way of distinguishing between equally plausible
----------------------------~---characterizations of Congress' use of the veto. The first is based
on a deference to Congress' judgment.

I am persuaded by Congress'

argument that when there is no textual assignment of functions in
the Constitution, Congress' judgment should be given some leeway.
In the context of the legislative veto, Congress has stated that use
of the veto is necessary to fulfill its duty to make the law.
Congress claims that the complexity of the subjects with which it
must deal leads to two related results.
Congress delegate power to the agencies.

First, it requires that
The second result of this

complexity is that it is often difficult for Congress to define with
precision the scope of the delegation.

Thus, in order to fulfill

its duty to make the laws Congress is required to monitor the rules
made by the agencies and
In a case such
The INS was not making broa

that they conform to its will.
little weight.

------------------so much

as it was

applying specific standards that Congress had already established.
Congress' duty to make the laws did not require it to monitor the
particularized determinations made by the INS.

Although it is true

that Congress previously passed private bills to suspend
deportation, it would seem that once Congress has established
standards and a procedure to make this kind of individualized
determination there is little need for Congress' continued
supervision.
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~~~4~~
In CECA, the regulation issued by FERC had a peculiarly

---

legislative cast.

It defined Congress' inchoate policy by extending

it to a broad group of natural gas users.

Because the promulgation

of the regulation involved a legislative policy choice, Congress'
duty to make the laws provides it with a greater justification for
participating in the formulation of legislative policy by the
agency.
A second consideration which perhaps provides a way of
drawing lines is to consider the competence of each branch and the
particular checks that each branch has on the power it exercises.
Separation of power does not merely involve the distribution of
threedifferent types of power, legislative, judicial and executive.
It also involves three different branches which are structured in
unique ways to administer the power conferred on them.

Each branch

has particular capabilities and restraints which inform the very
power it exercises.

One way of avoiding characterization is to

determine whether the function that a particular branch has
undertaken is one which it is well suited to perform or which is
checked by its own internal restraints.
The decision in Chadha involved the application of
established policy to a individual case.
I I

l t

' '-

This is the kind of
'-\.

decision that the judiciary and the executive, to the extent th

---------------

executive operates in a quasi-judiciary capacity, are able
accurately and fairly.

------------------

~o

Both branches have the capability to

evidence and determine with some accuracy the facts in the
individual case before them.

Similarly, their application of

principles to the facts of each case is controlled by strict

m
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procedural rules.

Considerations such as the requirement that each

explain the reasons for its decision, the application of stare
decisis and the possibility of appellate review all prevent both
branches from acting arbitrarily.

Congress by contrast lacks the

fact finding capabilities to make an accurate determination.

More

importantly, however, there is no effective check on arbitrary
action by Congress.

The primary justification for and check on

Congress' exercise of its power is the fact that it is responsive to
the public will, as manifested in elections.

However, when Congress

makes individual determinations, like the decision to exercise its
veto in Chadha, the effect of its action is so limited that the
check on its power is not brought into play.

Because the check

inherent in the vote is not well suited to preventing Congress from
acting arbitrarily in individual cases, Congress' participation in
such determinations allows it to exercise precisely the kind of
power that the separation of powers was designed to avoid.
By contrast, Congress' participation in the decision in /
CECA does not pose the same danger.

It was a decision that was

~~

particularly within Congress' competence; it was the kind of policy
choice that the representative nature of Congress allows it to make.
Moreover, because Congress' decision had a broad impact on a
category of people, its action was the kind of action that calls
into play the primary check on Congress' power.

In vetoing agency

rules of broad application, there is less danger that Congress'
exercise of its power will go unchecked.
If both these considerations are taken into account, it is
perhaps possible to say that the lack of necessity of supervising

55.

the INS' application of the Immigration Act coupled with the danger
of arbitrary action posed by allowing Congress to act in individual
cases results in the veto in Chadha violating the doctrine of
separation of powers.

It is perhaps also possible to say that the

necessity for Congress to participate in formulating the policy that
was involved in the FERC's Phase II rule and the lessened danger
that Congress' would be held unaccountable for its actions combine
to justify its action in CECA.
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j

so-called •one-House veto.•
I

/

!

u.

s.

- 2 FACTS AND CONTENTIONS:

Following argument of these cases on Feb. 22,

1982, the Court set the cases for reargument on Dec. 7, 1982.

Both of these

petrs advise that two recent decisions by the CADC necessitate further
argument by the parties in supplemental briefs.

These decisions, they note,
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will soon reach the court for review.

In Consumer Energy Council of America

v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, No. 81-2008, the CADC held that a
provision for one-House disapproval of a rule under the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978 was unconstitutional.

In Consumers Union of the United states, Inc.
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CADC held that a provision for disapproval of a trade regulation rule of the
FTC was unconstitutional.
Because the CADC based its ·decisions in these cases upon its
interpretation of the Presentation Clause, both parties seek leave to file
these supplementary briefs which address that provision .
.._.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

Re: Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, and 80-2171, INS v. Chadha

All sides have filed supplemental memos in Chadha, which
are concerned primarily with the Presentation Clause.

The House

argues that the resolution disapproving the Attorney General's
decision to suspend Chadha's deportation did not constitute
legislative action.
status~

It did not alter Chadha's existing legal

it simply withheld an act of grace that would have allowed

Chadha to stay in this country.
seem persuasive.

This argument, however, does not

As the CA9 noted, if the House fails to act the

INS's suspension of deportation will become effective.

Thus, the

INS's action, which embodies the 6ongressional delegation of power,
has some independent force independent of Congress's subsequent
veto.
The Senate makes two arguments.

First, it contends that

when the Framers drafted the Presentation Clause they were
attempting to respond to a problem that had arisen under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.

Although the Pennsylvania Constitution

had required that the state legislators lay over bills from one
session to the next before making them law, the legislators had
evaded the requirement by adopting resolves that had the force of

2.

law during the lay over.

Because Madison had this procedure in mind

when he proposed the Presentation Clause, he intended for the clause
to apply only to laws or the equivalent of laws.

The clause was not

intended to foreclose legislative review when the statute
authorizing review was passed in accordance with the requirements of
the Presentation Clause.

The Senate also recites the history of the

legislative veto to demonstrate that it has been incorporated
frequently into a host of bills since 1920.
The SG responds that the Framers did not intend the
Presentation Clause to be limited only to those acts that are
formally designated laws.

The purpose of the Presentation Clause is

to prevent either branch of Congress from taking untoward or
precipitate action by requiring Congress to follow strict procedural
requirements.

The House and the Senate's view would allow Congress

to avoid the procedural limitations placed on the exercise of
congressional power by the Constitution.

With respect to the

Senate's reliance on the experience of the Pennsylvania legislature,
the SG argues that the Presentation Clause is designed to prevent
the problem encountered by Pennsylvania, hasty and unthinking
determinations that affect the rights of the state's citizens.
Because the use of the legislative veto poses just such a problem,
the Senate's argument undercuts rather than supports its position.
Finally, the SG argues the history of the legislative veto
has been one of disagreement between the Executive and the Congress
over the validity of the legislative veto.

The fact that Congress

has relied on this provision extensively does not mean that its
validity has been established.

3.
Although it seems that the SG has the better of the legal
arguments in this round of briefs, I am still troubled by Congress'
statement that the legislative veto is essential to its operation.

..............

Although deciding this case on the narrow
separation of
,_.

~owers

grounds would leave a host of questions unanswered, the extent to
which the veto has been incorporated in statutes leads me to
recommend that the Presentation Clause not be reached until
necessary.
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fly Louis Fisher

W

E ARE WITNESSING an ironic turn in the historic struggle between ·
the executive branch and Congress: a court decision which seemingly
promises much greater power for the executive but which, if upheld, would
likely lead to the opposite effect. ·
The Jan. 29 ruling, by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals here,
gave a rude jolt to the "legislative veto," a device Congress has relied on for at
least a half century to control executive actions.
. .. Specifically, the panel struck down a one-house veto used to disapprove a
gas-pricing regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
]3ut its language was so broad as to question the constitutionality of legislative
·vetoes in hundreds of other laws governing arms sales, immigration, war
.powers, impoundment, endless agency regulations and much else.
·
. The D.C. panel recognized that its finding - that all legislative acts consti7ttitionally require "presentation to the president and passage by both houses
:of Congress" - "may have far-reaching effects on the operation of the na:tjonal government." But it may have misunderstood those effects.
: . Many assume the ruling portends a gain for the executive branch, a victory
-for orderly government, a blow to congressional interference. Think again. If
'.the Supreme Court upholds the overly broad opinion, the net result will more
:likely be less power for executive officials, a more convoluted legislative pro.cess, and continued congressional involvement in administrative decisions.
.. Bizarre consequences? Not if you understand why the legislative veto was
,.originally adopted. Presidents accepted (indeed, often invited) legislative'
,vetoes because they provided a way to get more power. The bargain was clearly
·understood by both branches. The president essentially told Congress: "Give
:me more authority than you normally would, and I'll give you a chance to veto
:my initiatives." If presidents disliked the legislative veto, Congress would with:hold authority.
.
.
· Courts are familiar with this quid pro quo. In 1977 the Fourth Circuit dis:~issed a suit by a federal employe who protested that the Senate acted uncori'stitutionally when it disapproved a pay raise recommended by the president.
But the legislative history convinced the court that Congress delegated the sal~ary authority only on the condition that it cotild, by a one-house veto, disapprove presidential recommendations. The authority and the condition were in:separable. .
.
.
· The FERC case was different. Here the court decided that the grant of rule-making authority was not tied explicitly to the one-house veto. But that is the
. .
exception, not the rule.
The record shows, for example, that the president could not tell Congress:
"Thanks very much for the authority to reorganize the executi\'e branch, but I
have no intention of recognizing your right to veto my plans." Executive reor_ganization power and the legislative veto could not be severed.
: · Other examples abound. Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the
president may defer spending unless one house of Congress disapproves. The
pres~dent is not at liberty to take the authority and ignore the condition. If the
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CONGRESS, From Page Dl
He might claim other a:'uthorities (statutory or implied
powers under the Constitution), .but this would merely
trigger the kind ~f fractious litigation we had in the early
1970s under President Nixon.
The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1980 raises a the Public Works committees fust approved the contracts. Eisenhower signed the bill after Brownell consimilar issue. Congress';:angered by some ITC regulations,
cluded
that this procedure - based on the authorizati6nenacted legislation requiring future rules to run the '
.appropriation process- was within Congress' power. The
gauntlet of the legislative· veto. If the D.C. panel's opinion
form had changed; the ·committee veto r_emained.
is l,lpheld, the ITC may lose its authority under the statIf the one-house veto over impoundment deferrals is in. ·
- .
ute tO issue regulationsr"'· .· _
Uncertainties in this area,·as in others, would probably ' valid, -Congress will have no trouble devising more burforce more issues into the courts, with the preponderance densome procedures · for the president. A harbinger of
w.hat might be in the works appears in the Transportation
of evidence often on the side of the Congress. In the laws
Appropriation Act for fiscal 1982, passed last December.
covering arms sales, foreign trade, the sale of nuclear fuel,
Whenever
the president-proposes to defer appropriations
federal salaries, immigration, impoundment and presidenfor various rail programs, the funds must be released un+\~ papers, for some ,notable examples, the delegated
less Congress within 45 days completes action on a bill apJwer and 'the legislative veto seem inseparable.
proving all or part of the proposed deferral.
Congress, of course/could rewrite many of its broad
delegations of power, and the executive branch also could
There is no constitutional problem here, since Congress
well lose soine procedural benefits. Where there is a legi~
will act through the regular legislative process. Yet in this
lative veto, presiden.tial 'proposals are put on a fast-track ' case, in effect, the president not only ends up with a onesystem. Other privileges include special procedures to byhouse veto but a more onerous version. Under the Impass committees, li,mitd~bate and prohibit floor amendpoundment Control Act, one house must take the initia·
ments. Without the legislative veto,,Congress would elimitive to disapprove a deferral. Under the transportation
statute one house can succeed through inaction. .
nate these advantages or r~uire the president to gain approval of both houses:in,a bill or joint resolution. Either
There are other anomalies. Opponents of the legislative
approach would undercu~ the president.
veto warn about the workload imposed on Congress by
having to review administrative actions. But the workload .
-~ ·~'!, o -~ · o
.
.. ~.. ·~~-~-,.
.
is likely to be far heavier if Congress has to act positively
The legislative vetQ~·is- criticized as a backdoor way of
through the regular process. The temptation will be
accomplishing what should be done directly through the
strong for Congress to grant powers for shorter periods,
regular legislative process: But if Congress is denied the
forcing the president to return to Congress for extensions.
legislative veto, no one should underestimate its ingenuity
Of course either\ house, by inaction, could deny him the
in inventing other devices that will be more cumbersome
authority.
for the president and just as satisfactory to Congress.
Other mechanisms are also available to protect congres 7 ·
President Eisenhower discovered this unpleasant fact
sional prerogatives. Under the Trade Act of 1958, the
in the 1950s when he objected to "committee vetoes"
president could Implement certain actions for import recompelling agencies to .·obtain advance clearance from
lief only by obtaining from Congress a concurrent resolucongressional panels, Attorney General Herbert Brownell
tion passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses.
called this an unconstitutional infringement on executive
Courts would likely find this type of concurrent resolution
responsibility:·
. .
constitutional, .since it contains a built-in override of a
Undaunted, CongresS created another procedure that
presidential veto. This would come as little consolation to yielded the same control. A bill was drafted to prohibit
a president forced to locate an extraordinary majority in
approJ,riations for cer~ real estate transactions uniT's
each house before acting.
J

courts ar
powers o
out.
Shall t
tive legis!
tions? \V
The D.C. court, in its FERC ruling, warned that the
gress to
legislative veto enables Cpngress."to expand its role from
This wou
one of oversight, with an eye td legislative revision, to one
of shared adrpinistration." This increase in congressional · placing a
departme
power, according to the court, violates the separation-ofbranches
powers doctrine.
.
success,
But with or without the legislative veto, Congress will
adjudicat
remain knee-deep in administrative decisions, and it is inShould
conceivable that any court or any president can prevent
under Co
' this. Call it supervision, intervention, interference or plain
time to ru
meddling, Congress will find a way.
ment in I
If an agency adopts a regulation that offends Congress,
It is to
legislators can attach language to an appropriation bill
grees wit
preventing the use of funds to implement the regulation.
it should
There is no constitutional question about Congress' right . regular p
to do this, although riders to appropriations bills are far
the need
from ideal ways to make law. Tbey are added without the
ride the
hearings, careful consideration and substantive knowledge
is placed
that more likely accompany a legislative veto.
jority vo
recapturt
Congress also exercises an extraordinary array of nonthe legis!
statutory controls. The clearest examples are the underThe IE
standings between Congress and the agencies for "repro1973 was
gramming": the shifting of funds from one program to another within the same appropriation account. Major _ found it:
reprogrammings must be approved by the committees (or _ majority
nam wa'
subcommittees) with jurisdiction over the program.
Nixon v,
This is simply one more quid pro quo between the
veto hav
branches. In return for the flexibility of lump-sum approNor i:
priations, agencies agree to abide by reprogramming
vetoes w
guidelines and committee clearance. No one wants to reprecise s
turn to line-item funding. Since this type of control is inCongr
formal and nonstatutory, it is difficult to conceive of a
legal issue that might reach the courts. But the involve- . step dift
venient
ment of Congress in "shared administration" is just as
decision
real and binding.
'
proposa
Judicial warnings about shared administration seem
when th
unrealistic in view of the extensive overlay of statutory
For n
and nonstatutory controls. Certainly it is extravagant' and
tive vet
hyperbolic for the D.C. Circuit to suggest that legislative
vetoes put us ~ the road to congressional tyranny. If th~ Strikin~
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Congress Can't Lose on Its Veto

The D.C. court, in its FERC ruling, warned that the
10 raises a the Public Works committees first approved the contracts. Eisenhower signed the bill after Brownell conlegislative veto enables Cpngress'"to expand its role from
egulations,
cluded that this procedure- based on the authorizati6none of oversight, with an eye td legislative revision, to one
> run the ·
processwas
within
Congress'
power.
The
.
appropriation
of
shared administration." This incre~se in congressional '
il's opinion
form
had
changed;
the
·
c
ommittee
veto
r_
e
mained.
power,
according to the court, violates the separation-of:r the statpowers doctrine.
.
If the one-house veto over impoundment deferrals is inBut with or without the legislative veto, Congress will
i probably ' valid, Congress will have no trouble devising more burremain knee-deep in administrative decisions, and it is in1onderance densome procedures for the president. A harbinger of
conceivable that any court or any president can prevent
.n the laws w.hat might be in the works appears in the Transportation
Appropriation Act for fiscal 1982, passed last December. ' this. Call it supervision, intervention, interference or plain
uclear fuel,
meddling, Congress will find a way.
i presiden- · Whenever the president.proposes to defer appropriations
for various rail programs, the funds must be released undelegated
If an agency adopts a regulation that offends Congress,
less Congress within 45 days completes action on a bill aplegislators can attach language to an appropriation bill
proving all or part of the proposed deferral.
f its broad
preventing the use of funds to implement the regulation.
1 also could
There is no constitutional problem here, since Congress
There is no constitutional question about Congress' right
e is a legi~will act through the regular legislative process. Yet in this
to do this, although riders to appropriations bills are far
a fast-track ' case, in effect, the president not only ends up with a onefrom ideal ways to make law. They are added without the
lures to byhouse veto but a more onerous version. Under the Imhearings, careful consideration and substantive knowledge
oor amendpoundment Control Act, one house must take the initia·
that more likely accompany a legislative veto.
vould elimitive to disapprove a deferral. Under the transportation
Congress also exercises an extraordinary array of non, to gain apstatute one house can succeed through inaction. .
statutory controls. The clearest examples are the undertian. Either
· There are other anomalies. Opponents of the legislative
standings between Congress and the agencies for "reproveto warn about the workload imposed on Congress by
gramming": the shifting of funds from one program to an·having to review administrative actions. But the workload , other within the same appropriation account. Major
is likely to be far heavier if Congress has to act positively
reprogrammings must be approved by the committees (or
d!oor way of
through the regular process. The temptation will be
subcommittees) with jurisdiction over the program.
through the
strong for Congress to grant powers for shorter periods,
This is simply one more quid pro quo between the
r denied the
forcing the president to return to Congress for extensions.
branches. In return for the flexibility of lump-sum approts ingenuity
Of course either' house, by inaction, could deny him the
priations, agencies agree to abide by reprogramming
:umbersome
authority.
guidelines and committee clearance. No one wants to rengress.
Other mechanisms are also available to protect congres; · turn to line-item funding. Since this type of control is in1leasant fact
sional prerogatives. Under the Trade Act of 1958, the
formal and nonstatutory, it is difficult to conceive of a
tee vetoes"
president could Implement certain actions for import relegal issue that might reach the courts. But the involvearance from
lief only by obtaining from Congress a concurrent resolument of Congress in "shared administration" is just as
ert Brownell
tion passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses.
real and binding.
'
on executive
Courts would likely find this type of concurrent resolution
Judicial warnings about shared administration seem
constitutional, .since it contains a built-in override of a
unrealistic in view of the extensive overlay of statutory
ocedure that
presidential veto. This would come as little consolation to
and nonstatutory controls. Certainly it is extravagant' and ·
1 to prohibit a president forced to locate an extraordinary majority in
hyperbolic for the D.C. Circuit to suggest that legislative
tions unhrs
each house before acting.
T
· vetoes put us oJi the road to congressional tyranny. If thfl_
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courts are serious about "untangling" the rights and
powers of the three branches, they have their work cut
out.
Shall they prohibit the president from making substantive legislation through executive orders and proclamations? Will courts resurrect the 1935 rule requiring COngress to delegate legislative· power with clear standards?
This would be a revolution in itself. Should we consider
placing all independent <;ommissions under the executive
departments, thereby tidying up the system of three
branches? This has been tried more than once, without
success, and for good reason. Can we no longer tolerate
adjudication and "quasi-legislation" by the agencies?
Should we eliminate "legislative courts" (established
under Congress' Article I powers)? For that matter, is it
time to ask the courts to pull back from their own involvement in legislation and administration?
It is too glib for courts to tell Congress that if it disagrees with what the president and the agencies are doing,
it should act through the regular legislative process. The
. regular process is subject to a president's veto, creating
the need for a two-thirds majority in each house to override the president. Without the legislative veto, Congress
is placed in the dilemma of delegating authority by a majority vote and then needing a two-thirds majority to
recapture control. That is why both branches agreed on
the legislative veto for reorganization authority.
The legislative -veto in the War Powers Resolution of
1973 was meant to extricate Congress from the situation it
found itself in under President Nixon: able to attract a
majority vote in each house to deny funding for the Vietnanl war, but unable to secure a two-thirds vote when
Nixon vetoed these restrictions. Critics of the legislative
veto have not addressed this problem.
Nor is it enough to advise Congress that legislative
vetoes would be unnecessary if it would only delegate with
precise standards and clear policy.
Congress has no doubt used the legislative veto to side- ·
, step difficult questions of national policy; it can be a convenient and irresponsible substitute for making legislative
· decisions. But the veto allows Congress to review specific
proposals undet circumstances that no one could foresee
when the authority was first delegated.
For many issues facing government today, the legislative veto is practical, appropriate and constitutional.
Striking it down is not a step to be ta~~n lightly.
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On Its Veto Power
1f the Supreme Court blocks its use, the
_presldent is likely to be the one fu,trt.
fly Louis Fisher
E ARE WITNESSING an ironic turn in the historic struggle between
the executive branch and Congress: a court decision which seemingly
promises much greater power for the executive but which, if upheld, would
likely lead to the opposite effect.
The Jan. 29 ruling, by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals here,
gave a rude jolt to the "legislative veto," a device Congress has relied on for at
least a half century to control executive actions.
. ·· Specifically, the panel struck down a one-house veto used to disapprove a
gas-pricing regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
_But its language was so broad as to question the constitutionality of legislative
·vetoes in hundreds of other laws governing arms sales, immigration, war
powers, impoundment, endless agency regulations and much else.
. The D.C. panel recognized that its finding - that all legislative acts consti7tutionally require "presentation to the president and passage by both houses
:of Congress" - "may have far-reaching effects on the operation of the na.tional government." But it may have misunderstood those effects.
: Many assume the ruling portends a gain for the executive branch, a victory
for orderly government, a blow to congressional interference. Think again. If
· the Supreme Court upholds the overly broad opinion, the net result will more
.likely be less power for executive officials, a more convoluted legislative process, and continued congressional involvement in administrative decisions.
, Bizarre consequences? Not if you understand why the legislative veto was
originally adopted. Presidents accepted (indeed, often invited) legislative
.vetoes because they provided a way to get more power. The bargain was clearly
understood by both branches. The president essentiallv told Congress: "Give
'me more authority than you normally would, and I'll gi~e you a chance to veto
my initiatives." If presidents disliked the legislative veto, Congress would with'hold authority.
.
.• Courts are familiar with this quid pro quo. In i977 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a suit by a federal employe who protested that the Senate acted uncon'stitutionally when it disapproved a pay raise recommended by the president.
But the legislative history convinced the court that Congress delegated the salrary authority only on the condition that it could, by a one-house veto, disap'prove presidential recommendations. The authority and the condition were in_separable.
·
The FERC case was different. Here the court decided that the grant of rule'ffiaking authority was not tied explicitly to the one-house veto. But that is the
exception, not the rule.

W

The record shows, for example, that the president could not tell Congress:
"Thanks very much for the authority to reorganize the executi\·e branch, but I
have no intention of recognizing your right to veto my plans." Executive reor_ganization power and the legislative veto could not be severed.
: Other examples abound. Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the
president may defer spending unless one house of Congress disapproves. The
president is not at liberty to take the authority and ignore the condition. If the
legislative veto is unconstitutional, the president '"ill forfeit the statutory authority to defer spending.
See CONGRESS, Page D5
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 80-2170, 80-2171

AND

80-1832

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PETITIONER
80-2170
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ET AL.
UNITED STATES SENATE, PETITIONER
80-2171
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ETAL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
APPELLANT
80-1832
v.
JAGDISH RAI CHADHA ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March-, 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No.
80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality
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of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
I
Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds
a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United
States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported
for having "remained in the United States for a longer time
than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to§ 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U. S. C. § 1254(b), a deportation hearing was held before an immigration judge on
January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable
for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation
under § 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). Section
244(a)(1) provides:
"(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation
and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and(1) is deportable under any law of the United States
except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and
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is a person of good moral character; and is a person
whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." 1
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of
deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results
of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the immigration judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The immigration judge found that
Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided
continuously in the United States for over seven years, was
of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(l),
the immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a
report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides:
"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection
(a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this
subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the
facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be
reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first
'Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department
of Justice. Ibid.
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day of each calendar month in which Congress is in
session."
Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under §244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S. C.
§ 1254(c)(2), to veto 2 the Attorney General's determination
that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2)
provides:
"In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsectionif during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or
authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall
pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel
deportation proceedings."
The June 25, 1974 order of the immigration judge suspendIn constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's
power under Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary
1403 (5th ed. 1979). It appears, however, that Congressional devices of
the type authorized by § 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as
a "veto." See, e. g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Miller and
Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L.J. 367 (1977). We refer to the Congressional "resolution"
authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's
decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States.
2
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ing Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid
order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the
record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority reserved to it under § 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th
Congress. This was the final session in which Congress,
pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. The
session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Gong. Rec. 42014,
42277 (1975). Absent Congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled after this
date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d).
On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman
of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the
granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six]
aliens", including Chadha. H. R. Res. 926, 94th Gong., 1st
Sess.; 121 Gong Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further
consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and
submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121
Gong. Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and
was not made available to other Members of the House prior
to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record
before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution
was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the
floor that
"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing
340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution
[Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it
is the opinion of the committee that their deportation
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should not be suspended." Ibid.
The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. 3
Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Article I legislative act; it was
not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for
his action.
Mter the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to
It is not at all clear whether the House generally, or Subcommittee
Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood the relationship between H. R. Res. 926 and the Attorney General's decision to suspend
Chadha's deportation. Exactly one year previous to the House veto of the
Attorney General's decision in this case, Representative Eilberg introduced a similar resolution disapproving the Attorney General's suspension
of deportation in the case of six other aliens. H. R. Res. 1518, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. The following colloquy occurred on the floor of the House:
"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, is this
procedure to expedite the ongoing operations of the Department of Justice,
as far as these people are concerned. Is it in any way contrary to whatever action the Attorney General has taken on the question of deportation;
does the gentleman know?
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the answer is no to the gentleman's final
question. These aliens have been found to be deportable and the Special
Inquiry Officer's decision denying suspension of deportation has been reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. We are complying with the
law since all of these decisions have been referred to us for approval or disapproval, and there are hundreds of cases in this category. In these six
cases however, we believe it would be grossly improper to allow these people to acquire the status of permanent resident aliens.
Mr. WYLIE. In other words, the gentleman has been working with the
Attorney General's office?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Mr. WYLIE. This bill then is in fact a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to do?
Mr. EILBERG. The gentleman is correct insofar as it relates to the
determination of deportability which has been made by the Department of
Justice in these cases:
Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection."
120 Cong. Rec. 41412 (1974).
Clearly, this was an obfuscation of the effect of a veto under § 244(c)(2).
Such a veto in no way constitutes "a confirmation of what the Attorney
3
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allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to
terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The immigration judge held that he had no
authority to rule on the constitutional validity of § 244(c)(2).
On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals again contending that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was
dismissed. App. 55-56.
Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a),
Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with
Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him
in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light of the
importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both
the Senate and the House of Representatives to file briefs
amici curiae.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals
held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to
deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the
House of Representatives." Chadha v. INS, 634 F. 2d 408,
436 (CA9 1980). The essence of its holding was that
§ 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
General intends to do." To the contrary, such a resolution was meant to
overrule and set aside, or "veto," the Attorney General's determination
that, in a particular case, cancellation of deportation would be appropriate
under the standards set forth in § 244(a)(1).
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postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in
No. 80-1832, 4 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm.
II
Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we
first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court
to resolve the issue raised.
A
Severability
Both Houses of Congress 5 contend that the provision for
'The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S. Res. 40
and H. R. Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981,
filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore
proper "parties" within the meaning of that term in 28 U. S. C. § 1254(a).
See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977).
Whether the Service's appeal in No. 80-1832 is properly before the
Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 is a difficult question. The Congressional
parties argue that because the Service seeks the invalidation of§ 244(c)(2)
and the Court of Appeals granted that relief, the Service lacks standing to
appeal that ruling. We are directed to our statement that "[a] party who
receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment
affording the relief and cannot appeal from it." Deposit Guaranty N ational Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 333 (1980). The Solicitor General
counters that the Service's presentation to the Court of Appeals of the Executive's view on the constitutional issue did not change the fact that the
decision of the Court of Appeals effectively set aside the immigration
judge's order of deportation. The Service is therefore "aggrieved" insofar
as it is prohibited from taking action it would otherwise take.
Rather than undertake to resolve this "tangled" question, we dismiss the
appeal in No. 80-1832. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 557 n. 3
(1967). In light of the fact that certiorari has been granted in Nos.
80-2170 and 80-2171, our decision to dismiss the Service's appeal in no way
affects our consideration of the issues presented by this case.
5
Nine Members of the House of Representatives have filed a brief amicus curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in
this case.
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the one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from
§ 244. Congress argues that if the provision for the oneHouse veto is held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must fall. If
§ 244 in its entirety is violative of the Constitution, it follows
that the Attorney General has no authority ·to suspend
Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) and Chadha would be
deported. From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the one-House
veto provision because he could receive no relief even if his
constitutional challenge proves successful. 6
Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed" '[u]nless it is evident that
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is
not."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 (1976), quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U. S.
210, 234 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on
that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. 1101, which provides:
"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." (Emphasis added.)
This language is unambiguous; it compels the conclusion that
Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a whole or
of any part of the Act to depend upon whether the veto clause
of§ 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto provision in
§ 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of the Act as that
language is used in the severability clause. Congress clearly
6
In this case we deem it appropriate to address questions of severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108-109 (1976); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585 (1968).
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intended "the remainder of the Act" to stand if "any particu- .
lar provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have
more plainly authorized the conclusion that the provision for
a one-House veto in § 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act of which it is a part. See Electric
Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419, 434 (1938).
The conclusion as to the severability of the one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) is further supported by the legislative
history of § 244. That section and its precursors supplanted
the long established pattern of dealing with deportations like
Chadha's on a case-by-case basis through private bills. The
history of private bills relating to deportations, and Congress' disenchantment with such legislation, are relevant to
the inquiry into whether Congress intended the veto provision to be severable.
The Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, § 14, 43
Stat. 153, 162, required the Secretary of Labor to deport any
alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could lawfully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented
to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I,
§ 7 of the Constitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced
by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant
permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:
"It was my original thought that the way to handle all
these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am
absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in
this House that it is impossible to deal with the situation
through special bills. We had a demonstration of that
fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before the
House. The House consumed 5 112 hours considering
four bills and made no disposition of any of these bills."
81 Cong. Rec. 5542 (1937).
Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574, but
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did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong. Rec.
8992-8996 (1938).
Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend
the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act
of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that
an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's
decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.
In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the
Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both
Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, ch.
783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent
resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as
private bills. Just four years later, the House Judiciary
Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2),
stated in a report:
"In the light of experience of the last several months, the
committee came to the conclusion that the requirements
of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in
many thousands of individual cases which are submitted
by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and
places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot
assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution
mechanism] are of purely administrative nature and
they seriously interfere with the legislative work of the
Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, interfere
with the legislative work of the House." H. R. Rep.
No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949). (Emphasis
added.)
The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the
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Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was
incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). Congress' desire
to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation
but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with
the burden of private immigration bills.
A provision is presumed severable if what remains after
severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 286 U. S., at 234.
There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and
workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House
veto, the administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation
under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this
delegated authority is preserved since all such suspensions
will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(1). Absent
the passage of a bill to the contrary, 7 deportation proceedings will be cancelled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2)
has expired. 8 Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.
'Without the provision for one-House veto, Congress would presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in§ 244(c)(2), to enact a law,
in accordance with the requirements of Article I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation. See, however, Attorney General
Jackson's attack on H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a bill torequire the Attorney General to deport an individual alien. The Attorney
General called the bill "an historical departure from an unbroken American
practice and tradition. It would be the first time that an act of Congress
singled out a named individual for deportation." S. Rep. No. 2031, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940) (reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18, 1940).
8
Without the Congressional veto, § 244 resembles the "report and wait"
provision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U. S. 1 (1941).
The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly promulgated
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not take effect until they shall have
been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a
regular session thereof and until after the close of such session." Act of
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B

Standing
We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks
standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance
the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation of powers dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's private interests. That overlooks the fact that Chadha has
demonstrated "injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that
the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the
claimed injury .... " Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 79 (1978). If the veto
provision violates the Constitution, and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will be cancelled. Chadha
therefore has standing to challenge the order deporting him.

c
Alternative Relief
It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the
constitutional question presented by this case because
Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him. It
is argued that since Chadha married a United States citizen
on August 10, 1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief
may be open under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8
U. S. C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, 1255. It is true that Chadha may
be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and,
as such, could lawfully be accorded permanent residence.
Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of the
June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute did not provide that
Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and
to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to
stay, and ultimately to revise the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare
Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973), with Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
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Court of Appeals in this case, Congress enacted the Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96--212, 94 Stat. 102, under which
the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then
permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to
his country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race."
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a
prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in this case. See Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention
we would most assuredly seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim advanced. But at most these other avenues of
relief are speculative, whereas if Chadha is successful in his
present challenge he will not be deported and will automatically become eligible to apply for citizenship. 9 A person
threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to
challenge the constitutional validity of the process which led
to his status merely on the basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of relief.

D
Jurisdiction
It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a). That
section provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation ... made against
aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative
Depending on how the Service interprets its statutory duty under
§ 244 apart from the challenged portion of§ 244(c)(2), Chadha's status may
be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent resident as of December
19, 1975-the last session in which Congress could have attempted to stop
the suspension of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of
deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's five-year
waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1427(a), would have elapsed.
9
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proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act." Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) takes
place outside the administrative proceedings conducted
under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant contained in
§ 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional
challenge.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 216 (1968),
this Court held that "§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under
§ 242(b), including those determinations made incident to a
motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one
court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar
to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). 10 However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
this case that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent,
rather than only those determinations actually made at the
hearing." 634 F. 2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation
stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final
order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Theoretically, the Attorney General could have announced that
the House action was a nullity and that his action was controlling; he appropriately let the controversey take its course
through the courts.
10
Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a)
would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue
could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b). Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In
Dastmalchi , Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that required them to report to
the District Director of the Service during the Iranian hostage crisis. The
aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding.
The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation would have
been cancelled but for § 242(c)(2).
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This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not
bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation
had been entered, the affected alien requested the Service to
stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under
§ 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals
lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did
not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought]
relief not inconsistent with it."' 392 U. S. at 213, quoting
Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in
contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself
and the relief he seeks-cancellation of deportation-is
plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under§ 106(a) to
decide this case.
E
Case or Controversey
It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy
but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, 297 U. S., at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass.
This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the Service
take the same position on the constitutionality of the oneHouse veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the
courts because the Attorney General of the United States
agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government,
as a nominal defendant charged with enforcing the statute,
agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, supra, 392
U. S., at 210 n. 9 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S.
303 (1946). Here, Congress' appearance as amicus in the
Court of Appeals assured the desired adverseness. Con-
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gress was later allowed to intervene as a party. See note 4,
supra.
F
Political Question
It is also argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause, U. S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress'
Article I power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization", combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of
aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 is not open to question but what is challenged
here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power.
It requires no recitation of the considerations underlying
the political question doctrine to demonstrate that the Constitution does not empower either Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert, to decide the constitutionality
of § 244(c)(2). 11
11
The suggestion is made that § 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from
constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was passed
by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that question. The assent of the Executive to
a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not
shield it from judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740,
n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 841 n. 12
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52 (1926). In any event, eleven Presidents, from Mr. Wilson
through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this issue have gone
on record at some point to challenge Congressional vetoes as unconstitutional. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735, 737-738 n. 7 (1979) (collecting citations to presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression on the
constitutionality of the Congressional veto is found in Attorney General
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It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be
termed a "political case." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217
(1962). But the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging
the constitutional authority of one of the three branches cannot be evaded by courts beause the issues have political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a "political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to
have been duly signed by the President but not delivered.
"The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra, 369
U.S. at 217.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether "a bill signed by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the
President of the Senate, presented to and approved by the
President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to
the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, does
not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact
been passed by Congress." ld., at 669. The Court stated:
"We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from
the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full
effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the
enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the auWilliam D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933 to President Hoover. 37
Op. Atty. Gen. 56. (1933). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are objectionable on
constitutional grounds. For example, after President Roosevelt signed
the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Attorney General Jackson released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the provision allowing the
Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution was unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
1353 (1953).
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thority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On
the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged,
in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled
bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast
magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the
public archives, as an act of Congress, ... did not become law." !d., at 670 (emphasis in original).
G
The parties are properly before us and the difficult and
sensitive issues have been fully briefed and twice argued in
this Court. The Court's duty in this case, as Chief Justice
Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821), is clear:
"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but
we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our
best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty."

III
A
We turn now to the question whether action of one House
of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that
the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the
Constitution, it must be sustained:
"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes
to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor
are we vested with the power of veto." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978).

By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
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government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the
fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
executive and independent agencies:
"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted
into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have
been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49,
nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes;
and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970
through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk,
The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52
Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977).
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress
and of the Executive in the legislative process. Art. I of the
Constitution provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1.
(Emphasis added).
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
... " Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added).

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
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be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added).
The purposes underlying the Presentation Clauses, Art. I,
§ 7, cls. 2, 3, and the bicameral requirment of Art. I, § 1 and
§ 7, cl. 2, guide our resolution of the important question
presented.
B
The Presentation Clauses
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that
the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the
Framers. 12 Presentation to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen
took special pains to assure that these requirements could not
be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl.
12
The widespread approval of the delegates was commented on by J oseph Story:
"In the convention there does not seem to have been much div.ersity of
opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to the president a negative
on the laws. The principal points of discussion seem to have been,
whether the negative should be absolute, or qualified; and if the latter, by
what number of each house the bill should subsequently be passed, in order
to become a law; and whether the negative should in either case be exclusively vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other department of government." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 611 (1858). See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 21, 97-104, 138-140; id., at 73-80, 181, 298,
301-305.
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2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be
evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a
"resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." 2 M. Farrand,
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 301-302. As
a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, ante, at 21, was added. I d.,
at 304-305.
The decision to provide the President with a limited and
qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the
powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most
carefully circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking
was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.
In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), Hamilton focused on the President's role in making laws:
"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the
legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive,
the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would
of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left
to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." I d., at
457-458.

See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 614-615 (1858).
The President's role in the law making process also reflects
the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role
in the legislative process was described later during public
debate on ratification:
"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative
body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influ-
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ence a majority of that body. . . . The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the
Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at
458 (A. Hamilton).
See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 123 (1926). The Court
also has observed that the Presentation Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is
grafted on the legislative process:
"The President is a representative of the people just as
the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it
may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of
the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not
countrywide .... " Myers v. United States, supra, 272
U. S. at, 123.
B
Bicameralism
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7 was of scarcely
less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto
and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of
the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the
Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentation Clauses, that legislation
should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully
considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court,
commented:
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"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes.
Sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military,
one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative au- thority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it
within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In
a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one,
of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1
M. Farrand, supra, at 254.
Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single
House was antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for
only one legislative organ, he warned:
"we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the
most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus
entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms
of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which
the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22,
supra, at 135.
This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the
fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph
Story:
"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally
under the dominion of strong passions and excitements;
impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the
firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough
under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings
and relations to society." J. Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 383-384 (1858).
These observations are consistent with what many of the
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Framers expressed, none more cogently than Hamilton in
pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to
protect liberty:
"In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches;
and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connected with
each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on the society will admit."
The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 324.
See also The Federalist No. 62.
However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their
fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of
public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not
of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states.
Those states feared a commonality of interest among the
larger states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical
of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the
people. See 1 M. Farrand, supra, 176--177, 484-491. It
need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise,
under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the
large and small states. 13
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious
that the bicameral requirement and the Presentation Clauses
would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect
the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the
The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers
that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered,
even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states
affected. See U. S. Const. Art V.
13
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whole people from improvident laws. The division of the
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full
study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two
thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby
precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See 1 M.
Farrand, supra, at 99-104. In sum, the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure. When there is Congressional
action closely paralleling the exercise of legislative power,
and such action affects important rights as here, it is subject
to critical scrutiny.
IV
Two preliminary observations guide our identification of
the nature of the House action revoking the suspension of
Chadha's deportation. First, the operative effect of what
the House did was to reverse the determination of the immigration judge and the reviewing tribunal of the Immigration
Service-and, by extension, of the Attorney General. On
the surface it might appear that the House was exercising a
kind of quasi-judicial review of a quasi-judicial determination
of the Executive Branch. But it can hardly be thought that
the House was acting in a judicial role, for the Constitution
vests no judicial powers in the House, although it does so as
to the Senate albeit in a narrow sense with respect to
impeachments.
Second, the House action might be seen as executive or administrative in nature. But we scan Article I in vain for any
indications of administrative authority in the House except
with respect to administering its own affairs. The power to
administer the laws passed by Congress is vested in the Executive subject, of course, to legislative oversight.

80-2170, 80-2171 & 80-1832-0PINION
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. INS

27

Legislative action is the third broad classification of federal
power. Within this classification, it is beyond doubt that
Congress has the power to enact, modify or repeal statutory
programs whose execution is delegated to the Executive.
The core issue in this case, however, is how Congress must
go about it.
Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)(2), either of
them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, 14 had determined the alien should remain in the United
Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in this case will
sanction "lawmaking by the Attorney General[.] . . . Why is the Attorney
General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full
bicameral process?" Brief of the United States House of Representatives
40. To be sure, some administrative agency action-rule making, for example-may resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), which defines an agency's "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.... " This Court has referred to
agency activity as being "quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935). Clearly, however, "[i]n
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co . v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 42.4 U. S. 1, 123 (1976). When the Attorney General
performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative"
power. The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot
reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney
General's execution of the authority delegated to him by§ 244 involves only
a question of delegation doctrine. The courts can always "ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States,
321 U. S. 414, 425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585
(1952); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F . 2d 1, 68 (CADC) (en bane) (separate
statement of Leventhal, J .), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe,
14
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States. Without the challenged provision in § 244(c)(2), this
could have been achieved, if at all, only by legislation requiring deportation. 15 Similarly, a veto by one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an attempt at
amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(l), or
as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I. 16
After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming
private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to
delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable alie~s to
remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It
is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadhano less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only
one way; bicameral passage and presentation to the President. Congress must abide by its delegations until it legislaJudicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965). Congress' authority
to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no
support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto.
15
We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any
constitutional provision. See note 7, supra.
16
During the Convention of 1787, the application of the President's veto
to repeals of statutes was addressed and the Framers were apparantly content with Madison's comment that "[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was
probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting
the duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal." 2 Farrand,
supra, at 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569,
587-599 (1953). There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or
amend laws by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. I.
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tively alters or revokes them. 17
The constitutional validity of this veto by one House is further undermined by the fact that when the Framers intended
to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action in
the Constitution. There are but four provisions in the Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House may
act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to
the President's veto:
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the
power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 6;
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials
following impeachment on charges inititated by the House
and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5;
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power
to approve or to disapprove presidential appointments. Art.
II, § 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, ·cl. 2.
Clearly, when the Convention sought to confer special
powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of
the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. 18
17
This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to "the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits and Klein,
Congresional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls
administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of
control, such as durationallimits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id., at
460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto", 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667 (1980). See also note
8, supra.
18
An exception from the Presentation Clauses was ratified in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment
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These carefully defined variations from presentment and
bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative functions of Congress and other unilateral but important
and binding Congressional acts. These exceptions are explicit, narrow, and separately justified by the Framers.
None of the exceptions authorize the type of action challenged here. On the contrary, these exceptions provide further support for the conclusion that Congressional authority
is not to be implied and for the holding that the veto provided
for in§ 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design
of the powers of the Legislative Branch.
We conclude that the action by the House under§ 244(c)(2)
which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority. See U. S. Const. Art. V.
One might also include another "exception" to the rule that Congressional action having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentation Clauses. Each House has the power to act
alone in determining specified internal matters. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3, and
§ 5, cl. 2. However, this "exception" only empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely
circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated
instances.
Although the bicameral check was not provided for in any of these provisions for independent Congressional action, precautionary alternative
checks are evident. For example, Art. II., § 2 requires that two-thirds of
the Senators present concur in the Senate's consent to a treaty, rather than
the simple majority required for passage of legislation. See The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay); The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton); The Federalist
No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the Framers adopted an alternative protection, in the stead of Presidential veto and bicameralism, by requiring
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present for a conviction of
impeachment. Art. I, § 3. We also note that the Court's holding in
Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command
the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second, three-fourths of the states
must ratify any amendment.
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was not within any of the express constitutional exceptions
authorizing one House to act alone, but was an exercise of
legislative power; as such it was subject to the standards prescribed in Article I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentation Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power
to override a veto were intended to erect enduring checks for
each Branch on the other and to protect the people from the
improvident exercise of power by either Branch. To preserve those checks, and the separation of powers, the carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be
eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one
House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity
with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentation to the President.
The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in
many respects a convenient shortcut. Congress' "sharing"
of its responsibility over aliens with the Executive in this
manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely
practical terms, it is obviously easier and simpler for an action to be taken unicamerally and without submission to the
President. But the Framers ranked other values higher
than efficiency; the records of the debates in the Convention
of 1787, and the debates preceding ratification by the states,
make crystal clear the common desire to curb the exercise of
federal power affecting the states or the people-to make
legislative action a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention no doubt impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made
by men who had lived under other forms of government that
permitted arbitrary acts of government to go unchecked.
We find no support in the Constitution or decisions of this
Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and de-

80-2170, 80-2171 & 80-1832-0PINION
32

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. INS

lays often encountered in complying with explicit
Consititutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious
flaws of delay, untidiness, and the potentials for abuse, we
have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by
making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted
restraints spelled out in the Constitution.

v

We hold that the Congressional veto provision in§ 244(c)(2)
is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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Re: Nos.
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80-2170, u.s. House of Representatives v. INS
~

~

The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court is
broadly.

w~~ ~

It relies on Presentation Clause and Bicameralism grounds

to invalidate virtually every legislative veto.

The opinion did not

need to rely on this broad rationale to decide this case, but the
result may be inevitable.

Even if this case were decided on a

narrow separation of powers ground, there are at least two CADC
appeals being held that will compel the Court to consider the
Presentation Clause/ Bicameralism question.

Both cases (the opinion

Mark worked on for Judge Wilkey and an en bane CADC opinion
invalidating an FTC rule)

involve the validity of a legislative veto

applied to agency rulemaking.

Although the breadth of the Chief's

opinion gives one pause, I am not sure that there is any reason to
put off the reaching this question until next term.
I am more ....-----=-r-concerned, however, by
.. the opinion's treatment
of the merits.
general outline.

(pp. 26-31).

I am not troubled by the opinion's

It seems that if one is going to hold the

legislative veto unconstitutional on Presentation Clause grounds,
the opinion generally follows the correct approach.

My difficulty

with the reasoning is that it seems to be skimming the surface on
~

2.
many issues.

For example, it seems to me that the majority deals

rather cursorily with the question of whether Congress' exercise of
~

the veto is a "legislative function" that must follow the strict
requirements of the Presentation Clause.

(pp. 26-27).

The

reasoning appears to be that because Congress is authorized only to
take legislative action, any action it takes must be legislative.
The unstated premise is that if the Congress were acting outside of
its legislative capacity such action would violate the
constitutional principles of

~aration - of -po;~

I would find the

opinion more persuasive if it explained the premises on which it is
~~~~~~~'I
based.
The lower courts (primarily the CADC and the Court of
Claims) have considered this issue more fullv than the Chief's
opinion and have addressed some of the more difficult points, such
as the argument that Congress can make its veto a condition
precedent to the agency action.

I realize that the Court does not

have to address every conceivable issue.

But it seems that when an

opinion holds unconstitutional a practice that a coordinate branch
of Government considers crucial to its functioning the Court should
provide a persuasive opinion.

Mark's opinion last year, for

example, seems to me to present a much better reasoned treatment of
this same issue.
If you agree that this is a significant flaw, I am not
sure how it can be remedied.

One alternative is to write a

--

concurrence on separation of powers grounds.
'-----.........__-.

While this is the most

attractive option, I question whether it serves any purpose to go
off on this rationale.

The Presentation Clause question has to be

3.

faced at some point, and relying on separation of powers only would
delay the inevitable.

On the other hand, concurring on Presentation

Clause grounds might not be helpful since the Chief's opinion does
not adopt the wrong tack.

The only purpose of such a concurrence

would be to explain what the Chief left unexplained.

I do not know,

however, whether it would be particularly politic to discuss in
detail what the Chief has left unanswered.

Moreover, I am not sure

that the Chief's treatment of the merits will have a bad
precedential effect.

While the practical effect is extensive, the

v/iegal issue presented is fairly narrow.
My initial suggestion is that you wait to see what Justice
White and Justice Rehnquist write.

I am not sure, from what I

understand of Justice White's proposed rationale, that it offers a
satisfactory answer to this question.

I hope that as Justice White

identifies weaknesses in the majority opinion that it will become
more cogent.

/

")1.bf-lj£r~~

If you are inclined to join, I would note some problems
that I find troubling with the opinion as it currently is written:

1.

Footnote 3 (p. 6) seems an unnecessary slap at Representative

Eilberg.

I would hestitate to say that he intended to "obfuscate"

the effect of the veto.

2.

The severability discussion does not seem persuasive.

It relies

heavily on the plain meaning of the severability clause, but I had
understood the Court previously to say that the presence of a
severability clause was not

dispositive~

instead, such a claim

4.
created a presumption that could be rebutted by clear evidence to
the contrary.

In this case, Congress has a strong argument that it

would not grant the Attorney General the power to suspend
deportations unless it retained a veto power.

The opinion, however,

does not discuss this aspect of the legislative history.
I would think that the stronger line of argument would be
to say that the severability clause creates a presumption that is
not rebutted in this case.

There is both the legislative history

noted above and legislative history showing that Congress delegated
this power to the Attorney General to rid itself of the
administrative inconvenience of passing private bills.

Because the

legislative history fairly can he described as balanced, it is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption created by the severability
clause.

3.

I am troubled by footnote 7 and the accompanying analysis in the

text.

The opinion reasons that if the section providing for the

legislative veto is severed, the provision remains "fully operative
as a law."

In support of this conclusion, it notes that Congress

still may deport an alien by passing a bill through normal
legislative channels.

Although the Court later states in fn. 15 (p.

28) that it does not pass on any constitutional ramifications that
such action might have, I would prefer to avoid giving any sort of
implicit approval to such a practice.
separation of powers problem.

It raises a substantial

At the least, as Attorney General

Jackson stated in 1940, such an action would be "an historical
departure from an unbroken American practice and tradition."

It

50

seems that the opinion could make its point that the provision would
be fully operative without discussing the issue raised in fn. 7.

4.

On page 17, the opinion states that "It requires no recitation
~

of the considerations underlying the political question doctrine to
demonstrate that the Constitution does not empower either Congress
or the Executive, or both acting in concert, to decide the
constitutionality of §244 (c) (2)."

I be may splitting hairs, but it

seems that the Constitution entrusted and expected the Congress to
consider the constitutionality of its acts.

Even if this Court has

the final word in determining what the Constitution means, it would
seem that Congress and the President certainly are empowered to make
their own

judgment. ~

-~

.J.o

I have a feeling that the Chief did not mean to make this
broad a statement.

In a politically sensitive opinion, however, it

would seem preferable not to make broad statements that could be
misconstrued.

5.

The opinion deals with the

broad fashion.

~olitical

\,;1

question doctrine in a

I do not think that this argument has merit in this

case, but the court's opinion could be read to say that any case or
controversy presenting a constitutional question is by definition
not a political question.

6.

(pp. 17-18).

The cite to Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), on pp. 18-19 is

questionable support for the point the opinion is making.

As I read

the portion of Field from which the quote comes, the question was

6.

whether Congress' statement that a bill had been enacted properly
was conclusive evidence of that issue.

The petrs in that case

sought to present evidence showing that too few people had voted on
the bill.

The Court held, however, that it would respect Congress'

determination that the bill had been passed properly.

The first Mr.

Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated:
"The respect due to coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated: leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the
act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution." Id., at 672.
The holding in Field is not necessarily inconsistent with the
Chief's point, but Field ordinarily might not be thought to provide
support for it.

6.

The opinion states on page 26 that "When there is Congressional

action closely paralleling the exercise of legislative power, and
such action affects important rights as here, it is subject to

___________..

critical scrutiny."

I assume that this standard derives from the

preceeding discussion of the historical basis for the Presentation
Clause and Bicameralism.

It is not clear to me, however, why the
------~-----------~--~

important purposes these clauses serve require that the Court apply
"critical scrutiny."

It could be argued that strict scrutiny (if

~

~ that's what critical scrutiny is) is normally reserved for suspect

_____.

classes who lack access to political channels.

But there is no

indication that there is any problem with political access in this
case.

The unexplained decision to apply "critical scrutiny" assumes

away all the difficult issues.

7.

Second, it is not clear what "important rights" are or why
the opinion refers to them.

Certainly, the opinion cannot mean that

Congress may take clear legislative action without complying with
the Presentation Clause so long as it does not address important
rights.

7.

I am unclear why the Court draws this distinction.

Finally, the opinon notes on p. 29, that when the constitution

meant to commit an action to one House it said so explicitly.

My

only problem with this point is that it speaks of giving
"unreviewable" power to each House.

I assume that the opinion means

unreviewable in the sense that the action does not have to be
submitted to the President.

The word also could be read, however,

to say that these actions were not reviewable by the judicial
branch.

The reference is not necessary to the opinion and it would

clear up any potential confusion if it were taken out.
My bottom line recommendation is to wait to see how the
dissent affects the majority's decision.

If you feel that a

separate concurrence is called for, I would recommend writing on the
separation of powers ground.

I am not sure that this approach will

answer all the questions that inevitably will arise.

At the least,

it would have the virtue of not holding every legislative veto
unconstitutional .
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Dear Chief:
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Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1832

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
APPELLANT v. JAGDISH RAJ CHADHA ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.
A severability clause creates a presumption that Congress
intended the valid portion of the statute to remain in force
when one part is found to be invalid. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U. S. 238, 312 (1936); Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Comm'n, 286 U. S. 210, 235 (1932). A severability clause does not, however, conclusively resolve the
issue. "[T]he determination, in the end, is reached by" asking "[w]hat was the intent of the lawmakers," Carter, supra,
at 312, and "will rarely turn on the presence or absence of
such a clause." United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570,
585, n. 27 (1968). Because I believe that Congress did not
intend the one-House veto provision of§ 244(c)(2) to be severable, I dissent.
Section 244(c)(2) is an exception to the general rule that an
alien's deportation shall be suspended when the Attorney
General finds that statutory criteria are met. It is severable
only if Congress would have intended to permit the Attorney
General to suspend deportations without it. This Court has
held several times over the years that exceptions such as this
are not severable because
"by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature
. . . the statute is made to enact what confessedly the
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legislature never meant. It confers upon the statute a
positive operation beyond the legislative intent, and beyond what anyone can say it would have enacted in view
of the illegality of the exceptions." Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 95 (1886).
By severing § 244(c)(2), the Court permits suspension of
deportation in a class of cases where Congress never stated
that suspension was appropriate. I do not believe we should
expand the statute in this way without some clear indication
that Congress intended such an expansion. As the Court
said in Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 484--485 (1922):
"Where an excepting provision in a statute is found unconstitutional, courts very generally hold that this does
not work an enlargement of the scope or operation of
other provisions with which that provision was enacted
and which was intended to qualify or restrain. The reasoning on which the decisions proceed is illustrated in
State Ex Rel. McNeal v. Dombaugh, 20 Ohio St. 167,
174. In dealing with a contention that a statute containing an unconstitutional provision should be construed as
if the remainder stood alone, the court there said: 'This
would be to mutilate the section and garble its meaning.
The legislative intention must not be confounded with
their power to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and vitality to a provision of law is one
thing, and to refuse to read it is a very different thing.
It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional provision of a statute is 'stricken out.' For
all the purposes of construction it is to be regarded as
part of the act. The meaning of the legislature must be
gathered from all that they have said, as well from that
which is ineffectual for want of power, as from that
which is authorized by law.'
Here the excepting provision was in the statute when
it was enacted, and there can be no doubt that the legis-
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lature intended that the meaning of the other provisions
should be taken as restricted accordingly. Only with
that restricted meaning did they receive the legislative
sanction which was essential to make them part of the
statute law of the State; and no other authority is competent to give them a larger application."
See also Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U. S. 515, 525
(1929).
The Court finds that the legislative history of § 244 shows
that Congress intended § 244(c)(2) to be severable because
Congress wanted to relieve itself of the burden of private
bills. But the history elucidated by the Court shows that
Congress was unwilling to give the Executive Branch permission to suspend deportation on its own. Over the years,
Congress consistently rejected requests from the Executive
for complete discretion in this area. Congress always insisted on retaining ultimate control, whether by concurrent
resolution, as in the 1948 Act, or by one-House veto, as in the
present Act. Congress has never indicated that it would be
willing to permit suspensions of deportation unless it could
retain some sort of veto.
It is doubtless true that Congress has the power to provide
for suspensions of deportation without a one-House veto.
But the Court has failed to identify any evidence that Congress intended to exercise that power. On the contrary,
Congress' continued insistence on retaining control of the
suspension process indicates that it has never been disposed
to give the Executive Branch a free hand. By severing
§ 244(c)(2) the Court has "confounded" Congress' "intention"
to permit suspensions of deportation "with their power to
carry that intention into effect." Davis, supra, at 484, quoting Dombaugh, supra, at 174.
Because I do not believe that § 244(c)(2) is severable, I
would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170

AND

80-2171

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
APPELLANT
80-1832
v.
JAGDISH RAI CHADHA ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PETITIONER
80-2170
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ET AL.
UNITED STATES SENATE, PETITIONER
80-2171
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ETAL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No.
80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality
of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nation-
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ality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
I

Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds
a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United
States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported
for having "remained in the United States for a longer time
than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U. S. C. § 1254(b), a deportation hearing was held before an immigration judge on
January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable
for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation
under§ 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). Section
244(a)(1) provides:
"(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation
and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and(1) is deportable under any law of the United States
except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and
is a person of good moral character; and is a person
whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
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General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." 1
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of
deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results
of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the immigration judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The immigration judge found that
Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided
continuously in the United States for over seven years, was
of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to § 244(c)(l) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(1),
the immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a
report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(1) provides:
"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection
(a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this
subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the
facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be
reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first
day of each calendar month in which Congress is in
session."
1
Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department
of Justice. Ibid.

80-1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171-0PINION
4

INS v. CHADHA

Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under § 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1254(c)(2), to veto 2 the Attorney General's determination
that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2)
provides:
"In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsectionif during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or
authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall
pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel
deportation proceedings."
The June 25, 1974 order of the immigration judge suspending Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid
order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the
record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority re2
In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's
power under Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary
1403 (5th ed. 1979). It appears, however, that Congressional devices of
the type authorized by§ 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as
a "veto." See, e. g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Miller and
Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L.J. 367 (1977). We refer to the Congressional "resolution"
authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's
decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States.

'.
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served to it under § 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th
Congress. This was the final session in which Congress,
pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. The
session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Cong. Rec. 42014,
42277 (1975). Absent Congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled after this
date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d).
On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman
of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the
granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six]
aliens", including Chadha. H. R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess.; 121 Cong Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further
consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and
submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121
Cong. Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and
was not made available to other Members of the House prior
to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record
before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution
was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the
floor that
"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing
340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution
[Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it
is the opinion of the committee that their deportation
should not be suspended." Ibid.
The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. 3
' It is not at all clear whether the House generally, or Subcommittee
Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood the relationship be-
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Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Article I legislative act; it was
not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for
his action.
After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to
allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the immigratween H. R. Res. 926 and the Attorney General's decision to suspend
Chadha's deportation. Exactly one year previous to the House veto of the
Attorney General's decision in this case, Representative Eilberg introduced a similar resolution disapproving the Attorney General's suspension
of deportation in the case of six other aliens. H. R. Res. 1518, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. The following colloquy occurred on the floor of the House:
"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, is this
procedure to expedite the ongoing operations of the Department of Justice,
as far as these people are concerned. Is it in any way contrary to whatever action the Attorney General has taken on the question of deportation;
does the gentleman know?
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the answer is no to the gentleman's final
question. These aliens have been found to be deportable and the Special
Inquiry Officer's decision denying suspension of deportation has been reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. We are complying with the
law since all of these decisions have been referred to us for approval or disapproval, and there are hundreds of cases in this category. In these six
cases however, we believe it would be grossly improper to allow these people to acquire the status of permanent resident aliens.
Mr. WYLIE. In other words, the gentleman has been working with the
Attorney General's office?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Mr. WYLIE. This bill then is in fact a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to do?
Mr. EILBERG. The gentleman is correct insofar as it relates to the
determination of deportability which has been made by the Department of
Justice in these cases.
Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection."
120 Cong. Rec. 41412 (1974).
Clearly, this was an obfuscation of the effect of a veto under § 244(c)(2).
Such a veto in no way constitutes "a confirmation of what the Attorney
General intends to do." To the contrary, such a resolution was meant to
overrule and set aside, or "veto," the Attorney General's determination
that, in a particular case, cancellation of deportation would be appropriate
under the standards set forth in § 244(a)(1).
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tion judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to
terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The immigration judge held that he had no
authority to rule on the constitutional validity of§ 244(c)(2).
On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals again contending that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was
dismissed. App. 55-56.
Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a),
Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with
Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him
in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light of the
importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both
the Senate and the House of Representatives to file briefs

amici curiae.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals
held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to
deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the
House of Representatives." Chadha v. INS, 634 F. 2d 408,
436 (CA9 1980). The essence of its holding was that
§ 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in
No. 80-1832, 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm.
II
Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we
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first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court
to resolve the issue raised.
A
Appellate Jurisdiction
Both Houses of Congress 4 contend that we are without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides:
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any
court of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam and the District Court of the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an
Act of Congress unconsititutional in any civil action, suit,
or proceeding to which the United States or any of its
agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party."

Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 742 n. 10 (1974), makes
clear that a court of appeals is a "court of the United States"
for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear that the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit or proceeding," that the
INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the
proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an Act of
Congress-namely, the one-House veto prov1s10n in
§ 244(c)(2)-unconstitutional. The express requisites for an
appeal under § 1252, therefore, have been met.
In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the Congressional
Parties 5 direct attention, however, to our statement that
'Nine Members of the House of Representatives have filed a brief amicus curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in
this case.
5
The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S. Res. 40
and H. R. Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981,
filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Ap-
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"[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not
aggrieved by the judgment affording relief and cannot appeal
from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445
U. S. 326, 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation
of § 244(c)(2) and the Court of Appeals granted that relief.
Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what
it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved
party, and therfore cannot appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.
The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport
Chadha. As we have set out more fully, ante at 7, the INS
concluded that it had no power to rule on the constitutionality
of that order and accordingly proceeded to implement it.
Chadha's appeal challenged that decision and the INS presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the
House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to
the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to
comply with the House action ordering deportation of
Chadha. The Court of Appeals' judgment set aside the deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to
cease and desist from taking any steps to deport Chadha;
steps that the Attorney General would have taken were it not
for that decision.
At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any
party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we
hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of
Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would
otherwise take. It is apparent that Congress intended that
this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical prerequisites of § 1252; in other cases where an Act of Congress is
held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in this Court
is available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of
peals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore
proper "parties" within the meaning of that term in 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).
See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977).
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the United States is a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal under § 1252.
The agency's status as an aggrieved party under § 1252 is not
altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the
holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The
appeal in No. 80-1832 is therefore properly before us. 6
B
Severability
Congress also contends that the provision for the oneHouse veto in§ 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from§ 244. Congress argues that if the provision for the one-House veto is
held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must fall. If § 244 in its entirety is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) and Chadha would be deported.
From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision because he could receive no relief even if his constitutional challenge proves successful.;
Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed" '[u]nless it is evident that
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is
not."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 (1976), quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U. S.
sIn addition to meeting the statutory requisites of§ 1252, of course, an
appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III.
Such a controversy clearly exists in No. 80-1832, as in the other two cases,
because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties.
See infra, at 18; see also Director, OWCP v. Perini North River AssoU. S. - , (1982).
ciates, 7
In this case we deem it appropriate to address questions of severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108-109 (1976); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585 (1968).

I

·. •. ·""'
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210, 234 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on
that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. 1101, which provides:
"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." (Emphasis added.)
This language is unambiguous and gives rise to a presump-~
tion that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a
whole, or of any part of the Act, to depend upon whether the
veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of
the Act as that language is used in the severability clause.
Congress clearly intended "the remainder of the Act" to
stand if "any particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have more plainly authorized the presumption 1
that the provision for a one-House veto in§ 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act of which it is a
part. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419,
434 (1938).
The presumption as to the severability of the one-House\
veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is supported by the legislative
history of § 244. That section and its precursors supplanted
the long established pattern of dealing with deportations like
Chadha's on a case-by-case basis through private bills. Al- \
though it may be that Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
severability raised by § 406.
The Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, § 14, 43
Stat. 153, 162; required the Secretary of Labor to deport any
alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only m.eans by which a deportable alien could law-
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fully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented
to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I,
§ 7 of the Constitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced
by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant
permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:
"It was my original thought that the way to handle all
these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am
absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in
this House that it is impossible to deal with the situation
through special bills. We had a demonstration of that
fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before the
House. The House consumed 5Yz hours considering four
bills and made no disposition of any of these bills." 81
Cong. Rec. 5542 (1937).
Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574,
but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Cong. Rec.
8992-8996 (1938).
Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend
the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act
of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that
an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's
decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.
In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the
Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both
Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, ch.
783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent
resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as
private bills. Just four years later, the House Judiciary
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Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2),
stated in a report:
"In the light of experience of the last several months, the
committee came to the conclusion that the requirements
of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in
many thousands of individual cases which are submitted
by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and
places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot
assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution
mechanism] are of purely administrative nature and they
seriously interfere with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, interfere
with the legislative work of the House." H. R. Rep.
No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the
Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was
incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). Plainly, Congress'
desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This legis-~
lative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
severability raised by § 406.
A provision is further presumed severable if what remains
after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 286 U. 8., at 234.
There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and
workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House
veto, the administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation
under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this
delegated authority is preserved since all such suspensions
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will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(l). Absent
the passage of a bill to the contrary, 8 deportation proceedings will be cancelled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2)
has expired. 9 Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.

c
Standing
We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks
standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance
the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation of powers dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's priWithout the provision for one-House veto, Congress would presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in§ 244(c)(2), to enact a law,
in accordance with the requirements of Article I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation, unless, of course, other constitu-~
tiona! principles place substantive limitations on such action. Cf. Attorney General Jackson's attack on H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a
bill to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien. The Attorney General called the bill "an historical departure from an unbroken
American practice and tradition. It would be the first time that an act of
Congress singled out a named individual for deportation. " S. Rep. No.
2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940) (reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18,
1940). See' note 17, infra.
\
9
Without the Congressional veto , § 244 resembles the "report and wait"
provision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson , 312 U. S. 1 (1941).
The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly promulgated
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not take effect until they shall have
been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a
regular session thereof and until after the close of such session. " Act of
June 19, 1934, ch. 651 , § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute did not provide that
Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and
to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to
stay, and ultimately to revise, the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare
Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973), with Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
8
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vate interests. Chadha has demonstrated "injury in fact and
a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury .... " Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59,
79 (1978). If the veto provision violates the Constitution,
and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will
be cancelled. Chadha therefore has standing to challenge
the order of the Executive mandated by the House veto.

D
Alternative Relief
It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the
constitutional question presented by this case because
Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him. It
is argued that since Chadha married a United States citizen
on August 10, 1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief
may be open under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8
U. S. C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, 1255. It is true that Chadha may
be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and,
as such, could lawfully be accorded permanent residence.
Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case, Congress enacted the Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 9~212, 94 Stat. 102, under which
the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then
permanent residence, to any alien who is unable to return to
his country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race."
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a
prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in this case. See Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention
we might well seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim
advanced. But at most these other avenues of relief are
speculative. It is by no means certain, for example, that \
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Chadha's classification as an immediate relative would result
in the adjustment of Chadha's status from nonimmigrant to
permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F. 2d 1028
(CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge
he will not be deported and will automatically become eligible
to apply for citizenship. 10 A person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional
validity of the process which led to his status merely on the
basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of
relief.
E
Jurisdiction
It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a). That
section provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against
aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative
proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act." Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) takes
place outside the administrative proceedings conducted
under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant contained
in § 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional
challenge.
In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 216 (1968),
this Court held that "§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under
10
Depending on how the Service interprets its statutory duty under
§ 244 apart from the challenged portion of§ 244(c)(2), Chadha's status may
be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent resident as of December
19, 1975-the last session in which Congress could have attempted to stop
the suspension of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of
deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's five-year
waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1427(a), would have elapsed.

I
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§ 242(b), including those determinations made incident to a
motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one
court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar
to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). 11 However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
this case that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent,
rather than only those determinations actually made at the
hearing." 634 F. 2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation
stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final
order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Al-l
though the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his
decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.
This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not
bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation
had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to
stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under
§ 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals
lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did
not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought]
Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a)
would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue
could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under §242(b). Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In
Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that required them to report to
the District Director of the INS during the Iranian hostage crisis. The
aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding.
The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation would have
been cancelled but for § 242(c)(2).
11
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relief not inconsistent with it."' 392 U. S. at 213, quoting
Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777 .<CA2 1966). Here, in
contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself
and the relief he seeks-cancellation of deportation-is
plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under § 106(a) to
decide this case.
F
Case or Controversy
It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy
but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, 297 U. S., at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass.
This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS
take the same position on the constitutionality of the oneHouse veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the
courts because the Attorney General of the United States
agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
A case or controversy is presented by this case. First,
from the time of Congress' formal intervention, see note 5,
supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt. Congress
is both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of
§ 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under § 1254(1). Second,
prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III
adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and
Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement
with the Court of Appeals decision that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's "aggrieved" status
for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252, see ante 8-10. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the
INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
"Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our deci-
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sion will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not
be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its
order and deport him." 634 F. 2d, at 419. 12
Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III,
concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of this case in the
absence of any participant supporting the validity of
§ 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any
such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both
Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an
agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing
the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statue is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,
supra, 392 U. S., at 210 n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328
u. s. 303 (1946).
G
Political Question
It is also argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause, U. S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress'
Article I power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization", combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of
12

A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, U. S. - . There, the
United States agreed with Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
Schools that certain Revenue Rulings denying tax exempt status to schools
that discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its agreement with the schools, however, the United States was complying with a
court order enjoining it from granting tax-exempt status to any school that
discriminated on the basis of race. Even though the government largely
agreed with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy, we found
an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the government intended
to enforce the challenged law against that party. See id., a t - n. 9.
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aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 is not open to question but what is challenged
here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we stated
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976), "Congress has plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." I d., at 132.
A brief review of those factors which may indicate the
presence of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that
our assertion of jurisdiction over this case does no violence to
the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), a political question may arise
when any one of the following circumstances is present:
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of Baker's factors by asserting that Chadha's
claim is "an assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for the United States House of Representatives 48. But if this turns the question into a political
question every challenge to the constitutionality of a statute
would be a political question.
Chadha indeed argues that one House of Congress cannot

\
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constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision to allow
him to remain in this country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting in concert and in compliance with Art. I,
can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision
for the courts. 13
Bakers other factors are likewise inapplicable to this case.
As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving
the question presented by this case. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch.
Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted, § 244(c)(2)
cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of that statute
The suggestion is made that § 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from
constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was passed
by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that question. The assent of the Executive to
a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not
shield it from judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740,
n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 841 n. 12
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52 (1926). See also note 21, infra. In any event, eleven Presidents,
from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this
issue have gone on record at some point to challenge Congressional vetoes
as unconstitutional. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735, 737-738 n. 7 (1979) (collecting
citations to presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression on the constitutionality of the Congressional veto is found in Attorney General William D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933 to President Hoover. 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 56. (1933). Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are
objectionable on constitutional grounds. For example, after President
Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Attorney General Jackson
released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the provision
allowing the Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution
was unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv.
L. Rev. 1353 (1953).
13

t
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is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility of "multi- \
farious pronouncements" on this question.
It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be
termed a "political" case. Baker v. Carr, supra 369 U. S.,
at 217 (1962). But the presence of constitutional issues with
significant political overtones does not automatically invoke
the political question doctrine. Resolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three
branches cannot be evaded by courts beause the issues have
political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a "political"
case, involving as it did claims under a judicial commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. "The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide
controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority." Baker v. Carr, supra,
369 U. S. at 217.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether "a bill signed by
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the
President of the Senate, presented to and approved by the
President of the United States, and delivered by the latter to
the Secretary of State, as an act passed by Congress, do~s
not become a law of the United States if it had not in fact
been passed by Congress." I d., at 669. The Court stated:
"We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from
the performance of which it may not shrink, to give full
effect to the provisions of the Constitution relating to the
enactment of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On
the other hand, we cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if this court should feel obliged,
in fidelity to the Constitution, to declare that an enrolled
bill, on which depend public and private interests of vast

.·
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magnitude, and which has been . . . deposited in the
public archives, as an act of Congress, ... did not become law." Id., at 670 (emphasis in original).
H
The parties are properly before us and the difficult and
sensitive issues have been fully briefed and twice argued in
this Court. The Court's duty in this case, as Chief Justice
Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821), is clear:
"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but
we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our
best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty."

III
A
We turn now to the question whether action of one House
of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that
the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the
Constitution, it must be sustained:
"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes
to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor
are we vested with the power of veto." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978).
By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the
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fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
executive and independent agencies:
"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted
into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have
been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49,
nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes;
and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970
through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk,
The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52
Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977).
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress
and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the
precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the
resolution of this case, we set them out verbatim. Art. I
provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1.
(Emphasis added).
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
... " Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added).

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
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by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, §7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added).
These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently noted that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the
Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, 424 U. S., at 124. Just as we relied on the textual
provision of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of
separation of powers in Buckley, we find that the purposes
underlying the Presentation Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and
the bicameral requirement of Art. I, § 1 and § 7, cl. 2, guide
our resolution of the important question presented in this
case. The very structure of the articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers and we now turn to Art. I.
B

The Presentation Clauses
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that
the requirement that all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the
Framers. 14 Presentation to the President and the Presiden"The widespread approval of the delegates was commented on by J oseph Story:
"In the convention there does not seem to have been much diversity of
opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to the president a negative
on the laws. The principal points of discussion seem to have been,
whether the negative should be absolute, or qualified; and if the latter, by
what number of each house the bill should subsequently be passed, in order
to become a law; and whether the negative should in either case be exclu-
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tial veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen
took special pains to assure that these requirements could not
be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl.
2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be
evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a
"resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." 2 M. Farrand,
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 301-302. As
a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, ante, at 24, was added. !d.,
at 304-305.
The decision to provide the President with a limited and
qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the
powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most
carefully circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking
was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.
In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), Hamilton focused on the President's role in making laws:
"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the
legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive,
the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would
of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left
to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." !d., at
457-458.

See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 614-615 (1858).
The President's role in the law making process also reflects
sively vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other department of government." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 611 (1858). See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 21, 97-104, 138-140; id., at 73--80, 181, 298,
301-305.
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the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role
in the legislative process was described later during public
debate on ratification:
"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative
body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that body. . . . The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the
Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at
458 (A. Hamilton).
See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 123 (1926). The Court
also has observed that the Presentation Clauses serve the important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is
grafted on the legislative process:
"The President is a representative of the people just as
the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it
may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of
the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not
countrywide .... " Myers v. United States, supra, 272
U. S. at, 123.

c

Bicameralism
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7 was of scarcely
less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto
and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By provid-

80-1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171-0PINION
28

INS v. CHADHA

ing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of
the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the
Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentation Clauses, that legislation
should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully
considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court,
commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes.
Sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military,
one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the L~gislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it
within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In
a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one,
of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1
M. Farrand, supra, at 254.
Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single
House was antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for
only one legislative organ, he warned:
"we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the
most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus
entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms
of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which
the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22,
supra, at 135.
This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the
fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph
Story:
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"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally
under the dominion of strong passions and excitements;
impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the
firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough
under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings
and relations to society." J. Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 383--384 (1858).
These observations are consistent with what many of the
Framers expressed, none more cogently than Hamilton in
pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to
protect liberty:
"In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches;
and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connected with
each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on the society will admit."
The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 324.
See also The Federalist No. 62.
However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their
fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of
public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not
of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states.
Those states feared a commonality of interest among the
larger states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical
of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the
people. See 1 M. Farrand, supra, 176-177, 484-491. It
need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise,
under which one House was viewed as representing the peo-
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ple and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the
large and small states. 15
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious
that the bicameral requirement and the Presentation Clauses
would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect
the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the
whole people from improvident laws. The division of the
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full
study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two
thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby
precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See 1 M.
Farrand, supra, at 99-104. In sum, the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
IOMiHic11
IV
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of
the federal government into three defined categories, executive, judicial and legislative which, although not "hermetically'' sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424
U. S., at 121, are functionally identifiable. When any
Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
Constitution has delegated to it. See Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, it presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And when, as here,
one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively
The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers
that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered,
even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states
affected. See U. S. Const. Art V.
'

5
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acting within its proper sphere.
Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless
establish that the challenged action under§ 244(c)(2) is of the
kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7
apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to
the bicameralism and presentation requirements of Art. I.
See post at 33. Whether actions taken by either House are,
in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not
on their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).
Examination of the action taken here by one-House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons including the Attorney General, Executive Branch
officials-and Chadna-all outside the legislative branch.
Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to require the Attorney General to deport an individual
alien whose deportation otherwise would be cancelled under
§ 244. The one-House veto operated in this case to overrule
the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House action, Chadha would remain in the United
States. Congress has acted and its action has altered
Chadha's status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in this case
is confirmed by the character of the Congressional action it
supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in§ 244(c)(2),
either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once
the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, 16 had determined the alien should remain in
'

6

Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in this case will
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the United States. Without the challenged provision in
§ 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by
legislation requ~ring deportation. 17 Similarly, a veto by one
House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an
attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(l), or
sanction "lawmaking by the Attorney General[.] . . . Why is the Attorney
General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full
bicameral process?" Brief of the United States House of Representatives
40. To be sure, some administrative agency action-rule making, for example-may resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), which defines an agency's "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy .... " This Court has referred to
agency activity as being "quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628 (1935). Clearly, however, "[i]n
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 123 (1976). When the Attorney General
performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative"
power. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976).
The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach
beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's
execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts can always "ascertain whether the
will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414,
425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 (1952); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 68 (CADC) (en bane) (separate statement of
Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the Attor-~
ney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Congress' authority to delegate
portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no support for the
argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the
laws by way of a Congressional veto.
17
We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any
constitutional provision. See note 8, supra.

l
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as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I. 18
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House
veto in this case further manifests its legislative character.
After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to
remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It
is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreement with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadhano less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only
one way; bicameral passage and presentation to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority
until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. 19
18
During the Convention of 1787, the application of the President's veto
to repeals of statutes was addressed and the Framers were apparantly content with Madison's comment that "[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was
probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting
the duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal." 2 Farrand,
supra, at 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569,
587-599 (1953). There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or
amend laws by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. I.
'"This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to "the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits and Klein,
Congresional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls
administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of
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Finally, the legislative character of the challenged action of
one House is confirmed by the fact that when the Framers
intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone
and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they
narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action
in the Constitution. There are but four provisions in the
Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House
may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject
to the President's veto:
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the
power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 6;
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials
following impeachment on charges inititated by the House
and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5;
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power
to approve or to disapprove presidential appointments. Art.
II, § 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the
President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. 20
control, such as durationallimits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id., at
460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto", 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667 (1980). See also note
9, supra.
20
An exception from the Presentation Clauses was ratified in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment
which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority. See U. S. Canst. Art. V.
One might also include another "exception" to the rule that Congressional action having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentation Clauses. Each House has the power to act
alone in determining specified internal matters. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3, and
§ 5, cl. 2. However, this "exception" only empowers Congress to bind it-
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These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative
functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and
binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution.
These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged here. On
the contrary, they provide further support for the conclusion
that Congressional authority is not to be implied and for the
conclusion that the veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the
Legislative Branch.
Since it is clear that the action by the House under
§ 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional
exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and that it
was an exercise of legislative power, it was subject to the
standards prescribed in Article I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and
Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect
self and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely
circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated
instances.
Although the bicameral check was not provided for in any of these provisions for independent Congressional action, precautionary alternative
checks are evident. For example, Art. II., § 2 requires that two-thirds of
the Senators present concur in the Senate's consent to a treaty, rather than
the simple majority required for passage of legislation. See The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay); The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton); The Federalist
No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the Framers adopted an alternative protection, in the stead of Presidential veto and bicameralism, by requiring
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present for a conviction of
impeachment. Art. I, § 3. We also note that the Court's holding in
Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command
the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second, three-fourths of the states
must ratify any amendment.
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enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people
from the improvident exercise of power. To preserve those
checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully
defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be
eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one
House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity
with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentation to the President. 21
The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in
many respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the
Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this
manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely
practical terms, it is obviously easier and simpler for action to
be taken unicamerally and without submission to the President. But it is crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and the debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The
records, the debates in the Convention and in the States preceding ratification, underscore the common desire to curb the
exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the
states or the people. There is unmistakable expression of a \
determination that legislation by the national Congress be a
step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention no doubt impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made
by men who had lived under a form of government that per21
Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the bicameralism and presentation requirements for the enactment of future legislation affecting aliens.
See Atkins v. United States, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1063-1064 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert
denied, 431 U. S. 1009 (1978); Brief for the United States House of Representatives 40. The explicit prescription for legislative action contained in
Art. I cannot be amended by legislation. See note 11, supra.
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mit ted arbitrary govermental acts to go unchecked. We find
no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for
the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit Consititutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potentials for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of
power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out
in the Constitution.

v
We hold that the Congressional veto provision in § 244(c)(2)
is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death
knell for nearly two hundred other statutory provisions in
which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto." For this
reason, the Court's decision is of surpassing importance.
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And it is for this reason that the Court would have been welladvised to decide the case, if possible, on the narrower
ounds of se ration of powers, leaving for full coiiSideration other congressiona review statutes operating on such
varied matters as war powers and agency rulemaking, some
of which concern the independent regulatory agencies. 1
The prominence of the legislative veto mechanism in our
contemporary political system and its importance to Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become a central
means by which Con ess seeks to secure the accountability
o execu 1ve and inde endent a encies Without such overSig t capa ility, Congress is face with a Hobson's choice:
either to refrain from delegating the necessary authority,
leaving itself with a hopeless task of writing laws with the
requisite specificity to cover endless special circumstances
across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to
abdicate its lawmaking function to the executive branch and
independent agencies. To choose the former leaves major
national problems unresolved; to opt for the latter risks unaccountable policymaking by those not elected to fill that role.
Accordingly, over the past five decades, the legislative veto
has been placed in nearly two hundred statutes. 2 The device is known in every field of governmental concern: reorganization, budgets, foreign affairs, war powers, and regulation
of trade, safety, energy, the environment and the economy.
I
The legislative veto developed initially in response to the
1
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that "We are not here
faced with a situation in which the unforeseeability of future circumstances
or the broad sco e and com lexity of the sub 'ect m
r of an agency's
ru~~ prec ude te articulation of specific criteria in the governing statute itself. Such factors might present considerations different
from those we find here, both as to the question of separation of powers
and the legitimacy of the unicameral device." 634 F. 2d, at 433
' A selected list and brief description of these provisions is appended to
this opinion.

~
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problems of reorganizing the sprawling government structure created in response to the Depression. When Congress
enacted and the President approved the Reorganization Act
of 1939, they established the chief model for legislative review provisions on the basis of extensive consideration of the
delegation problem and otlier constitutional issues. President Hoover requested authority to reorganize the government in 192~. From the outset, the -President coupled his
request that the "Congress be willing to delegate its authority over the problem (subject to defined principles) to the Executive" with a proposal for legislative review. He proposed
that the Executive "should act upon approval of a joint committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its
consideration." Pub. Papers 432 (1929). Congress followed
President Hoover's suggestion and authorized reorganization
subject to legislative review. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314,
Section 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414. Although the reorganization
authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto
provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt Administration and has since been renewed numerous times.
Over the years, the provision was used extensively. Presidents submitted 115 reorganization plans to Congress of
which 23 were disapproved by Congress pursuant to legislative veto provisions.
Shortly after adoption of the Reorganization Act of 1939,
Congress and the President a lied the legislative veto roce ure o reso ve
elegation roble or na 10na security
orld War II occasioned the need to
an
gn a a1rs.
transfer greater authority to the President in these areas.
The legislative veto offered the means by which Congress
could confer additional authority while preserving its own
constitutional role. During World War II, Congress enacted
over thirty statutes conferring powers on the Executive with
legislative veto provisions. President Roosevelt accepted
~

J;
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the veto as the necessary price for obtaining exceptional
authority.
Over the following quarter of a century after World War
II, Presidents continued to accept legislative vetos by one or
both IfOUses as constitutional, while regQ_ar_~_denouncing
pro~sions ?Z-!~ic~_s;on~~committees reviewed Executive activity.
The legislative veto balanced delegations of statutory author• Every one of these Presidential statements, until the veto by President Nixon of the War Powers Resolution, concerned bills authorizing committee review. Rather, as the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers found in 1969, "an accommodation was reached years ago on legislative vetoes exercised by the entire Congress or by one House, [while] disputes have continued to arise over the committee form fo the veto." S.
Rep. No. 549, 92st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
In fact, Presidents K~edy, Johnson, and Nixon actually proposed eneas
actment of statutes with legislative review provisions in such ·
as withdrawa of wilderness a:eas, agri~programs, ta~ion, fefteral
grants and international trade, as well as in reorganization. See National
Wilderness Preservation :ct:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs on S.4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (President
Kennedy's proposals for legislative review of withdrawal of wilderness areas); Pub. Papers 6 (1961) (President Kennedy's proposals for legislative
review of agricultural programs); President's Message to the Congress
Transmitting the Budget for Fiscal Year 1970, 5 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc.
70, 73 (Jan. 15, 1969) (President Johnson's proposals for legislative review
of taxation).
When the ~nstitutionality of such provisions was questioned, the administration of\1'resident Kennedy submitted a memorandum supporting the
constitutionality oflegislative review. See General Counsel of the Department of Agriculture, Constitutionality of Title I of H. R. 6400, 87th Cong.,
1st Session (1961), reprinted in Legislative Policy of the Bureau of the Budget: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Credit of the
House Comm. on Agriculture, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1966). During the
administration of President Johnson, the Department of Justice again affirmed the constitutionality of the legislative review provision of the
Reorganiztion Act, as contrasted with provisions for committee review.
See Separation of Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
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ity in new areas of governmental involvement: the space program, international agreements on nuclear energy, tariff arrangements, and adjustment of federal pay rates. 4
During the 1970's the legislative veto was important in resolving a series of major constitutional disputes between the
President and Congress over claims of the President to broad
impoundment, war, and national emergency powers. The
key provision of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. S. C.
§ 1544(c), authorizes the termination by concurrent resolution
of the use of armed forces in hostilities. A similar measure
resolved the problem posed by Presidential claims of inherent
power to impound appropriations h)' 2t similat measure. In
conference, a compromise was achieved under which permanent impoundments, termed "rescissions," would require approval through enactment of legislation. In contrast, temporary impoundments, or "deferrals," would become effective
unless disapproved by one House. This compromise provided that President with flexibility, while preserving Congressional control. 5 Although the War Powers Resolution
was enacted over President Nixon's veto, the Impoundment
Control Act was enacted with the President's approval.
Pwoers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 206
(1967) (testimony of Frank M. Wozencraft, Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel).
4
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568,
§ 302, 72 Stat. 426, 433 (space program); Atomic Energy Act Amendment
of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-479, § 4, 72 Stat. 276, 277 (cooperative nuclear
agreements); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351, 76
Stat. 872, 899, 17 U. S. C. 1981 (tariff recommended by Tariff Commission
may be imposed by concurrent resolution of approval); Postal Revenue and
Federal Salary Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 90-206, § 255(i)(l), 81 Stat. 613,
644.
"The Impoundment Control Act's provision for legislative review has
been used extensively. Presidents have submitted hundreds of proposed
budget deferrals, of which sixty-five have been disapproved by resolutions
of the House or Senate with no protest by the Executive.
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These statutes were followed by others resolving similar
problems: the National Emergencies Act, resolving the longstanding problems with unchecked Executive emergency
power; the Arms Export Control Act, resolving the problem
of foreign arms sales; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978, resolving the problem of exports of nuclear
capability.
In the energy field, the legislative veto served to balance
broad delegations in legislation emerging from the energy
crisis of the 1970's. 6 In the educational field, it was found
that fragmented and narrow grant programs "inevitably lead
to Executive-Legislative confrontations" because they
inartfully limited the Commissioner of Education's authority.
The response was to grant the Commissioner of Education
rulemaking authority, subject to a legislative veto. In the
trade regulation area, the veto preserved Congressional authority over the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) broad
mandate to make rules to prevent businesses from engaging
in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." 7
6
The veto appears in a host of broad statutory delegations concerning
energy rationing, contingency plans, strategic oil reserves, allocation of energy production materials, oil exports, and naval reserve production. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-258, § 201,
90 Stat. 303, 309, 10 U. S. C. 7422(c)(2)(C) (naval reserve production); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, §§ 159, 201, 401(a),
and 455, 89 Stat. 871, 886, 890, 941, and 950 (1975), 42 U. S. C. 6239 and
6261, 15 U. S. C. 757 and 760a (strategic oil reserves, rationing and contingency plans, oil price controls and product allocation); Federal Nonnuclear
Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93--577, Section 12, 88 Stat. 1878, 1892--93, 42 U. S. C. 5911 (allocation of energy production materials); Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93--153, § 10, 87
Stat, 576, 582, 30 U. S. C. 185(u) (oil exports).
7
Congress found that under the agency's
"very broad authority to prohibit conduct which is 'unfair or deceptive' the
FTC can regulate virtually every aspect of America's commercial life .. ..
The FTC's rules are not merely narrow interpretations of a tightly drawn
statute; instead , they are broad policy pronouncements which Congress
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Even this brief review suffices to demonstrate that the legislative veto is more than "efficient, convenient, and useful."
Ante, at 23. It is an important if not indispensable political
invention that allows the President and Congress to resolve
major constitutional and policy differences, assures the
accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and preserves Congress' control over lawmaking. Perhaps there
are other means of accomodation and accountability, but the
increasing reliance of Congress upon the legislative veto suggests that the alternatives to which Congress must now turn
are not entirely satisfactory. 8
has an obligation to study and review."
124 Cong. Rec. 5012 (1978) (statement by Rep. Broyhill). A two-House
legislative veto was added to constrain that broad delegation. The
constitututionality of that provision is presently pending before us.
United States Senate v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 82-935; United
States House of Representatives v. Federal Trade Commission, No.
82-1044.
8
To be sure Congress has other means of oversight by which to monitor
compliance with program objectives, to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, and to assess whether executive and agency action
comports with the pubic interest. But none of these mechanisms allows
Congress to ensure that public policy actually comports with the legislative
perception of the public interest. "In an era of delegated authority, it is
the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over
the evolution and implemnentation of its policy as declared by statute."
Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 New York U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977).
While Congress could write certain statutes with greater specificty, it is
unlikely that this is a realistic or even desirable substitute for the legislative veto. "Political volatility and the controversy of many issues would
prevent Congress from reaching agreement on many major problems if
specificity were required in their enactments." Fuchs, Administrative
Agencies and the Energy Problem 47 Ind. L. J . 606, 608 (1972); Stewart,
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667,
1695-96 (1975). For example, in the deportation context, the solution is
not for Congress to create more refined categorizations of the deportable
aliens whose status should be subject to change. In 1979, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service proposed regulations setting forth factors to be
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It is also clear from the history of the legislative veto that
it has not been a sword with which Congress has struck out
to· aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches-the
concerns of Madison and Hamilton. Rather, the veto has
been a means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authOrity
ne@ sary ~ss is to fu!filllts designated role under
Article I as the nation's lawmaker. While the President has
often o Jec e o pa ICular legislative vetos, generally those
left in the hands of congressional committees, the Executive
has more often agreed to legislative review as the price for a
broad delegation of authority. To be sure, the President
may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could be
considered in the exercise of discretion under numerous provisions of the
Act, but not including § 244, to ensure "fair and uniform" adjudication
"under appropriate discretionary criteria." 44 Fed. Reg. 36187 (1979).
The proposed rule was canceled in 1981, because "[t]here us an inherent
failure in any attempt to list those factors which should be considered in
the exercise of discretion. It is impossible to list or foresee all of the adverse or favorable factors which may be present in a given set of circumstances." 46 Fed. Reg. 9119 (1981).
Oversight hearings and congressional investigations have their purpose,
but unless Congress is to be rendered a think tank or debating society,
they are no substitute for the exercise of actual authority. The "laying"
procedure approved in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U. S. 1, 15 (1941), while satisfactory for certain measures, has its own shortcomings. Because a new
law must be passed to restrain administrative action, Congress must delegate authority without the certain ability of being able to check its
exercise.
Finally, the passage of corrective legislation after agency regulations
take effect or Executive Branch officials have acted creates other problems
endemic to a retroactive response. "Post hoc substantive revision of legislation, the only available corrective mechanism in the absence of
postenactment review could have serious prejudicial consequences; if Congress retroactively tampered with a price control system after prices have
been set, the economy could be damaged and private interests seriously
impaired; if Congress rescinded the sale of arms to a foreign country, our
relations with that Country would be severely strained; and if congress reshuffled the bureaucracy after a President's reorganization proosal had
taken effect, the results could be chaotic." Jacobs and Klein, supra, at 464,

80-1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171-DISSENT
INS v. CHADHA

9

precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check
on the exercise of delegated authority.
II
For all these reasons, the apparent sweep of the Court's
decision today is regretable. The Court's Article I analysis
app~rs to invalidate all forms of the legislative yeto irrespective of f'OTiiiO'r subject. Because the legislative veto is
commonly found as a check upon rulemajdng by administrative agencies and upon broad-based policy decisions of the
Executive Branch, it is particularly unfortunate that the
Court reaches its decision in a case involving the exercise of a
veto over deportation decisions regarding particular individuals. Courts should always be wary of striking statutes as
unconstitutional; to strike an entire class of statutes based on
consideration of a somewhat atypical and more-readily indictable exemplar of the class is irresponsible. But as I understand the Court, todays' holding is not so limited and is
plainly wrong. 9
• Perhaps I am wrong and the Court remains open to consider whether
certain forms of the legislative veto are reconcilable with the Article I requirements. One possibilit for the Court and Congress is to accept that a
ega e ect m 1ts own nght,
resolution of disappro~a cannot be given
bUfilillyServe as a guide in tllemter retatwn of a dele ation of lawmaking
au or1ty. n ee , t e exerc1se of the ve o cou be read as a manifestatio'iiof legislative intent, which, unless itself contrary to the authorizing
statute, serves as the definitive construction of the statute. Therefore, an
agency rule vetoed by Congress would not be enforced in the courts because the veto indicates that the agency action departs from the Congressional intent.
This limited role for a redefined legislative veto follows in the steps of
the longstanding practice of giving some weight to the subsequent legislative reaction to administrative rulemaking. The "silence of Congress after
consideration of a practice by the Executive may be equivalent to acquiescence and consent that the practice be continued until the power exercised
be revoked." United States v. Midwest Oil Co ., 236 U. S. 460, 472-473
(1914). See also Z em el v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965) (relying on Congressional failure to repeal administration interpretation); Haig v. Agee

'
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If the legislative veto were as plainly unconstitutional as

the Court strives to suggest, its broad ruling today would be
more comprehensible. But, the constitutionality of the legislative veto is an~hing but Ciearcu1. The issue divides
scholars, 10 courts, 11 attorneys general, 12 and the two other
453 U. S. 280 (1981) (same); Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 50 U. S.L.W. 4457,
4465 (relying on failure to disturb judicial decision in later revision of law).
Reliance on subsequent legislative reaction has been limited only because of two fears--<>verturning the intent of the original Congress and the
unreliability of discerning present intent. Consumer Product Safety
Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U. S. 102 (1980); United States v.
Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). These concerns are not forceful when the
original statute authorizes subsequent legislative review. The ~teseeense
of the review provision constitutes an express authorization for a subsequent Congress to participate in defining the meaning of the law. Second,
the disapproval resolution allows for a reliable determination of Congressional intent. Without the review mechanism, uncertainty over the inferences to draw from subsequent Congressional action is understandable.
The refusal to pass an amendment, for example, may indicate opposition to
that position but could mean that Congress believes the amendment is redundant with the statute as written. By contrast, the exercise of legislative review is an unmistakeable indication that the agency or Executive decision at issue is disfavored. This is not to suggest that the failure to pass
a veto resolution should be given any weight whatever.
1
°For commentary general! favorable to the le ·slative veto see
Abourezk, Congressional Veto: A on temporary Response to Executive
Encroachment on Legislative Prerogative, 52 Ind. L.J. 323 (1977);
Boisvert, A Legislative Tool For Supervision of Administrative Agencies:
The Laying System, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 638 (1956-57); Cooper & Cooper,
The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 467
(1962); Dry, The Congressional Veto and Constitutional Separation of Powers, in the Presidency in the Constitutional Order 195 (J. Bessette & J.
Tulis eds.); Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative
Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 455 (1977); Miller &
Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L.J. 367 (1977); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, The Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1064 (1981); Newman & Keaton,
Congress and the Faithful Execution of Laws-Should Legislators Supervise Administrators?, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 565 (1953); Pearson, Oversight: A
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branches of the National Government. If the veto devices so
flagrantly disregarded the requirements of Article I as the
Court today suggests, I find it incomprehensible that Congress, whose members are bound by oath to uphold the Constitution, would have placed these mechanisms in nearly two
hundred separate laws over a period of fifty years: - - -

v

Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U. Kan. L. Rev. 277
(1975); Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Actions, 5 Seton Hall
L. Rev. 489 (1974); Schwartz, Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A
Reexamination, 46 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 351 (1978); Schwartz, Legislative
Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: I. The American Experience, 30 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 1031 (1955); Stewart, Constitutionality of the
Legislative Veto, 13 Harv. J. Legis. 593 (1976); Note, "Laying on theTable"-A Device For Legislative Control Over Delegated Powers, 65 Harv.
L. Rev. 637 (1952).
For Commentary generally unfavorable to the legislative veto, see J.
Bolton, Tfie Legtslah ve Veto:tl'nseparating the Powers (1977); Bruff &
Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes~90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1977); Dixon, The Congres...sional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive On a Leash?, 56
N.C.L. Rev. 423 (1978); FitzGerald, Congressional Oversight or Congressional Foresight: Guidelines From the Founding Fathers,~8 Ad. L. Rev.
429 (1976); Ginnane, The Control of E:ederal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and CommitteeS'(M Harv. L. Rev. 569 (1953); Henry,
The Legislative~earch of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J.
Legis. 735 (1979
rtin,
e Legislative veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressio
wer, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy For System Overload, Regulation, Nov.-Dec.
1979, at 19; Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control
of the Executive, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 983 (1975); Comment, Congressional
Oversight of Administrative Discretion: Defining the Proper Role of the
Legislative Veto, 26Am. U.L. Rev. 1018 (1977); Note, Congressional Veto
of Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 Duke L.J. 285; Recent Developments, The Legislative Veto in
the Arms Control Act of 1976, 9 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1029 (1977).
11
Compare Atkins v. United States, 556 F. 2d 1028 (Ct. Claims 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1009 (1978), (upholding legislative veto provision in
Federal Salary Act, 2 U. S. C. §§ 351 et seq. (1976)) with Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 673 F. 2d 425 (CA DC 1982), appeals
and petitions for cert. pending, Nos. 81-2008, 81-2020, 81-2151, 81-2171,
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The reality of the situation is that the constitutional question posed today is{one oU m.mense difficultr}over which the
executive and legislative branches-as well as scholars and
judges-have understandably disagreed. That disagreement stems from the silence of the Constitution on the precise question: The Constitution does not directly authorize or
prohibit the legislative veto. Thus, our task should be to determine whether the legislative veto is consistent with the
purposes of Art. I and the principles of Separations of Powers which are reflected in that Article and throughout the
Constitution. 13 We should not find the lack of a specific constitutional authorization for the legislative veto surprising,
and I would not infer disapproval of the mechanism from its
absence. From the summer of 1787 to the present the governance of the United States has become an endeavor far beyond the contemplation of the Framers. Only within the last
half century has the complexity and size of the Federal Government's responsibilities grown so greatly that the Congress must rely on the legislative veto as the most effective if
not the only means to insure their role as the nation's lawmakers. But the wisdom of the Framers was to anticipate
that the nation would grow and new problems of governance
would require different solutions. Accordingly, our Federal
Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility
to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental democratic principles. This was the spirit in which
82-177 and 82-209, (holding unconstitutional the legislative veto provision
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3342 (Supp. III
1979)).
2
' See, e. g., 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 680, 683 (1854); Jackson, "A Presidential
Legal Opinion," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1953); 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 10, at
2 (1977).
13
I limit my concern here to those legislative vetos which require either
one or both Houses of Congress to pass resolutions of approval or disapproval, and leave aside the questions arising from the exercise of such powers by committees of Congress.
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Justice Jackson penned his influential concurrence in the
Steel Seizure Case:
"The actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the
power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or
even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it
also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635
(1952).
This is the perspective from which we should approach the
novel constitutional questions presented by the legislative
veto. In my view, neither Article I of the Constitution nor
the cl_octrine of sepa~ of powers is vi<_llitted by this mechanism by which our elected representatives preserve their
voice in the governance of the nation.

III
The Court holds that the disapproval of a suspension of deportation by the resolution of one House of Congress is an exercise of legislative power without compliance with the prerequisites for lawmaking set forth in Article I of the
Constitution. Specifically, the Court maintains that the provisions of§ 244(c)(2) are inconsistent with the requirement of
bicameral approval, implicit in Art. I, § 1, and the requirement that all bills and resolutions that require the concurrence of both houses be presented to the President, Art. I,
§ 7, cl. 2 & 3. 14
14
fa"gree with JUSTICE REHNQUIST that Congress did not intend the
one-House veto provision of§ 244(c)(2) to be severable. Although the general rule is that the presence of a savings clause creates a presumption of
divisibility, Champlin Rfg Co . v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 235 (1931), I
read the savings clause contained in § 406 of the Immigration Act as primarily pertaining to the severability of major parts of the Act from one an-
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I do not dispute the Court's truismatic exposition of these
clauses. There is no question that a hlll does not become a
law until it is approved by both the House and the Senate,
and presented to the President. Similarly, I would not hesitate to strike an action of Congress in the form of a concurrent resolution which constitutea an exercise of ori ·nal awmaking aut onty.
agree With the Court that the
President's qualified veto power is a critical element in the
distribution of powers under the Constitution, widely endorsed among the Framers, and intended to serve the President as a defense against legislative encroachment and to
check the "passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence,
or design." The Federalist No. 73, at 458 (A. Hamilton).
The records of the Convention reveal that it is the first purpose which figured most prominently but I acknowledge the
vitality of the second. See A. Hamilton, The Federalist No.
73, at 443. I also agree that the bicameral approval required
by Art. I, §§ 1, 7 "was of scarcely less concern to the Framers
than was the Presidential veto," ante, at 27, and that the
need to divide and disperse legislative power figures significantly in our scheme of Government. All of this, the Third
Part of the Court's opinion, is entirely unexceptionable.
It does not, however, answer the constitutional question
before us. The Court properly recognizes that it "must establish that the challenged action under § 244(c)(2) is of the
kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7
other, not the divisibility of different provisions within a single section.
Surely, Congress would want the naturalization provisions of the Act to be
severable from the deportation sections. But this does not support preserving § 244 without the legislative veto any more than a savings provision would justify preserving immigration authority without quota limits.
More relevant is the fact that for forty years, Congress has insisted on
retaining a voice on individual suspension cases-it has frequently rejected
bills which would place final authority in the Executive branch. It is clear
that Congress believed its retention crucial. Given this history, the
Court's rewriting of the Act flouts the will of Congress.
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apply" and admits that "not every action taken by either
House is subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements of Art. 1." Ante, at 31.

A
The terms of the Presentment Clauses suggest only that
bills and their equivalent are subject to the requirements of
bicameral passage and presentment to the President. Article I, § 7, cl. 2, stipulates only that "Every Bill which shall
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President"
for approval or disapproval, his disapproval then subject to
being overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Section 7, cl. 3 goes further:
"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall
be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the same shall take Effect, shall be approved by
him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by
two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations ascribed in the
Case of a Bill.
Although the Clause does not specify the actions for which
the concurrence of both Houses is "necessary," the proceedings at the Philadelphia Convention indicate its purpose was
to prevent Congress from circumventing the presentation requirement in the making of new legislation. James Madison
observed that if the President's veto was confined to bills, it
could be evaded by calling a proposed law a "resolution" or
"vote" rather than a "bill." Accordingly, he proposed that
"or resolve" should be added after "bill" in what is now clause
2 of §7. 2M. Farrand, The Records ofthe Federal Convention of 1787 301-302. After a short discussion on the subject,
the amendment was rejected. On the following day, how-

----
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ever, Randolph renewed the proposal in the substantial form
as it now appears, and the motion passed. I d., at 304-305; 5
Elliot's Debates 431 (1845). The chosen language, Madison's
comment, and the brevity of the Convention's consideration,
all suggest a modest role was intended for the Clause and no
broad restraint on Congressional authority was contemplated. See Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative
Veto, 13 Harv. J. Legisl. 593, 609-611 (1976). This reading
is consistent with the historical background of the Presentation Clause itself which reveals only that the Framers were
concerned with limiting the methods for enacting new legislation. The Framers were aware of the experience in Pennsylvania where the legislature had evaded the requirements
attached to the passing of legislation by the use of "resolves,"
and the criticisms directed at this practice by the Council of
Censors. 15 There is no record that the Convention contem15
The Pennsylvania Constitution required that all "bills of [a] public nature" had to be printed after being introduced and had to lie over until the
following session of the legislature before adoption. Pa. Const. § 15 (1776).
These printing and layover requirements applied only to "bills." At the
time, measures could also be enacted as a "resolve," which was allowed by
the Constitution as "urgent temporary legislation" without such requirements. Pa. Const. § 20 (1776). Using this method the Pennsylvania legislature routinely evaded printing and layover requirements through adoption of resolves. A. Nevins, The American States During and After the
Revolution 152 (1969).
A 1784 Report of a committee of the Concil of Censors, a state body responsible for periodically reviewing the state government's adherence to
its Constitution, charged that the procedures for enacting legislation had
been evaded though the adoption of resolves instead of bills. Report of
the Committee of the Council of Censors 13 (1784). See Nevins, supra at
190. When three years later the federal Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia, the delegates were reminded, in the course of discussing the President's veto, of the dangers pointed out by the Council of Censors Report. 5 J. Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 430 (12974 ed.). Furthermore, Madison, who made the motion that led to the Presentation Clause, knew of the Council of Censors
report, The Federalist No. 50, at 353 (Wright ed. 1974), and was aware of
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plated, let alone intended, that these Article I requirements
would someday be invoked to restrain the scope of Congressional authority pursuant to duly-enacted law. 16
the Pennsylvania experience. See The Federalist No. 48, at 346. We have
previously recognized the relevance of the Council of Censors report in interpreting the Constitution. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486,
529-530 (1969).
16
Although the legislative veto was not a feature of Congressional enactments until the twentieth century, the practices of the first Congresses
demonstrate that the constraints of Article I were not envisioned as a constitutional straightjacket. The First Congress, for example, began the
practice of arming its committees with broad investigatory powers. See
A. Josephy, On the Hill: A History of the American Congress 81-83 (1975).
More directly petinent is the First Congress' treatment of the Northwest
Territories Ordinance of 1787. The ordinance, initially drafted under the
Articles of Confederation on July 13, 1787, was the document which governed the territory of the United States northwest of the Ohio River. The
ordinance authorized the territories to adopt laws, subject to disapproval
in Congress.
"The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in
the district, such laws of the original states, criminal and civil, as may be
necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report
them to Congress , from time to time; which laws shall be in force in the
district until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards the legislature shall have authority to alter them as they shall think fit." (emphasis added)
After the Constitution was enacted, the ordinance was reenacted to conform to the requirements of the Constitution. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch.
VIII, § 1, 1 Stat. 50-51. Certain provisions, such as one relating to appointment of officials by Congress, were changed because of constitutional
concerns, but the language allowing disapproval by Congress was retained.
Subsequent provisions for territorial laws contained similar language.
See, e. g. 48 U. S. C. § 1478 (1970).
Although at times Congress disapproved of territorial actions by passing
legislation, see e. g., Act of March 3, 1807, 4 Laws of the United States,
Ch. 99, 117, on at least two occasions one House of Congress passed resolutions of disapproval of territorial laws, only to have the other House fail to
pass the measure for reasons pertaining to the subject matter of the bills.
First, on February 16, 1795, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution disapproving in one sweep all but one of the laws that
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When the Convention did turn its attention to the scope of
Congress' lawmaking power, the Framers were expansive.
The Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, vests
Congress with the power "to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [the enumerated powers of § 8], and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." It
is long-settled that Congress may "exercise its best judgment
in the selection of measures, to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government," and "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 420 (1819)
the governors and judges of the Northwest Territory had passed at a legislative session on August 1, 1792. 4 Annals of Congress 1227. The Senate,
however, refused to concur. 4 Annals of Congress 830. See B. Bond, The
Civilization of the Old Northwest 70-71 (1934). Second, on May 9, 1800,
the House passed a resolution to disapprove of a Misssissippi territorial law
imposing a license fee on taverns. 3 House Journal 704-706. The Senate
unsuccessfully attempted to amend the resolution to strike down all laws of
the Mississippi territory enacted since June 30, 1799. Carter, Territorial
Papers of the United States Vol. 5---Mississippi, 94-95 (1937). The histories of the territories, the correspondence of the era, and the Congressional
reports contain no indication that such resolutions disapproving of territorial laws were to be presented to the President or that the authorization for
such a "congressional veto" in the Act of August 7, 1789 was of doubtful
constitutionality.
The practices of the First Congress are not so clear as to be dispositive of
the constitutional question now before us. But it is surely significant that
that this body, largely composed of the same men who authored Article I
and secured ratification of the Constitution, did not view the Constitution
as forbidding a precursor of the modern day legislative veto. See H ampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 412 (1928) ("In the first Congress sat
many members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. This Court has
repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our government and
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs,
long acquiesced in, fixed the construction to be given its provisions.")

80-1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171-DISSENT
INS v. CHADHA

19

B
The Court heeded this counsel in ~roving the modern administrative state. 1 The Court's holding that all legislativetype action must be enacted through the lawmaking process
ignores that legislative authority is routinely delegated to the
Executive branch, to tile maependent regulatory agencies,
and ~e individuals and groups. This Court's decisions sanctioning such delegations make clear that Article I
does not require all action with the effect of legislation to be
passed as a law.
Theoretically, agencies and officials were asked only to "fill
up the details," and the rule was that "Congress cannot delegate any part of its legislative power except under a limitation of a prescribed standard." United States v. Chicago,
Milwaukee R. Co., 282 U. S. 311, 324 (1931). Chief Justice
Taft elaborated the standard in J.W. Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394, 409 (1928): "If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a fobidden delegation
of legislative power." In practice, however, restrictions on
the scope of the power that could be delegated diminished
and all but disappeared. In only two instances did the Court
find an unconstitutional delegation. Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). In other cases, the
"intelligible principle" through which agencies have attained
enormous control over the economic affairs of the country
was held to include such formulations as "just and reasonable," Tagg Bros & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420
(1930), "public interest," New York Central Securities Corp.
v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932), "public convenience, interest, or necessity," Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U. S. 266 (1933), and "unfair
methods of competition." FTC v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421 (1920).
The wisdom and the constitutionality of these broad dele-

----
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gations are matters that still have not been put to rest. But
for present purposes, these cases establish that by virtue of
Congressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised
by independent agencies and Executive departments without
the passage of new legislation. For some time, the sheer
amount of law-the substantive rules that regulate private
conduct and direct the operation of government-made by
the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in
by Congress through the traditional process. There is no
question but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any
functional or realistic sense of the term. The Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 551(4) provides that a "rule" is an
agency statement "designed to implement, intepret, or prescribe law or policy." When agencies are authorized to prescribe law through substantive rulemaking, the administrator's regulation is not only due deference, but is accorded
"legislative effect." See, e. g. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U. S. 34, 43-44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S.
416 (1977). 17 They bind courts and officers of the federal
government, may pre-empt state law, see,e. g., Fidelity
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. De la Cuesta, supra, and
grant rights and impose obligations on the public. In sum,
they have the force of law.
"Legislative, or substantive, regulations are 'issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and ... implement the statute, as for example, the proxy rules issue by the Securities and Exechange Commission
. . . Such rules have the force and effect of law.' U. S. Dept. of Justice,
Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedures Act 30 n. 3
(1947).'' Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977).
Substantive agency regulations are clearly exercises of lawmaking authority; agency interpretations of their statutes are only arguably so. But
as Henry Monaghan has observed, "Judicial deference to agency 'interpretation' of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency." H. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1983). See, e. g. NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U. S. 111 (1944); NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural
Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
17
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If Congress may delegate lawmaking power to independ-

ent__and executive agencies, it1s most difficult to understand
Article I as foroioaing Congress from also reserving legislative power for jtself. Absent the veto, the agenciesreceiving delegations of legislative or quasi-legislative power may
issue regulations having the force of law without bicameral
approval and without the President's signature. It is thus
not apparent why the reservation of a veto over the exercise
of that legislative power must be subject to a more exacting
test. In both cases, it is enough that the initial statutory authorizations comply with the Article I requirements.
Nor are there strict limits on the agents that may receive
such delegations of legislative authority so that it might be
said that the legislature can delegate authority to others but
not to itself. While most authority to issue rules and regulations is given to the executive branch and the Independent
Regulatory Agencies, statutory delegations to private persons have also passed this Court's scrutiny. In Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U. S. 1 (1939), the statute provided that restrictions upon the production or marketing of agricultural commodities was to become effective only upon the favorable
vote by a prescribed majority of the affected farmers.
United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533, 577
(1939), upheld an act which gave producers of specified
commodoties the right to veto marketing orders issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture. Assuming Currin and Rock
Royal Co-operative remain sound law, the Court's decision
today suggests that Congress may place a "veto" power over
suspensions of deportation in private hands or in the hands of
an independent agency, but is forbidden from reserving such
authority for itself. Perhaps this odd result could be justified on other constitutional grounds, such as the separation of
powers, see infra at--, but certainly it cannot be defended
as consistent with the Court's view of the Article I presentment and bicameralism commands. 18
'

8

As the Court acknowledges , the "provisions of Art. I are integral parts

I
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The Court's opinion in the present case comes closest to
facing the reality of administrative lawmaking in considering
the contention that the Attorney General's action in suspend\ ing deportation under § 244 is itself a legislative act. The
Court posits that the Attorney General is acting in an Article
II enforcement capacity under § 244. This characterization
is at odds with Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924), where
the power conferred on the Executive to deport aliens was
considered a delegation of "legislative power." More fundamentally, even if the Executive Branch's authority to suspend orders of deportation under § 244 is considered an Article II function, it does not follow that Congress' exercise of
independent judgment on who is to be deported and who is to
remain constitutes an executive act. While the Court characterizes the Attorney General's power under§ 244 as an Article II executive power, the Court concedes that "some administrative agency action-rulemaking, for example-may
resemble lawmaking," and recognizes that "this Court has referred to agency activity as being 'quasi-legislative' in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602,
628 (1935)." Ante, at 32, n.16. This being so, it remains to
be answered why such agency action is permissible under the
Constitution without being subject to the bicameral and presentment process and why the legislative veto is not.
of the constitutional design for the separation of powers." Ante, at 25.
But these separation of power concerns are that legislative power be exercised by Congress, executive power by the President, and judicial power
by the Courts. A scheme which allows delegation of legislative power to
the President and the departments under his control, but restricts its exercise by Congress itself obviously denigrates the separation of power concerns underlying Article I. To be sure, the doctrine of separation of powers is also concerned with checking each branches exercise of its
characteristic authority. Section 244(c)(2) is fully consistent with the need
for checks upon Congressional authority, infra at--, and the legislative
veto mechanism more generally is an important check upon Executive authority, infra at - - .
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Also noteworthy is the Court's opinion that "The bicameral
process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a
statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7." Ante, at 32
n. 16. By the same reasoning, a resolution of disapproval
under § 244(c)(2) need not again be subject to the bicameral
process. Because it serves only to check the Attorney General's exercise of the suspension authority granted by § 244,
the disapproval resolution also "cannot reach beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Article I." In sum, the Court cannot distinguish the
agencies' authority to make rules with the effect of law from
the veto device which simply precludes such rules from having operative force. Such rules and adjudications by the
agencies meet the Court's own definition of legislative action
for they "alter the legal rights, d.,uties, and relations of persons ... outside the legislative branch," ante at 31. and involve "determinations of policy," ante, at 33. 19
The Court's other reasons for considering the legislative veto subject
to the presentment and bicameral passage requirements require but brief
discussion. First, the Court posits that the resolution of disapproval
should be considered equivalent to new legislation because absent the veto
authority of§ 244(c)(2) neither House could, short of legislation, effectively
require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General
has determined that the alien should remain in the United States. Ante,
at 31-32. The statement is neither accurate nor meaningful. The Attorney General's power under the Act is only to "suspend" the order of deportation; the "suspension" does not cancel the deportation or adjust the
alien's status to that of a permanent resident alien. Cancellation of deportation and adjustment of status must await favorable action by Congress. The question is whether § 244(c)(2) as written is constitutional and
no law is amended or repealed by the resolution of diapproval which is, of
course, expressly authorized by that section.
The Court also argues that "the legislative character of the challenged
action of one House is confirmed by the fact that when the Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its
19
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c
The Court also takes no account of perhaps the most relevant
consideration: However resolutions of disapproval under
§ 244(c)(2f are formally characterized, in reality, a departure
from the status quo occurs only upon the concurrence of opinion among the House, Senate, and President. Reservations
of legislative authority to be exercised by Congress should be
upheld, particularly if the exercise of such reserved authority
is essentially consistent with tfiec hstnbution of and limits
at A 1c e I provides.
upo
1

As its history reveals, § 244(c)(2) withstands this analysis.
Until 1917, Congress had never established laws concerning
the deportation of aliens. The Immigration Act of 1924 enlarged the categories of aliens subject to mandatory deportation, and substantially increased the likelihood of hardships
to individuals by abolishing in most cases the previous time
limitation of three years within which deportation proceedings had to be commenced. Immigration Act of 1924, ch.
190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). Thousands of persons, who either
had entered the country in more lenient times or had been
smuggled in as children, or had overstayed their permits,
faced the prospect of deportation. Enforcement of the Act
prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined
the procedure for such action in the Constitution." Ante, at 34. Leaving
aside again the above-refuted premise that all action with a legislative
character requires passage in a law, the short answer is that all of these
carefully defined exceptions from the presentment and bicameralism strictures do not involve action of the Congress pursuant to a duly-enacted statute. Indeed, for the most part these powers-those of impeachment, review of appointments, and treaty ratification-are not legislative powers at
all. The fact that it was essential for the Constitution to stipulate that
Congress has the power to impeach and try the President hardly demonstrates a limit upon Congress authority to reserve itself a legislative veto
through ~ over subjects within its lawmaking authority.

l
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grew more rigorous over the years with the deportation of
thousand of aliens without regard to the mitigating circumstances of particular cases. See Mansfield, The Legislative
Veto and the Deportation of Aliens, 1 Public Administration
Review 281 (1940). Congress provided relief in certain cases
through the passage of private bills.
In 1933, when deportations reached their zenith, the Secretary of Labor temporarily suspended numerous deportations
on grounds of hardship, 78 Cong. Rec. 11783 (1934), and proposed legislation to allow certain deportable aliens to remain
in the country. H. R. 9725, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
The Labor Department bill was opposed, however, as "grant[ing] too much discretionary authority," 78 Cong. Rec. 11790
(remarks of Rep. Dirksen), and it failed decisively. Id., at
11791.
The following year, the administration proposed bills to authorize an inter-Departmental committee to grant permanent
residence to deportable aliens who had lived in the United
States for ten years or who had close relatives here. S. 2969
& H. R. 8163, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). These bills were
also attacked as an "abandonment of congressional control
over the deportation of undesirable aliens," H. R. Rep. No.
1110 (Part 2, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935), and were not enacted. A similar fate awaited a bill introduced in the 75th
Congress that would have authorized the Secretary to grant
permanent residence to up to 8,000 deportable aliens. The
measure passed the House, but did not come to a vote in the
Senate. H. R. 6391, 83 Cong. Rec. 8992-96 (1938).
The succeeding Congress again attempted to find a legislative solution to the deportation problem. The initial House
bill required congressional action to cancel individual deportations, 84 Cong. Rec. 10455 (1939), but the Senate
amended the legislation to provide that deportable aliens
should not be deported unless the Congress by Act or resolution rejected the recommendation of the Secretary. H. R.
5138, § 10, as reported with amendments by S. Rep. No.
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1721, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1940). The compromise solution, the immediate predecessor to § 244(c), allowed the Attorney General to suspend the deportation of qualified aliens.
Their deportation would be canceled and permanent residence granted if the House and Senate did not adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval. S. Rep. No. 1796, 76th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 5-6 (1940). The Executive Branch played a
major role in fashioning this compromise, see 86 Cong. Rec.
8345 (1940), and President Roosevelt approved the legislation, which became the Alien Registration Act of 1940, P.L.
No. 670, 54 Stat. 670.
In 1947, the Department of Justice requested legislation
authorizing the Attorney General to cancel deportations
without congressional review. H. R. 2933, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947). The purpose of the proposal was to "save time
and energy of everyone concerned . . . " Regulating Powers
of the Attorney General to Suspend Deportation of Aliens:
Hearings Before the Subcomm on Immigration of the House
Comm on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1977). The
Senate Judiciary Committee objected, stating that "affirmative action by the Congress in all suspension cases should be
required before deportation proceedings may be canceled."
S. Rep. No. 1204, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948). See also
H. R. Rep. No. 647, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). Congress not only rejected the Department's request for final authority but amended the Immigration Act to require that
cancellation of deportation be approved by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. President Truman signed the bill
without objection. Act of July 1, 1948, P.L. No. 863, 62
Stat. 1206.
Practice over the ensuing several years convinced Congress that the requirement of affirmative approval was "not
workable ... and would, in time, interfere with the legislative work of the House." House Judiciary Committee,
H. R. Rep. No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949). In preparing the comprehensive Immigration and Nationality Act
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of 1952, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that
for certain classes of aliens the adjustment of status be subject to the disapproval of either House; but deportation of an
alien "who is of the criminal, subversive, or immoral classes
or who overstays his period of admission," would be cancelled
only upon a concurrent resolution disapproving the deportation. S. Rep. No. 1514, 81st Gong. 2d Sess 610 (1950).
Legislation reflecting this change was passed by both
Houses, and enacted into law as part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 over President Truman's veto, which
was not predicated on the presence of a legislative veto.
Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). In subsequent
years, the Congress refused further requests that the Attorney General be given final authority to grant discretionary
relief for specified categories of aliens, and § 244 remained intact to the present.
Section 244(A)(1) authorizes the Attorney General, in his
discretion, to suspend the deportation of certain aliens who
are otherwise deportable and, upon Congress' approval, to
adjust their status to that of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. In order to be eligible for this relief, an
alien must have been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than seven years, must
prove he is of good moral character, and must prove that he
or his immediate family would suffer "extreme hardship" if
he is deported. Judicial review of a denial of relief may be
sought. Thus, the suspension proceeding "has two phases: a
determination whether the statutory conditions have been
met, which generally involves a question of law, and a determination whether relief shall be granted, which [ultimately]
... is confided to the sound discretion of the Attorney General [and his delegates]." 2 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 7.9a(5) at 7-134.
There is also a third phase to the process. Under
§ 244(c)(1) the Attorney General must report all such suspensions, with a detailed statement of facts and reasons, to the
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Congress. Either House may then act, in that session or the
next, to block the suspension of deportation by passing a
resolution of disapproval. § 244(c)(2). Upon Congressional
approval of the suspension-by its silence-the alien's permanent status is adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien.
The history of the Immigration Act makes clear that
§ 244(c)(2) did not any alter the division of actual authority
between Congress and the Executive. At all times, whether
through private bills, or .through affirmative concurrent resolutions, or through the present one-House veto, a permanent
change in a deportable alien's status could be accomplished
only with the agreement of the Attorney General, the House,
and the Senate.
2

The central concern of the presentation and bicameralism
requirements of Article I is that when a departure from the
legal status quo is undertaken, it is done with the approval of
the President and both Houses of Congress-or, in the event
of a presidential veto, a two-thirds majority in both Houses.
This interest is fully satisfied by the operation of § 244(c)(2).
The President's approval is found in the Attorney General's
action in recommending to Congress that the deportation
order for a given alien be suspended. The House and the
Senate indicate their approval of the Executive's action by
not passing a resolution of disapproval within the statutory
period. Thus, a change in the legal status quo-the
deportability of the alien-is consummated only with the approval of each of the three relevant actors. The disagreement of either branch maintains the alien's pre-existing status: the Executive may choose not to recommend suspension;
the House and Senate may each veto the recommendation.
The effect on the rights and obligations of the affected individuals and upon the legislative system is precisely the same
as if a private bill were introduced but failed to receive the
necessary approval. "The President and the two Houses en-
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joy exactly the same say in what the law is to be as would
have been true for each without the presence of the oneHouse veto, and nothing in the law is changed absent the concurrence of the President and a majority in each House."
Atkins v. United States, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1064 (Ct. Claims,
1977), cert. denied, 434 U. 8. 1009 (1978).
This very construction of the Presentment Clause which
the Executive Branch now rejects was the basis upon which
the Executive Branch defended the constitutionality of the
Reorganization Act, 5 U. 8. C. 906(a) (1979), which provides
that the President's proposed reorganization plans take effect
only if not vetoed by either House. When the Department
of Justice advised the Senate on the constitutionality of congressional review in reorganization legislation in 1949, it
stated: "In this procedure there is no question involved of the
Congress taking legislative action beyond its initial passage
of the Reorganization Act." 8. Rep. No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1949) (Dept of Justice Memorandum). This also
represents the position of the Attorney General more
20
recently.
Thus understood, § 244(c)(2) fully effectuates the purposes
of the bicameralism and presentation requirements. I now
briefly consider possible objections to the analysis.
20
In his opinion on the constitutionality of the legislative review provisions of the most recent reoganziation statute, 5 U. S. C. 906(a) (Supp. III
1979), Attorney General Bell stated that "the statement in Article I, § 7 of
the procedural steps to be followed in the enactment of legislation does not
exclude other forms of action by the Congress." 43 Op. Atty Gen. No. 10,
at 2 (1977). "If the procedures provided in a given statute have no effect
on the constitutional distribution of power between the legislature and the
executive," then the statute is constitutional. !d., at 3. In the case of the
reorganization statute, the power of the President to refuse to submit a
plan, combined with the power of either House of Congress to reject a submitted plan suffices under the standard to make the statute constitutional.
Although the Attorney Aeneral sought to limit his opinion to the reorganization statute, and the Executive opposes the instant statute, I see no
Article I basis to distinguish between the two.

\
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First, it may be asserted that Chadha's status before legislative disapproval is one of nondeportation and that the exercise of the veto, unlike the failure of a private bill, works a
change in the status quo. This position plainly ignores the
statutory language. At no place in § 244 has Congress delegated to the Attorney General any final power to determine
which aliens shall be allowed to remain in the United States
for reasons of extreme hardship to the alien or his family.
Congress has retained the ultimate power to pass on such
changes in deportable status. By its own terms, § 244(a)
states that whatever power the Attorney General has been
delegated to suspend deportation and adjust status is to be
exercisable only "as hereinafter prescribed in this section."
Subsection (c) is part of that section. A grant of "suspension" does not cancel the alien's deportation or adjust the
alien's status to that of a permanent residence alien. A suspension order is merely a "deferment of deportation,"
McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U. S. 162, 168 (1950), which can
mature into a cancellation of deportation and adjustment of
status only upon the approval of Congress-by way of silence-under§ 244(c)(2). Only then does the statute authorize the Attorney General to "cancel deportation proceedings"
§ 244(c)(2), and "record the alien's lawful admission for permanent residence ... " § 244(d). The Immigration and Naturalization Service's action, on behalf of the Attorney General, "cannot become effective without ratification by
Congress." 2 Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and
Procedure, § 8.14 p. 8-121 (rev. ed. 1979). Until that ratification occurs, the executive's action is simply a recommendation that Congress finalize the suspension-in itself, it
works no legal change.
Second, it may be said that this approach leads to the incongruity that the two-House veto is more suspect than its
one-House brother. Although the idea may be initially
counter-intuitive, on close analysis, it is not at all unusual
that the one-House veto is of more certain constitutionality
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than the two-House version. If the Attorney General's action is a proposal for legislation, then the disapproval of but a
single House is all that is required to prevent its passage.
Because approval is indicated by the failure to veto, the oneHouse veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval.
The two-House version may present a different question.
The concept that "neither branch of Congress, when acting
separately, can lawfully exercise more power than is conferred by the Constitution on the whole body," Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 182 (1881) is fully observed. 21
Third, it may be objected that Congress cannot indicate its
approval of legislative change by inaction. In the Court of
Appeals' view, inaction by Congress "could equally imply endorsement, acquiescence, passivity, indecision or indifference." --F. 2d, at--. This objection appears more
properly directed at the wisdom of the legislative veto than
its constitutionality.
The Constitution does not and cannot
guarantee that legislators will carefully scrutinize legislation
and deliberate before acting. In a democracy it is the electorate that holds the legislators accountable for the wisdom
of their choices. It is hard to maintain that a private bill receives any greater individualized scrutiny than a resolution of
disapproval under§ 244(c)(2). The requirements of Article I
are not compromised by the Congressional scheme.
IV
The Court of Appeals struck § 244(c)(2) as violative of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. It is true
that the purpose of separating the authority of government is
to "prevent an unnecessary and therefore dangerous concentration of power in one branch." For that reason, the
Framers saw fit to divide and balance the powers of govern21
Of course, when the authorizing legislation requires approval to be expressed by a positive vote, then the two-House veto would clearly comply
with the Bicameralism requirement under any analysis.
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ment so that each branch would be checked by the others.
Virtually every part of our constitutional system bears the
mark of this judgment.
But the history of the separation of powers doctrine is also
a history of accomodation and practicality. Apprehensions
of an overly powerful branch have not led to undue prophylactic measures that handicap the effective working of the national government as a whole. The Constitution does not
contemplate total separation of the three branches of Government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 121 (1976). "[A] hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from
one another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Ibid. 22
Our decisions reflect this judgment. As already noted,
the Court, recognizing that modern government must address a formidable agenda of complex policy issues, countenanced the delegation of extensive legislative authority to executive and independent agencies. Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). The separation of
powers doctrine has heretofore led to the invalidation of government action only when the challenged action violated
some express provision in the Constitution. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 118--124 (1976) (per curiam) and Myers v.
United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), congressional action com22
Madison emphasized that the principle of separation of powers is primarily violated "where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department."
Federalist No. 47, 302-303. Madison noted that, the oracle of the separation doctrine, Montesquieu, in writing that the legislative, executive and
judicial powers should not be united "in the same person or body of persons," did not mean "that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or controul over the acts of each other." The Federalist No.
47, p. 325 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). Indeed, according to
Montesquieu, the legislature is uniquely fit to exercise an additional function: "to examine in what manner the laws that it has made have been executed." Gwyn, Meaning of Separation of Powers 102 (1965).
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promised the appointment power of the President. See also
Springer v. Phillipine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 200-201
(1928). In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1871), an
Act of Congress was struck for encroaching upon judicial
power, but the Court found that the Act also impinged upon
the Executive's exclusive pardon power. Art. II, § 2. Because we must have a workable efficient government, this is
~
as it should be.
This is the teaching of Nixon v. Administrator of Gen.
Servs., 433 U. S. 425 (1977), which, in rejecting a separation
of powers objection to a law requiring that the Administrator
take custody of certain presidential papers, set forth a framework for evaluating such claims:
"[l]n determining whether the Act disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S.
at 711-712. Only where the potential for disruption is
present must we then determine whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need to promote objectives
withhin the constitutional authority of Congress." 433
U. S., at 443.
Section 244(c)(2) survives this test. The legislative veto
provision does not "prevent the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."
First, it is clear that the Executive Branch has no "constitutiOrlally assigned" function of suspending the deportation of
aliens. "'Over no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 766
(1972), quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). Nor can it be said that the inherent function of the Executive Branch in executing the law is
involved. The Steel Seizure Case resolved that the Article
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II mandate for the President to execute the law is a directive
to enforce the law which Congress has written. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952). "The duty
of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty
that does not go beyond the laws or require him to a achieve
more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." Myers v. United States, 272 U. S., at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting); 272 U. S., at 247 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Here,
§ 244 grants the executive only a qualified suspension authority and it is only that authority which the President is constitutionally authorized to execute.
Moreover, the Court apparently agrees that the legislative )
veto we consider today is best characterized as an excercise
of legislative or quasi-legislative authority. Under this
characterization, the practice does not, even on the surface,
constitute an infringement of executive or judicial preroga- _. • __ J-&..:'"'
tive. The Attorney General's suspension of ~'fteF4ty is u..c.
....-TJ-,'
equivalent to a proposal for legislation. The nature of the
Attorney General's role as recommendatory is not altered because § 244 provides for congressional action through disapprova:l rather than by ratification. In comparison to private
bills, which must be initiated in the Congress and which allow
a Presidential veto to be overriden by a two-thirds majority
in both Houses of Congress, § 244 augments rather than reduces the executive branch's authority in this area. So understood, congressional review does not undermine, as the
Court of Appeals thought, the "weight and dignity" that attends the decisions of the Executive Branch.
Nor does § 244 infringe on the judicial power. Section 244
makes clear that Congress has reserved its own judgment as
part of the statutory process. Congressional action does not
substitute for judicial review of the Attorney General's decisions. The Act provides for judicial review of the refusal of
the Attorney General to suspend a deportation and to transmit a recommendation to Congress. INS v. Wang, 450
U. S. 139 (1981) (per curiam). But the courts have not been

rn."'
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given the authority to review whether an alien should be
given permanent status; review is limited to whether the Attorney General has properly applied the statutory standards
for essentially denying the alien a recommendation that his
deportable status be changed by the Congress. Moreover,
there is no constitutional obligation to provide any judicial review whatever for a failure to suspend deportation. "The
power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country,
may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has
been made by Congress to depend." Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713-714 (1893). See also
Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 576 (1926); Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 171-172 (1948); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 590 (1952).
(
I do not suggest that all legislative vetos are necessarily
consistent With senarati"on of powers principles. A legislative check i5ilai1fnherently executive function, for example
that of initiating prosecutions, poses an entirely different
question. But the legislative veto device here-and in many
other settings-is far from an instance of legislative tyranny
over the Executive but a necessary check on the unavoidably
expanding power of the agencies, both executive and independent, as they engage in exercising powers delegated by
Congress.

v

I regret that I am in disagreement with my colleagues on
the fundamental questions that this case presents. But even
more I regret the destructive scope of the Court's holding.
It reflects a profoundly different conception of the Constitution than that held by the Courts which sanctioned the modern adminstrative state. Today's decision strikes down in
one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress
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than the Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history. I
fear it will now be more difficult "to insure that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an
appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to
the people," Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 626 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). I must dissent.
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APPENDIX 1
STATUTES WITH PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW
This compilation, reprinted from the Brief for the United
States Senate, identifies and describes briefly current statutory provisions for a legislative veto by one or both Houses of
Congress. Statutory provisions for a veto by committees of
the Congress and provisions which require legislation (i. e.,
passage of a joint resolution) are not included. The fifty-six
statutes in the compilation (some of which contain more than
one provision for legislative review) are divided into six
broad categories: foreign affiars and national security, budget, international trade, energy, rulemaking and
miscellaneous.

A.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Act for International Development of 1961, Pub. L. No.
87-195, §617, 75 Stat. 424, 444, 22 U.S. C. 2367 (Funds
made available for foreign assistance under the Act may be
terminated by concurrent resolution).
2. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5, 87 Stat.
555, 556--557 (1973), 50 U. S. C. 1544 (Absent declaration of
war, President may be directed by concurrent resolution to
remove United States armed forces engaged in foreign
hostilities.)
3. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization
Act, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-155, § 807, 87 Stat. 605, 615 (1973),
50 U. S. C. 1431 (National defense contracts obligating the
United States for any amount in excess of $25,000,000 may be
disapproved by resolution of either House).
4. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization
Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-365, § 709(c), 88 Stat. 399, 408
(1974), 50 U. S. C. app. 2403-l(c) (Applications for export of
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defense goods, technology or techniques may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution).
5. H. R. J. Res. 683, Pub. L. No. 94-110, § 1, 89 Stat. 572
(1975), 22 U. S. C. 2441 note (Assignment of civilian personnel to Sinai may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
6. International Development and Food Assistance Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 Stat. 849, 860, 22
U. S. C. 2151n (Foreign assistance to countries not meeting
human rights standards may be terminated by concurrent
resolution).
7. International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 211, 90 Stat. 729, 743, 22
U. S. C. 2776(b) (President's letter of offer to sell major defense equipment may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution).
8. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 202, 90
Stat. 1255 (1976), 50 U. S. C. 1622 (Presidentially declared
national emergency may be terminated by concurrent
resolution).
9. International Navigational Rules Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-75, § 3(d), 91 Stat. 308, 33 U. S. C. § 1602(d) (Supp.
III 1979) (Presidential proclamation of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea may be disapproved by
concurrent resolution).
10. International Security Assistance Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-92, § 16, 91 Stat. 614, 622, 22 U. S. C. § 2753(d)(2)
(Supp. III 1979) (President's proposed transfer of arms to a
third country may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
11. Act of December 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 207(2)(b),
91 Stat. 1625, 1628, 50 U. S. C. 1706(b) (Supp. III 1979)
(Presidentially declared national emergency and exercise of
conditional powers may be terminated by concurrent
resolution).
12. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-242, §§ 303, 304, 306, 307, 401, 92 Stat. 120, 130, 134,
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137-38, 139, 144, 42 u. s. c. §§ 2160(f), 2155(b), 2157(b),
2153(d) (Supp. III 1979) (Cooperative agreements concerning
storage and disposition of spent nuclear fuel, proposed export
of nuclear facilities, materials or technology and proposed
agreements for international cooperation in nuclear reactor
development may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
B.
BUDGET
13. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 1013, 88 Stat. 297, 334-35, 31
U. S. C. 1403 (The proposed deferral of budget authority
provided for a specific project or purpose may be disapproved
by an impoundment resolution by either House).

c.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
14. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 351,
76 Stat. 872, 899, 19 U. S. C. 1981(a) (Tariff or duty recommended by Tariff Commission may be imposed by concurrent
resolution of approval).
15. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 203(c), 302(b),
402(d), 407, 88 Stat. 1978, 2016, 2043, 2057-60, 2063-64, 19
U. S. C. 2253(c), 2412(b), 2432, 2434 (Proposed Presidential
actions on import relief and actions concerning certain countries may be disapproved by concurrent resolution; various
Presidential proposals for waiver extensions and for extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to products of foreign
countries may be disapproved by simple (either House) or
concurrent resolutions).
16. Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-646, §8, 88 Stat. 2333, 2336, 12 U. S. C. 635e (Presidentially proposed limitation for exports to USSR in excess of
$300,000,000 must be approved by concurrent resolution).
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D.
ENERGY
17. Act of November 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 101, 87
Stat. 576, 582, 30 U. S. C. 185(u) (Continuation of oil exports
being made pursuant to President's finding that such exports
are in the national interest may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
18. Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-577, § 12, 88 Stat. 1878,
1892-1893, 42 U. S. C. 5911 (Rules or orders proposed by the
President concerning allocation or acquisition of essential materials may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
19. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
94-163, § 551, 89 Stat. 871, 965 (1975), 42 U. S. C. 6421(c)
(Certain Presidentially proposed "energy actions" involving
fuel economy and pricing may be disapproved by resolution of
either House).
20. Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-258, § 201, 90 Stat. 303, 309, 10 U. S. C.
7422(c)(2)(C) (President's extension of production period for
naval petroleum reserves may be disapproved by resolution
of either House).
21. Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No.
94-385, § 305, 90 Stat. 1125, 1148 (1976), 42 U. S. C. 6834
(Proposed sanctions involving federal assistance and the energy conservation performance standards for new buildings
must be approved by resolution of both Houses).
22. Department of Energy Act of 1978--Civilian Applications, Pub. L. No. 95--238, §§ 107, 207(b), 92 Stat. 47, 55, 70,
22 U. S. C. 3224a, 42 U. S. C. 5919(m) (Supp. III 1979) (International agreements and expenditures by Secretary of Energy of appropriations for foreign spent nuclear fuel storage
must be approved by concurrent resolution, if not consented
to by legislation;) (plans for such use of appropriated funds
may be disapproved by either House;) (financing in excess of
$50,000,000 for demonstration facilities must be approved by
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resolution in both Houses).
23. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-372, §§205(a), 208, 92 Stat. 629, 641, 668, 43
U. S. C. §§ 1337(a), 1354(c) (Supp. III 1979) (Establishment
by Secretary of Energy of oil and gas lease bidding system
may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (export of
oil and gas may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
24. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621,
§§ 122(c)(1) and (2), 202(c), 206(d)(2), 507, 92 Stat. 3350, 3370,
3371, 3372, 3380, 3406, 15 U. S. C. 3332, 3342(c), 3346(d)(2),
3417 (Supp. III 1979) (Presidential reimposition of natural
gas price controls may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;) (Congress may reimpose natural gas price controls by
concurrent resolution;) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) amendment to pass through incremental
costs of natural gas, and exemptions therefrom, may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (procedure for congressional review established).
25. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72,
§ 7(d)(B), 7(g)(3), 93 Stat. 503, 518, 520, 50 U. S. C. app.
2406(d)(2)(B), 2406(g)(3) (Supp. III 1979) (President's proposal to domestically produce crude oil must be approved by
concurrent resolution;) (action by Secretary of Commerce to
prohibit or curtail export of agricultural commodities may be
disapproved by concurrent resolution).
26. Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, §§ 104(b)(3),
104(e), 126(d)(2), 126(d)(3), 128, 129, 132(a)(3), 133(a)(3),
137(b)(5), 141(d), 179(a), 803, 94 Stat. 611, 618, 619, 620,
623-26, 628-29, 649, 650-52, 659, 660, 664, 666, 679, 776
(1980) (to be codified in 50 U. S. C. app. 2091-93, 2095, 2096,
2097, 42 u. s. c. 8722, 8724, 8725, 8732, 8733, 8737, 8741,
8779, 6240) (Loan guarantees by Departments of Defense,
Energy and Commerce in excess of specified amounts may be
disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's proposal to provide loans or guarantees in excess of established
amounts may be disapproved by resolution of either House;)
(proposed award by President of individual contracts for pur-
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chase of more than 75,000 barrels per day of crude oil may be
disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's proposals to overcome energy shortage through synthetic fuels
development, and individual contracts to purchase more than
75,000 barrels per day, including use of loans or guarantees,
may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (procedures for either House to disapprove proposals made under
Act are established;) (request by Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) for additional time to submit its comprehensive
strategy may be disapproved by resolution of either House;)
(proposed amendment to comprehensive strategy by SFC
Board of Directors may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of either House or by failure of both Houses to pass concurrent resolution of approval;) (procedure for either House
to disapprove certain proposed actions of SFC is established;)
(procedure for both Houses to approve by concurrent resolution or either House to reject concurrent resolution for proposed amendments to comprehensive strategy of SFC is established;) (proposed loans and loan guarantees by SFC may
be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (acquisition by
SFC of a synthetic fuels project which is receiving financial
assistance may be disapproved by resolution of either
House;) (SFC contract renegotiations exceeding initial cost
estimates by 175% may be disapproved by ·resolution of either House;) (proposed financial assistance to synthetic fuel
projects in Western Hemisphere outside United States may
be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (President's
request to suspend provisions requiring build up of reserves
and limiting sale or disposal of certain crude oil reserves must
be approved by resolution of both Houses).

E.
RULEMAKING
27. Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93--380,
§ 509, 88 Stat. 484, 567, 20 U. S. C. 1232(d)(1) (Department
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of Education regulations may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution).
28. Federal Education Campaign Act Amendments of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 109, 93 Stat. 1339, 1364, 2 U. S. C.
438(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979) (Proposed rules and regulations of
the Federal Election Commission may be disapproved by
resolution of either House).
29. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93--595, § 2, 88 Stat.
1926, 1948, 28 U. S. C. 2076 (Proposed amendments by Supreme Court of Federal Rules of Evidence may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
30. Act of August 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, § 208, 89 Stat.
433, 436-37, 42 U. S. C. 602 note (Social Security standards
proposed by Secretary of Health and Human Services may be
disapproved by either House).
31. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
§ 43(f)(3), 92 Stat. 1705, 1752, 49 U. S. C. 1552(f) (Supp. III
1979) (Rules or regulations governing employee protection
program may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
32. Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561,
§§ 1138, 1212, 1409, 92 Stat. 2143, 2327, 2341, 2341, 2369, 25
U. S. C. 2018, 20 U. S. C. 1221-3(e) (Supp. III 1979) (Rules
and regulations proposed under the Act may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution).
33. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-247, § 7(b)(1), 94 Stat. 349, 352-355 (1980) (to be codified in 42 U. S. C. 1997e) (Attorney General's proposed
standards for resolution of grievances of adults confined in
correctional facilities may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
34. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21(a), 94 Stat. 374, 393 (to be codified
in 15 U. S. C. 57a-1) (Federal Trade Commission rules may
be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
35. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No.
96-88, § 414(b), 93 Stat. 668, 685 (1979), 20 U. S. C. 3474
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(Supp. III 1979) (Rules and regulations promulgated with respect to the various functions, programs and responsibilities
transferred by this Act, may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution).
36. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-364, § 102, 94 Stat. 1208, 1213 (to be codified
in 29 U. S. C. 1322a) (Schedules proposed by Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) which requires an increase in
premiums must be approved by concurrent resolution;) (revised premium schedules for voluntary supplemental coverage proposed by PBGC may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution).
37. Farm Credit Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96--592, § 508, 94 Stat. 3437, 3450 (to be codified in 12
U. S. C. 2121) (Certain Farm Credit Administration regulations or delayed by resolution of either House.)
38. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96--510, § 305, 94
Stat. 2767, 2809 (to be codified in 42 U. S. C. 9655) (Environmental Protection Agency regulations concerning hazardous
substances releases, liability and compensation may be disapproved by concurrent resolution or by the adoption of either
House of a concurrent resolution which is not disapproved by
the other House).
39. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96--515, § 501, 94 Stat. 2987, 3004 (to be codified
in 16 U. S. C. 470w-6) (Regulation proposed by the Secretary of the Interior may be disapproved by concurrent
resolution).
40. Costal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96--464, § 12, 94 Stat. 2060, 2067 (to be codified in
16 U. S. C. 1463a) (Rules proposed by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
41. Act of December 17,1980, Pub. L. No. 96--539, §4, 94
Stat. 3194, 3195 (to be codified in 7 U. S. C. 136w) (Rules or
regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the Envi-
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ronmental Protection Agency under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
42. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, §§ 533(a)(2), 1107(d), 1142, 1183(a)(2), 1207, 95 Stat.
357, 453, 626, 654, 659, 695, 718-20 (to be codified in 20
u. s. c. 1089, 23 u. s. c. 402(j), 45 u. s. c. 761, 767,
564(c)(3), 15 U. S. C. 2083, 1276, 1204) (Secretary of Education's schedule of expected family contributions for Pell Grant
recipients may be disapproved by resolution of either House;)
(rules promulgated by Secretary of Transportation for programs to reduce accidents, injuries and deaths may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (Secretary of Transportation's plan for the sale of government's common stock in
rail system may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;)
(Secretary of Transportation's approval of freight transfer
agreements may be disapproved by resolution of either
House;) (amendments to Amtrak's Route and Service Criteria may be disapproved by resolution of either House;) (Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations may be disapproved by concurrent resolution of both Houses, or by
concurrent resolution of disapproval by either House if such
resolution is not disapproved by the other House).

F.
MISCELLANEOUS
43. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-920,
§ 201, 64 Stat. 1245, 1248, 50 app. U. S. C. 2281(g) (Interstate civil defense compacts may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
44. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No.
8fr.568, § 302c, 72 Stat. 426, 433, 42 U. S. C. 2453 (President's transfer to National Air and Space Administration of
functions of other departments and agencies may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
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45. Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-656, § 3, 84 Stat. 1946, 1949, 5 U. S. C. 5305 (President's
alternative pay plan may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
46. Act of October 19, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-134, § 5, 87 Stat.
466, 468, 25 U. S. C. 1405 (Plan for use and distribution of
funds paid in satisfaction of judgment of Indian Claims Commission or Court of Claims may be disapproved by resolution
of either House).
47. Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 6, 87
Stat. 770, 773 (1973), 25 U. S. C. 903d(b) (Plan by Secretary
of the Interior for assumption of the assets the Menominee
Indian corporation may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
48. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 303, 602(c)(1) and
(2), 87 Stat. 774, 784, 814 (1973) (District of Columbia Charter amendments ratified by electors must be approved by
concurrent resolution;) (acts of District of Columbia Council
may be disapproved by concurrent resolution;) (acts of District of Columbia Council under certain titles of D.C. Code
may be disapproved by resolution of either House).
49. Act of December 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, § 102, 89
Stat. 1124, 12 U. S. C. 461 note (Federal Reserve System
Board of Governors may not eliminate or reduce interest rate
differentials between banks insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and associations insured by Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporations without concurrent resolution of approval).
50. Veterans' Education and Employment Assistance Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-502, § 408, 90 Stat. 2383, 2397-98, 38
U. S. C. 1621 note (President's recommendation for continued enrollment period in Armed Forces educational assistance program may be disapproved by resolution of either
House).
51. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub.
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L. No. 94-579, §§ 203(c), 204(c)(l), 90 Stat. 2743, 2750, 2752,
43 U. S. C. 1713(c), 1714 (Sale of public lands in excess of two
thousand five hundred acres and withdrawal of public lands
aggregating five thousand acres or more may be disapproved
by concurrent resolution).
52. Emergency Unemployment Compensation Extension
Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-19, §401, 91 Stat. 39, 45, 2
U. S. C. 359 (Supp. III 1979) (Preident's recommendations
regarding rates of salary payment may be disapproved by
resolution of either House).
53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
§ 515, 92 Stat. 1111, 1179, 5 U. S. C. 3131 note (Supp. III
1979) (Continuation of Senior Executive Service may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).
54. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-523, § 304(b), 92 Stat. 1887, 1906, 31 U. S. C.
1322 (Supp. III 1979) (Presidential timetable for reducing unemployment may be superseded by concurrent resolution).
55. District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-122, § 164, 93 Stat. 866, 891-92 (1979) (Required reports to Congress on the District of Colubmia retirement program may be rejected by resolution of either House).
56. Act of August 29, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-332, § 2, 94 Stat.
1057, 1058 (to be codified in 16 U. S. C. 1432) (Designation of
marine sanctuary by the Secretary of Commerce may be disapproved by concurrent resolution).

drk 05/19/83

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Rives

\

Re: Justice White's dissent in No. 80-1832, INS v. Chadha

The dissent is well written and focuses on its strongest
points: Congress' need to delegate authority to the agencies; the
corresponding need to retain control through a legislative veto; and
the sweeping effect of the Court's opinion.
policy concerns well.

~

It articulates these

There are, however, policy considerations
~
counseling in favor of the Court's opinion. They are well-expressed
in David Martin's article in the Virginia Law Review, The
Legislative Veto and the Reponsible Exercise of Congressional Power,
68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982).

Essentially, the point he makes on the

other side is that the legislative veto allows Congress to delegate
all the hard questions to agencies, thereby avoiding its
responsibility to face and decide difficult issues.
With respect to the

main argument

advanced by the dissent is that the structure of the Government has
changed.

Agencies are given almost standardless mandates, and they

effectively exercise legislative power.

The dissent reasons that if

an agency may exercise legislative power without complying with the
formal requirements of the Presentment Clause, why should Congress
have to do so when it exercises the legislative veto.

The response,

2.

I believe, lies in who takes the action--i.e., whether it is
Congress or an agency.

Agency action is subject to other checks,

such as a higher standard of judicial review than congressional
action.

And Congress retains the power to pass a bill changing

either the rule promulgated by the agency or more basically the
grant of power to the agency.
Congress' power.

There is no similar restraint on

Thus, the formal requirements of the Presentment

Clause may be more necessary when Congress acts.
The dissent seems most vulnerable when it refutes the
argument that Congress' veto "works a change in the status quo." and
therefore must comply with the Presentment Clause.

It argues that

"the executive's action is simply a recommendation that Congress
finalize the suspension--in itself, it works no legal change."

I do

not see why, however, the dissent bothers with refuting this
argument.

If it really believes that some forms of legislative

action (agency action and the legislative veto) do not need to
comply with the Presentment Clause, it does not matter whether the
exercise of the veto works a change in anyone's status.

Making this

argument, however, exposes a weakness in the dissent's position.
The executive's action may be, as the dissent argues, only a
recommendation that Chadha should not be deported.

But if Congress

fails to act, the recommended suspension will take place.

If the

recommendation itself did not change Chadha's status, it is unclear
why congressional inaction would do so.
Nevertheless, I think Justice White's dissent gives the
most convincing explanation for upholding the legislative veto and

3

0

it seems to me that one could join the discussion of the Presentment
Clause with no problem.
I do have, however, greater problems with his discussion
of separation of powers.

He frames the discussion solely in terms

of whether the Congress' exercise of power interferes with the
Executive's or the Judicial Branch's exercise of their power.

This

certainly is one way in which separation of power principles can be
violated.

They also can be violated when one branch assumes a power

that is best left to the other branch.
violation presented by this case.

That is the kind of

Congress has acted as an

adjudicative body and determined the rights of one individual.

This

is particularly unfair since Chadha had no opportunity to present
his side of the case, no right of review and Congress did not
explain its reasons.

In short, Chadha was denied all the procedural

protections that inhere when a Court or an adminsitrative agency
ajudicates a person's rights.

It is precisely because Congress

lacks these restraints that it violates principles of separation of
powers for Congress to act like a court.

In so doing, Congress

exercises power for which there is no effective check.
If you agree with me, one possibility would be to concur
in the judgment on the separation of power ground, but indicate that
you agree with Justice White on the Presentment Clause issue.

.§n.prtnu ~onrtllf tfrt ~b ~taftg

:Jfas:Jringhtn. ~. OJ.

2llgtJI.~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 27, 1983
Re:

Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171, INS v. Chadha

Dear Bill, Thurgood, Harry, Lewis, John and Sandra:
Byron has a forceful dissent in this case. However I
believe his valid points were all anticipated.
I see no need to
respond except to add:
1. At page 24, following the indented quote from Senator
Abourezk:
See also Appendix 1 to JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, post at----~
JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition
that the one-House veto is a useful "political invention," post
at
, and we need not challenge that assertion. We can even
concede this utilitarian argument although the long range
political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable.
It has been
vigorously debated and it is instructive to compare the views of
the protaganists. See e.g., Javits & Klein, Congressional
Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin, The Legislative Veto and
the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev.
253 (1982). But policy arguments supporting even useful
"political inventions" are subject to the demands of the
Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to thissubject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.
2. At footnote 16, page 31, add the following just before
the final sentence of the footnote:
Executive action under legislatively delegated authority that
might resemble "legislative" action in som~ respects is not
subject to the approval of both Houses of .Congress and the
President for the reason that the Constitution does not so
require. That kind of Executive action is always subject to
check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it, and if
that authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review
independent of the power of Congress to revoke the authority
entirely. Congressional action such as the one-House veto which
is clearly legislative in both character and effect is not so
checked. The need for the check supplied by Art. I, §§1, 7 is
therefore clear.

3.

At footnote 21, page 36, add the

follo~ing

paragraph:

JUSTICE WHITE suggests that the Attorney General's action
under §244 (c) (1) suspending deportation is equivalent to a
profosal for legislation and that because Cogressional approval
1s 1ndicated "by failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies
the requirement of bicameral approval." Post, at
However,
as the Court of Appeals noted, that approach "would analogize the
- effect of the one house disapproval to the failure of one house
to vote affirmatively on a private bill." 634 F. 2d, at 435.
Even if it were clear that Congress entertained such an arcane
theory when it enacted §244(c) (2), which JUSTICE WHITE does not
suggest, this would amount to nothing less than an amending of
Art. I. The legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty
formalities; they were designed to assure that both Houses of
- congress and the President participate in the exercise of
lawmaking authority. This does not mean that legislation must
always be preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that
it is not necessary for a legislative body to "articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute." United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). But the
steps required by Art. I, §§1, 7 make certain that there is an
opportunity for deliberation and debate. A scheme under which
Congress could evade the strictures of the Constitution and in
effect enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot
be squared with Art. I.
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am circulating an opinion concurring i.n your

j udgmerit •·
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''ji,

~
It has taken me a lonq time to make a decision.
You may recall my doubt that prompte(1 me to join vou in car- '
rying this case over from lnst ~e~m. At Conf.erenc~, my vote
to affirm was tentative. I have been concerned about the
consequences of the judicial branch invalidating an
arragement that -despite recurring criticism - has existed
since the J903s. ·

You have written a strong and persuasive opinion,
and you have a Court of six Justices. After a good deal of
reflection, t have decided against iotninq either of the
dissenting opinions. T orefer to decide the case on separation of powers grounds rather than the broader Presentment
Clauses.
Tn any event, the issue is now settled.
Sincerelv,

The Chief Justice

..

To: Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
~stice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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KAl CHADHA ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
PETITIONER
80-2170
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ETAL.
UNITED STATES SENATE, PETITIONER
80-2171
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
ETAL.
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction in No.
80-1832. Each presents a challenge to the constitutionality
of the provision in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nation-
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ality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(2), authorizing one House of
Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch, pursuant to authority delegated by Congress
to the Attorney General of the United States, to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United States.
I

Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds
a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the United
States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa. His visa expired on June 30, 1972. On October 11, 1973, the District
Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be deported
for having "remained in the United States for a longer time
than permitted." App. 6. Pursuant to § 242(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (Act), 8 U. S. C. § 1254(b), a deportation hearing was held before an immigration judge on
January 11, 1974. Chadha conceded that he was deportable
for overstaying his visa and the hearing was adjourned to enable him to file an application for suspension of deportation
under§ 244(a)(l) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(a)(1). Section
244(a)(1) provides:
"(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation
and adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, in the case of an alien who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation and(1) is deportable under any law of the United States
except the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this
subsection; has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and
is a person of good moral character; and is a person
whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney
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General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence." 1
After Chadha submitted his application for suspension of
deportation, the deportation hearing was resumed on February 7, 1974. On the basis of evidence adduced at the hearing, affidavits submitted with the application, and the results
of a character investigation conducted by the INS, the immigration judge, on June 25, 1974, ordered that Chadha's deportation be suspended. The immigration judge found that
Chadha met the requirements of § 244(a)(1): he had resided
continuously in the United States for over seven years, was
of good moral character, and would suffer "extreme hardship" if deported.
Pursuant to § 244(c)(1) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1254(c)(1),
the immigration judge suspended Chadha's deportation and a
report of the suspension was transmitted to Congress. Section 244(c)(l) provides:
"Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to meet the requirements of subsection
(a) of this section the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this
subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the
facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be
reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. Such reports shall be submitted on the first
day of each calendar month in which Congress is in
session."
Congress delegated the major responsibilities for enforcement of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to the Attorney General. 8 U. S. C.
§ 1103(a). The Attorney General discharges his responsibilities through
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department
of Justice. Ibid.
1
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Once the Attorney General's recommendation for suspension of Chadha's deportation was conveyed to Congress, Congress had the power under§ 244(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1254(c)(2), to veto 2 the Attorney General's determination
that Chadha should not be deported. Section 244(c)(2)
provides:
"In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this subsectionif during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it
does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the
Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or
authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law. If, within the time above specified, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall
pass such a resolution, the Attorney General shall cancel
deportation proceedings."
The June 25, 1974 order of the immigration judge suspending Chadha's deportation remained outstanding as a valid
order for a year and a half. For reasons not disclosed by the
record, Congress did not exercise the veto authority re2

In constitutional terms, "veto" is used to describe the President's
power under Art. I , § 7 of the Constitution. See Black's Law Dictionary
1403 (5th ed. 1979). It appears, however, that Congressional devices of
the type authorized by § 244(c)(2) have come to be commonly referred to as
a "veto." See, e. g., Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible
Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Miller and
Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 Ind. L.J. 367 (1977). We refer to the Congressional "resolution"
authorized by § 244(c)(2) as a "one-House veto" of the Attorney General's
decision to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States.
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served to it under§ 244(c)(2) until the first session of the 94th
Congress. This was the final session in which Congress,
pursuant to § 244(c)(2), could act to veto the Attorney General's determination that Chadha should not be deported. The
session ended on December 19, 1975. 121 Cong. Rec. 42014,
42277 (1975). Absent Congressional action, Chadha's deportation proceedings would have been cancelled after this
date and his status adjusted to that of a permanent resident
alien. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d).
On December 12, 1975, Representative Eilberg, Chairman
of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
and International Law, introduced a resolution opposing "the
granting of permanent residence in the United States to [six]
aliens", including Chadha. H. R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess.; 121 Cong Rec. 40247 (1975). The resolution was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. On December 16, 1975, the resolution was discharged from further
consideration by the House Committee on the Judiciary and
submitted to the House of Representatives for a vote. 121
Cong. Rec. 40800. The resolution had not been printed and
was not made available to other Members of the House prior
to or at the time it was voted on. Ibid. So far as the record
before us shows, the House consideration of the resolution
was based on Representative Eilberg's statement from the
floor that
"[i]t was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing
340 cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution
[Chadha and five others] did not meet these statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it
is the opinion of the committee that their deportation
should not be suspended." Ibid.
The resolution was passed without debate or recorded vote. 3
3
It is not at all clear whether the House generally, or Subcommittee
Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood the relationship be-
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Since the House action was pursuant to § 244(c)(2), the resolution was not treated as an Article I legislative act; it was
not submitted to the Senate or presented to the President for
his action.
After the House veto of the Attorney General's decision to
allow Chadha to remain in the United States, the immigratween H. R. Res. 926 and the Attorney General's decision to suspend
Chadha's deportation. Exactly one year previous to the House veto of the
Attorney General's decision in this case, Representative Eilberg introduced a similar resolution disapproving the Attorney General's suspension
of deportation in the case of six other aliens. H. R. Res. 1518, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. The following colloquy occurred on the floor of the House:
"Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, is this
procedure to expedite the ongoing operations of the Department of Justice,
as far as these people are concerned. Is it in any way contrary to whatever action the Attorney General has taken on the question of deportation;
does the gentleman know?
Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the answer is no to the gentleman's final
question. These aliens have been found to be deportable and the Special
Inquiry Officer's decision denying suspension of deportation has been reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. We are complying with the
law since all of these decisions have been referred to us for approval or disapproval, and there are hundreds of cases in this category. In these six
cases however, we believe it would be grossly improper to allow these people to acquire the status of permanent resident aliens.
Mr. WYLIE. In other words, the gentleman has been working with the
Attorney General's office?
Mr. EILBERG. Yes.
Mr. WYLIE. This bill then is in fact a confirmation of what the Attorney General intends to do?
Mr. EILBERG. The gentleman is correct insofar as it relates to the
determination of deportability which has been made by the Department of
Justice in these cases.
Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection."
120 Cong. Rec. 41412 (1974).
Clearly, this was an obfuscation of the effect of a veto under § 244(c)(2).
Such a veto in no way constitutes "a confirmation of what the Attorney
General intends to do." To the contrary, such a resolution was meant to
overrule and set aside, or "veto," the Attorney General's determination
that, in a particular case, cancellation of deportation would be appropriate
under the standards set forth in § 244(a)(1).
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tion judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order deporting Chadha. Chadha moved to
terminate the proceedings on the ground that § 244(c)(2) is
unconstitutional. The immigration judge held that he had no
authority to rule on the constitutional validity of§ 244(c)(2).
On November 8, 1976, Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House action.
Chadha appealed the deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals again contending that§ 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board held that it had "no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress" and Chadha's appeal was
dismissed. App. 55-56.
Pursuant to § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a),
Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service agreed with
Chadha's position before the Court of Appeals and joined him
in arguing that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional. In light of the
importance of the question, the Court of Appeals invited both
the Senate and the House of Representatives to file briefs
amici curiae.
After full briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals
held that the House was without constitutional authority to
order Chadha's deportation; accordingly it directed the Attorney General "to cease and desist from taking any steps to
deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the
House of Representatives." Chadha v. INS, 634 F. 2d 408,
436 (CA9 1980). The essence of its holding was that
§ 244(c)(2) violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers.
We granted certiorari in Nos. 80-2170 and 80-2171, and
postponed consideration of our jurisdiction over the appeal in
No. 80-1832, 454 U. S. 812 (1981), and we now affirm.
II
Before we address the important question of the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision of § 244(c)(2), we
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first consider several challenges to the authority of this Court
to resolve the issue raised.
A
Appellate Jurisdiction
Both Houses of Congress 4 contend that we are without jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832. Section 1252 provides:
"Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an
interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any
court of the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam and the District Court of the Virgin Islands and any court of record of Puerto Rico, holding an
Act of Congress unconsititutional in any civil action, suit,
or proceeding to which the United States or any of its
agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party."
Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 742 n. 10 (1974), makes
clear that a court of appeals is a "court of the United States"
for purposes of § 1252. It is likewise clear that the proceeding below was a "civil action, suit or proceeding," that the
INS is an agency of the United States and was a party to the
proceeding below, and that that proceeding held an Act of
Congress-namely, the one-House veto provision in
§ 244(c)(2)-unconstitutional. The express requisites for an
appeal under§ 1252, therefore, have been met.
In motions to dismiss the INS appeal, the Congressional
parties 5 direct attention, however, to our statement that "[a]
• Nine Members of the House of Representatives have filed a brief amicus curiae urging that the decision of the Court of Appeals be affirmed in
this case.
5
The Senate and House authorized intervention in this case, S. Res. 40
and H. R. Res. 49, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), and, on February 3, 1981,
filed motions to intervene and petitioned for rehearing. The Court of Ap-
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party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording relief and cannot appeal
from it." Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445
U. S. 326, 333 (1980). Here, the INS sought the invalidation
of § 244(c)(2) and the Court of Appeals granted that relief.
Both Houses contend that the INS has already received what
it sought from the Court of Appeals, is not an aggrieved
party, and therfore cannot appeal from the decision of the
Court of Appeals. We cannot agree.
The INS was ordered by one House of Congress to deport
Chadha. As we have set out more fully, ante at 7, the INS
concluded that it had no power to rule on the constitutionality
of that order and accordingly proceeded to implement it.
Chadha's appeal challenged that decision and the INS presented the Executive's views on the constitutionality of the
House action to the Court of Appeals. But the INS brief to
the Court of Appeals did not alter the agency's decision to
comply with the House action ordering deportation of
Chadha. The Court of Appeals set aside the deportation
proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease and
desist from taking any steps to deport Chadha; steps that the
Attorney General would have taken were it not for that
decision.
At least for purposes of deciding whether the INS is "any
party" within the grant of appellate jurisdiction in § 1252, we
hold that the INS was sufficiently aggrieved by the Court of
Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it would
otherwise take. It is apparent that Congress intended that
this Court take notice of cases that meet the technical prerequisites of § 1252; in other cases where an Act of Congress is
held unconstitutional by a federal court, review in this Court
is available only by writ of certiorari. When an agency of
peals granted the motions to intervene. Both Houses are therefore
proper "parties" within the meaning of that term in 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).
See Batterton v. Francis, 432 U. S. 416, 424, n. 7 (1977).
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the United States is a party to a case in which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitutional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an appeal under § 1252.
The agency's status as an aggrieved party under§ 1252 is not
altered by the fact that the Executive may agree with the
holding that the statute in question is unconstitutional. The
appeal in No. 80-1832 is therefore properly before us. 6
B
Severability
Congress also contends that the provision for the oneHouse veto in § 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from§ 244. Congress argues that if the provision for the one-House veto is
held unconstitutional, all of § 244 must fall. If § 244 in its entirety is violative of the Constitution, it follows that the Attorney General has no authority to suspend Chadha's deportation under § 244(a)(1) and Chadha would be deported.
From this, Congress argues that Chadha lacks standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the one-House veto provision because he could receive no relief even if his constitutional challenge proves successful. 7
Only recently this Court reaffirmed that the invalid portions of a statute are to be severed" '[u]nless it is evident that
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions
which are within its power, independently of that which is
not."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108 (1976), quoting
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U. S.
6
In addition to meeting the statutory requisites of § 1252, of course, an
appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy under Art. III.
Such a controversy clearly exists in No. 80-1832, as in the other two cases,
because of the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties.
See infra, at 18; see also Director, OWCP v. Perini North River AssoU. S. - , (1982).
ciates, 7
In this case we deem it appropriate to address questions of severability first. But see Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 108-109 (1976); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570, 585 (1968).
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210, 234 (1932). Here, however, we need not embark on
that elusive inquiry since Congress itself has provided the answer to the question of severability in § 406 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. 1101, which provides:
"If any particular provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby." (Emphasis added.)
This language is unambiguous and gives rise to a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the Act as a
whole, or of any part of the Act, to depend upon whether the
veto clause of § 244(c)(2) was invalid. The one-House veto
provision in § 244(c)(2) is clearly a "particular provision" of
the Act as that language is used in the severability clause.
Congress clearly intended "the remainder of the Act" to
stand if "any particular provision" were held invalid. Congress could not have more plainly authorized the presumption
that the provision for a one-House veto in§ 244(c)(2) is severable from the remainder of § 244 and the Act of which it is a
part. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419,
434 (1938).
The presumption as to the severability of the one-House
veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is supported by the legislative
history of § 244. That section and its precursors supplanted
the long established pattern of dealing with deportations like
Chadha's on a case-by-case basis through private bills. Although it may be that Congress was reluctant to delegate final authority over cancellation of deportations, such reluctance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of
severability raised by § 406.
The Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, § 14, 43
Stat. 153, 162, required the Secretary of Labor to deport any
alien who entered or remained in the United States unlawfully. The only means by which a deportable alien could law-
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fully remain in the United States was to have his status altered by a private bill enacted by both Houses and presented
to the President pursuant to the procedures set out in Art. I,
§ 7 of the Constitution. These private bills were found intolerable by Congress. In the debate on a 1937 bill introduced
by Representative Dies to authorize the Secretary to grant
permanent residence in "meritorious" cases, Dies stated:
"It was my original thought that the way to handle all
these meritorious cases was through special bills. I am
absolutely convinced as a result of what has occurred in
this House that it is impossible to deal with the situation
through special bills. We had a demonstration of that
fact not long ago when 15 special bills were before the
House. The House consumed 5\12 hours considering four
bills and made no disposition of any of these bills." 81
Gong. Rec. 5542 (1937).
Representative Dies' bill passed the House, id., at 5574,
but did not come to a vote in the Senate. 83 Gong. Rec.
8992-8996 (1938).
Congress first authorized the Attorney General to suspend
the deportation of certain aliens in the Alien Registration Act
of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 671. That Act provided that
an alien was to be deported, despite the Attorney General's
decision to the contrary, if both Houses, by concurrent resolution, disapproved the suspension.
In 1948, Congress amended the Act to broaden the category of aliens eligible for suspension of deportation. In addition, however, Congress limited the authority of the Attorney General to suspend deportations by providing that the
Attorney General could not cancel a deportation unless both
Houses affirmatively voted by concurrent resolution to approve the Attorney General's action. Act of July 1, 1948, ch.
783, 62 Stat. 1206. The provision for approval by concurrent
resolution in the 1948 Act proved almost as burdensome as
private bills. Just four years later, the House Judiciary
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Committee, in support of the predecessor to § 244(c)(2),
stated in a report:
"In the light of experience of the last several months, the
committee came to the conclusion that the requirements
of affirmative action by both Houses of the Congress in
many thousands of individual cases which are submitted
by the Attorney General every year, is not workable and
places upon the Congress and particularly on the Committee on the Judiciary responsibilities which it cannot
assume. The new responsibilities placed upon the Committee on the Judiciary [by the concurrent resolution
mechanism] are of purely administrative nature and they
seriously interfere with the legislative work of the Committee on the Judiciary and would, in time, interfere
with the legislative work of the House." H. R. Rep.
No. 362, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
The proposal to permit one House of Congress to veto the
Attorney General's suspension of an alien's deportation was
incorporated in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163, 214 (1952). Plainly, Congress'
desire to retain a veto in this area cannot be considered in isolation but must be viewed in the context of Congress' irritation with the burden of private immigration bills. This legislative history is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of
severability raised by § 406.
A provision is further presumed severable if what remains
after severance "is fully operative as a law." Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, supra, 286 U. S., at 234.
There can be no doubt that § 244 is "fully operative" and
workable administrative machinery without the veto provision in § 244(c)(2). Entirely independent of the one-House
veto, the administrative process enacted by Congress authorizes the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation
under § 244(a). Congress' oversight of the exercise of this
delegated authority is preserved since all such suspensions
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will continue to be reported to it under § 244(c)(l). Absent
the passage of a bill to the contrary, 8 deportation proceedings will be cancelled when the period specified in § 244(c)(2)
has expired. 9 Clearly, § 244 survives as a workable administrative mechanism without the one-House veto.

c
Standing
We must also reject the contention that Chadha lacks
standing because a consequence of his prevailing will advance
the interests of the Executive Branch in a separation of powers dispute with Congress, rather than simply Chadha's priWithout the provision for one-House veto, Congress would presumably retain the power, during the time allotted in§ 244(c)(2), to enact a law,
in accordance with the requirements of Article I of the Constitution, mandating a particular alien's deportation, unless, of course, other constitutional principles place substantive limitations on such action. Cf. Attorney General Jackson's attack on H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a
bill to require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien. The Attorney General called the bill "an historical departure from an unbroken
American practice and tradition. It would be the first time that an act of
Congress singled out a named individual for deportation." S. Rep. No.
2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940) (reprinting Jackson's letter of June 18,
1940). See note 17, infra.
9
Without the Congressional veto, § 244 resembles the "report and wait"
provision approved by the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U. S~ 1 (1941).
The statute examined in Sibbach provided that the newly promulgated
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not take effect until they shall have
been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a
regular session thereof and until after the close of such session." Act of
June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064. This statute did not provide that
Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and
to pass legislation barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable. This technique was used by Congress when it acted in 1973 to
stay, and ultimately to revise, the proposed Rules of Evidence. Compare
Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973), with Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
8
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vate interests. Chadha has demonstrated "injury in fact and
a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury .... " Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U. S. 59,
79 (1978). If the veto provision violates the Constitution,
and is severable, the deportation order against Chadha will
be cancelled. Chadha therefore has standing to challenge
the order of the Executive mandated by the House veto.
D

Alternative Relief
It is contended that the Court should decline to decide the
constitutional question presented by this case because
Chadha may have other statutory relief available to him. It
is argued that since Chadha married a United States citizen
on August 10, 1980, it is possible that other avenues of relief
may be open under §§ 201(b), 204, and 245 of the Act, 8
U. S. C. §§ 1151(b), 1154, 1255. It is true that Chadha may
be eligible for classification as an "immediate relative" and,
as such, could lawfully be accorded permanent residence.
Moreover, in March 1980, just prior to the decision of the
Court of Appeals in this case, Congress enacted the Refugee
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, under which
the Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, and then
permanent residence, to apy alien who is unable to return to
his country of nationality because of "a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race."
It is urged that these two intervening factors constitute a
prudential bar to our consideration of the constitutional question presented in this case. See Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). If we could perceive merit in this contention
we might well seek to avoid deciding the constitutional claim
advanced. But at most these other avenues of relief are
speculative. It is by no means certain, for example, that
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Chadha's classification as an immediate relative would result
in the adjustment of Chadha's status from nonimmigrant to
permanent resident. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F. 2d 1028
(CA9 1979). If Chadha is successful in his present challenge
he will not be deported and will automatically become eligible
to apply for citizenship. 10 A person threatened with deportation cannot be denied the right to challenge the constitutional
validity of the process which led to his status merely on the
basis of speculation over the availability of other forms of
relief.
E
Juris diction
It is contended that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 106(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1105a(a). That
section provides that a petition for review in the Court of Appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation . . . made against
aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative
proceedings under section 242(b) of this Act." Congress argues that the one-House veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) takes
place outside tpe administrative proceedings conducted
under § 242(b), and that the jurisdictional grant contained
in § 106(a) does not encompass Chadha's constitutional
challenge.
, In Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 216 (1968),
this Court held that "§ 106(a) embrace[s] only those determinations made during a proceeding conducted under
10
Depending on how the Service interprets its statutory duty under
§ 244 apart from the challenged portion of§ 244(c)(2), Chadha's status may
be retroactively adjusted to that of a permanent resident as of December
19, 1975-the last session in which Congress could have attempted to stop
the suspension of Chadha's deportation from ripening into cancellation of
deportation. See 8 U. S. C. § 1254(d). In that event, Chadha's five-year
waiting period to become a citizen under § 316(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C.
§ 1427(a), would have elapsed.
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§ 242(b), including those determinations made incident to a
motion to reopen such proceedings." It is true that one
court has read Cheng Fan Kwok to preclude appeals similar
to Chadha's. See Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). 11 However, we agree with the Court of Appeals in
this case that the term "final orders" in § 106(a) "includes all
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent,
rather than only those determinations actually made at the
hearing." 634 F. 2d, at 412. Here, Chadha's deportation
stands or falls on the validity of the challenged veto; the final
order of deportation was entered against Chadha only to implement the action of the House of Representatives. Although the Attorney General was satisfied that the House action was invalid and that it should not have any effect on his
decision to suspend deportation, he appropriately let the controversy take its course through the courts.
This Court's decision in Cheng Fan Kwok, supra, does not
bar Chadha's appeal. There, after an order of deportation
had been entered, the affected alien requested the INS to
stay the execution of that order. When that request was denied, the alien sought review in the Court of Appeals under
§ 106(a). This Court's holding that the Court of Appeals
lacked jurisdiction was based on the fact that the alien "did
not 'attack the deportation order itself but instead [sought]
11
Under the Third Circuit's reasoning, judicial review under § 106(a)
would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue
could not have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b). Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F. 2d 880 (CA3
1981). The facts in Dastmalchi are distinguishable, however. In
Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens who had entered the United States on nonimmigrant student visas challenged a regulation that required them to report to
the District Director of the INS during the Iranian hostage crisis. The
aliens reported and were ordered deported after a § 242(b) proceeding.
The aliens in Dastmalchi could have been deported irrespective of the challenged regulation. Here, in contrast, Chadha's deportation would have
been cancelled but for § 242(c)(2).
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relief not inconsistent with it."' 392 U. S., at 213, quoting
Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F. 2d 772, 777 (CA2 1966). Here, in
contrast, Chadha directly attacks the deportation order itself
and the relief he seeks-cancellation of deportation-is
plainly inconsistent with the deportation order. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction under§ 106(a) to
decide this case.
F
Case or Controversy
It is also contended that this is not a genuine controversy
but "a friendly, non-adversary, proceeding," Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, supra, 297 U. S., at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring), upon which the Court should not pass.
This argument rests on the fact that Chadha and the INS
take the same position on the constitutionality of the oneHouse veto. But it would be a curious result if, in the administration of justice, a person could be denied access to the
courts because the Attorney General of the United States
agreed with the legal arguments asserted by the individual.
A case or controversy is presented by this case. First,
from the time of Congress' formal intervention, see note 5,
supra, the concrete adverseness is beyond doubt. Congress
is both a proper party to defend the constitutionality of
§ 244(c)(2) and a proper petitioner under § 1254(1). Second,
prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III
adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and
Chadha. We have already held that the INS's agreement
with the Court of Appeals decision that § 244(c)(2) is unconstitutional does not affect that agency's "aggrieved" status
for purposes of appealing that decision under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1252, see ante 8-10. For similar reasons, the INS's agreement with Chadha's position does not alter the fact that the
INS would have deported Chadha absent the Court of Appeals judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
"Chadha has asserted a concrete controversy, and our deci-
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sion will have real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not
be deported; if we uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its
order and deport him." 634 F. 2d, at 419. 12
Of course, there may be prudential, as opposed to Art. III,
concerns about sanctioning the adjudication of this case in the
absence of any participant supporting the validity of
§ 244(c)(2). The Court of Appeals properly dispelled any
such concerns by inviting and accepting briefs from both
Houses of Congress. We have long held that Congress is the
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an
agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing
the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statue is inapplicable or unconstitutional. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS,
supra, 392 U. S., at 210 n. 9; United States v. Lovett, 328
u. s. 303 (1946).
G

Political Question
It is also argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question because Chadha is merely challenging Congress' authority under the Na.turalization Clause, U. S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
U. S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. It is argued that Congress'
Article I power "To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization", combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause,
grants it unreviewable authority over the regulation of
A relevant parallel can be found in our recent decision in Bob Jones
U. S. - . There, the United States
agreed with Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools that
certain Revenue Rulings denying tax exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race were invalid. Despite its agreement with
the schools, however, the United States was complying with a court order
enjoining it from granting tax-exempt status to any school that discriminated on the basis of race. Even though the government largely agreed
with the opposing party on the merits of the controversy, we found an adequate basis for jurisdiction in the fact that the government intended to enforce the challenged law against that party. See id., a t - n. 9.
12

University v. United States, -
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aliens. The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 is not open to question but what is challenged
here is whether Congress has chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that power. As we made
clear in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); "Congress has
plenary authority in all cases in which it has substantive legislative jurisdiction, M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316
(1819), so long as the exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction." !d., at 132.
A brief review of those factors which may indicate the
presence of a nonjusticiable political question satisfies us that
our assertion of jurisdiction over this case does no violence to
the political question doctrine. As identified in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U. S. 186,217 (1962), a political question may arise
when any one of the following circumstances is present:
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."
Congress apparently directs its assertion of nonjusticiability to the first of the Baker factors by asserting that Chadha's
claim is "an assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)." Brief for the United States House of Representatives 48. But if this turns the question into a political
question virtually every challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute would be a political question. Chadha indeed argues
that one House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the
Attorney General's decision to allow him to remain in this

. ~.
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country. No policy underlying the political question doctrine suggests that Congress or the Executive, or both acting
in concert and in compliance with Art. I, can decide the constitutionality of a statute; that is a decision for the courts. 13
Other Baker factors are likewise inapplicable to this case.
As we discuss more fully below, Art. I provides the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" of Baker for
resolving the question presented by this case. Those standards forestall reliance by this Court on nonjudicial "policy
determinations" or any showing of disrespect for a coordinate branch. Similarly, if Chadha's arguments are accepted,
§ 244(c)(2) cannot stand, and, since the constitutionality of
that statute is for this Court to resolve, there is no possibility
of "multifarious pronouncements" on this question.
It is correct that this controversy may, in a sense, be
18
The suggestion is made that § 244(c)(2) is somehow immunized from
constitutional scrutiny because the Act containing § 244(c)(2) was passed
by Congress and approved by the President. Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803), resolved that question. The assent of the Executive to
a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not
shield it from judicial review. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740,
n. 5 (1979); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 841 n. 12
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); Myers v. United States, 272
U. S. 52 (1926). See also note 21, infra. In any event, eleven Presidents,
from Mr. Wilson through Mr. Reagan, who have been presented with this
issue have gone on record at some point to challenge Congressional vetoes
as unconstitutional. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 735, 737-738 n. 7 (1979) (collecting
citations to presidential statements). Perhaps the earliest Executive expression on the constitutionality of the Congressional veto is found in Attorney General William D. Mitchell's opinion of January 24, 1933 to President Hoover. 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 56. (1933). Furthermore, it is not
uncommon for Presidents to approve legislation containing parts which are
objectionable on constitutional grounds. For example, after President
Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Attorney General Jackson
released a memorandum explaining the President's view that the provision
allowing the Act's authorization to be terminated by concurrent resolution
was unconstitutional. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 1353 (1953).
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termed "political." But the presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political question doctrine. Resolution of
litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of
the three branches cannot be evaded by courts beause the issues have political implications in the sense urged by Congress. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), was also a
"political" case, involving as it did claims under a judicial
commission alleged to have been duly signed by the President but not delivered. But "courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U. S. at 217.
In Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892), this Court addressed and resolved the question whether
"a bill signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and by the President of the Senate, presented to
and approved by the President of the United States, and
delivered by the latter to the Secretary of State, as an
act passed by Congress, does not become a law of the
United States if it had not in fact been passed by
Congress. _._
, ,
We recognize, on one hand, the duty of this court, from the
performance of which it may not shrink, to give full effect to
the provisions of the Constitution relating to the enactment
of laws that are to operate wherever the authority and jurisdiction of the United States extend. On the other hand, we
cannot be unmindful of the consequences that must result if
this court should feel obliged, in fidelity to the Constitution,
to declare that an enrolled bill, on which depend public and
private interests of vast magnitude, and which has been .. .
deposited in the public archives, as an act of Congress, .. .
did not become law." Id., at 669, 670 (emphasis in original).

...

H

The parties are properly before us and the difficult and
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sensitive issues have been fully briefed and twice argued in
this Court. The Court's duty in this case, as Chief Justice
Marshall declared in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404
(1821), is clear:
"Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but
we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our
best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our
duty."
III
A

We turn now to the question whether action of one House
of Congress under § 244(c)(2) violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that
the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action does not violate the
Constitution, it must be sustained:
"Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes
to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor
are we vested with the power of veto." Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978).
By the same token, the fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government and our inquiry is sharpened rather than blunted by the
fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to
executive and independent agencies:
"Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted
into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have
been inserted in 196 different statutes as follows: from
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1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; from 1940-49,
nineteen statutes; between 1950-59, thirty-four statutes;
and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year 1970
through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such provisions were included in eighty-nine laws." Abourezk,

The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to
Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52
Ind. L. Rev. 323, 324 (1977). See also Appendix 1 to
JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent, post, at--.
JUSTICE WHITE undertakes to make a case for the proposition that the one-House veto is a useful "political invention,"
post at - - , and we need not challenge that assertion. We
can even concede this utilitarian argument although the long
range political wisdom of this "invention" is arguable. It has
been vigorously debated and it is instructive to compare the
views of the protagonists. See, e. g., Javits & Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1977), and Martin,
The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982). But policy arguments supporting even useful "political inventions" are
subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines
powers and, with respect to this subject, sets out just how
those powers are to be exercised.
Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution
prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress
and of the Executive in the legislative process. Since the
precise terms of those familiar provisions are critical to the
resolution of this case, we set them out verbatim. Art. I
provides:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives." Art. I, § 1.
(Emphasis added).
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"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States;
... " Art. I, § 7, cl. 2. (Emphasis added).

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may
be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)
shall be presented to the President of the United States;
and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved
by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." Art. I, § 7, cl. 3. (Emphasis added).
These provisions of Art. I are integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers. We have recently noted that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was
not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the
Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787." Buckley v. Valeo,
supra, 424 U. S., at 124. Just as we relied on the textual
provision of Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, to vindicate the principle of
separation of powers in Buckley; we find that the purposes
underlying the Presentment Clauses, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, and
the bicameral requirement of Art. I, § 1 and § 7, cl. 2, guide
our resolution of the important question presented in this
case. The very structure of the articles delegating and separating powers under Arts. I, II, and III exemplify the concept of separation of powers and we now turn to Art. I.
B

The Presentment Clauses
The records of the Constitutional Convention reveal that
the requirement that all legislation be presented to the Presi-
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dent before becoming law was uniformly accepted by the
Framers. 14 Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen
took special pains to assure that these requirements could not
be circumvented. During the final debate on Art. I, § 7, cl.
2, James Madison expressed concern that it might easily be
evaded by the simple expedient of calling a proposed law a
"resolution" or "vote" rather than a "bill." 2 M. Farrand,
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 301-302. As
a consequence, Art. I, § 7, cl. 3, ante, at 25, was added. /d.,
at 304-305.
The decision to provide the President with a limited and
qualified power to nullify proposed legislation by veto was
based on the profound conviction of the Framers that the
powers conferred on Congress were the powers to be most
carefully circumscribed. It is beyond doubt that lawmaking
was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.
In The Federalist No. 73 (H. Lodge ed. 1888), Hamilton focused on the President's role in making laws:
"If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the
legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive,
the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would
of themselves teach us that the one ought not to be left
The widespread approval of the delegates was commented on by Joseph Story:
"In the convention there does not seem to have been much diversity of
opinion on the subject of the propriety of giving to the president a negative
on the laws. The principal points of discussion seem to have been,
whether the negative should be absolute, or qualified; and if the latter, by
what number of each house the bill should subsequently be passed, in order
to become a law; and whether the negative should in either case be exclusively vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other department of government." 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 611 (1858). See 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 21, 97-104, 138-140; id., at 73--80, 181, 298,
301-305.
14
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to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defense." I d., at
457-458.
See also The Federalist No. 51. In his Commentaries on the
Constitution, Joseph Story makes the same point. 1 J.
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 614-615 (1858).
The President's role in the law making process also reflects
the Framers' careful efforts to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures. The President's veto role
in the legislative process was described later during public
debate on ratification:
"It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative
body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, .or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may happen to influence a majority of that body. . . . The primary
inducement to conferring the power in question upon the
Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws through haste, inadvertence, or design." The Federalist No. 73, supra, at
458 (A. Hamilton).
See also The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 123 (1926). The Court
also has observed that the Presentment Clauses serve the
important purpose of assuring that a "national" perspective is
grafted on the legislative process:
"The President is a representative of the people just as
the members of the Senate and of the House are, and it
may be, at some times, on some subjects, that the President elected by all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of
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the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not
countrywide .... " Myers v. United States, supra, 272
U. S. at, 123.

c

Bicameralism
The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7 was of scarcely
less concern to the Framers than was the Presidential veto
and indeed the two concepts are interdependent. By providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of
the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the
Framers reemphasized their belief, already remarked upon
in connection with the Presentment Clauses, that legislation
should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully
considered by the Nation's elected officials. In the Constitutional Convention debates on the need for a bicameral legislature, James Wilson, later to become a Justice of this Court,
commented:
"Despotism comes on mankind in different shapes.
Sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a military,
one. Is there danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty
nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it
within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In
a single house there is no check, but the inadequate one,
of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it." 1
M. Farrand, supra, at 254.
Hamilton argued that a Congress comprised of a single
House was antithetical to the very purposes of the Constitution. Were the Nation to adopt a Constitution providing for
only one legislative organ, he warned:
"we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the
most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus
entail upon our posterity one of the most execrable forms
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of government that human infatuation ever contrived.
Thus we should create in reality that very tyranny which
the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert." The Federalist No. 22,
supra, at 135.
This view was rooted in a general skepticism regarding the
fallibility of human nature later commented on by Joseph
Story:
"Public bodies, like private persons, are occasionally
under the dominion of strong passions and excitements;
impatient, irritable, and impetuous. . . . If [a legislature] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the
firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough
under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings
and relations to society." J. Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States 383-384 (1858).
These observations are consistent with what many of the
Framers expressed, none more cogently than Hamilton in
pointing up the need to divide and disperse power in order to
protect liberty:
"In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches;
and to render them, by different modes of election and
different principles of action, as little connected with
each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on the society will admit."
The Federalist No. 51, supra, at 324.
See also The Federalist No. 62.
However familiar, it is useful to recall that apart from their
fear that special interests could be favored at the expense of
public needs, the Framers were also concerned, although not
of one mind, over the apprehensions of the smaller states.
Those states feared a commonality of interest among the
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larger states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger states, on the other hand, were skeptical
of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the
people. See 1 M. Farrand, supra, 176-177, 484-491. It
need hardly be repeated here that the Great Compromise,
under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the
large and small states. 16
We see therefore that the Framers were acutely conscious
that the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses
would serve essential constitutional functions. The President's participation in the legislative process was to protect
the Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the
whole people from improvident laws. The division of the
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full
study and debate in separate settings. The President's unilateral veto power, in turn, was limited by the power of two
thirds of both Houses of Congress to overrule a veto thereby
precluding final arbitrary action of one person. See 1 M.
Farrand, supra, at 99-104. It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the
Framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal
government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
IV
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of
the federal government into three defined categories, executive, judicial and legislative which, although not "hermetically'' sealed from one another, Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424
15
The Great Compromise was considered so important by the Framers
that they inserted a special provision to ensure that it could not be altered ,
even by constitutional amendment, except with the consent of the states
affected. See U. S. Const. Art V.
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U. S., at 121, are functionally identifiable. When any
Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
Constitution has delegated to it. See Hampton & Co. v.
United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). When the Executive acts, it presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity as defined in Art. II. And when, as here,
one House of Congress purports to act, it is presumptively
acting within its assigned sphere.
Beginning with this presumption, we must nevertheless
establish that the challenged action under§ 244(c)(2) is of the
kind to which the procedural requirements of Art. I, § 7
apply. Not every action taken by either House is subject to
the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I.
See post at 33. Whether actions taken by either House are,
in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not
on their form but upon "whether they contain matter which is
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect." S. Rep. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1897).
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined
in Art. I, § 8, cl. 4 to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch
officials and Chadh~all outside the legislative branch. Section 244(c)(2) purports to authorize one House of Congress to
require the Attorney General to deport an individual alien
whose deportation otherwise would be cancelled under § 244.
The one-House veto operated in this case to overrule the Attorney General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent
the House action, Chadha would remain in the United States.
Congress has acted and its action has altered Chadha's
status.
The legislative character of the one-House veto in this case
is confirmed by the character of the Congressional action it
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supplants. Neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate contends that, absent the veto provision in § 244(c)(2),
either of them, or both of them acting together, could effectively require the Attorney General to deport an alien once
the Attorney General, in the exercise of legislatively delegated authority, 16 had determined the alien should remain in
16

Congress protests that affirming the Court of Appeals in this case will
sanction "lawmaking by the Attorney General[.] . . . Why is the Attorney
General exempt from submitting his proposed changes in the law to the full
bicameral process?" Brief of the United States House of Representatives
40. To be sure, some administrative agency action-rule making, for example-may resemble "lawmaking." See 5 U. S. C. § 551(4), which defines an agency's "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.... " This Court has referred to
agency activity as being "quasi-legislative" in character. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602; 628 (1935). Clearly, however, "[i]n
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 587 (1952). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 123 (1976). When the Attorney General
performs his duties pursuant to § 244, he does not exercise "legislative"
power. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 213-214 (1976).
The bicameral process is not necessary as a check on the Executive's administration of the laws because his administrative activity cannot reach
beyond the limits of the statute that created it-a statute duly enacted pursuant to Art. I, §§ 1, 7. The constitutionality of the Attorney General's
execution of the authority delegated to him by § 244 involves only a question of delegation doctrine. The courts can always "ascertain whether the
will of Congress has been obeyed," Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414,
425 (1944), and can enforce adherence to statutory standards. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585 (1952); Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 541 F. 2d 1, 68 (CADC) (en bane) (separate statement of
Leventhal, J.), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 941 (1976); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control
of Administrative Action 320 (1965). It is clear, therefore, that the Attorney General acts in his presumptively Art. II capacity when he administers
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive action under legisla- \
tively delegated authority that might resemble "legislative" action in some
respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress and the
President for the reason that the Constitution does not so require. That
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the United States. Without the challenged prov1s1on in
§ 244(c)(2), this could have been achieved, if at all, only by
legislation requiring deportation. 17 Similarly, a veto by one
House of Congress under § 244(c)(2) cannot be justified as an
attempt at amending the standards set out in § 244(a)(l), or
as a repeal of § 244 as applied to Chadha. Amendment and
repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I. 18
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House
veto in this case further manifests its legislative character.
After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming private bill procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to
remain in this country in certain specified circumstances. It
is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in Art. I. Disagreekind of Executive action is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it, and if that authority is exceeded it is open to
judicial review as well as the power of Congress to revoke the authority
entirely. Congressional action such as the one-House veto which is clearly
legislative in both character and effect is not so checked. The need for the
check supplied by Art. I, §§ 1, 7 is therefore clear. Congress' authority to
delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by way of a Congressional veto.
17
We express no opinion as to whether such legislation would violate any
constitutional provision. See note 8, supra.
18
During the Convention of 1787, the application of the President's veto
to repeals of statutes was addressed and the Framers were apparantly content with Madison's comment that "[a]s to the difficulty of repeals, it was
probable that in doubtful cases the policy would soon take place of limiting
the duration of laws as to require renewal instead of repeal." 2 Farrand,
supra, at 587. See Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by
Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 587-599
(1953). There is no provision allowing Congress to repeal or amend laws
by other than legislative means pursuant to Art. I.
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ment with the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's
deportation-that is, Congress' decision to deport Chadhano less than Congress' original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to make that decision, involves
determinations of policy that Congress can implement in only
one way; bicameral passage followed by presentment to the
President. Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. 19
Finally, the legislative character of the challenged action of
one House is confirmed by the fact that when the Framers
intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone
and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they
narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action
in the Constitution. There are but four provisions in the
Constitution, explicit and unambiguous, by which one House
may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject
to the President's veto:
(a) The House of Representatives alone was given the
power to initiate impeachments. Art. I, § 2, cl. 6;
(b) The Senate alone was given the power to conduct trials
following impeachment on charges inititated by the House
and to convict following trial. Art. I, § 3, cl. 5;
(c) The Senate alone was given final unreviewable power
to approve or to disapprove presidential appointments. Art.
19

This does not mean that Congress is required to capitulate to "the accretion of policy control by forces outside its chambers." Javits and Klein,
Congresional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 455, 462 (1977). The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls
administrative agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of
control, such as durationallimits on authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power. See id., at
460-461; Kaiser, Congressional Action to Overturn Agency Rules: Alternatives to the "Legislative Veto", 32 Ad. L. Rev. 667 (1980). See also note
9, supra.
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II, § 2, cl. 2;
(d) The Senate alone was given unreviewable power to ratify treaties negotiated by the President. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
Clearly, when the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House, independent of the other House, or of the
President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous terms. 20
These carefully defined exceptions from presentment and bicameralism underscore the difference between the legislative
functions of Congress and other unilateral but important and
binding one-House acts provided for in the Constitution.
20

An exception from the Presentment Clauses was ratified in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). There the Court held presidential approval was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment
which had passed both Houses of Congress by the requisite two-thirds majority. See U. S. Const. Art. V.
One might also include another "exception" to the rule that Congressional action having the force of law be subject to the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses. Each House has the power to act
alone in determining specified internal matters. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3, and
§ 5, cl. 2. However, this "exception" only empowers Congress to bind itself and is noteworthy only insofar as it further indicates the Framers' intent that Congress not act in any legally binding manner outside a closely
circumscribed legislative arena, except in specific and enumerated
instances.
Although the bicameral check was not provided for in any of these provisions for independent Congressional action, precautionary alternative
checks are evident. For example, Art. II., § 2 requires that two-thirds of
the Senators present concur in the Senate's consent to a treaty, rather than
the simple majority required for passage of legislation. See The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay); The Federalist No. 66 (A. Hamilton); The Federalist
No. 75 (A. Hamilton). Similarly, the Framers adopted an alternative protection, in the stead of Presidential veto and bicameralism, by requiring
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present for a conviction of
impeachment. Art. I, § 3. We also note that the Court's holding in
Hollingsworth, supra, that a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution need not be presented to the President, is subject to two alternative protections. First, a constitutional amendment must command
the votes of two-thirds of each House. Second, three-fourths of the states
must ratify any amendment.
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These exceptions are narrow, explicit, and separately justified; none of them authorize the action challenged here. On
the contrary, they provide further support for the conclusion
that legislative authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized by the constitutional design of the powers of the Legislative Branch.
Since it is clear that the action by the House under
§ 244(c)(2) was not within any of the express constitutional
exceptions authorizing one House to act alone, and that it
was an exercise of legislative power, it was subject to the
standards prescribed in Article I. The bicameral requirement, the Presentment Clauses, the President's veto, and
Congress' power to override a veto were intended to erect
enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people
from the improvident exercise of power. To preserve those
checks, and maintain the separation of powers, the carefully
defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be
eroded. To accomplish what has been attempted by one
House of Congress in this case requires action in conformity
with the express procedures of the Constitution's prescription for legislative action: passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President. 21
21

Neither can we accept the suggestion that the one-House veto provision in § 244(c)(2) either removes or modifies the bicameralism and presentation requirements for the enactment of future legislation affecting aliens.
See Atkins v. United States, 556 F. 2d 1028, 1063-1064 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert
denied, 431 U. S. 1009 (1978); Brief for the United States House of Representatives 40. The explicit prescription for legislative action contained in
Art. I cannot be amended by legislation. See note 11, supra.
JUSTICE WHITE suggests that the Attorney General's action under
§ 244(c)(1) suspending deportation is equivalent to a proposal for legislation
and that because Congressional approval is indicated "by failure to veto,
the one-House veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval."
Post, a t - . However, as the Court of Appeals noted, that approach
"would analogize the effect of the one house disapproval to the failure of
one house to vote affirmatively on a private bill." 634 F. 2d, at 435.
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The veto authorized by § 244(c)(2) doubtless has been in
many respects a convenient shortcut; the "sharing" with the
Executive by Congress of its authority over aliens in this
manner is, on its face, an appealing compromise. In purely
practical terms, it is obviously easier and simpler for action to
be taken unicamerally and without submission to the President. But it is crystal clear from the records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and the debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The
records, the debates in the Convention and in the States preceding ratification, underscore the common desire to curb the
exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the
states or the people. There is unmistakable expression of a
determination that legislation by the national Congress be a
step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention no doubt impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made
by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary govermental acts to go unchecked. We find
no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for
the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
Even if it were clear that Congress entertained such an arcane theory
when it enacted § 244(c)(2), which JUSTICE WHITE does not suggest, this
would amount to nothing less than an amending of Art. I. The legislative
steps outlined in Art. I are not empty formalities; they were designed to
assure that both Houses of Congress and the President participate in the
exercise oflawmaking authority. This does not mean that legislation must
always be preceded by debate; on the contrary, we have said that it is not
necessary for a legislative body to "articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute." United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S.
166, 179 (1980). But the steps required by Art. I, §§ 1, 7 make certain that
there is an opportunity for deliberation and debate. A scheme under
which Congress could evade the strictures of the Constitution and in effect
enact Executive proposals into law by mere silence cannot be squared with
Art. I.
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encountered in complying with explicit Consititutional standards may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U. S. 579 (1952). With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potentials for abuse, we have not yet found a better
way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of
power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out
in the Constitution.

v
We hold that the Congressional veto provision in § 244( c)(2)
is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of
the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one
pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds
of statutes, dating back to the 1930s. Congress clearly
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views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation
of power to administrative agencies. 1 One may disagree
with Congress' assessment of the veto's utility, 2 but the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of Government
cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than
necessary to decide this case. In my view, the case may be
decided on a narrower ground. When Congress finds that a
particular person does not satisfy the statutory criteria for
permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial
function in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
I
A

The Framers perceived that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Theirs was not a baseless
fear. Under British rule, the colonies suffered the abuses of
unchecked executive power that was attributed, at least popularly, to an hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some Aspects
of Separation of Powers, Colum. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1976); The
Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation, the States reAs JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion explains, the legislative veto
has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from bills for executive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. See post, at 2-9.
Whether the veto complies with the Presentment Clauses may well turn on
the particular context in which it is exercised, and I would be hesitant to
conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example presented by this litigation.
' See Martin, The Legislative Veto and The Responsible Exercise of
Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC,- U. S. App. D. C . - , -, 673 F . 2d 425,
475 (1982).
1
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acted by removing power from the executive and placing it in
the hands of elected legislators. But many legislators
proved to be little better than the Crown. "The supremacy
of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities. The legislatures
confiscated property, erected paper money schemes, [and]
suspended the ordinary means of collecting debts." Levi, 76
Colum. L. Rev., at 374-375.
One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation
was the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures.
The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one person to the
"tyranny of shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that
members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had
not been prevented from assuming judicial power, and
"'[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided rights
which should have been left to judiciary controversy.'" The
Federalist No. 48, p. 336 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in
original) (quoting T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia
196 (London edition 1787)). The same concern also was evident in the reports of the Council of the Censors, a body that
was charged with determining whether the Pennsylvania
Legislature had complied with the state constitution. The
Council found that during this period "[t]he constitutional
trial by jury had been violated; and powers assumed, which
had not been delegated by the Constitution. . . . [C]ases belonging to the judiciary department, frequently [had been]
drawn within legislative cognizance and determination.''
Id., at 336-337.
It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the
Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate branches. Their concern that a legislature
should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person was expressed not only in this general
allocation of power, but also in more specific provisions, such
as the Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. As the
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Court recognized in United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437,
442 (1965), "the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as
a narrow, technical ... prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more
simply-trial by legislature." This Clause, and the separation of powers doctrine generally, reflect the Framer's concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary
to prevent the abuse of power.
B
The Constitution does not establish three branches with
precisely defined boundaries. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam). Rather, as Justice Jackson
wrote, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion).
The Court thus has been mindful that the boundaries between each branch should be fixed "according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 406 (1928). But where one branch has impaired
or sought to assume a power central to another branch, the
Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 123.
Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways.
One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. See
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425,
433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra,
at 587 (1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189,
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This case presents the latter situation. 3
II

Before considering whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly Congress' actions. J agdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya,
stayed in this country after his student visa expired. Although he was scheduled to be deported, he requested the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country. After a hearing, 4 the Service
granted Chadha's request and sent a report of its action to
Congress.
In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it
the names of 339 other persons whose deportations also had
been suspended by the Service. The House Committee on
the Judiciary decided that six of these persons, including
Chadha, should not be allowed to remain in this country.
Accordingly, it submitted a resolution to the House, which
stated simply that "the House of Representatives does not
approve the granting of permanent residence in the United
States to the aliens hereinafter named." 121 Cong. Rec.
40800 (1975). The resolution was not distributed prior to the
vote, 5 but the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee ex3
The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned function.
Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not address the concern
that the Congress is exercising unchecked judicial power at the expense of
individual liberties. It was precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that
the Framers adopted the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
'The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice, administers the Immigration and Naturalization Act on
behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary responsiblity for the Act's
enforcement. See 8 U. S. C. § 1103. The Act establishes a detailed administrative procedure for determining when a specific person is to be deported, see § 1252(b), and provides for judicial review of this decision, see
§ 1105(a); Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963).
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plained to the House:
"It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340
cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution did not
meet [the] statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee
that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid.
(remarks of Rep. Eilberg).
Without further explanation and without a recorded vote, the
House rejected the Service's determination that these six
people met the statutory criteria.
On its face, the House's action appears clearly adjudicatory. 6 The House did not enact a general rule; rather it
made its own determination that six specific persons did not
comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook
the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other
5
Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before acting on it, see 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975), but the statute providing for the
legislative veto limits the time in which Congress may veto the Service's
determination that deportation should be suspended. See 8 U. S. C.
§ 1254(c)(2). In this case Congress had Chadha's report before it for approximately a year and a half, but failed to act on it until three days before
the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, it was required to abandon
its normal procedures for considering resolutions, thereby increasing the
danger of arbitrary and ill-considered action.
6
The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in character
because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its proper sphere."
Ante, at 30-31. The Court's presumption provides a useful starting point,
but does not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's action alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see
ante, at 31, that the action is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature.
In determining whether one branch unconstitutionally has assumed a
power central to another branch, the traditional characterization of the assumed power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). But
reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an act and the more
helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid.
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branches. Even if the House did not make a de novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts. Cf. Foti v. INS, 375
U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that courts of appeals have sole and
exclusive jurisdiction to review INS decisions to suspend deportation). Where, as here, Congress has exercised a power
"that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.,
at 138, the decisions of this Court have held that Congress
impermissibly assumed a function that the Constitution entrusted to another branch, see id., at 138-141; cf. Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U. S., at 202.
The impropriety of the House's assumption of this function
is confirmed by the fact that its action raises the very danger
the Framers sought to avoid-the exercise of unchecked
power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints
that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to
remain in this country. 7 Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an
7
When Congress grants particular individuals relief or benefits under its
spending power, the danger of oppressive action that the separation of
powers was designed to avoid is not implicated. Similarly, Congress may
authorize the admission of individual aliens by special acts, but that does
not mean that it unilaterally may make a judgment that a particular alien
has no legal right to remain in this country. See Memorandum Concerning H. R. 9766 Entitled "An Act to Direct the Deportation of Harry Renton Bridges," reprinted inS. Rep. No. 2031, pt. 1, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 8
(1940). As Attorney General Robert Jackson remarked, such a practice
"would be an historical departure from an unbroken American practice and
tradition." S. Rep. No. 2031, supra, at 9.
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agency 8 adjudicates individual rights. The only effective
constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is
most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons,
those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting
majority."
Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules would seem
to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 136 (1810). In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its
constitutionally prescribed authority. I would not reach the
broader question whether legislative vetoes are invalid under
the Presentment Clauses.

8
We have recognized that independent regulatory agencies and departments of the Executive Branch often exercise authority that is "judicial in
nature." Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1, 140-141 (1976). This function,
however, forms part of the agencies' execution of public law and is subject
to the procedural safeguards, including judicial review, provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. See also n. 4,
supra.

Rider X, Chadha
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In its response to my opinion, the Court argues
that the one-house veto exercised in this case was not
judicial in nature because the decision of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service was not a justiciable issue
that could have been reviewed by a court on appeal.

Of

course, since the administrative agency decided the case
in favor of Chadha, there was no{ aggrieved party who
could appeal.

Reliance by the Court on this fact,

however, misses the point.

The House of Representatives,

acting without affording Chadha a hearing or even the
right to counsel, overruled the decision made according to
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of law.

In my view, the legislative branch in

effect acted as an appellate court without according the
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most elementary due process.

Although the parallel is not

entirely complete, the effect on Chadha's personal rights
would not have been different in principle had he been
acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by a
house of Congress to have been guilty.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of
the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one
pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds
of statutes, dating back to the 1930s. Congress clearly
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views this procedure as essential to controlling the delegation
of power to administrative agencies. 1 One reasonably may
disagree with Congress' assessment of the veto's utility/ but
the respect due its judgment as a coordinate branch of Government cautions that our holding should be no more extensive than necessary to decide this case. In my view, the case
may be decided on a narrower ground. When Congress
finds that a particular person does not satisfy the statutory
criteria for permanent residence in this country it has assumed a judicial function in violation of the principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
I
A

The Framers perceived that "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny." The Federalist No. 47, p. 324 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Theirs was not a baseless
fear. Under British rule, the colonies suffered the abuses of
unchecked executive power that was attributed, at least popularly, to an hereditary monarchy. See Levi, Some Aspects
of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 374 (1976);
The Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation, the
States reacted by removing power from the executive and
'As JUSTICE WHITE's dissenting opinion explains, the legislative veto
has been included in a wide variety of statutes, ranging from bills for executive reorganization to the War Powers Resolution. See post, at ~9.
Whether the veto complies with the Presentment Clauses may well turn on
the particular context in which it is exercised, and I would be hesitant to
conclude that every veto is unconstitutional on the basis of the unusual example presented by this litigation.
2
See Martin, The Legislative Veto and The Responsible Exercise of
Congressional Power, 68 Va. L. Rev. 253 (1982); Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC,- U. S. App. D. C . - , - , 673 F. 2d 425,
475 (1982).
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placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But many legislators proved to be little better than the Crown. "The supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities. The
legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money
schemes, [and] suspended the ordinary means of collecting
debts." Levi, 76 Colum. L. Rev., at 374-375.
One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation
was the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures.
The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one person to the
"tyranny of shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that
members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had
not been prevented from assuming judicial power, and
"'[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided rights
which should have been left to judiciary controversy."' 3
The Federalist No. 48, p. 336 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis
in original) (quoting T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (London edition 1787)). The same concern also was
evident in the reports of the Council of the Censors, a body
that was charged with determining whether the Pennsylvania Legislature had complied with the state constitution.
The Council found that during this period "[t]he constitutional trial by jury had been violated; and powers assumed,
which had not been delegated by the Constitution....
3
Jefferson later questioned the degree to which the Constitution insulates the judiciary. See D. Malone, Jefferson the President: Second Term,
1805-1809, pp. 30~05 (1974). In response to Chief Justice Marshall's
rulings during Aaron Burr's trial, Jefferson stated that the judiciary had
favored Burr-who Jefferson viewed as clearly guilty of treason-at the
expense of the country. He predicted that the people "will see and amend
the error in our Constitution, which makes any branch independent of the
nation." Id. , at 305 (quoting Jefferson's letter to William Giles). The
very controversy that attended Burr's trial, however, demonstrates the
wisdom in providing a neutral forum, removed from political pressure, for
the determination of one person's rights.

80-1832, 80-2170 & 80-2171-CONCUR
4

INS v. CHADHA

[C]ases belonging to the judiciary department, frequently
[had been] drawn within legislative cognizance and determination." I d. , at 336-337.
It was to prevent the recurrence of such abuses that the
Framers vested the executive, legislative, and judicial powers in separate branches. Their concern that a legislature
should not be able unilaterally to impose a substantial deprivation on one person was expressed not only in this general
allocation of p9wer, but also in more specific provisions, such
as the Bill of Attainder Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 3. As the
Court recognized in United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437,
442 (1965), "the Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as
a narrow, technical ... prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more
simply-trial by legislature." This Clause, and the separation of powers doctrine generally, reflect the Framer's concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary
to prevent the abuse of power.
B
The Constitution does not establish three branches with
precisely deffued boundaries. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U. S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curia'Y{L). Rather, as Justice Jackson
wrote, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring opinion).
The Court thus has been mindful that the boundaries between each branch should be fixed "according to common
sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 406 (1928). But where one branch has impaired
or sought to assume a power central to another branch, the
Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buck-
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ley v. Valeo, supra, at 123.
Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways.
One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. See
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425,
433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra,
at 587 (1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189,
203 (1928). This case presents the latter situation. 4
II
Before considering whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly Congress' actions. J agdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya,
stayed in this country after his student visa expired. Although he was scheduled to be deported, he requested the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country. After a hearing, 5 the Service
granted Chadha's request and sent-as required by the reservation of the veto right-a report of its action to Congress.
In addition to the report on Chadha, Congress had before it
'The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned function.
Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not address the concern
that the Congress is exercising unchecked judicial power at the expense of
individual liberties. It was precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that
the Framers adopted the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice, administers the Immigration and Naturalization Act on
behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary responsiblity for the Act's
enforcement. See 8 U. S. C. § 1103. The Act establishes a detailed administrative procedure for determining when a specific person is to be deported, see § 1252(b), and provides for judicial review of this decision, see
§ 1105(a); Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963).
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the names of 339 other persons whose deportations also had
been suspended by the Service. The House Committee on
the Judiciary decided that six of these persons, including
Chadha, should not be allowed to remain in this country.
Accordingly, it submitted a resolution to the House, which
stated simply that "the House of Representatives does not
approve the granting of permanent residence in the United
States to the aliens hereinafter named." 121 Cong. Rec.
40800 (1975). The resolution was not distributed prior to the
vote, 6 but the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee explained to the House:
"It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340
cases, that the aliens contained in the resolution did not
meet [the] statutory requirements, particularly as it relates to hardship; and it is the opinion of the committee
that their deportation should not be suspended." Ibid.
(remarks of Rep. Eilberg).
Without further explanation and without a recorded vote, the
House rejected the Service's determination that these six
people met the statutory criteria.
On its face, the House's action appears clearly adjudicatory. 7 The House did not enact a general rule; rather it
6

Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before acting on it, see 121 Cong. Rec. 40800 (1975), but the statute providing for the
legislative veto limits the time in which Congress may veto the Service's
determination that deportation should be suspended. See 8 U. S. C.
§ 1254(c)(2). In this case Congress had Chadha's report before it for approximately a year and a half, but failed to act on it until three days before
the end of the limitations period. Accordingly, it was required to abandon
its normal procedures for considering resolutions, thereby increasing the
danger of arbitrary and ill-considered action.
7
The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in character
because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its proper sphere."
Ante, at 30-31. The Court's presumption provides a useful starting point,
but does not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's ac-
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made its own determination that six specific persons did not
comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook
the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other
branches. Even if the House did not make a de novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts. 8 See 5 U. S. C. § 704
(providing generally for judicial review of final agency action); cf. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that
courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review INS decisions
denying suspension of deportation). Where, as here, Contion alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see
ante, at 31, that the action is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature.
In determining whether one branch unconstitutionally has assumed a
power central to another branch, the traditional characterization of the assumed power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). But
reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an act and the more
helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers the Framers sought to avoid.
8
The Court reasons in response to this argument that the one-house
veto exercised in this case was not judicial in nature because the decision of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not present a justiciable
issue that could have been reviewed by a court on appeal. The Court
notes that since the administrative agency decided the case in favor of
Chadha, there was no aggrieved party who could appeal. Reliance by the
Court on this fact misses the point. Even if review of the particular decision to suspend deportation is not committed to the courts, the House of
Representatives assumed a function that generally is entrusted to an impartial tribunual. In my view, the legislative branch in effect acted as an
appellate court by overruling the Service's application of established law to
Chadha. And unlike a court or an administrative agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a hearing before acting. Although the parallel is not entirely complete, the effect on Chadha's personal rights would not have been different in principle had he been
acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by one House of Congress
to have been guilty.
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gress has exercised a power "that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 138, the decisions of
this Court have held that Congress impermissibly assumed a
function that the Constitution entrusted to another branch,
see id., at 138-141; cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277
U. S., at 202.
The impropriety of the House's assumption of this function
is confirmed by the fact that its action raises the very danger
the Framers sought to avoid-the exercise of unchecked
power. In deciding whether Chadha deserves to be deported, Congress is not subject to any internal constraints
that prevent it from arbitrarily depriving him of the right to
remain in this country. 9 Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an
agency 10 adjudicates individual rights. The only effective
9
When Congress grants particular individuals relief or benefits under its
spending power, the danger of oppressive action that the separation of
powers was designed to avoid is not implicated. Similarly, Congress may
authorize the admission of individual aliens by special acts, but it does not
follow that Congress unilaterally may make a judgment that a particular
alien has no legal right to remain in this country. See Memorandum Concerning H. R. 9766 Entitled "An Act to Direct the Deportation of Harry
Renton Bridges," reprinted in S. Rep. No. 2031, pt. 1, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess., 8 (1940). As Attorney General Robert Jackson remarked, such a
practice "would be an historical departure from an unbroken American
practice and tradition." S. Rep. No. 2031, supra, at 9.
10
We have recognized that independent regulatory agencies and departments of the Executive Branch often exercise authority that is "judicial in
nature." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 140-141 (1976). This function,
however, forms part of the agencies' execution of public law and is subject
to the procedural safeguards, including judicial review, provided by the
Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. See also n. 5,
supra.
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constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is
most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons,
those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting
majority."
Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules would seem
to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 136 (1810). In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its
constitutionally prescribed authority. I would not reach the
broader question whether legislative vetoes are invalid under
the Presentment Clauses.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's decision, based on the Presentment Clauses,
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 and 3, apparently will invalidate every use of
the legislative veto. The breadth of this holding gives one
pause. Congress has included the veto in literally hundreds
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pects of Separation of Powers, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 369, 374
(1976); The Federalist No. 48. During the Confederation,
the States reacted by removing power from the executive
and placing it in the hands of elected legislators. But many
legislators proved to be little better than the Crown. "The
supremacy of legislatures came to be recognized as the supremacy of faction and the tyranny of shifting majorities.
The legislatures confiscated property, erected paper money
schemes, [and] suspended the ordinary means of collecting
debts." Levi, 76 Colum. L. Rev., at 374-375.
One abuse that was prevalent during the Confederation
was the exercise of judicial power by the state legislatures.
The Framers were well acquainted with the danger of subjecting the determination of the rights of one person to the
"tyranny of shifting majorities." Jefferson observed that
members of the General Assembly in his native Virginia had
not been prevented from assuming judicial power, and
"'[t]hey have accordingly in many instances decided rights
which should have been left to judiciary controversy."' 3
The Federalist No. 48, p. 336 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis
in original) (quoting T. Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 196 (London edition 1787)). The same concern also was
evident in the reports of the Council of the Censors, a body
that was charged with determining whether the PennsylvaJefferson later questioned the degree to which the Constitution insulates the judiciary. See D. Malone, Jefferson the President: Second Term,
1805-1809, pp. 304-305 (1974). In response to Chief Justice Marshall's
rulings during Aaron Burr's trial, Jefferson stated that the judiciary had
favored Burr-whom Jefferson viewed as clearly guilty of treason-at the
expense of the country. He predicted that the people "will see and amend
the error in our Constitution, which makes any branch independent of the
nation." /d., at 305 (quoting Jefferson's letter to William Giles). The
very controversy that attended Burr's trial, however, demonstrates the
wisdom in providing a neutral forum, removed from political pressure, for
the determination of one person's rights.
3
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sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination." J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 406 (1928). But where one branch has impaired
or sought to assume a power central to another branch, the
Court has not hesitated to enforce the doctrine. See Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 123.
Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways.
One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. See
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425,
433 (1977); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974). Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra,
at 587 (1952); Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189,
203 (1928). This case presents the latter situation. 4
II

Before considering whether Congress impermissibly assumed a judicial function, it is helpful to recount briefly
Congress' actions. J agdish Rai Chadha, a citizen of Kenya,
stayed in this country after his student visa expired. Although he was scheduled to be deported, he requested the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to suspend his deportation because he met the statutory criteria for permanent residence in this country. After a hearing, 5 the Service
'The House and the Senate argue that the legislative veto does not prevent the executive from exercising its constitutionally assigned function.
Even assuming this argument is correct, it does not address the concern
that the Congress is exercising unchecked judicial power at the expense of
individual liberties. It was precisely to prevent such arbitrary action that
the Framers adopted the doctrine of separation of powers. See, e. g., Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
' The Immigration and Naturalization Service, a division of the Department of Justice, administers the Immigration and Naturalization Act on
behalf of the Attorney General, who has primary responsiblity for the Act's
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tory. 7 The House did not enact a general rule; rather it
made its own determination that six specific persons did not
comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook
the type of decision that traditionally has been left to other
branches. Even if the House did not make a de novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's findings, it still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal courts. 8 See 5 U. S. C. § 704
(providing generally for judicial review of final agency action); cf. Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217 (1963) (holding that
' The Court concludes that Congress' action was legislative in character
because each branch "presumptively act[s] within its assigned sphere."
Ante, at 31. The Court's presumption provides a useful starting point, but
does not conclude the inquiry. Nor does the fact that the House's action
alters an individual's legal status indicate, as the Court reasons, see ante,
at 32, that the action is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature. In
determining whether one branch unconstitutionally has assumed a power
central to another branch, the traditional characterization of the assumed
power as legislative, executive, or judicial may provide some guidance.
See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 203 (1928). But reasonable minds may disagree over the character of an act and the more helpful inquiry, in my view, is whether the act in question raises the dangers
the Framers sought to avoid.
8
The Court reasons in response to this argument that the one-house
veto exercised in this case was not judicial in nature because the decision of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service did not present a justiciable
issue that could have been reviewed by a court on appeal. See ante , at
36-37, n. 21. The Court notes that since the administrative agency decided the case in favor of Chadha, there was no aggrieved party who could
appeal. Reliance by the Court on this fact misses the point. Even if review of the particular decision to suspend deportation is not committed to
the courts, the House of Representatives assumed a function that generally is entrusted to an impartial tribunual. In my view, the legislative
branch in effect acted as an appellate court by overruling the Service's
application of established law to Chadha. And unlike a court or an administrative agency, it did not provide Chadha with the right to counsel or a
hearing before acting. Although the parallel is not entirely complete, the
effect on Chadha's personal rights would not have been different in principle had he been acquitted of a federal crime and thereafter found by one
House of Congress to have been guilty.
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constraint on Congress' power is political, but Congress is
most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting
majority."
Chief Justice Marshall observed: "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules would seem
to be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 6
Cranch 87, 136 (1810). In my view, when Congress undertook to apply its rules to Chadha, it exceeded the scope of its
constitutionally prescribed authority. I would not reach the
broader question whether legislative vetoes are invalid under
the Presentment Clauses.

Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq . See also n. 5,
supra.

)

80-1832

INS v. Chadha (Rives)
CJ for the Court
1st draft 4/1/83
2nd draft 5/4/83
3rd draft 6/2/83
4th draft 6/10/83
5th draft 6/16/83
6th draft 6/20/83
Joined by CJ, TM, HAB, JPS, SOC
BRW dissent
1st draft 5/16/83
2nd draft 6/14/83
WHR dissent
1st draft 4/23/83
Joined by BRW
LFP dissent
1st draft 6/3/83
2nd draft 6/14/83

,.,

